# NOOR Staffing Group LLC v. Staff Management Solutions, LLC

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · December 6, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10149819

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 6, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NOOR Staffing Group LLC d/b/a J.D. &
Tuttle Hospitality Staffing,

Plaintiff,

v.

Staff Management Solutions, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.
No. 19 CV 529

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins
Staff Management Solutions, LLC, et al.,

Counter Claimants,

v.

NOOR Staffing Group LLC d/b/a J.D. &
Tuttle Hospitality Staffing,

Counter Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Shortly after Plaintiff Noor Staffing Group LLC acquired Corporate Resource
Development and its business, Noor signed a contract with Defendant Staff
Management Solutions, LLC to provide Staff Management with temporary labor
services similar to those Corporate had provided to Staff Management. Noor alleges
that Staff Management breached that contract in two ways: by paying approximately
$1 million into Corporate’s bank account, rather than Noor’s, and by failing to pay for
roughly $200,000 in services Noor provided to a client.1 Staff Management moves for

1 Three brief points of clarification: (1) Noor sued Staff Management and its affiliate
PeopleScout MSP, LLC. [Dkt. 1.] Both parties treat Staff Management and PeopleScout
summary judgment on both claims. [Dkt. 184.] For the reasons explained below, Staff
Management’s motion is granted.
I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent
Bank, 27 F.4th 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 2022).

The Court “must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527,
532 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, a party needs evidence, not mere
speculation, to defeat summary judgment. See Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th 483,
491 (7th Cir. 2022). And while ordinarily when both parties support their narratives
with evidence, summary judgment will be improper, Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,

773 (7th Cir. 2003), when the nonmovant’s version of events is “blatantly contradicted
by the record,” it may be appropriate to grant summary judgment, Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); see Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1997).

collectively [Dkt. 185 at 4; Dkt. 193 at 1], so the Court refers only to Staff Management.
(2) Noor’s Complaint included an “account stated” claim in addition to its breach of contract
claims, but Noor has abandoned that claim [Dkt. 193 at 1 n.1], and the Court addresses it no
further. (3) The precise sums at issue are $1,082,447.29 and $206,744.77; the Court refers to
these figures as $1 million and $206,000 for convenience.
II. Background
The Court draws on the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 filings to recount the facts.
The facts are not in dispute except where otherwise noted.

A. Noor and Staff Management’s Relationship
During the period relevant to this case, Staff Management was a managed
service provider (“MSP”) that helped clients obtain temporary labor from entities like
Noor, a temporary staffing organization or supplier of temporary labor. [Id. ¶¶ 1–3.]
Staff Management was an intermediary. Clients requested temporary labor through
Staff Management, Staff Management arranged for a supplier to provide the labor,
the clients paid Staff Management, and Staff Management in turn paid the supplier.
[See id. ¶ 7.]

On January 15, 2015, Staff Management entered a Supplier Non-Exclusive
Master Services Agreement with Corporate, pursuant to which Corporate would
provide temporary labor for Aramark, a Staff Management client. [Id. ¶¶ 3–4.]
Corporate requested that Staff Management make payments to Corporate into a
Wells Fargo bank account. [Id. ¶ 4.] On February 26, 2015, Corporate sold its
business and assets to Noor. [Id. ¶ 5.] A month later, on March 25, 2015, Noor and

Staff Management entered into their own Supplier Non-Exclusive Master Services
Agreement (the “Agreement”). [Id. ¶ 6.] Pursuant to the Agreement, Noor began to
supply Aramark with temporary labor. [Id. ¶¶ 5–7.]
B. The Agreement
The parties agree that the Agreement governed Noor and Staff Management’s
relationship and that the Agreement forms the basis for Noor’s breach of contract

claims. [Id. ¶¶ 6, 12.] The Agreement contained the following terms:
• All communication regarding Aramark’s temporary labor needs was to go
through Staff Management using an electronic Vendor Management
System (“VMS”). Noor was prohibited from directly contacting Aramark.
• When Noor accepted a job, Staff Management would send a work order to
Aramark, and Noor’s right to payment was contingent upon Noor receiving
an executed work order from Staff Management.
• Noor would submit invoices through the VMS within 30 days after work
was completed; it had no entitlement to payment for work performed that
was not submitted in this manner.
• Staff Management would consolidate Noor’s invoices and send Aramark a
weekly invoice, which would pay amounts “not in dispute” within 30 days.
• Upon receipt and clearance of Aramark’s funds, Staff Management was
required to pay Noor within five days. Clearance of Aramark funds was an
explicit precondition for Staff Management’s duty to pay Noor.
[Id. ¶¶ 8–10.] While Noor does not dispute that these terms appear in the written
contract, it contends that the parties implicitly modified the Agreement—and that
Staff Management waived strict compliance with its terms—through custom and
practice. [Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 11–12.] The Court must therefore determine whether these
disputes are genuine for summary judgment purposes. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Noor’s only evidence in support of its argument that the parties amended the
Agreement through custom and practice is an affidavit of Carlos Rodriguez [Dkt. 194-
1; see Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 8–9, 11–12, 25, 27–29, 31–34, 52–57], a Noor employee who was
twice deposed as Noor’s business representative under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6). [Dkt. 186-2, 186-9.] Staff Management invokes the sham affidavit
rule to argue that Rodriguez’s affidavit does not create a genuine dispute of fact. [Dkt.
196 at 11–13;2 see Dkt. 197.]3 The sham affidavit rule is an exception to the general
principle that when there is evidence on both sides of a dispute, including self-serving
affidavits, summary judgment is inappropriate. See, e.g., Foster v. PNC Bank, Nat’l

Ass’n, 52 F.4th 315, 320 (7th Cir. 2022). As the Seventh Circuit has explained,
[T]he sham-affidavit rule prohibits a party from submitting an affidavit
that contradicts the party’s prior deposition or other sworn testimony.
… The organizing principle of our sham-affidavit practice is simply
stated: a genuine issue of material fact cannot be conjured out of nothing.
We adopted the sham-affidavit rule to weed out unfounded claims,
specious denials, and sham defenses.
James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 316 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). The sham affidavit rule
is narrow. It does not bar an affiant from trying to clarify or explain away seemingly
damaging testimony. See Seshadri, 130 F.3d at 801–02. Nor does it require striking
an offending affidavit in full; only the contradictory portions are disregarded. See
Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 910–12 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court agrees with
Staff Management that Rodriguez’s affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony in
part, so it will disregard those portions of the affidavit.

2 Citations to page numbers of briefs refer to the page number listed on the filing.
Citations to page numbers of exhibits refer to the electronic pagination.
3 The Court notes that docket entry 197 is a reply to Noor’s Local Rule 56.1 response,
which raises objections to numerous paragraphs of that response. This filing is not proper.
Local Rule 56.1 does not permit a summary judgment movant filing such a reply. N.D. Ill.
Loc. R. 56.1(e)(2) (“If a party contends that its opponent has included objectionable or
immaterial evidence or argument in a LR 56.1 submission, the party’s argument that the
offending material should not be considered should be included in its response or reply
brief.”). The effect of Staff Management’s Local Rule 56.1 is that it has used more than 15
pages for argument without the Court’s permission. See N.D. Ill. Loc. R. 7.1. However, Noor
has not objected to the Local Rule 56.1 reply or the cumulative length of Staff Management’s
papers, so the substantive effect is similar to an unopposed motion to file an oversize brief,
and the Court will consider all of Staff Management’s arguments. The Court reminds
litigants, including Staff Management, to read the Local Rules carefully because the Court
can—and at a party’s request often will—require strict compliance with the Local Rules. See
Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Found., 71 F.4th 601, 611 n.13 (7th Cir. 2023).
1. Rodriguez’s Deposition Testimony
Rodriguez was deposed twice as Noor’s business representative. [Dkt. 186-2,
186-9.] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Rodriguez worked at Noor from late November

2015 through 2020 as a finance manager. In 2020, he began working as finance
director, a position he held when he was deposed. [Dkt. 186-2 at 9:14–10:10.]
During his first deposition, Rodriguez testified about how Noor’s relationship
with Staff Management worked under the Agreement:
From my knowledge the way this is supposed to operate is that Aramark
makes contact … with the venues. [Aramark] pretty much ha[s]
contracted services with them. [Aramark] in turn reach[es] out … to
companies [like Noor] just to staff these events. …
[T]he venues would submit orders, I believe they call them requisitions.
We fill the requisitions with the appropriate personnel. That gets
approved by the venue. And the payment would flow from Staff
Management to us after the hours have been approved in the system.
And the system being IQ Navigator [or IQN].
[Id. at 33:17–34:13; see id. at 34:19–35:3 (testifying that the venues would make the
requisitions through the IQN).] Although this was “the usual course of the process,”
Rodriguez testified that “from time to time they would send us e-mail requisitions
promising to open up those requisitions [in the IQN] at a later point.” [Id. at 35:5–:8.]
Rodriguez testified that “the venues” were the primary entities that would approve
hours worked by Noor workers in the IQN, although his understanding was that Noor
would get “approvals coming from people directly in Aramark from the venue, [or]
from [Staff Management].” [Id. at 35:22–36:11.] He also agreed that “once the hours
were approved [Staff Management] would get paid and they would pay us in turn.”
[Id. at 35:12–36:2.]
Rodriguez was asked about the relationship between the VMS and the IQN.
He testified that his understanding was that they were distinct, suggesting that the
IQN was a system that fell under the larger category of a VMS. [Id. at 42:3–43:7.]

Rodriguez had little familiarity with the IQN or the VMS. He had no clear
understanding of who owned or operated the VMS, and he did not personally use it
because it was a “forward facing” system, while he “only deal[t] with back of the house
applications.” [Id. at 38:9–39:8.] Rodriguez also did not use the IQN. [Id. at 43:9–:11.]
Rodriguez was also asked about provision 3.l of the Agreement, which states
that Noor would communicate exclusively with Staff Management with respect to

work done pursuant to the Agreement and would not communicate with clients such
as Aramark. [Id. at 46:16–:24; see Dkt. 1-1 at 4.] Rodriguez acknowledged that the
contract required Noor to communicate only with Noor, but he testified that, in
practice, “the client reaches out sometimes … when they’re not able to go through a
system and [the client] sa[ys] they’re going to put it on [to a VMS] later on.” [Dkt.
186-2 at 47:1–48:1.] When asked what he meant by “client,” Rodriguez testified that
he “do[esn’t] have any communication … with the front facing. So it would be a

combination of the venue, Aramark, or Staff Management, Peoplescout, whoever is
putting in the request … for the services.” [Id. at 48:2–:8.] Rodriguez was then asked
whether he understood that Noor would not be paid by Staff Management if hours
are not put into the VMS. [Id. at 48:9–:13.] He did not disagree with that point, but
he stated that “it depends if the client is stating via e-mails that they are going to put
[the work order] in, I mean … that’s an agreement in itself.” [Id. at 48:14–:17.]
Later in the deposition, Rodriguez recapped some of this testimony, saying that
how Noor was supposed to communicate under the Agreement was not a black and
white issue because in “e-mail correspondence a lot of the times I don’t see a Staff

Management e-mail attached to it. … [I]t might be, you know, at Aramark” or “at …
True Blue …. Yeah, and I[’ve] seen the venue’s e-mails as far as the communication
when it comes to the services.” [Id. at 70:15–72:21.] Rodriguez agreed that when he
mentioned “e-mail communication that didn’t have … at Staff Management dot com”
he was “talking about e-mails or communications from … either the vendor or
Aramark or some combination thereof.” [Id. at 72:22–:11.] He then reiterated that he

was unfamiliar with whether the contract had been modified with respect to
communication provisions, stating that “My communication … with Staff
Management is strictly about payment allocation. … [M]y concern wasn’t really …
with the front of house.” [Id. at 74:9–75:14.] He also understood that Noor “only
placed temps with [a] requisition” in the IQN. [Id. at 75:15–76:22.]
In Rodriguez’s second deposition, he was asked more specific questions about
the VMS and IQN and how those systems related to Noor providing temp workers to

Aramark and being paid for those services. He testified that while under the contract,
all communication had to go through the IQN, and that was “the regular course of
business,” “but we do get request[s] via e-mails, phone calls, and many other ways
from the client and Aramark.” [Dkt. 186-9 at 11:8–12:4.] But he testified that “[t]here
is no way [Noor] would take an order from an Aramark client that doesn’t get put
through the IQ Navigator.” [Id. at 15:19–:21.] With respect to a specific invoice, he
testified that it “wasn’t paid, so they didn’t put it through the IQ Navigator.” [Id. at
15:22–16:1.] Rodriguez then agreed that “in order to get paid, you have to put it
through the IQN … [a]nd Staff Management … would have to approve of the work.”

[Id. at 16:2–:9.]
Rodriguez was then shown an example email from Sonia Lewis who was
identified as a “meeting and event planner for City,” a client. [Id. at 13:4–14:3.] He
initially testified that he “[did] not know” whether Lewis worked for Staff
Management, then testified that Lewis “is clearly employed by Staff Management,
because … she has to have access to the system in order to put these requests in.” [Id.

at 14:9–15:16.] He then testified that her email “says Aramark, so that to me clearly
states she works for [Staff Management].” [Id. at 17:8–:9.] When asked if he knew
that Aramark and Staff Management were two different companies, he stated, “I
don’t know what the relationship is when it comes to who owns who …. So, just by
looking at someone’s e-mail address, I can’t tell you exactly … who they are employed
with.” [Id. at 17:10–:23.] When pressed, Rodriguez eventually agreed that he lacked
personal knowledge about the relationship, and it was possible that Aramark and

Staff Management were separate companies. [Id. at 17:24–18:14.]
A significant portion of the deposition was devoted to reviewing emails and
timecards relating to hours worked by temporary workers supplied by Noor but not
entered in the IQN or VMS. Rodriguez agreed that he saw no indication on the emails
themselves that Staff Management or PeopleScout was notified about timesheets or
invoices, although he testified that he did not know which entities the email
recipients worked for. [See, e.g., id. at 22:11–:23:12 (“Q. … Did you see the words Staff
Management, SMS or PeopleScout in any of those exhibits? A. I did not see those
words.”).] Rodriguez also testified that certain invoices for work done based on email

requisitions were not entered into a VMS:
Q. … [Y]ou identified timecards and work being performed outside
of the IQN VMS system that was never entered or approved by [Staff
Management], and you are seeking for [Staff Management employee]
Janae Brown’s approval in that correspondence, correct?
A. It wasn’t entered, but it wasn’t being outside [the contract], no ….
Q. -- okay, I will use your words, not entered into the VMS system.
A. Correct, by the supervisor, or whoever it is.
Q. Got it. It was never entered, and [Staff Management] was not
notified until Mr. Rodriguez diligently sees all this, by the time he is in
there this work has been performed, it was never entered in the VMS
system, we are alerting Janae Brown, saying, Ms. Brown, … these
stacks of 1300 documents was never entered into the VMS system, can
you please approve it …, correct?
A. That’s correct.
[Id. at 57:4–58:10.] The correspondence in question occurred in 2018, years after the
work had been performed. [See, e.g., id. at 54:7–:23.]
2. Rodriguez’s Affidavit
Paragraphs 12–17 of Rodriguez’s affidavit [Dkt. 194-1] address the same facts.
Some of his assertions are consistent with or clarify his deposition testimony, while
others contradict his deposition testimony. The former may be considered but the
latter may not. See Dunn, 880 F.3d at 910–12; Seshadri, 130 F.3d at 801–02.
The relevant portion of Rodriguez’s affidavit begins by explaining that Noor
provided labor to Aramark that was not requisitioned through the VMS. [Dkt. 194-1
¶ 12.] This assertion is consistent with the deposition testimony and can be
considered at summary judgment. However, when Rodriguez provides more details
about that practice, his affidavit conflicts with his deposition testimony without any

plausible explanation for the discrepancies.
He states that Noor often provided Aramark with labor at Aramark’s direct
request, rather than through a request via the VMS. [Id. ¶¶ 13–14.] “In such cases,
Noor provides labor at the request of Staff Management” and “relies upon Staff
Management to open the appropriate requisitions for that labor.” [Id. ¶ 13.]
Rodriguez states that there were four ways time entries would be handled:

1) the worker would clock in and the time entered into the payment
system; 2) the amount of time would be entered by Noor staff into the
payment system 3) the worker’s time would be kept on time sheets and
then later entered into the payment system; and 4) the time would be
forwarded to Staff Management by email to be entered into the payment
system. These practices and procedures have been followed to this day.
[Id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 16 (“Noor provided the staffing requested by Aramark and
provided the time records to Staff Management the same as Noor has always done in
such circumstances.”), ¶ 17 (communications between Noor and Staff Management
about services provided to Aramark but not entered into the VMS “were not out of
the ordinary and Noor and Staff Management have always worked together in this
fashion. On numerous occasions, in fact almost on a weekly basis, Noor has provided
temporary labor for ARAMARK prior to Staff Management issuing a requisition for
that labor. Staff management has never rejected [such] a request for payment ….”).]
Rodriguez’s detailed description of how Noor, Staff Management, and Aramark
conducted work requisitions outside of the VMS conflicts with his deposition
testimony. There, he denied having knowledge of how the VMS and IQN worked or
the “front facing” means by which work orders and invoices were entered into the
system. He also indicated that it was the client, not Staff Management, who was

responsible for putting work orders into the system. [Dkt. 186-2 at 47:1–48:17.]4 Both
at the time when Rodriguez was being deposed in 2022 and when he submitted his
affidavit in 2023, the events relevant to this case had occurred in the past, so he could
not have acquired additional personal knowledge of these events. Cf. James, 959 F.3d
at 317 (sham affidavit rule does not apply when there is new evidence). Nor does he
suggest that his memory failed during the depositions and his earlier testimony was

“demonstrably mistaken.” See id. (citation omitted).5 Because this portion of the
affidavit purports to make assertions based on personal knowledge that Rodriguez
denied having during his depositions, it is inconsistent with that testimony and
cannot be used at summary judgment. Id. at 316.
Other parts of Rodriguez’s affidavit may clarify or supplement his deposition
testimony. Citing email communications [Dkt. 194-1 Ex. C], Rodriguez states that
with respect to the disputed $206,000, Noor notified Staff Management by email that

4 During his depositions, Rodriguez expressed uncertainty about who Noor’s client was.
[Dkt. 186-2 at 48:2–:8 (suggesting the client “would be a combination of the venue, Aramark,
or Staff Management, Peoplescout, whoever is putting in the request … for the services” but
denying further knowledge about “front facing” communication).] He also suggested that
Aramark and Staff Management were related companies and mistakenly referred to Staff
Management as “Staffmark” several times. [Dkt. 186-9 at 13–19, 31–32.] It is undisputed
that Aramark and Staff Management are distinct companies [see, e.g., Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 3–4, 7],
so no reasonable jury could find based on Rodriguez’s testimony that Staff Management was
a “client” responsible for putting work orders into the VMS after Noor provided services.
5 Further, the Court doubts such an explanation could prevail for a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition because the deponent must prepare for the deposition. See, e.g., Kraft Foods
Global, Inc. v. United Egg Producers, Inc., 2023 WL 5647204, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2023).
these funds had not been paid. Staff Management responded that these work orders
had not been put into the VMS and it “assured Noor that it would follow up with
ARAMARK and that Noor would be paid for that labor. Staff Management did not

object to Noor’s request and did not assert that Noor was in violation of the Agreement
by either providing labor for which a requisition had not been placed or delaying its
request for payment.” [Id. ¶ 15.] Rodriguez adds that Noor was paid for work done at
one Aramark location as a result of its communications with Staff Management and
that Staff Management told Noor not to contact Aramark directly because Staff
Management would do so. [Id. ¶ 17.] As a result, Rodriguez understood Staff

Management to have assured Noor that it would be paid the disputed $206,000. [Id.]
Staff Management objects to this testimony as inconsistent with Rodriguez’s
deposition testimony [Dkt. 196 at 11–13; see also Dkt. 195 ¶¶ 55, 57], but the Court
disagrees. Rodriguez testified about the emails regarding the $206,000 during his
depositions, and his position was that Noor had notified Staff Management (or its
affiliate, PeopleScout) about the services Noor had not been paid for and that Staff
Management had agreed to ensure that Noor was paid. [See, e.g., Dkt. 186-9 at 23–

31.] Rodriguez’s affidavit explains further about his understanding regarding those
emails and attaches them. This portion of the affidavit clarifies or supplements the
deposition testimony, so the Court will not disregard it. See James, 959 F.3d at 317.
C. The Wells Fargo Bank Account
According to Staff Management, after Noor acquired Corporate and began
providing Aramark with temporary labor, Staff Management continued making
payments into a Wells Fargo bank account formerly belonging to Corporate. [Dkt. 194
¶¶ 18–23.] In total, Staff Management made 58 deposits totaling the disputed $1
million into that account. [Id. ¶¶ 19–20.] Noor disputes this, pointing out that at
various stages in this litigation, Staff Management made representations that the

amount paid into the Wells Fargo account was less than $1 million or that more or
fewer than 58 deposits were made. [Id. ¶¶ 18–23, 40–42.] This discrepancy, it argues,
means that a jury must determine how much Staff Management paid into the
account. [Dkt. 193 at 6–8.]
Staff Management argues that there is no genuine dispute as to these funds.
[See Dkt. 196 at 5–6.] The Court agrees. Staff Management notes that Noor does not

dispute the authenticity or accuracy of the bank records. [See Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 20, 40–42.]
No reasonable jury could credit Staff Management’s preliminary representations
about the amount deposited in the account over the unchallenged bank records
themselves. See Seshadri, 130 F.3d at 802 (“Documents or objective evidence may
contradict the witness’ story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or
implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it.” (quoting
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)). Thus, there is no genuine

dispute that Staff Management paid the $1 million into the Wells Fargo account.
For its part, Noor asserts that in March 2015, it instructed Staff Management
to remit payments to Noor’s Sterling National Bank account instead of the Wells
Fargo account and sent a “Final Notice: Remittance Instructions” confirming those
instructions in June 2015. [Dkt. 195 ¶¶ 36, 50.]6 Despite telling Staff Management to
remit payment to the Sterling account, Staff Management continued to deposit funds
in the Wells Fargo account between June 2015 and February 2016. [Id. ¶ 51.] In total,

Noor contends that Staff Management failed to remit $1 million to the proper bank
account during this period. [Id.]
D. Procedural History
1. Corporate’s Bankruptcy Proceeding
Corporate, the entity Noor purchased, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July
23, 2015. [Dkt. 194 ¶ 16 & n.2.] In connection with that proceeding, the Wells Fargo
account was part of Corporate’s bankruptcy estate under the control of the Chapter
11 trustee. Noor Staffing Grp. LLC v. Staff Mgmt. Sols., LLC, 2020 WL 11762285, at

*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2020). [See Dkt. 78-4 ¶ 11.] The trustee initiated an adversary
proceeding against Noor, claiming among other things that the funds in the Wells
Fargo account were property of the estate, and Noor settled that proceeding on June
2, 2017. Noor Staffing, 2020 WL 11762285, at *2. [See Dkt. 78-9 (settlement
agreement).] Under that agreement, Noor “release[d] any claims to the entirety of the
[funds] held [in the] Wells Fargo [account], the ownership of which is disputed, … to

the Trustee.” [Dkt. 78-9 at 11.] In exchange, the trustee released claims against Noor.
[Id. at 17–18.]

6 Staff Management disputes the March 2015 communication, noting that Noor has not
provided a record of such communication. [Dkt. 195 ¶ 50.] The Court finds that there is at
least a genuine dispute as to whether communication in March occurred because a jury could
infer from the email correspondence that Noor did inform Staff Management about the bank
account change in March. [See Dkt. 194-1 at 9, 13.] In any event, any dispute is immaterial
because the disputed payments date from June 2015 to February 2016. [Dkt. 195 ¶ 51.]
2. This Litigation
In 2019, Noor brought this lawsuit against Staff Management. It asserted two
breach of contract theories, related to the disputed $1 million and $206,000. [Dkt. 1.]

In 2020, Staff Management moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the
disputed $1 million. [Dkt. 78 at 8.] It argued that in the bankruptcy proceeding, Noor
claimed an interest in the funds in the Wells Fargo account (which it released in the
settlement agreement), so it could not claim in the present proceeding that Staff
Management had not paid it by depositing funds in that account. [Id. at 1–2.]
The Court agreed with much of Staff Management’s argument, but it held that
a motion for judgment on the pleadings was an improper vehicle to resolve the parties’

dispute. It explained:
The crux of defendants’ motion is that the pleadings and documents
demonstrate that Staff Management paid all of the amounts claimed by
plaintiff for services it rendered to ARAMARK into the Wells Fargo
Account, and that plaintiff claimed a right to and then used those funds
to settle the adversary action. …
The court’s review of all the admissible documents establishes without
doubt that Staff Management mistakenly made payments into the Wells
Fargo Account for work plaintiff performed for ARAMARK after plaintiff
purchased [Corporate’s] business. Plaintiff admits this much. There is
also no doubt that plaintiff used those funds to settle the adversary
action. Thus, there is no doubt that in the instant action defendants are
entitled to at least a set-off for those payments. What cannot be
determined from the admissible evidence is the extent of those payments
(as opposed to payments for work performed by [Corporate]), and
whether the payments constitute the total amount owed by Staff
Management to plaintiff.
Noor Staffing, 2020 WL 11762285, at *2. The Court therefore denied the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Staff Management has now moved for summary judgment
on Noor’s claims to the disputed $1 million and $206,000. [Dkt. 184.]
III. Analysis
Noor pursues separate breach of contract claims with respect to the disputed
$1 million and the disputed $206,000. [Dkt. 1.] Under Illinois law, which the parties

agree applies [see Dkt. 185 at 15–16; Dkt. 193 at 9–10], “[t]he essential elements of a
breach of contract claim are: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2)
performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to
the plaintiff.” Pepper Const. Co. v. Palmolive Tower Condos., LLC, 59 N.E.3d 41, 66
(Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citation omitted). On the summary judgment record, a reasonable
jury could not find in Noor’s favor on either claim; therefore, Staff Management is
entitled to summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A. The Disputed $206,000
Noor argues that Staff Management owes it approximately $206,000 for work
it provided to Aramark outside the process contemplated by the Agreement. [Dkt. 193
at 8–9.] Staff Management moves for summary judgment on this count, arguing that
Noor cannot recover because it did not comply with the terms of the Agreement in
connection with this work. [Dkt. 185 at 20.] See Rsrv. Hotels PTY Ltd. v. Mavrakis,
790 F.3d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Under Illinois law, a party cannot sue for breach

of contract without alleging that he has himself substantially complied with all the
material terms of the agreement.” (cleaned up)). Noor counters that parties can waive
strict enforcement of contractual terms under Illinois law, which Noor and Staff
Management did here through custom and practice. [Dkt. 193 at 9–10 (citing
caselaw).] However, even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Noor, see
Majors, 714 F.3d at 532, Noor cannot establish the elements of its claim.
In arguing for waiver, Noor relies exclusively on Rodriguez’s affidavit and the
email correspondence he discusses. [Dkt. 193 at 10–11; Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 54–57.] As
explained above, that affidavit can be considered at summary judgment only in part.

The Court disregards Rodriguez’s detailed description of the parties’ practice of
departing from the written terms of the Agreement because those assertions
contradict his deposition testimony. See James, 959 F.3d at 316. Rodriguez’s affidavit
can be used to establish: (1) that Aramark regularly asked Noor to provide temporary
workers directly, rather than through the VMS, and (2) that Noor and Staff
Management engaged in email correspondence regarding the disputed $206,000,

which Rodriguez asserts establishes that Staff Management said it would ensure
Noor got paid. [See Dkt. 194-1 ¶¶ 13–17.] But Noor cannot contradict Rodriguez’s
deposition testimony that when work was done after a direct request, it was the
responsibility of the client—here, Aramark—“to put [the work order] on [to the
VMS],” and that Noor would be paid only after a work order was put on the VMS and
paid through Staff Management. [See Dkt. 186-2 at 47:1–48:8; Dkt. 186-9 at 15:22–
16:9.] For Noor to survive summary judgment, it must point to admissible evidence

showing either that Aramark submitted work orders through the VMS or that Staff
Management took responsibility for Aramark doing so. See Moran, 54 F.4th at 491.
Noor cannot do so.
It is undisputed that work orders associated with the disputed $206,000 were
never submitted through the VMS or paid by Aramark. [See Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 30–35 (Noor
raising some disputes but not as to these points).] Under the terms of the Agreement,
therefore, Staff Management had no obligation to pay Noor these funds [id. ¶¶ 9–10],
and Noor has no evidence that Staff Management waived the condition to pay Noor
only after receiving payment from Aramark.

Nor has Noor raised a genuine dispute that Staff Management was obliged to
input the work order itself or compel Aramark to do so. The Court has disregarded
Rodriguez’s assertion in his affidavit that Noor “relies on Staff Management to open
the appropriate requisitions for … labor” performed pursuant to a direct request from
Aramark. [Dkt. 194-1 ¶ 13; see Dkt. 186-2 at 47:1–48:17 (client is responsible for
submitting the work order).] Noor argues that in emails, “Staff Management assured

Noor that it would follow up with ARAMARK and that Noor would be paid for that
labor.” [Dkt. 194-1 ¶ 15.] The emails do not support that reading.
The relevant messages, all from Janae Brown are:
• “I will review and get back to you on this next week.” [Id. at 19–20 (April
12, 2018).]
• Requesting additional information that “will allow management to quickly
view the financial impact for each profit center.” [Id. at 22 (April 26, 2018).]
• An indication that the “information has been forwarded to Aramark for
review.” [Id. at 27–28 (May 8, 2018).]
• In response to a request for an update: “I’ve been advised to contact the
managers of the respective profit centers to request approval to submit the
late invoicing. Upon approval, your office will have to submit labor hours
through IQN to generate invoicing. I will notify you as we receive these
approvals.” [Id. at 25 (May 24, 2018).]
• In response to a question as to whether Noor should contact Aramark
managers directly: “Please do not contact managers about this invoicing,
but instead wait until you are contacted by the managers or our team on
their behalf.” [Id. at 31–32 (June 22, 2018).]
At best, Brown’s messages indicate that Staff Management took responsibility for
communicating with Aramark in connection with the disputed $206,000, and they
are clear that Noor’s payment is contingent on (1) Aramark’s approval of the invoices
and (2) Noor’s submission of the hours through the IQN. No reasonable jury could
interpret “I will notify you as we receive these approvals” or “wait until you are
contacted by the managers or our team on their behalf” as a promise that Staff

Management would pay the disputed funds if Aramark did not.7
Further, the fact that Staff Management did not affirmatively reject any
payment after Noor provided Aramark labor outside of the normal contractual
process and the fact that Noor was paid for work done at one Aramark location do not
change the result. [See Dkt. 194 ¶ 57; Dkt. 194-1 at 31.] Noor cites no evidence that
Staff Management’s approvals of payment for work directly solicited by Aramark or

the payment for the single Aramark location was not effected through the VMS.
Without such evidence, a jury could not find that Staff Management breached its
contract as to the disputed $206,000 because no record evidence supports the finding
that Staff Management ever paid or agreed to pay Noor if Staff Management was not
first paid through the VMS.
Because a jury could not find that it breached the Agreement with respect to
the disputed $206,000, Staff Management is entitled to summary judgment.

B. The Disputed $1 Million
Turning to the disputed $1 million, the analysis is more straightforward. As
the Court previously found, Noor’s position in the bankruptcy proceedings and the
resulting settlement agreement establish that Noor disposed of the disputed funds in

7 It may be possible that Brown’s directive that Noor should not contact the Aramark
managers directly could have impacted Noor’s ability to collect from Aramark. Noor has not
attempted to collect from Aramark directly in this suit, however, and it has neither argued
nor introduced evidence that Brown’s directive prevented it from doing so.
the Wells Fargo account to settle claims with the Chapter 11 trustee. Noor Staffing,
2020 WL 11762285, at *2. The only question remaining after the Court’s ruling on
the motion for judgment on the pleadings was “the extent of [Staff Management’s]

payments [into the Wells Fargo account] … and whether the payments constitute the
total amount owed by Staff Management to” Noor. Id. The undisputed evidence shows
that Staff Management paid the entirety (less one cent due to a clerical error that
Noor does not pursue) of the disputed $1 million into the Wells Fargo account and
that is the full amount Staff Management owes Noor in connection with that account.
[Dkt. 194 ¶ 20.] Noor makes three arguments in response. The Court has already

rejected its argument that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Staff Management
paid the full $1 million. [See Dkt. 193 at 6–8.] Its other arguments fare no better.
First, it argues that the breach of contract was not Staff Management’s failure
to pay the $1 million, but its failure to pay the $1 million into the Sterling account.
[Id. at 5–6.] The problem with this argument is that while misdirecting another’s
funds may be poor business practice or actionable under another legal theory, Noor
does not identify any support in the Agreement for its position that Staff Management

breached the contract by failing to pay into the correct account. It suggests that under
section 8.c of the Agreement, “[t]he parties agreed that Staff Management was to
deposit the funds directly into the account designated by Noor.” [Id. at 5.] But that
section says no such thing. It reads:
Subject to Client’s [Aramark’s] payment to Staff Management for
Supplier’s [Noor’s] Services, the applicable hourly rate set forth on the
SOW [Statement of Work] (or such other rate as may have otherwise
been agreed upon in writing by an authorized representative of Client),
multiplied by, the number of the total number of labor hours worked by
the Temporary Worker at that Client Location less the MSP Fee as
defined in the SOW.
If Supplier determines that a Temporary Worker has incurred daily or
weekly overtime based on time worked solely at one or more Client
Locations in Supplier’s work week, and such overtime was approved in
advance by the Client Location where the overtime was incurred, then
Staff Management shall pay the amount calculated under Section 8.c
above, plus a premium attributable to such overtime. [Calculation.]
[Dkt. 1-1 at 10–11.] Moreover, Noor has not attempted to establish that this was an
implied term of the Agreement. In any event, even if there were a basis for requiring
Staff Management to deposit funds in Noor’s bank account of choice, Noor’s remedy
would not be payment of the disputed $1 million, which it already received and
disposed of, but the costs incurred in connection with securing the misdirected funds.
But while Noor asserts that Staff Management’s conduct “den[ied] Noor access to
those funds and caus[ed] significant financial distress for Noor,” it cites no evidence
to prove the damages it suffered. [Dkt. 194 ¶ 51.]8 Because injury is an element of a
breach of contract claim, see Pepper Const., 59 N.E.3d at 66, the failure to produce
evidence showing Noor’s damages is fatal to this theory.
Second, Noor argues that the bankruptcy settlement “preserved a $97,000
ARAMARK receivable for Noor even after crediting Noor with all of the deposits made
by Staff Management in that account.” [Dkt. 193 at 8.] Noor argues that it is entitled
to an offset in this amount from the disputed $1 million that Staff Management paid
into the Wells Fargo account. [Id.] But the undisputed evidence establishes that the

8 Noor mistakenly cites Staff Management’s motion for leave to file an oversized brief
in support of this proposition [see Dkt. 76], but even if Noor had cited valid evidence, its claim
would fail for the reasons explained above.
full $1 million was deposited into the account, and Noor used those funds to settle
with the Chapter 11 trustee. Thus, even if Noor could prove that Staff Management
owes it this $97,000, that obligation would arise out of Staff Management’s prior
dealings with Corporate, not a breach of the Agreement. [Dkt. 196 at 6—7.] The Court
takes no position on whether Noor can collect those funds through other means, but
because the scope of this suit is limited to Staff Management’s contractual obligations
under the Agreement, Noor cannot collect the $97,000 for breach of the Agreement.
Therefore, Staff Management is entitled to summary judgment with respect to
the disputed $1 million.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Staff Management and PeopleScout’s
motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 184] is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor
of Defendants and against Plaintiff Noor on Plaintiffs claims against Defendants. By
separate order, the Court will direct the parties to file a status report regarding
Defendants’ counterclaims.
Enter: 19-cv-529
Date: December 6, 2023

Lindsay. Jenkins □□□
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10149819. Public record. Not legal advice.