# Akmakjian v. Village of Hoffman Estates, The

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · February 27, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10148371

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 27, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SAM AKMAKJIAN,

Plaintiff, No. 22 C 04023

v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin

THE VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Sam Akmakjian alleges Defendant Village of Hoffman Estates (the
“Village”) has denied his rezoning request in violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. Akmakjian also alleges the
Village violated the Village’s Zoning Code through arbitrary and capricious conduct
and petitions the Court to issue a writ of mandamus. The Village moves to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF no. 15. That motion is granted because Akmakjian’s claims are not ripe for
adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARD
“It is well established that the existence of a case and controversy is a
prerequisite for the exercise of federal judicial power under Article III.” Sprint
Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, Ind., 361 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004). One
important requirement is that the case or controversy is “ripe” for adjudication. Id. If
a case is not ripe for purposes of Article III, the court should dismiss the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Biddison
v. City of Chi., 921 F.2d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 1991). In considering a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must accept the

complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor. Transit Exp., Inc. v. Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir.
2001).
BACKGROUND
Akmakjian, an Armenian-American, owns a 40,000 square foot property at
1180-1190 Apple Street in Hoffman Estates, Illinois. R. 1 ¶ 1. In the thirty years that

he has owned the property, the surrounding area has changed significantly from
largely residential to commercial. Id. Akmakjian’s property is subject to a restrictive
covenant that limits the lots in the subdivision to residential use only, yet it is abutted
on all four sides by commercial activity. Id. ¶¶ 10, 28. In 2018, Akmakjian petitioned
the Village to rezone his property from R-2 (One Family Residential) to B-2 (business
district) and to approve a proposed site plan for the development of a multi-tenant
retail/office building with a drive-thru facility. Id. ¶ 13. The Village Board denied his

application. Id. ¶ 17. In 2019, Akmakjian submitted a similar request to rezone the
property for commercial use, which the Board also denied. Id. ¶ 18. Akmakjian alleges
that Village staff told him that he should resubmit his rezoning application after the
next election. Id. ¶ 19.
In April 2022, Akmakjian sought the Village’s Planning and Zoning
Commission’s “courtesy review” of a development plan consisting of a scaled-back
one-story office building and a parking lot. Id. ¶ 20. Akmakjian alleges that during
the courtesy review, one Village Board Trustee stated, “I’ll never vote to flip these
residentials to commercial ever.” Id. ¶ 26.

Akmakjian sent a letter to the Village, requesting approval of his 2022 plan or
payment of a sum reflecting his lost economic opportunity. Id. ¶ 33. When the Village
did not respond, Akmakjian brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of the Takings Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. ¶ 35. Akmakjian claims that the Village violated the Takings Clause
by declining to rezone his property as commercial, thereby depriving him of the

economically viable use of his property. Akmakjian also alleges that the Village does
not enforce the restrictive covenant limiting land to residential use on other lots and
that multiple properties in the same subdivision as his property violate the covenant.
Id. ¶¶ 29-31. He therefore alleges that the restrictive covenant is being selectively
enforced against him because of his Armenian ethnic origin in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. ¶¶ 32, 40. He also alleges violations of the Village’s Zoning
Code through arbitrary and capricious conduct and petitions the Court to issue a writ

of mandamus ordering the Village to rezone his property. The Village filed the instant
motion to dismiss, R. 15, arguing that the Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over Akmakjian’s claims because they are not ripe for review, and that
Akmakjian failed to state a claim.
DISCUSSION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from
taking private property for public use “without just compensation.” U.S. Const.
Amend. V. A regulatory taking is a restriction on the use of property that is “so

onerous” it violates the Takings Clause without depriving the owner of all the
economic use of his property. Dyson v. City of Calumet City, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1028,
1045 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The court considers “a complex of factors” in determining
whether a regulation violates the Takings Clause. Id. at 1045-46 (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
Cases alleging violations of the Takings Clause are subject to a special ripeness

analysis. Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). “In land use
challenges, the doctrine of ripeness is intended to avoid premature adjudication or
review of administrative action. It rests upon the idea that courts should not decide
the impact of regulation until the full extent of the regulation has been finally fixed
and the harm caused by it is measurable.” Unity Ventures v. Lake Cnty., 841 F.2d
770, 774 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1494
(9th Cir. 1987)). “Ripeness is, essentially, a question of timing.” Sprint Spectrum, 361

F.3d at 1002.
A claim, therefore, is not ripe until the plaintiff receives a final decision
regarding the application of the challenged regulations to the property at issue.
Williamson Cnty. Reg. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191-92
(1985). A decision is final when “there [is] no question . . . about how the regulation
at issue applies to the particular land in question.” Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, Cal., 594 U.S. 2226, 2230 (2021). A plaintiff is required to “at least resort
to the procedure for obtaining variances and obtain a conclusive determination by the
Commission whether it would allow the proposed development, in order to ripen [his]

takings claim.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 737 (1997) (cleaned
up).
The Village argues that Akmakjian’s claims are not ripe because the Village
Board, which has the ultimate decision-making authority on zoning requests, has not
issued a final decision on his 2022 proposal. The Court agrees. “A final decision must
be demonstrated by a development plan submitted, considered, and rejected by the

governmental entity.” Unity Ventures, 841 F.2d at 775. Akmakjian alleges that he
sought a “courtesy review” from the Village’s Planning and Zoning Committee in
2022. R. 1 ¶ 20. But he does not allege that he submitted any formal request for his
development plan to the Village Board for consideration, or that the Village Board
made any final decision on it. The Village’s Subdivision Code provides that a courtesy
review by the Committee “shall not constitute a review by the Village Board and any
direction to proceed to development review before the [] Commission shall not be

construed as any indication of future project approval by the Village Board.” Vill. of
Hoffman Estates, Ill. Subdivision Code 10-2-2(B). Therefore, because the Village
Board has not come to a definitive position on Akmakjian’s 2022 proposed plan, there
is no final administrative action for this Court to review. See Williamson Cnty., 473
U.S. at 173 (“The administrative action must be final before it is judicially
reviewable.”); Willan v. Dane Cnty., No. 21-1617, 2021 WL 4269922 at *3 (7th Cir.
Sept. 20, 2021) (affirming the district court’s finding that claims under the Takings
and Equal Protection Clauses were not ripe where the plaintiffs did not allege that
they took the steps to obtain a zoning variance or that the county had reached a final

decision).
Akmakjian argues that the finality requirement is met because submitting his
2022 proposal to the Village Board would be futile. It is true that “[t]he final decision
requirement can be met with proof that attempts to comply would be futile.” Long
Grove Country Club Ests., Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove, 693 F. Supp. 640, 653 (N.D. Ill.
1988). However, “mere allegations by a property owner that [he] has done everything

possible to obtain acceptance of a development proposal will not suffice to prove
futility.” Unity Ventures, 841 F.2d at 776 (cleaned up). Rather, he must at least show
that he made one meaningful application for the approval of his plan Id.
Akmakjian undercuts his own futility argument because he alleges that his
2022 redevelopment plan reconciles issues that the Village Board flagged with his
previous applications and proposes a significantly less intense development. R. 1 ¶¶
20-24. Moreover, one Village Board Trustee’s statement indicating that he would

never vote for rezoning does not indicate how the entire Board might vote. At this
point, it would be speculative for the Court to determine how the Board would vote
on Akmakjian’s 2022 application because, by Akmakjian’s own admission, it is
markedly different from the previous applications that he submitted. Akmakjian’s
claims are not ripe for adjudication and must be dismissed.
Finally, since Akmakjian’s federal claims are dismissed under the ripeness
doctrine, the Court need not analyze whether Akmakjian adequately stated a claim.
The Court further declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims. Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.
2010); Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) ([I]t is well-
established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice
state supplemental claims whenever federal claims have been dismissed prior to
trial.”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Village’s motion to dismiss (R. 15) is granted,
and Akmakjian’s case is dismissed without prejudice.

ENTERED:

Alona M Luthor.
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: February 27, 2023

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10148371. Public record. Not legal advice.