# Bentz v. Allsup

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · December 30, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151385

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 30, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151385

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the phrase “one or more of the Defendants” did not adequately connect specific defendants to illegal acts, and thus failed to adequately plead personal involvement

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID ROBERT BENTZ, )
#S03210, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-00770-NJR
)
KRISTA ALLSUP, )
LASHBROOK, )
ELVESIZER, )
FRANK EVOLDIE, )
WILLIAM QUALLS, )
BRAD BRAMLET, )
T. BRUMLEY, )
T. JONES, )
DONAL LINDENBERG, )
MR. WHITE, )
MISS WALKER, )
MR. GRIFFIN, )
MR. HECHT, )
LOYD, )
YANKEY,1 )
MR. CONWAY, )
MR. CHITTY, )
MR. MICHEALES, )
E. ELLIETT, )
JOHN HOOD, )
J. SPARLING, )
G. GUTTERSLOTH, )
ANDREW MARTIN, )
JOHN/JANE DOES, )
MISS MARSHAL, )
THOMAS LAFOND, )
JOHN DOE,personal property officer, )
KENT BROOKMAN, )
JASON HART, )
MR. SPILLER, )
PATRICIA STEWART, )
MR. COCKRUM, )
1The Clerk is directed to correct the docket so that Defendant “Loyd Yankey” is listed as two separate parties. (See
Doc. 1, p. 2).
JOHN DOE #1, )
JOHN DOE #2, )
JOHN DOE #3, )
JOHN DOE #4, )
JOHN DOE #5, )
JOHN DOE #6, )
JOHN DOE #7, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #8, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #9, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #10, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #11, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #12, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #13, )
JOHN DOE #14, )
JOHN DOE #15, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #16, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #17, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #18, )
JOHN DOE #19, )
JOHN DOE #20, )
JOHN DOE #21, )
JOHN DOE #22, )
JOHN DOE #23, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #24, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #25, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #26, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #27, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #28, )
JOHN/JANE DOE #29,and )
JOHN/JANE DOES, Unidentified, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL,Chief Judge:
Plaintiff David Bentz, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who
is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights. Bentz claims that he was issued a
false disciplinary ticketand placed in segregation for filing lawsuits against certain defendants.He
seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Bentz’s Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28U.S.C.
§1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out
non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money
damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28U.S.C.

§1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. Rodriquez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Bentz makes the following allegations: On June 14, 2018, Allsup issued Bentz a false
disciplinary ticket for forgery and giving false information to an employee in retaliation against
Bentz for filing a lawsuit against her. (Doc. 1, p. 7). As a result, he was “deadlocked” within his
cell from June 14, 2018, until June 27, 2018, and was denied showers, yard exercise, chow line
movements, use of the commissary, hygene indigent kits, law library access, legal exchange, and
other general population activities. (Id.). On June 27, 2018, he went before the Adjustment

Committee. (Id. at p. 10). Bentz asked for (1) the recusal of Adjustment Committee Members
Brookman and Hart on the basis of bias because he is suing them in another civil lawsuit; (2) the
identification ofthe internal affairs officer mentionedin the disciplinary ticketand that such officer
be called as a witness; and (3) the incident report and other documents regarding the disciplinary
ticket. All of his requests were denied. (Id. at pp. 10, 11, 17). He was found guilty and moved to
segregation. (Id. at p. 11).
Between June 27, 2018, and July 11, 2018, Bentz was placed in punitive segregation in
unconstitutional conditions. (Id. at pp. 8, 9). He was housed in dirty cells without running water,
cleaning supplies, writing supplies, hygiene items, ice or ice water, linens, including towels,
change of clothes, or access to laundry services, showers, or exercise time. Bentz’s mattress and
pillow were soiled, and he had no light switch and so the lights were off at all times. He was also
exposed to excessive heat with no ventilation. (Id. at pp. 8, 9).
From June 14, 2018, until July 11, 2018, he was denied access to legal storage to access
court documents and the law library. (Id. at pp. 7, 8, 9, 15). On July 14, 2018, Bentz was again

denied access to his legal storage. (Id. at p. 11).
On January 31, 2019, the Administrative Review Board expunged Bentz’s charge of giving
false information to an employee. (Id at p. 13).
PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS
In addition to listing twenty-nine unidentified John/Jane Doe defendants, Bentz identifies
a group of defendants as “unidentified John/Jane Does,” in the case caption and asserts claims
against this group throughout the statement of claim. While a plaintiff may use the “John Doe”
designation to refer to specific individuals whose names are unknown, a plaintiff will run afoul of
the pleading standards in Iqbal and Twombly by merely asserting that a group of Menard

correctional officers and staff has violated his constitutional rights. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d
574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding the phrase “one or more of the Defendants” did not adequately
connect specific defendants to illegal acts, and thus failed to adequately plead personal
involvement). When a plaintiff does nothing but state that a group of staff harmed him without
providing more, all he has done is establish that there is a “sheer possibility” that someone in that
group harmed him. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Bentz may not know the name of individual defendants, but he must
make plausible allegations against individuals, describingthe “who, what, why, where, and how”
that form the basis of the claim against that person. See FED R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2).To allow otherwise
would be effectively allowing Bentzto amend his Complaint further at will without review of this
Court, a result contrary to both the local rules and § 1915A. Accordingly, “unidentified John/Jane
Does” and any claims against them are dismissed without prejudiceas defendants.
Bentz also names John Doe, personal property officer, Lashbrook, John/Jane Doe #13,
John Doe #14, and John Doe #15 in the case caption, but he does not assert any allegations against

them in the“statement of facts” section. Because he has failed to associate any claims against these
Defendants, they also shall be dismissed without prejudice. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007);
FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2).
Finally, in the statement of facts, Bentz asserts allegations against Clark, Scandland,
Cleavland, John Doe #30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe
#35, John Doe # 36, John Doe #38, and John Doe #39, but these individuals are not listed in the
case caption. The Court will not treat parties not listed in the caption as defendants, and any claims
against them are considered dismissed without prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d
551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate the
following elevenCounts:
Count 1: First Amendment claim against Allsup for issuing Bentz a false
disciplinary ticket and causing him to be deadlocked in his cell and
placed segregationin retaliation for naming her in a lawsuit.
Count 2: First Amendment claim against Brookman, Hart, and Walker for
finding Bentz guilty at the adjustment committee hearing in
retaliation for filing lawsuits.
Count 3: First Amendment claim against Brumleyfor denying Bentz hygiene
kits in July 2018 in retaliation for filing grievances and lawsuits.
Count 4: First Amendment claim against Brumley and Evoldie for denying
Bentz access to his legal documents on July 14, 2018, in retaliation
for filing grievances.
Count 5: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment against
Qualls, Brumley, Elvesizer, Bramlet, Yankey, Martin, John Doe #4,
John Doe #5, John Doe #22, and John Doe #23 for subjecting Bentz
to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was on
deadlock in his cell from June 14, 2018, until June 27, 2018.
Count 6: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment against
Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty,
Micheales, Elliett, Hood, Sparling, Guttersloth, Evoldie,
Lindenberg, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe
#21, and John/Jane Doe #29 for housing Bentz in unconstitutional
conditions of confinement from June 27, 2018, until July 11, 2018,
while he was in segregation.
Count 7: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against
Allsup for filing a false disciplinary report.
Count 8: Fourteenth Amendment claim against John/JaneDoe #16, John/Jane
Doe #17, and John/Jane Doe #18 for falsifying reports and the
investigation.
Count 9: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Brookman, Hart, and Walker
for denying Bentz due process by not recusing themselves and
improper procedure during the disciplinary hearing.
Count 10: First Amendment claim of access to courts against Lafond, Cockrum
John Doe #3, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Qualls, Brumley,
Elvesizer, Bramlet, Yankey, Martin, John Doe #4, John Doe #5,
John Doe #22, John Doe #23, Lindenberg, Jones, Griffin, Elliett,
Hood, John Doe #6, John Doe #7, John/JaneDoe #8, John/Jane Doe
#9, John/Jane Doe #10, John/Jane Doe #11, John/Jane Doe #12,
John Doe #19, John Doe #21, Stewart, John/Jane Doe #24,
John/Jane Doe #25, John/Jane Doe #26, John/Jane Doe #27,
John/Jane Doe #28, and Evoldie for denying Bentz access to his
legal storage or the law library.
Count 11: Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need against Nurse Marshal for refusing to address Bentz’s
medical issues on June 27, 2018.
The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned in the
Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without prejudice as
inadequately pled under the Twombly2 pleading standard.
Counts 1-4

To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that a
“prison official retaliated against him for exercising a constitutionally protected right.” Pearson v.
Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Antoine v. Ramos, 497 F. App’x 631, 634
(7th Cir. 2012).
Bentz allegations that: (1) Allsup filed a false disciplinary ticket in retaliation for filing a
previous lawsuit against her (Doc. 1, p. 7); (2) Brookman, Hart, and Walker found him guilty of
the charges on the disciplinary ticket in retaliation for filing a previous lawsuit against Brookman
and Hart (Id. at pp. 10, 11); (3) Brumley denied him hygiene items for filing lawsuits and
grievances (Id. at p. 14); and (4) Brumley and Evoldie denied him access to legal documents in

retaliation for filing grievances (Id. at p. 11) are enough to state a First Amendment claim against
Allsup, Brookman, Hart, Walker, Brumley, and Evoldie. Therefore, Counts 1-4 survive
preliminary review.
Counts 5and 6
Eighth Amendmentprotectionsextend to conditions of confinement that pose a substantial
risk of serious harm to a prisoner’s health and safety. See Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v.
Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). Not all prison conditions, however, amount to an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr. 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). Only

2Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007).
deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical safety will
trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
Bentz claims that while on “deadlock” in his cell for two weeks he was denied showers,
exercise, chow line movements, commissary, hygiene kits, and other general population activities.
(Doc. 1, p. 7). Although standing alone some these conditions might not support an independent

claim, when considered in combination, however, the Court cannot dismiss the claim at this time
and Count 5 will proceed. See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gills v.
Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006).
Count 6 will also proceed, as Bentz claims that while in segregation he was housed in
unsanitary conditions and subjected to excessive heat with no running water, showers, hygiene
items, or ventilation (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 9). See Knight, 590 F.3d at 463 (shelter, bedding, cleaning
supplies, and hygiene items are among life’s necessities).
Counts 7-9
Standing alone, the receipt of a false disciplinary ticket does not give rise to a due process

violation.This is because “due process safeguards associated with prison disciplinary proceedings
are sufficient to guard against potential abuses[,] [and a] hearing before a presumably impartial
Adjustment Committee terminates an officer’s possible liability for the filing of an allegedly false
disciplinary report.”Hadley v. Peters,841 F.Supp. 850, 856 (C.D.Ill.1994), aff’d,70 F.3d 117 (7th
Cir.1995)(citations omitted).
When a plaintiff brings an action under Section1983 for procedural due process violations,
he must show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or
property” without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). A court
reviewing a due process claim must, therefore, engage in a two part inquiry: (1) was there a
protected interest at stake that necessitated the protections demanded by due process; and (2) was
the disciplinary hearing process conducted in accordance with procedural due process
requirements? Due process requires that an inmate facing a disciplinary hearing is given advance
written notice of the charge, the right to appear before the hearing panel, the right to call witnesses
if prison safety allows, and a written statement of the reasons for the resulting discipline. Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974). The imposition of discipline following a hearing must
also be supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
Scruggs v. Jordan,485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007)
Bentz alleges that (1) Allsup filed a false disciplinary ticket; (2) John/Jane Doe #16,
John/Jane Doe #17, John/Jane Doe #18 falsified reports that were turned over to the Adjustment
Committee; and (3) Brookman, Hart, and Walker disregarded constitutionally required procedures
while conducting the disciplinary hearing (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 10). As a result of Defendants’ actions,
he was placed in segregation for two weeks. Bentz’s allegations regrading the conditions of his
confinement while in segregation amount to an “atypical and significant hardship” that could

implicate a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484(1995); (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 9).
Bentz also claims that his due process rights were violated because he was issued a false
disciplinary ticket, false reports and evidence were used during the hearing, the members of the
Adjustment Committee werenotimpartial, he was not allowed to call an internal affairs officer as
a witness, and he did not receive copies of documents relating to the hearing, such as the incident
report. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11, 17). These issues implicate a violation of the Wolff requirements, and,
therefore, Counts 7,8, and 9will proceed.
Count 10
There is not “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance[.]” Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that his denial of access to the library or other legal assistance “hindered his
efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. Mere delay or inconvenience is not an unconstitutional

detriment. A plaintiff must connect the defendants’ conduct with his “inability to pursue a
legitimate challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions.” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d
664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted); accord Guajardo Palma v.
Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2010). This requires a plaintiff to identify the
underlying claim that was lost. See Christopher,536 U.S. at 416; Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623,
633 (7th Cir. 2007).
Bentz claims that on several occasions he was denied access to the law library and tolegal
exchange in order to access his legal documentsfor court deadlines and that these denials frustrated
and impeded his access to the courts. (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15). He does not, however,

explain “the connection between the alleged denial of access to legal materials [and the law library]
and an inability to pursue a legitimate challenge.” Ortiz, 561 F.3d at 671 (citations omitted).
Because he has not alleged that the deprivations have cause him actual injury, Count 10 will be
dismissed.
Count 11
Count 11 also will be dismissed without prejudice. Bentz’s claim that Nurse Marshal
refused to address his medical issues during her evaluation of him for segregation is vague and
conclusory. (Doc. 1, p. 7). He does not describe the medical issues or what makes them serious
medical needs, and, therefore, has not alleged enough to show that his condition was objectively
serious. See Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000).
MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Bentzhas filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 10),which will be denied.Bentz
discloses three unsuccessful efforts to contact attorneys via written correspondence and has

included the letters from the attorneys declining representation. (Id. at pp. 4-6). Accordingly, he
appears to have made reasonable efforts to retain counsel on his own. With respect to his ability
to pursue this action pro se, Bentz states that he will be unable to conduct discovery because it is
difficult to correspond with Defendants as an indigent person. (Id. at p. 2). Nonetheless, the Court
finds that Bentz can proceed pro se, at least for now. Not only has Bentz’s Complaint survived
preliminary review, but a review of the docket demonstrates an ability to construct coherent
sentences and relay information to the Court. Bentz appears competent to try this matter without
representation at this time. Once discovery has commenced, if he has significant difficulty, Bentz
may refile his motion.

IDENTIFICATION OF UNKNOWN DEFENDANTSAND OFFICIAL CAPACITYCLAIMS
As previously noted, Bentzwill be allowed to proceed with Count 5against John Does #4,
5, 22, and 23, Count 6 against John Does #7, 19, 20, 21, and 29, and Count 8 against John/Jane
Does #16, 17, and 18. These defendants must be identified with particularity, however, before
service of the Complaint can be made on them.Bentzwill have the opportunity to engage in limited
discovery to ascertain their identity. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832
(7th Cir. 2009). Once the names of these individuals are discovered, Bentz shall file a motion to
substitute each newly identified defendant in place of the generic designations in the case caption
and throughout the Complaint. In that vein, the warden of Menard,Frank Lawrence, will be added
as a party in this action, in his official capacity only, and shall be responsible for responding to
discovery aimed at identifying these unknown defendants and implementing any potential order
for injunctive relief. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
Finally, the Court notes that Bentz asserts his claims against the remaining defendants in
their official and individual capacities. Because state officials named in their official capacities

may not be sued for monetary damages, Will v.Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989),
and Defendant Lawrence has been added as a party in his official capacity, allowing Bentz to
proceed with an official capacity claim against the other Defendants for injunctive relief would be
redundant. See Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the official
capacity claims against Allsup, Brookman, Hart, Walker, Brumley, Qualls, Elvesizer, Bramlet,
Yankey, Martin, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #7, John/JaneDoe #16, John/JaneDoe #17,
John/Jane Doe #18, John Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe #21, John Doe #22, John Doe #23,
John/Jane Doe #29, Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty, Micheales,
Elliett, Hood, Sparling, Guttersloth, Evoldie, and Lindenbergwill be dismissed with prejudice.

DISPOSITION
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. COUNT 1 shall proceed against Allsup, COUNT 2 shall proceed against Brookman,
Hart, and Walker, COUNT 3 shall proceed against Brumley, COUNT 4 shall proceed against
Brumley and Evoldie, COUNT 5 shall proceed against Qualls, Brumley, Elvesizer, Bramlet,
Yankey, Martin, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #22,and John Doe #23,COUNT 6shall
proceed against Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty, Micheales,
Elliett, Hood, Sparling, Guttersloth, Evoldie, Lindenberg, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John
Doe #20, John Doe #21, and John/Jane Doe #29, COUNT 7 shall proceed against Allsup,
COUNT 8 shall proceed against John/Jane Doe #16, John/Jane Doe #17, and John/Jane Doe
#18,COUNT 9 shall proceed against Brookman, Hart,and Walker.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 10 and 11 are DISMISSED without
prejudice. Because there are no other claims against them, John/Jane Does C/O,John/Jane Does
unidentified C/O,John Doe personal property officer,John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3,

John Doe #6, John/Jane Doe #8, John/Jane Doe #9, John/Jane Doe #10, John/Jane Doe #11,
John/Jane Doe #12, John/Jane Doe #13, John Doe #14, John Doe #15, John/Jane Doe #24,
John/Jane Doe #25, John/Jane Doe #26, John/Jane Doe #27, John/Jane Doe #28, Lafond,
Cockrum, Stewart, Marshal, and Lashbrook are DISMISSED from this action without
prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them from the Case
Management/Electronic Case Filing (“CM/ECF”) system. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to
change Defendants’ names in accordance with footnote 1.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ADD the warden of Menard Correctional Center,
Frank Lawrence, in his official capacity only, for the purpose of responding to discovery aimed

at identifying the unknown defendantsand implementing any injunctive relief that may be ordered.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 10) is
DENIED without prejudice.
TheClerk of Court shallprepare forAllsup, Brookman, Hart, Walker, Brumley, Qualls,
Elvesizer, Bramlet, Yankey, Martin, Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway,
Chitty, Micheales, Elliett, Hood, Sparling, Guttersloth, Evoldie, Lindenberg, and Lawrence
(official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Bentz. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk of Court within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk of Court shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and
the court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Bentz, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk of Court with that defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his or her
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk of Court. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the
Clerk of Court.
Service shall not be made on the unknown defendants, until such time as Bentz has
identified each by name in a properly filed motion for substitution. Bentz is ADVISED that it is
his responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service addresses for these individuals.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244, defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this merit
review order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Bentz, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Bentzwill be required to pay the full
amount of the costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. 28
U.S.C.§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Bentz is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 12/30/2019 q g 5

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit
and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants
will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60
days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that
it will take 90 days or more. When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a
Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.
Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,
to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need
not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151385. Public record. Not legal advice.