# Parmeley v. Williamson County Jail

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · December 2, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151261

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 2, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151261

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that established law of this circuit is that the “usual practice” is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever federal claims have been dismissed before trial
- holding that to be properly considered a party, a defendant must be specified in the caption

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JASON PARMELEY, )
#13231-045 )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 19-cv-00812-JPG
vs. )
)
WILLIAMSON COUNTY JAIL, )
C/O CHRISS, )
C/O GUS, )
JOHN DOE 1, )
JANE DOE 1, )
C/O STARLING, )
JOHN DOE 2, )
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER, )
JANE DOE 2, )
JOHN DOE 3, and )
SHERIFF, WILLIAMSON COUNTY, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jason Parmeley brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at
Williamson County Jail. Plaintiff asserts claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments along
with various Illinois state law claims. (Doc. 16). He seeks monetary damages. (Id.).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended Complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out
nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Amended Complaint that is
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an
immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Amended Complaint: Plaintiff was a federal
pretrial detainee in the Williamson County Jail (WCJ). (Doc. 16, p. 2). During his detention,
Plaintiff was in the same unit as inmate Watts. (Id., p. 3). It was known that Watts killed three
women in a bank robbery by cutting their throats. (Id.). Jail staff did not like Watts and knew

Plaintiff did not get along with him. (Id.). Chriss, Starling, and Jane Doe 1 asked Plaintiff to start
a fight with Watts so they would have a reason to use force on Watts (the “get Watts plan”). (Id.).
Plaintiff refused the request and staff began retaliating against him. (Id.). Because of issues
between Plaintiff and Watts, Plaintiff was moved to a different unit. (Id.).
Plaintiff was later placed in segregation on a bogus charge as retaliation. (Id.). Upon
release from segregation, Jane Doe 1 told Plaintiff he was going to the same unit as Watts. (Id.).
Plaintiff refused and put in writing that Watts would attempt to kill him. (Id.). Jane Doe 1 told
him he was going anyway. (Id., p. 4). Within 5 to 10 minutes after Plaintiff entered the unit, Watts
entered Plaintiff’s cell, covered the window with a towel, and brutally attacked Plaintiff. (Id.).

Watts told Plaintiff he was going to kill him. (Id.). Plaintiff defended himself, gained the upper
hand, and pressed the distress button. (Id.). Chriss and Gus entered the cell and Chriss struck
Plaintiff in the head with such force he was knocked unconscious. (Id.).
Later, in the medical unit, Jane Doe 2 attended to him for only a few minutes and did not
provide any medical treatment. (Id.). Plaintiff spoke to John Doe 1, who was present and was the
head of WCJ, and told him that he had written a letter stating he did not want to be a part of the
“get Watts plan,” that his life had been threatened by Watts, and that Chriss had assaulted him for
no reason. (Id.). John Doe 1 responded that he did not care and advised Plaintiff that he was going
to segregation. (Id.). By that time, the side of Plaintiff’s head was swollen. (Id.).
A few days later in segregation, Plaintiff spoke to John Doe 2, who saw the swelling. (Id.,
p. 5). When Plaintiff asked John Doe 2 why Chriss assaulted him, John Doe 2 responded “maybe
you should’ve went along with the plan and it would’ve been Watts who got hurt.” (Id.).
Plaintiff suffered swelling inside his skull that went untreated by staff. (Id.). Later, he had
a MRI and learned that he suffered substantial injuries. (Id.). He suffers from headaches,

dizziness, psychological trauma, loss of movement in his neck, and nerve pain. (Id.). Because he
refused to go along with the “get Watts plan,” the staff, including Jane Doe 2 and John Doe 3,
denied him medical care. (Id.).
Shortly after arriving at WCJ he had a torn ligament in his right arm. (Id.). On a sick call,
Jane Doe 2 told him there was nothing that could be done. (Id.). The pain became so bad he lost
the use of his arm. (Id.). He was unable to wash himself. (Id.). “Medicals” told him that if he
made a sick call he would go to segregation (Id.). On another occasion, Jane Doe 2 took him off
of his nerve pain medication that also controlled seizures for no reason. (Id.). She told him she
does what she wants and the doctor signs off on it. (Id.). John Doe 3, by letting Jane Doe 2 do

what she wants, caused Plaintiff pain, suffering, and emotional distress. (Id.).
John Doe 1 conspired with others to open legal mail and create false and misleading
information about Plaintiff in retaliation for his refusal to participate in the “get Watts plan.” (Id.).
The information was sent to an AUSA who opened a frivolous malicious obstruction of justice
investigation, which was presented at Plaintiff’s sentencing. (Id.). It was done to harass Plaintiff
and taint the sentencing. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s wedding ring was taken from him by staff when he arrived at WCJ. (Id., p. 6).
Upon release to federal authorities, Chriss and John Doe 1 told him he could not be transported
with his wedding ring. (Id.). He was later told by a U.S. Marshall that was not true. (Id.). His
ring has not been returned to him. (Id.).
Preliminary Dismissals
Williamson County Jail
Plaintiff named Williamson County Jail (WCJ) as a Defendant. However, WCJ is not a
“person” subject to suit under Section 1983. Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th

Cir. 2012); Powell v. Cook Cnty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993). WCJ is not even a
legal entity. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, a defendant must have the legal
capacity to be sued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). When determining whether an entity has this
capacity, federal courts look to state law. Magnuson v. Cassarella, 812 F. Supp. 824, 827 (N.D.
Ill. 1992). WCJ is not considered a suable entity under Illinois law. Isaacs v. St. Clair Cnty. Jail,
No. 08-0417-DRH, 2009 WL 211158, at *3-4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2009); Hedger v. HCP, No. 18-
cv-2081-JPG, 2019 WL 117986, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2019). Accordingly, Williamson County
Jail is dismissed with prejudice.
Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff alleges claims against each Defendant in his or her individual and official
capacities but seeks only monetary damages. When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a
state official, he must bring the suit against the official in his or her individual capacity. Brown v.
Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987).
This is because a suit for money damages against a defendant in his or her official capacity is really
a suit for money damages against the state and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Section
1983 creates a federal remedy against any “person” who, under color of state law, deprives “any
citizen of the United States...of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws.” Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dep’t. Health,
699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Supreme Court has held that
“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under [Section]
1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The claims against the
Defendants in their official capacities are, therefore, dismissed.
Health Care Provider

Plaintiff alleges that medical personnel were employed by Health Care Provider (HCP) and
seeks to hold it responsible for its employee’s actions. The claim fails because HCP is not subject
to respondent superior liability under section 1983. Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d
782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) When a private corporation has contracted to provide essential
government services, such as healthcare for inmates, the corporation can be held liable under
Section 1983 only if a constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom
of the corporation itself. Id. Plaintiff has not made any such allegations and, therefore, HCP is
dismissed without prejudice.
Commissioner and County

Plaintiff makes allegations against the “Commissioner” and the “County,” but they are not
identified as defendants in the case caption. The Court will not treat individuals or entities not
listed in the caption as defendants, and any claims against them are considered dismissed without
prejudice. Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be
properly considered a party, a defendant must be specified in the caption).
John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3
Plaintiff’s claims against John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 in their supervisory
roles are dismissed. A supervisor cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinate employees,
as the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to section 1983 actions. Sanville v.
McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Because there is no other claim against John Doe
2, he is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Discussion

Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint that are attributable to individual
defendants,1 the Court designates the following counts:
Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Chriss, Starling, and
Jane Doe 1 for exposing Plaintiff to a risk of harm by asking him
to assault Watts.

Count 2: First Amendment claim against Jane Doe 1 for retaliating
against Plaintiff because he refused to participate in the “get
Watts plan” by placing him in the same unit with Watts over his
objection.

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against Jane
Doe 1 and John Doe 1 based on Plaintiff’s placement in the same
unit as Watts.

Count 4: Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against Chriss
and Gus and/or failure to protect or intervene claim against
Gus.

Count 5: First Amendment claim against Chriss and Gus for retaliating
against Plaintiff because he refused to participate in the “get
Watts plan” by use of excessive force and/or failure to protect
or intervene.

Count 6: Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Jane Doe 2 for denying Plaintiff medical treatment after Watts
and Chriss assaulted him.

Count 7: Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
John Doe 3 for denying Plaintiff medical treatment.

Count 8: First Amendment claim against Jane Doe 2 and John Doe 3 for
retaliating against Plaintiff because he refused to participate in
the “get Watts plan” by denying him medical treatment.

1 Plaintiff makes allegations collectively against the “staff,” which is insufficient to identify actions by any individual
defendant. Allegations made collectively against a group of defendants fail to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8.
Count 9: Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property claim against
Chriss and John Doe 1.

Count 10: First Amendment claim against Chriss and John Doe 1 for
retaliating against Plaintiff because he refused to participate in
the “get Watts plan” by taking his property.

Count 11: First Amendment claim against John Doe 1 for opening
Plaintiff’s legal mail.

Count 12: Constitutional malicious prosecution claim and/or Illinois state
law malicious prosecution claim and/or abuse of process claim
against John Doe 1 for fabricating false and misleading
information and submitting it to an AUSA to open a frivolous
and malicious obstruction of justice investigation.

Count 13: First Amendment claim against John Doe 1 for retaliating
against Plaintiff because he refused to participate in the “get
Watts plan” by opening his legal mail and fabricating false and
misleading information and submitting it to an AUSA to open a
frivolous and malicious obstruction of justice investigation.

Count 14: Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to train.

Count 15: Illinois state law assault claim against Chriss.

Count 16: Illinois state law battery claim against Chriss.

Count 17: Illinois state law medical negligence claim against Jane Doe 2
for denying Plaintiff medical care after Watts and Chriss
assaulted him and John Doe 3 for denying Plaintiff medical care.

Count 18: Illinois state law negligence claim.

Count 19: Illinois state law intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.

Count 20: Illinois state law claim for failure to investigate, failure to train,
and/or gross negligence.

Count 21: Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Jane Doe 2 for denying Plaintiff medical care for a torn ligament
in his right arm.

Count 22: Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Jane Doe 2 for taking Plaintiff off his nerve pain medication.

Count 23: Illinois state law medical negligence claim against Jane Doe 2
for denying Plaintiff medical care for a torn ligament in his right
arm.

Count 24: Illinois state law medical negligence claim against Jane Doe 2
for taking Plaintiff off his nerve pain medication.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designations do not constitute an opinion
regarding their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed
in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under
the Twombly pleading standard.2
Count 1
Plaintiff contends Chriss, Starling, and Jane Doe 1 exposed him to a risk of harm by asking
him to assault Watts. When considering this type of claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prison
official who intentionally or with reckless indifference exposes an inmate to psychological harm
or a heightened risk of future injury may be liable, even if no attack occurred. See Wright v. Miller,
561 F.App’x. 551, 555 (7th Cir.2014) (citing Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir.2008)
(concluding that guard’s alleged attempts to induce other inmates to assault plaintiff prisoner
“posed a substantial risk of serious harm to [the prisoner’s] future health”)). As a pretrial detainee,
Plaintiff’s claim is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. To state a
claim against a jail official under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must allege that
(1) the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when they considered the
consequences of their handling of a plaintiff’s situation, and (2) the challenged conduct was

2 An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state
a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
objectively unreasonable. McCann v. Ogle Cty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). A
pretrial detainee must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something
akin to reckless disregard.” Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at the screening stage to proceed on the claim in
Count 1 against Chriss, Starling, and Jane Doe 1.

Count 3
To state a claim that a jail official failed to protect him, a pretrial detainee must allege that
(1) the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when they considered the
consequences of their handling of a plaintiff’s situation, and (2) the challenged conduct was
objectively unreasonable. See McCann v. Ogle Cty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018).
The allegations in Count 3 are sufficient to proceed against Jane Doe 1. As to John Doe 1,
however, the allegations do not suggest that he knew, or was responsible for, Plaintiff’s placement
in a unit with Watts or that he was aware of the letter Plaintiff wrote shortly before the assault.
Count 1 is dismissed as to John Doe 1 for failure to state a claim.

Count 4
The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “protects a pretrial detainee from the use
of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473
(2015). To prove that force was excessive, a “pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. The Complaint sets
forth sufficient allegations at the screening stage for Count 4 to proceed against Chriss. There are
no allegations, however, that Gus used any force on Plaintiff. Plaintiff describes the blow to his
head by Chriss and states he reported to John Doe 1 that “Chriss is the one who assaulted him for
no reason.”
To the extent Plaintiff asserts a failure to protect claim against Gus, he fails to state facts
supporting that claim. There is nothing to suggest that Gus could have foreseen or prevented
Chriss’s action. Therefore, the claim in Count 4 against Gus is dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
Counts 6 and 7

Medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees are subject only to the objective
unreasonableness inquiry identified in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2466
(2015). Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019). “[T]he controlling inquiry for
assessing a due process challenge to a pretrial detainee’s medical care proceeds in two steps.”
McCann v. Ogle County, Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Miranda v. County of
Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018)). In the first step, the inquiry is “whether the medical
defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the
consequences of their handling of [plaintiff’s] case.” Id. At the second step, the inquiry is whether
the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable. Id. “This standard requires courts to focus on

the totality of facts and circumstances faced by the individual alleged to have provided inadequate
medical care and to gauge objectively—without regard to any subjective belief held by the
individual—whether the response was reasonable.” Id.
The allegations in Count 6 are sufficient to proceed against Jane Doe 2. The claim in
Count 7, however, is dismissed. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that establish John Doe 3 was
involved in his medical care. His threadbare and conclusory allegation that John Doe 3 denied
him medical care fails to state a claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (“courts
should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory
legal statements”).
Count 9
To state a property loss claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. If the state provides an adequate
remedy, Plaintiff has no civil rights claim. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530–36 (1984)
(availability of damages remedy in state claims court is an adequate, post-deprivation remedy). In

that vein, the Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy
in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510,
513 (7th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat.
505/8 (1995). Thus, Plaintiff must pursue any claim for the loss of his property in the Illinois Court
of Claims, and Count 9 is dismissed with prejudice from this action.
Count 11
Under the First Amendment, prisoners have the right to send and receive mail, but prison
official may inspect incoming and outgoing mail for contraband. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 576 (1974); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999). Mail from an attorney who is

representing a prisoner is entitled to greater protection, in order to avoid interference with the
prisoner’s right to access the courts. Incoming mail from an attorney that is clearly marked as legal
or privileged mail must be opened only in the presence of the prisoner. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577;
Rowe, 196 F.3d at 782. However, the interception of communications with a lawyer is subject to
harmless-error analysis. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554-59 (1977); Guajardo-Palma v.
Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 805-806 (7th Cir. 2010); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685-
86 (7th Cir. 2005). The unjustified opening of mail from an attorney is actionable only if it has
hindered an ongoing claim. Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 686. A prisoner who raises a claim based on
interference with legal mail must demonstrate some resulting hindrance to his ability to pursue a
legal claim or defense. Id. Plaintiff has not alleged that his ability to litigate any matter was affected
by John Doe 1’s action. Accordingly, Count 11 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Count 12
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a federal constitutional claim for malicious
prosecution, it fails because “there is no such thing as a constitutional right not to be prosecuted

without probable cause.” Manual II, 903 F.3d at 670 (citing Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593
(7th Cir. 2013).
For a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he was
subjected to a judicial proceeding for which there was no probable cause; (2) the defendant
instituted those proceedings maliciously; (3) the proceedings were terminated in his favor; and (4)
he was injured. Wilbon v. Plovanich, 67 F.Supp.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2014). For an abuse of process
claim under Illinois law, Plaintiff must allege: (1) the “existence of an ulterior motive or purpose”;
and (2) an “act in the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings.”
Podolsky v. Alma Energy Corp., 143 F.3d 364, 372 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Commerce Bank, N.A.

v. Plotkin, 255 Ill. App. 3d 870, 872 (1994). “[P]rocess” in this context means “the literal, legal
sense of something issued by the court ... under its official seal.” Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v.
Kalamata, Inc., 75 F.3d 898, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Merely “harassing” or “pressur[ing]” a
defendant to defend itself in litigation is insufficient. Id. at 909 (“The institution of a lawsuit with
malicious intent or the purpose to harass, on its own, does not constitute abuse of process.”).
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to proceed on a state law claim for malicious prosecution or
abuse of process. He does not indicate he was arrested or charged with obstruction of justice but
instead, alleges false information was submitted to open an investigation.
For the reasons stated, Count 12 is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Counts 2, 5, 8, 10, and 13
Plaintiff alleges that after he refused to participate in the “get Watts plan” Defendants
retaliated against him. To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech, (2) he suffered a deprivation likely
to deter protected speech; and (3) his protected speech was a motivating factor in the defendants’

actions. Antoine v. Ramos, 497 F. App’x 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2012). It is not clear whether Plaintiff
engaged in protected speech, but his retaliation claims will be allowed to proceed for further
development. Specifically, Count 2 will proceed against Jane Doe 1. Count 5 will proceed against
Chriss but is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim as to Gus. Count 8 will proceed
against Jane Doe 2 but is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim as to John Doe 3.
Count 10 will proceed against Chriss and John Doe 1. Count 13 will proceed against John Doe 1.
Count 14
Under limited circumstances, failure to train may serve as the basis for liability under §
1983. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). A plaintiff must allege that the failure

to train is the result of an official custom or policy of the city, county, or municipality that he or
she is suing. Id. at 389; Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff appears to
be asserting this claim against the Commissioner and the County, who are not parties, and WCJ,
which has been dismissed because it is not a proper party. Accordingly, the claim in Count 14 is
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Counts 15 and 16
Plaintiff does not associate his state law claims for assault and battery against any specific
defendant. To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert those claims based on the facts that support
the excessive force claim in Count 4 against Chriss, he has sufficiently pled those claims. This
Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims because they involve the same facts as the
federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Therefore plaintiff may proceed with Counts 15 and 16
against Chriss. See e.g. Shea v. Winnebago Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 746 F. App’x 541, 547-48 (7th
Cir. 2018) (discussing assault and battery under Illinois law).
Count 17

Although Plaintiff does not associate his state law medical negligence claim against any
specific defendant, the Court presumes that he intended to assert the claim based on the same facts
as his deliberate indifference claims in Count 6 against Jane Doe 2 and Count 7 against John Doe
3. An Illinois negligence claim for personal injuries requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the
existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an
injury proximately caused by that breach. Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007). In Illinois,
there is a duty to provide inmates in Illinois with reasonable medical care. See West v. State of
Illinois, 67 Ill. Ct. Cl. 147 (2014) (citing Dye v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 452, 455 (1995)). See also 730
ILCS 5/3-7-2(d). The claim may proceed against Jane Doe 2. The claim is dismissed as to John

Doe 3 because Plaintiff has not alleged facts that establish John Doe 3 was involved in his medical
care.
Counts 18 and 19
Plaintiff does not associate his state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against any specific defendant. The bald and conclusory allegations that he is
asserting those claims do not satisfy the Twombly pleading requirements. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570 (to survive screening, claim must be “plausible on its face”). The claims in Counts 18 and
19, therefore, are dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Count 20
Plaintiff’s state law claims for failure to investigate, failure to train, and gross negligence
(to the extent those claims are recognized by state law) appear to be intended against the
Commissioner and the County, who are not parties, and WCJ, which has been dismissed because
it is not a proper party. The claim in Count 20, therefore, is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Counts 21-24
For Count 21, Plaintiff alleges he saw Jane Doe 2 on one sick call for a torn ligament in
his right arm and she told him there was nothing she could do. This does not suggest deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. Although he states the pain became so bad that he was
unable to use his arm, this happened after he saw Jane Doe 2 and does not establish that she knew
of his pain and disregarded it. For Count 22, Plaintiff alleges only that Jane Doe 2 took him off
his nerve pain medication for no reason. He does not allege he suffered any adverse consequences.
The deliberate indifference claims in Counts 21 and 22 against Jane Doe 2 are dismissed for failure
to state a claim.

To the extent Plaintiff intended to allege state law medical negligence claims based on the
facts alleged in Counts 21 and 22, which are being dismissed, the Court will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), extends the jurisdiction of federal district courts to all claims that are sufficiently
related to the claim or claims on which their original jurisdiction is based to be part of the same
case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. This same statute
provides that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
“[T]he general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court
should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on the
merits.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Groce v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that established law of this circuit is that
the “usual practice” is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever federal
claims have been dismissed before trial). Accordingly, Counts 23 and 24 are dismissed without

prejudice.
Identification of Doe Defendants
The Sheriff of Williamson County will be added as a Defendant, in his or her official
capacity only, for purposes of responding to discovery aimed at identifying the Doe Defendants.
See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P.
21. Guidelines for discovery will be set by the Court. Once the names of the Doe Defendants are
discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the newly identified Defendants in place of
the Doe designations.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count 1 will proceed against Chriss, Starling, and Jane

Doe 1. Count 2 will proceed against Jane Doe 1. Count 3 will proceed against Jane Doe 1 but is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim as to John Doe 1. Counts 4 and 5 will
proceed against Chriss but are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim against Gus.
Count 6 will proceed against Jane Doe 2. Count 8 will proceed against Jane Doe 2 but is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim against John Doe 3. Count 10 will proceed against
Chriss and John Doe 1. Count 13 will proceed against John Doe 1. Counts 15 and 16 will proceed
against Chriss. Count 17 will proceed against Jane Doe 2 but is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim as to John Doe 3. Counts 7, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 are
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Count 9 is dismissed with prejudice.
Williamson County Jail is dismissed with prejudice and Health Care Provider is dismissed without
prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Williamson County Jail, Health Care
Provider, Gus, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 as parties in CM/ECF.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ADD the Sheriff of
Williamson County, in his or her official capacity only, to the docket for purposes of responding

to discovery aimed at identifying the Doe Defendants.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Chriss, Starling, Sheriff of
Williamson County (official capacity only), and, once identified, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, Jane
Doe 2: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2)
Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy
of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or
disclosed by the Clerk.
Service shall not be made on the Doe Defendants until such time as Plaintiff has identified
him the Doe Defendants by name in a properly filed motion for substitution of party. Plaintiff is
ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide the Court with the name and service address for
each individual.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). As the Sheriff of

Williamson County is in the case solely for discovery purposes, he or she need not respond to the
Complaint. The Sheriff only needs to enter his or her appearance and will receive further
instruction on discovery at a later date. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants
need only respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of
whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
IT IS ORDERED that this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent

to such a referral.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and the opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 2, 2019
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate Defendants of your lawsuit
and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the Defendants
will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days
from the date of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it
will take 90 days or more. When all the Defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a
Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.
Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the Defendants before filing any motions,
to give the Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need
not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151261. Public record. Not legal advice.