# Medina v. Buckner-Pena

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · March 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10148639

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10148639

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that it is irrelevant whether the employer should have perceived the plaintiff’s words as a threat or whether they even occurred; it only mattered whether the employer honestly believed the plaintiff made threats
- finding that the plaintiff’s employer regarded him as disabled when they discovered his fear of heights, restricted him from construction tasks that could even be performed on the ground, and forced him to take non-occupational disability leave
- concluding that the plaintiff could not establish that his employer regarded him as disabled when the employer was unaware of the plaintiff’s heart condition and recent bypass surgery
- finding that the employer viewed the plaintiff’s medical restrictions as only precluding her from being a general laborer at the plant but not a variety of other jobs
- noting that the employer would have terminated the plaintiff regardless of their improper consideration of her perceived disability

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARTURO MEDINA, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 19-cv-07916
v. )
) Judge Andrea R. Wood
BOARD OF EDUCATION )
OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Arturo Medina, Jr., a former employee of the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago (“Board”), alleges that the Board terminated his employment due to his perceived
disability. Medina subsequently sued the Board for disability discrimination, asserting a claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Now before the
Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 48.) For the following reasons,
Defendant’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.1

1 The Court notes that Medina’s response to the Board’s statement of facts fails to comply with the
Northern District of Illinois’s Local Rule 56.1, which governs motions for summary judgment. For
instance, Medina often cites his deposition testimony to dispute an asserted fact without stating how the
Board’s descriptions diverge from his testimony. In responding to an opposing party’s statement of facts,
Local Rule 56.1(e) requires parties to specify which part of an asserted fact is disputed, cite specific
evidentiary material that controverts the fact, and concisely explain how the cited material controverts the
asserted fact. Nonetheless, Medina’s non-compliance with Local Rule 56.1 does not overly complicate
the Court’s task in evaluating the Board’s motion. As a result, Medina’s non-compliance is excused with
an admonishment that it not be repeated.
The Board also requests that the Court strike Medina’s statement of additional material facts because
many of the asserted facts are hearsay, immaterial, argumentative, or conclusory. The Board properly
objects in its response when it believes a particular statement is improper and, where it agrees, the Court
I. Hiring and Incidents at Clark Elementary School
Medina began working for the Board in September 2018 as a Special Education Assistant
(“SECA”) at Peter Cooper Dual Lang Academy (“Cooper Academy”), where he assisted students
with learning disabilities. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Facts (“PRDSF”) ¶ 7, Dkt. No. 53.)
While employed at Cooper Academy, Medina applied for the School Clerk I position at Clark

Elementary School (“Clark”) and accepted the position after an interview with Clark Principal Dr.
Natasha Bucker-Pena. (Id. ¶¶ 8–11.) The school clerk role entailed clerical, administrative, and
payroll support responsibilities; organizing school events; managing shipments; overseeing
timesheets; and working with Clark teachers, students, and parents. (Id. ¶ 13.) School clerks were
also expected to be professional, independent, and self-sufficient workers and refrain from
inappropriate behavior. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 45.)
On April 22, 2019, Medina started his new position as a probationary employee. (Id.
¶¶ 12, 14.) Pena served as his direct supervisor and assigned Clark SECA Angela Prince to train
and aid Medina in his transition, including instructing him on how to schedule events, accept and

receive packages, and answer the phone and record messages. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 17–18.) Before Medina
became the school clerk, Prince had been temporarily performing the clerk duties. (Id. ¶ 17.)
During his first week at Clark, Medina experienced difficulties in trying to complete the
administrative tasks that Pena expected him to handle while simultaneously attempting to
complete his job training. (PRDSF ¶ 20; Def.’s Statement of Material Facts (“DSMF”), Ex. A,
Medina Dep. Tr. Part I 82:13–84:21, Dkt. No. 50-1.)

disregards the noncompliant portions of the statement. Therefore, it is unnecessary to strike the entirety of
Medina’s statement of additional material facts.
In his second week of employment, several incidents occurred between Medina, Prince,
and Pena. (PRDSF ¶¶ 23–39.) First, Medina and Prince had a conflict concerning package
delivery and acceptance, where neither Medina nor Prince ensured that a package arrived at its
proper destination. (Id. ¶ 23.) On another occasion, Medina did not notify Pena of a visitor she
had been expecting because he thought that Prince would inform Pena. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Pena subsequently scheduled a meeting with Medina and Prince on April 29, 2019 to
discuss the miscommunication between Medina and Prince and the school’s visitor protocols. (Id.
¶ 25.) During the meeting, Prince told Medina that “I don’t like that you always forget things.”
(Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts (“DRPSAF”) ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 57.2) Medina then
reminded Prince of her role as a SECA and that he was a new employee who learned at a different
pace. (PRDSF ¶ 26.) Medina also discussed his experience as a SECA and gave an example of a
teacher instructing their student and keeping up with their progress. (DRPSAF ¶ 6.) The Board
asserts that Medina then insulted Prince, stating, “I would think you are smarter than you are.”
(Id. ¶ 27.) The Board further contends that Medina next said that a SECA works with mentally

disturbed students and “students with disabilities have mental issues.” (Id.) According to the
Board, Pena responded to Medina by stating that he “cannot equate students with disabilities as
having mental issues,” that Medina’s statements were not “okay, and that Medina was making her
uncomfortable. (Id. ¶ 28.) Medina denied at the time, and continues to deny, that he made the
statements about students with disabilities. (Id.) During the meeting, when Medina denied making
the comment, Pena and Prince told Medina that he did make the statement. (Id. ¶ 29.) Prince and

2 Contrary to the Board’s assertion, Prince’s statement to Medina is not inadmissible hearsay (See
DRPSAF ¶ 3). Rather, it is an opposing party’s statement since the statement is being offered by Medina
against the Board and it was made by the Board’s employee on a matter within the scope of that
relationship. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).
Pena then began arguing with Medina and yelled at him. (DRPSAF ¶ 11.) Medina also became
angry, raised his voice, and accused Pena and Prince of setting him up. (PRDSF ¶ 30.) As a result,
Pena ended the meeting and directed Medina and Prince to leave her office. (Id.) Following the
meeting, Pena notified the school’s security guard that she felt unsafe and uncomfortable after her
meeting with Medina because of his angry actions. (Id. ¶ 31.3)

On that same day, Pena scheduled another meeting with Medina to review the school’s
policies and procedures and his responsibilities as the school clerk. (Id. ¶ 32.) She told Medina he
could not close the door for the meeting because she felt uncomfortable after the day’s earlier
events. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) During the meeting, Medina showed Pena a copy of the Chicago Public
Schools’ (“CPS”) job description for the SECA position and highlighted portions of the document
to “clarify” his earlier remarks. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) One highlighted section stated that one of a
SECA’s essential functions is to assist special education teachers in “reinforcing efforts with
children with various disabilities, including physical disabilities, visual and hearing impairments,
learning disabilities, behavioral disorders, emotional impairments, and mental impairments.” (Id.)

Medina asserts that his alleged inappropriate comment was consistent with the SECA job
description. (DRPSAF ¶ 15.) The Board contends that the comment was inconsistent with the
description as the description does not state that “students with disabilities have mental issues.”
(Id.)
Upon Medina showing her the job description, Pena reminded Medina about the purpose
of the meeting, but Medina refused to discuss the school’s policies and procedures and his job
responsibilities. (PRDSF ¶ 34.) Pena did not allow Medina to clarify his earlier remarks.

3 Contrary to Medina’s objection that Pena’s statement to the security guard is inadmissible hearsay
(PRDSF ¶ 31), the statement is likely admissible under the state of mind exception, which allows for the
admission of statements of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or
emotional condition. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).
(DRPSAF ¶ 16.) And instead, she asked Medina to leave her office. (PRDSF ¶ 35.) While exiting
Pena’s office, Medina told Pena that he wanted to have a meeting with her and his union
representative; Pena agreed. (Id.)
Pena later emailed Medina, requesting another meeting with him on the following day to
discuss Clark policies and procedures. (Id. ¶ 36.) In his reply email, Medina asked for a union

representative from the Chicago Teachers Union to attend the meeting with him and discuss the
April 29 incident. (Id.) Pena replied to Medina’s email, agreeing that a union representative and
another administrator could attend the meeting; she also stated that she was “taken aback” by
Medina’s earlier behavior and had concerns regarding his comment about students with
disabilities having mental issues, his subsequent denial of the statement, and his accusations that
she and Prince were setting him up. (Id. ¶¶ 36–37.) Later in the day, Pena emailed Medina asking
for clarification of his request for the presence of the union representative because the purpose of
the meeting was to provide “guidance and coaching.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Medina did not respond to Pena’s
email since he had already left work. (Id. ¶ 39.)

II. Termination and Disability Discrimination Claim
That evening, Medina emailed Pena, informing her that he would be taking a sick day on
April 30, 2019. (Id. ¶ 40.) Pena called Medina on April 30 when he did not show up for work, but
he did not respond to her call. (Id. ¶ 41.) As a result, Pena emailed Mary Ernesti, the Executive
Director of the Board’s Office of Employee Engagement, summarizing Medina’s conduct during
the April 29 incident and stating that she had concerns about Medina’s behavior. (Id. ¶ 43.)
Ernesti replied to Pena’s email, stating that the Board could terminate Medina since he was a
probationary employee. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Also on April 30, Medina informed Pena that he would be absent from work on May 1
because he was still sick. (Id. ¶ 50.) On May 1, Pena emailed Ernesti, noting that Medina was still
absent from work and directing Ernesti to proceed with the termination process for Medina. (Id.
¶ 49.) Later that day, the Board notified Medina that they had terminated his employment
effective May 2 and placed a “do not hire” designation in his file, and that he was now ineligible

for employment at CPS. (Id. ¶ 52.) Ernesti processed Medina’s termination based on (1) Pena’s
recommendation, (2) Medina’s alleged comment regarding students with disabilities, and (3)
Medina’s behavior during his meeting with Pena and Prince. (Id. ¶ 54.)
Medina suffers from three medical conditions: obsessive compulsive disorder, major
depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (Id. ¶ 56.) But he does not believe that his
mental condition substantially limits a major life activity, such as working. (Id. ¶ 57.) While
employed by the Board, Medina never disclosed his medical conditions to the Board or Pena. (Id.
¶¶ 58–60.) Additionally, Pena did not discuss with any Board employee whether she thought
Medina had any medical conditions that impacted his working ability. (Id. ¶ 61.) And Board

employees never joked or made derogatory comments about his medical conditions. (Id. ¶ 65.)
Medina claims that he attempted to disclose his psychiatric conditions to Pena and Prince during
the first April 29 meeting, which is why he discussed his experience as a SECA and commented
on students with disabilities, but Pena would not let him finish or clarify his comments. (DRPSAF
¶¶ 5, 8–9.)
Following his termination, Medina filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued a right to sue letter. Medina then filed this
lawsuit against the Board, alleging that the Board, acting through Pena, regarded him as disabled
and discriminated against him in violation of the ADA.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, even after all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Dynegy
Mktg. & Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011). A genuine dispute exists

where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). While facts and reasonable inferences are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, “our favor . . . does not extend to drawing inferences that are
supported by only speculation or conjecture.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503
(7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court grants summary judgment when the
non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to the party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in the discharge of employees and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To succeed on a claim of discrimination under the ADA,
Medina must prove that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) the
Board took an adverse employment action against him on the basis of his disability. See Kurtzhals
v. Cty. of Dunn, 969 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2020). The ADA defines a disability as (a) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity; (b) a record of such
an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Here,
Medina does not claim that he is actually disabled within the meaning of the ADA; rather, he
asserts that the Board regarded him as disabled and unlawfully discriminated against him by
terminating him based on his perceived disability.
I. “Regarded as” Disabled
The Court first considered whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Board

regarded Medina as disabled. Specifically, Medina claims that his commentary about students
with disabilities and his past experience as a SECA, in the context of a discussion about his job
performance, made Pena aware of his psychiatric conditions.
To prevail on a claim under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA, Medina must show that
the Board “believed, rightly or wrongly, that he had an impairment that substantially limited one
or more major life activities.” Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 195–97 (7th Cir. 2011)
(finding that the plaintiff’s employer regarded him as disabled when they discovered his fear of
heights, restricted him from construction tasks that could even be performed on the ground, and
forced him to take non-occupational disability leave). An employer’s mere knowledge of the

plaintiff’s impairment is insufficient; the plaintiff must show that the employer knew of the
impairment and believed that it substantially limited the plaintiff in a major life activity. See
Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 523 (7th Cir. 2009); Nese v. Julian Nordic
Constr. Co., 405 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty.
Coll., Dist. No. 524, 795 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the plaintiff could not
establish that his employer regarded him as disabled when the employer was unaware of the
plaintiff’s heart condition and recent bypass surgery).
Work qualifies as a major life activity under the ADA. See Miller, 643 F.3d at 195. But
the employer must have believed that the plaintiff’s impairment limited their ability to perform a
class or broad range of jobs, not just a specific job. Hanson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 688 F.3d 816, 819
(7th Cir. 2012); Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that
the employer viewed the plaintiff’s medical restrictions as only precluding her from being a
general laborer at the plant but not a variety of other jobs).
Here, there is simply not enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Board

regarded Medina as disabled. It is undisputed that Medina never disclosed his psychiatric
conditions to Board employees, Pena never made jokes or derogatory comments about Medina’s
conditions, and Pena never discussed with any Board employee whether she believed that Medina
had any physical or mental impairments that impacted his working ability. The emails between
Ernesti and Pena regarding Medina’s termination also do not mention any perceived impairments.
Instead, Pena describes her concerns about Medina’s behavior during their meeting, including
Medina making the alleged comment about students with disabilities having mental issues,
becoming argumentative when he denied making that statement, and accusing her of setting him
up. Even if Medina was attempting to disclose his psychiatric conditions to Pena during their

meeting, there is no basis from which to conclude that Pena understood him to be doing so. It
would require a substantial leap in logic—one supported only by speculation—to conclude that
Pena somehow became aware of Medina’s impairments through his discussion about students
with disabilities, his experience as SECA, and how he learned at a different pace. Without
showing the Board’s awareness or belief of an impairment when they terminated Medina, he
cannot succeed in proving that the Board regarded him as disabled.
Even if Medina had adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Board
believed he had a mental impairment, Medina still would not have provided any evidence to
support that the Board believed his impairment substantially limited him in a major life activity,
such as work. For the major life activity of work, Medina would have to offer evidence sufficient
to show that the Board believed his impairment substantially limited his ability to perform a broad
range of jobs—not only the school clerk position—and he has not done so.
II. Causation
Even if Medina had produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the

Board perceived him as disabled, Medina has not provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable
juror to conclude that the Board terminated him on the basis of his disability. For a discriminatory
discharge claim, a plaintiff must prove that their employer would not have fired them “but for”
their actual or perceived disability; proof of mixed motives is inadequate. Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962–63 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the employer would have
terminated the plaintiff regardless of their improper consideration of her perceived disability); see
McCann v. Badger Mining Corp., 965 F.3d 578, 589 (7th Cir. 2020).4 “But for” causation can be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, including suspicious timing, evidence that similarly
situated employees outside of the protected group regularly received better treatment, and

evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for its actions. Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of
Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017). In addition to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for employment discrimination cases,5 the Seventh Circuit has also advised that courts
should consider the evidence as a whole and ask “‘whether the evidence would permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that . . . [a] proscribed factor caused the discharge.’” Id. at 504
(quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)).

4 The Seventh Circuit has noted that it is an open question whether the ADA’s language change in 2008
from “because of disability” to “on the basis of disability” changes the “but for” causation standard; but it
continues to apply this standard in the absence of parties arguing for another. See Kurtzhals, 969 F.3d at
728; Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017).
5 See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Here, Medina argues that the Board’s stated reasons for firing him were pretextual. In
determining whether an employer’s reason for an adverse employment action was pretextual, the
key “question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether
the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the action.” Kurtzhals, 969
F.3d at 730 (quoting Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex, LLC, 930 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2019)); see

also Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that it is irrelevant whether
the employer should have perceived the plaintiff’s words as a threat or whether they even
occurred; it only mattered whether the employer honestly believed the plaintiff made threats). A
finding of pretext demands more than just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the
employer’s part; instead, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s given reason is a lie.
McCann, 965 F.3d at 589. “Shifting and inconsistent explanations” can support a pretext
determination. Id. at 589–90; see Stelter v. Wis. Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 950 F.3d 488, 491
(7th Cir. 2020).
Medina cites de Lima Silva v. Department of Corrections, 917 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2019),

for the proposition that pretext can be established by the plaintiff identifying weaknesses and
inconsistencies in the employer’s reasons for termination. In de Lima Silva, the Seventh Circuit
held that a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s reason for firing the plaintiff was
pretextual because the employer’s reasons shifted over time, including adding new rationales at
subsequent hearings and depositions. Id. at 561–63. Here, Medina claims that he has identified
inconsistencies and weaknesses in the Board’s reasons for his termination; specifically, he
emphasizes that the alleged comment he made about students with disabilities having mental
issues was consistent with the SECA job description, and he attempted to explain this consistency
to Pena. Essentially, Medina contends that the Board’s stated reason for terminating him cannot
be a legitimate reason since the alleged comment was not inappropriate or offensive if it was
consistent with the job description.
First, de Lima Silva is inapposite because the Board’s stated reasons for firing Medina
have not changed. In Pena’s initial email to Ernesti, which started Medina’s termination process,
Pena expressed concerns about Medina’s behavior in the first April 29 meeting. For instance,

Pena stated that Medina said students with disabilities have mental issues, that he became
argumentative when questioned about his comment, and that he accused her and Prince of setting
him up. Likewise, Medina’s employee disciplinary record indicates that the Board processed his
termination as due to substantiated charges of using verbally abusive language and
insubordination. (DSMF, Ex. Q, Employee Disciplinary Action Coding, Dkt. No. 50-1.) At the
summary judgment stage, the Board continues to maintain these rationales, asserting that the
Board terminated Medina because of his inappropriate comment and unprofessional behavior
toward Pena and Prince.
Although there is a disputed issue of fact regarding whether Medina actually stated that

students with disabilities have mental issues, it matters only whether the Board honestly believed
that Medina’s comment was an inappropriate remark. And there is ample evidence that the Board
honestly believed Medina made a disparaging comment about students with mental disabilities.
For example, Pena and Prince accused Medina of making the statement during their meeting,
Pena told Medina that he should not equate students with disabilities as having mental issues,
Pena later emailed Ernesti about Pena’s alleged comment, and Medina’s employment record
indicates charges of use of verbally abusive language. On the other hand, Medina offers no
evidence that the Board actually had some other reason for terminating him, other than his own
speculation. Therefore, the Court cannot find that the Board’s stated reasons for terminating
Medina were pretextual.
Assuming that Medina did not make the allegedly inappropriate comment (as the Court is
required to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor), Medina still cannot show that a perceived
disability was the “but for” cause of his termination. In addition to the charge of verbally abusive

language, the Board also stated that it fired Medina for his insubordination and unprofessional
behavior toward Pena and Prince. It is undisputed that Medina raised his voice at Pena and Prince
and accused them of setting him up when they told him that he did make the alleged statement.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Medina refused to discuss Clark’s policies and procedures and
his responsibilities as the school clerk during his second meeting on April 29 with Pena. In sum,
the Board had other undisputed reasons for terminating Medina.
III. Essential Functions
As explained above, the Board is entitled to summary judgment on Medina’s ADA claim
because there is no genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Board perceived Medina as disabled

or, even if they did, whether the perceived disability was the “but-for” cause of his termination.
Nonetheless, the Court will continue on to consider the Board’s argument that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact concerning whether Medina could perform the essential functions of the
school clerk position. On this point, the Court disagrees with Board.
To assess whether a job function is essential, courts consider the employer’s judgment,
written job descriptions, the amount of time the employee spends performing that function, the
experiences of past and current employees, and the consequences of not requiring the employee to
perform that function. Conners v. Wilkie, 984 F.3d 1255, 1261 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Bilinsky v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir. 2019). The ADA does not protect “disabled
individuals from adverse employment actions if the individual, for reasons unrelated to his
disability (such as a poor work ethic, carelessness, bad attitude, insubordination or unprofessional
demeanor) . . . is unable to perform the job’s essential functions.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese
Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 863 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Board describes the duties of the school clerk position as clerical,

administrative, and payroll support responsibilities; organizing school events; managing
shipments; overseeing timesheets; and working with teachers, students, and parents. (PRDSF
¶ 13.) School clerks are also expected to be professional, independent, and self-sufficient workers
and to refrain from inappropriate behavior. The Board contends that Medina cannot show that he
was qualified to perform the essential functions of the school clerk position because he had
difficulty completing administrative tasks, made an inappropriate comment, and exhibited
unprofessional behavior during his meeting with Pena and Prince. Medina, of course, denies
making the allegedly inappropriate comment. He also disputes the Board’s characterization of his
testimony about the difficulties he experienced in trying to complete his job training and

administrative tasks. Indeed, the Court agrees that the Board mischaracterizes Medina’s
testimony. Medina does state that he had difficulty completing administrative tasks; however, he
also mentions that this difficulty stemmed from technical issues with the administrative systems, a
staff shortage, and the concurrent need to finish his job training. (See Medina Dep. Tr. Part I
82:13–84:21.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Medina, a reasonable jury
could find that Medina could perform the essential functions of the school clerk position.
But despite the existence of a dispute of fact regarding Medina’s ability to perform the
essential duties of the school clerk position, Medina’s ADA discrimination claim cannot survive
summary judgment. There is simply insufficient evidence to support a finding that the Board
regarded Medina as disabled, and that Medina’s perceived disability was the “but for” cause of
his termination. Accordingly, summary judgment 1s appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 48) is
granted.
ENTERED:

Dated: March 31, 2023 oaaci □□□
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10148639. Public record. Not legal advice.