# In Re: Opana ER Antitrust Litigation

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · July 27, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10147229

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 27, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10147229

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a “plaintiff could satisfy its burden . . . [to] establish antitrust injury” through a “‘but-for’ analysis” consisting of “an expert construction of a hypothetical market free of any anticompetitive restraint”
- describing Chicago Board of Trade is a “warhorse” that should not be taken literally as “an endorsement of kitchen-sink antitrust in which anything that might alarm a jury is made admissible”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE OPANA ER ANTITRUST MDL No. 2580
LITIGATION
Lead Case No. 14-cv-10150

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

ALL CASES

PLAINTIFFS’ POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW OR FOR A NEW TRIAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................................5
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................7
I.  PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
BECAUSE ENDO FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY COGNIZABLE
PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATION. ......................................................................7
A.  Endo Offered No Evidence That Its Reverse Payment Was Procompetitive
at the Time of Its Agreement With Impax. ..............................................................8
B.  Endo Offered No Evidence of Any Procompetitive Justification Resulting
From the Reverse Payment Found by the Jury. .....................................................14
C.  Endo Offered No Evidence to Rebut Plaintiffs’ Showing That a Settlement
Without a Reverse Payment Was a Less Restrictive Means of Achieving
the Benefits of Settlement. .....................................................................................19
II.  IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A NEW
TRIAL TO CORRECT THE COURT’S ERRONEOUS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, VERDICT FORM, AND EVIDENTIARY RULINGS. ...............22
A.  The Jury Instructions and Verdict Form Were Contrary to the Law
Governing the Competitive Effects of a Reverse Payment. ..................................22
1.  Time for Assessment of Competitive Effects ..................................................23
2.  Need to Justify the Reverse Payment ...............................................................26
3.  Avoidance of Risk of Competition ..................................................................29
4.  Less Restrictive Means ....................................................................................31
B.  The Extensive Evidence of the Later-Issued Patents and Related Litigation
Should Have Been Excluded as Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial. .....................35
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................38
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................... 2, 33
Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................... 7
Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 604 (E.D. Pa. 2017) ............................................ 9
Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) ....................................................................... 8
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ...................................... 24, 25, 36
Cullen v. Olin Corp., 195 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1020
(2000) ................................................................................................................................. 7, 35
EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2016)............................................................ 6, 22
Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815 (7th
Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................................................. 6
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) ............................................................................. passim
FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) ..................................................... 31
Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2010) ....................................................... 7
Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2000) ..................................... 7
Impax Labs., Inc. v. FTC, 994 F.3d 484 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 712
(2021) ..................................................................................................................... 9, 11, 33, 35
In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D. Conn. 2015) ...................................... 9, 11
In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2015) ....................................................................... 9
In re Glumetza Antitrust Litig., 2021 WL 3773621 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2021) ........................... 28
In re Impax Labs., Inc., 2019 WL 1552939 (FTC Mar. 28, 2019), review denied,
994 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 712 (2021) ................................. passim
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
983 (2018) .............................................................................................................................. 15
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 3d 274 (D.R.I. 2019) ..................................... 28
In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Opana ER
I”) ............................................................................................................................................. 2
In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 2021 WL 2291067 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2021)
("Opana ER II") .............................................................................................................. passim
In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003), review denied, 416 F.3d 29
(D.C. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................................................... 16
In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 734655 (D.
Mass. Feb. 6, 2018) ................................................................................................................ 28
In re Surescripts Antitrust Litig., 2022 WL 2208914 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2022) ........................... 21
In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., 2021 WL 6690351 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2021) ...................................................................................................................................... 37
King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir.
2015) (“Lamictal”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) ......................................................... 2
Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2016) ............................................ 36
Lawson v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2015) .................................................. 6
Martin v. Milwaukee Cnty., 904 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2018) ............................................................. 6
N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 1170 (2009) ............................................................................................................. 16
Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc, v, Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286 (8th
Cir. 1988) ............................................................................................................................... 36
NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) ................................................................................. 19, 32
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) .......................... 16
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) .................................................................. 24, 32
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) .......................................................................... 11
Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison, Ill., 970 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2020) ..................................................... 7
Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) ................................ 8, 23, 35
Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2013) .............................................................. 6
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S.
942 (2011) .............................................................................................................................. 16
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) ................................................. 6
Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2019)......................................................................... 6
Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 1985 WL 1737 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1985) .............................. 33
Shick v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2002) ........................................... 7, 38
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).......................................................................... 24, 25, 36
Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 373 F.3d 57
(1st Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................................................ 24
Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Michigan Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp.,
922 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................... 6
Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441 (7th Cir.
2001) ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Thorne v. Member Select Ins. Co., 882 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2018) ................................................... 6
Umpleby v. Potter & Brumfield, Inc., 69 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................ 7
United States v. Consolidated Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1978)........................... 21
United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) ......................................... 20
United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 811 (2004) ...................................................................................................................... 16
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004) .................................................................................................... 9
Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 6
Walgreen Co. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 09-cv-3956 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) ................................... 10
Wilk v. Am. Med. Assoc., 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 895 F.2d 352
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990). ............................................................... 20
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 ................................................................................................................ 1, 2, 3, 5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 .................................................................................................................... 1, 4, 6
Fed. R. Evid. 402 .......................................................................................................................... 37
Fed. R. Evid. 403 .......................................................................................................................... 37
Other Authorities
A. Edlin, S. Hemphill, H. Hovenkamp & C. Shapiro, The Actavis Inference:
Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 585 (2015) ..................................................... 10
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
ANTITRUST CASES (2016 ed.) ................................................................................................ 10
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES (2d ed. 2010) ............................................................................................ 37
F. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) ............................................... 24
FTC & DOJ, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (2000) ..................... 10
H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust & the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 467 (2015) ....................................................................................................................... 21
P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (4th & 5th eds. 2015-2021) ....................... passim
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), all Plaintiffs renew their motion made at the
close of the evidence that the Court: (1) find that Endo failed to identify any legally cognizable
justification for its reverse payments to Impax and (2) enter judgment for Plaintiffs that Endo
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 In the alternative, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59,
Plaintiffs move for a new trial to correct: (1) the flawed jury instructions on the procompetitive

justification of reverse payments including the least restrictive means of achieving any such
benefits; (2) the failure of the verdict form to require consideration of a less restrictive means of
achieving procompetitive benefits; and (3) the admission of irrelevant, prejudicial post-
agreement events.
INTRODUCTION
In this case, Plaintiffs alleged that Endo made a large reverse payment to Impax
consisting of a no-authorized generic agreement, the Endo Credit, and a $10 million
nonrefundable upfront cash payment under the Development and Co-Promotion Agreement
(“DCA”), which was expressly incorporated into the Settlement and License Agreement
(“SLA”). Plaintiffs alleged that Endo’s large reverse payment was anticompetitive under the

antitrust rule of reason that the Supreme Court held to be applicable to reverse payments in FTC
v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 156 (2013).
Under the rule of reason, Plaintiffs had the initial burden of demonstrating
anticompetitive effects by proving that Endo had market power and made a large payment to
Impax. See In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 2021 WL 2291067, at *24 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2021)
(“Opana ER II”); see also In re Impax Labs., Inc., 2019 WL 1552939, at *15 (FTC Mar. 28,

1 Judgment should also be entered establishing Endo’s violation of the state laws asserted by the End-
Payor Plaintiffs (“EPPs”) because Endo agreed that a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act would
necessarily violate the state antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws asserted by the
EPPs.
2019), review denied, 994 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 712 (2021); King
Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 412 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“Lamictal”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016). Upon such proof, the burden shifted to Endo
to show that its reverse payment was justified by procompetitive benefits. See Opana ER II,
2021 WL 2291067, at *24; In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719 (N.D. Ill.

2016) (“Opana ER I”); Lamictal, 791 F.3d at 412. Finally, if Endo demonstrated legitimate
procompetitive benefits, the jury had to balance the anticompetitive harms against the legitimate
procompetitive benefits. See Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *24. However, at this final
step of the rule of reason, if the claimed procompetitive benefits could be achieved by some
means less restrictive of competition, those benefits could not justify the reverse payment. See
Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 2012); Impax, 2019 WL 1552939, at *15.
After almost three weeks of trial, the jury found that Endo possessed market power in a
relevant market and that the settlement between Endo and Impax included a reverse payment.
ECF No. 1005. In other words, the jury found that Plaintiffs had satisfied the first step of the

rule of reason. However, the jury further found that the anticompetitive effects of the settlement
with the reverse payment did not outweigh Endo’s claimed procompetitive justifications. Id.
The Court should enter judgment for Plaintiffs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) that Endo violated the
antitrust laws because, at the second step of the rule of reason, Endo did not offer any legally
cognizable procompetitive justifications to offset the anticompetitive effects of the reverse
payment found by the jury.
At trial, Endo’s only claimed procompetitive justification was the so-called “broad
license.” As Plaintiffs explained at the close of the evidence, that procompetitive justification
failed for three separate and independent reasons. Tr. 2437:20-2444:5.2 First, the competitive
effects of any agreement under the antitrust laws must be assessed as of the date of the
agreement, and neither Endo nor its experts identified any evidence that Endo’s reverse payment
was procompetitive on or about June 2010 when Endo agreed to make the reverse payment to
Impax in the SLA and DCA.

Second, any procompetitive benefits must explain or justify the challenged reverse
payment as procompetitive, not the settlement as a whole. Endo offered no evidence that the
broad license was linked in any way to its reverse payment to Impax. The broad license was an
additional benefit that Endo granted to Impax at Impax’s insistence; it did not explain Endo’s
reverse payment as anything other than a payment to avoid the risk of competition.
Third, even if the broad license were a legally-cognizable procompetitive benefit,
Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrated that a less restrictive means of settling with the same broad
license would have been for Endo and Impax to settle their patent lawsuit without any reverse
payment. Because Endo did not offer any evidence that the reverse payment and the broad

license were linked, there is no legal or economic reason that would have prevented a settlement
with the broad license but without any reverse payment. Endo’s evidence that it never offered
Impax an entry date prior to January 1, 2013 did not establish that a less restrictive no-payment
settlement with an earlier entry date was not available; it was merely evidence that Endo, like
any brand company making a reverse payment, preferred to pay Impax to delay its entry rather
than compete vigorously.
Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), the Court should enter judgment for
Plaintiffs establishing that Endo violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act (and the state laws

2 Citations to “Tr. __” refer to the trial transcript found at ECF Nos. 1009-1038.
asserted by EPPs) because Endo presented no evidence that the reverse payment found by the
jury had any legally cognizable procompetitive justifications that could not have been achieved
by a less restrictive means.
As an alternative, Plaintiffs request that the Court order a new trial pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59. The Court’s jury instructions and verdict form were erroneous. The jury instructions

did not tell the jury that, under the Sherman Act, competitive effects must be assessed as of the
time of the agreement; did not explain that it was Endo’s burden to identify a procompetitive
justification for the reverse payment, not the settlement as a whole; did not identify the
competitive harm of reverse payments that Endo had to justify as the avoidance of the risk of
competition; nor did they explain how to evaluate less restrictive means under the rule of reason.
In addition, the verdict form omitted any reference to the less-restrictive-means analysis,
suggesting that the jury’s only task was to balance anticompetitive effects against procompetitive
justifications.
Collectively, and individually, these critical flaws left the jury without any understanding

of the procompetitive justifications permitted by law or how to evaluate any claimed
procompetitive justification. Endo took full advantage of these errors, improperly arguing that
the jury should assess Endo’s June 2010 agreement in hindsight and find it to be procompetitive
because, absent the broad license that it included, Endo would have been able to stop Impax from
selling generic Opana ER using patents Endo obtained years after agreeing to pay Impax. But
under Actavis, the “relevant anticompetitive harm” is the avoidance of the risk of competition.
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157. Risk is not evaluated based on what ultimately occurs after a
challenged agreement. Rather, risk must be evaluated at the time of the challenged agreement.
A retrial is necessary to permit a jury to properly assess the competitive harm caused by the
reverse payment that the jury found (and then to determine whether the violation caused
Plaintiffs any injury).
Retrial is also necessary to exclude Endo’s evidence of the three later-issued patents and
related litigation. Endo did not obtain these patents or sue to enforce them until years after it
paid Impax to avoid the risk of competition. At the time that Endo agreed to pay Impax in June

2010, no one knew if or when any of the pending applications would ever issue as patents, what
subject matter they would cover if they issued, or what a license to any such later patents might
be worth. As a result, the later-issued patents were entirely irrelevant to the question of whether
Endo’s reverse payment was anticompetitive at the time that Endo agreed to pay Impax to avoid
the risk of competition. Nor were the later-issued patents relevant to the question of causation
because Plaintiffs’ sole theory of causation was that, absent the illegal reverse payment, Endo
and Impax would have entered an alternative settlement agreement with an earlier generic entry
date. Because that alternative settlement agreement would have had the same license found in
the SLA, the evidence presented at trial regarding the later-issued patents and the litigation

concerning them was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Nevertheless, these later-issued patents
were the centerpiece of Endo’s defense and were undoubtedly the reason that the jury found in
Endo’s favor despite Endo’s failure to identify any cognizable procompetitive benefits at the
time of Endo’s agreement to pay Impax.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) provides that a party may renew a pre-verdict
motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a). Under Rule 50(b), the Court can
direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law for the moving party or order a new trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
The standard for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) “‘mirrors’ the standard for
granting summary judgment.” Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Michigan Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians
Assurance Corp., 922 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). If “no rational jury could have found for” the
nonmovant, the Court should grant the Rule 50(b) motion. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641,
646 (7th Cir. 2014). When a party challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury

verdict, the Court must determine “whether a reasonable jury would have ‘a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the [nonmoving] party on that issue.’” Empress Casino Joliet Corp.
v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 822 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lawson v. Sun
Microsystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015)). “Without assessing credibility or
weighing evidence,” the Court must nevertheless review the basis for the jury’s decision,
because “a verdict supported by no evidence or a mere scintilla of evidence will not stand.”
Martin v. Milwaukee Cnty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Thorne v. Member Select
Ins. Co., 882 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Alternatively, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1), a “new trial is appropriate

if the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial was in some way
unfair to the moving party.” Venson, 749 F.3d at 656. The Court should grant a new trial based
on improper jury instructions “if the instructions did not sufficiently inform the jury of the
applicable law and the instructions prejudiced the [movant].” EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d
916, 922 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2013)).
A party suffers prejudice if “considering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the
evidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the applicable law.” Sansone v.
Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v. Ashton-
Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001)). See also Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison, Ill.,
970 F.3d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 2020) (granting plaintiff new trial where jury instructions misstated
legal standard and defendants “argued and presented evidence” based on the incorrect standard).
A new trial is also appropriate when the verdict form contained an “incorrect statement of
the law” that did “not accurately and correctly present the key issue[s] to the jury.” Umpleby v.
Potter & Brumfield, Inc., 69 F.3d 209, 213-15 (7th Cir. 1995). The relevant question is “whether

the jury was misled in any way and whether it had [an] understanding of the issues and its duty
to determine those issues.” Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). A verdict form that “fails to accurately reflect the controlling law” is
“reversible error.” Umpleby, 69 F.3d at 214.
Finally, when a Rule 59 motion challenges improperly admitted evidence, the Court
should grant a new trial “if the improperly admitted evidence had ‘a substantial influence over
the jury,’ and the result reached was ‘inconsistent with substantial justice.’” Shick v. Ill. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 759
(7th Cir. 1999)). This standard is satisfied when there is a “significant chance” that the evidence

“affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. (quoting Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 200
F.3d 1035, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000)). See also Cullen v. Olin Corp., 195 F.3d 317, 324-25 (7th Cir.
1999) (granting defendants’ motion for new trial when plaintiff’s “most compelling and
supportive evidence,” referenced in opening and closing statements and in cross-examination,
was irrelevant and prejudicial and should not have been admitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1020
(2000).
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
BECAUSE ENDO FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY COGNIZABLE
PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATION.
Under the first step of the rule of reason, an antitrust plaintiff must prove market power
and a reverse payment by a brand manufacturer to a generic manufacturer to settle patent
litigation. Here, the jury found that Plaintiffs proved both elements. As a result, the burden
shifted to Endo to prove procompetitive benefits for its reverse payment.3 Based on Endo’s
evidence at trial, no reasonable jury could have found that Endo had any procompetitive
justification that outweighed the anticompetitive effects of its reverse payment for the three

separate and independent reasons that Plaintiffs identified at the close of the evidence.
A. Endo Offered No Evidence That Its Reverse Payment Was Procompetitive at
the Time of Its Agreement With Impax.
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Endo violated the Sherman Act
because Endo failed to rebut Plaintiffs’ prima facie evidence under the first step of the rule of
reason by identifying any evidence showing that its reverse payment was procompetitive at the
time of its agreement with Impax.
Under the Sherman Act, the competitive effects of an agreement must be determined as
of the date of the agreement. This Court recognized that bedrock principle in its summary
judgment opinion. Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *28. It is the unambiguous law of this
Circuit. See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a “court must ask whether an agreement promoted enterprise and productivity at the time it
was adopted”) (emphasis added); Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Polk
teaches that courts must look to the time an agreement was adopted in assessing its potential for

3 In Question 3 on the Verdict Form, the Court correctly recognized that a “yes” answer to Questions
1 and 2 would establish anticompetitive harm, leaving only the question of whether that harm was
outweighed by Endo’s asserted procompetitive justification: “Was the settlement between Endo and
Impax with the reverse payment unreasonably anticompetitive? That is, did the anticompetitive effects of
that settlement outweigh any procompetitive justifications?” ECF No. 1005, at 2 (emphasis added).
Question 3 did not ask the jury to consider the existence of “anticompetitive effects of the settlement” that
followed from its answers to the first two questions, only whether those effects were outweighed by
Endo’s asserted justification.
promoting enterprise and productivity . . . .”). In addressing the same June 2010 settlement
agreement at issue here, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected Impax’s argument “that the [June
2010] settlement does not look anticompetitive in hindsight” because “it is a basic antitrust
principle that the impact of an agreement on competition is assessed as of the time it was
adopted.” Impax Labs., Inc. v. FTC, 994 F.3d 484, 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 712

(2021). As the Fifth Circuit specifically recognized: “That approach also makes sense in reverse
payment cases.” Id.
Other courts considering challenges to reverse payments both before and after Actavis
have similarly recognized that the competitive effects of an agreement must be assessed at the
time it was made. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir.
2003) (pre-Actavis reverse payment case refusing to consider post-settlement patent ruling
finding patent at issue invalid because “the reasonableness of agreements under the antitrust laws
[is] to be judged at the time the agreements are entered into”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004);
In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 870 (Cal. 2015) (holding that justification of reverse

payment “will not turn on whether the patent would ultimately have been proved valid or
invalid” because “[a]greements must be assessed as of the time they are made, at which point the
patent’s validity is unknown and unknowable”) (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306); In re
Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241 (D. Conn. 2015) (“The salient question is not
whether the fully-litigated patent would ultimately be found valid or invalid – that may never be
known – but whether the settlement included a large and unjustified reverse payment leading to
the inference of profit-sharing to avoid the risk of competition.”); Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.,
255 F. Supp. 3d 604, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“[T]he Actavis rule of reason analysis is focused on
whether the settlements were reasonable at the time they were entered into . . . .”).
The FTC and DOJ agree that competitive effects must be assessed as of the date of a
challenged agreement. See FTC & DOJ, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors § 2.4 (2000) (specifying that the agencies “assess the competitive effects of a
relevant agreement as of the time of possible harm to competition”). Commentators agree. P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046e1 (4th & 5th eds. 2015-2021) (explaining

that the “reasonableness of a patent settlement agreement cannot be made to depend on an ex
post determination” of validity or infringement); A. Edlin, S. Hemphill, H. Hovenkamp & C.
Shapiro, The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 585, 617 (2015)
(“[T]he antitrust analysis of a reverse-payment settlement should be made on an ex ante basis, as
of the date of the settlement itself.”).
The ABA Model Antitrust Jury Instructions, which Endo urged the Court to adopt in
almost all other respects, recognize this bedrock rule. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES Instr. 4(B)(3) (2016 ed.) (in cases
involving agreements about patents, rule of reason must consider whether “agreement

unreasonably restrained trade at the time it was made”) (emphasis added). Jury instructions in
another reverse-payment case identified the time of the agreement as the relevant time to assess
the competitive effects of reverse payments. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions, ECF No. 155,
Walgreen Co. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 09-cv-3956, at 15 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) (explaining that
“the rule of reason analysis . . . is conducted on an ‘ex ante’ basis, meaning considering the facts
and circumstances as they existed as of” the date on which the challenged settlement agreement
was executed).
In reverse-payment cases, the time for evaluating competitive effects is critical. As the
Supreme Court explained, the antitrust concern when a brand manufacturer makes a reverse
payment is that it “is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a
finding of noninfringement.” Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). The relevant
anticompetitive harm occurs when the payment “likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition.”
Id. at 157. As the Fifth Circuit explained, “[t]he fact that generic competition was possible, and
that Endo was willing to pay a large amount to prevent that risk, is enough to infer

anticompetitive effect.” Impax, 994 F.3d at 495 (emphasis added); see also Impax, 2019 WL
1552939, at *16 (“And Actavis makes clear that eliminating the risk of competition is a
cognizable harm under the antitrust laws.”); Aggrenox, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 245 (identifying the
question under Actavis as “whether a large and unjustifiable reverse payment was made in order
to avoid the risk of patent invalidation”); Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *26 (quoting
Aggrenox with respect to Actavis’s concern about risk avoidance). After the fact, later events
may make it possible to assess how the litigation was likely to have turned out absent the
agreement. But that is not the competitive harm that Actavis identified.4 Actavis considers the
potential for competition, and “paying a potential competitor not to compete is so detrimental to

competition that normally it is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.” Impax, 994 F.3d at 493
(citing Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1990)).5 A legal rule that considered
developments after the fact, as Endo argued extensively to the jury, would make the competitive
effects of the agreement hinge on the date of the antitrust trial. Had the trial in this case occurred

4 The Actavis dissent may have accepted Endo’s hindsight analysis of the competitive effects of
reverse payment settlements. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 172-73 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Actavis majority’s concern with the risk of competition because it could lead to what it characterized as
“absurd results” in hindsight if, after making a reverse payment to one generic competitor, the brand
litigates its patent and wins against another generic competitor, thereby establishing the validity of its
patent). But the dissent’s opinion is not the law.

5 “Normally,” of course, refers to cases outside the scope of Actavis. Because of the unique context of
Hatch-Waxman patent litigation, Actavis held that reverse payments by brand manufacturers to their
generic competitors are judged under the rule of reason. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155-56.
before Endo obtained the later patents (or before Endo asserted them against other generic
companies), Endo would have had no evidence that the broad license had any procompetitive
effects. Endo was only able to claim procompetitive benefits from the broad license because the
trial in this case took place after it had prevailed against other generic manufacturers on the later-
issued patents. The question of whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer violated the antitrust

laws should not depend upon when the case against it is tried.
The relevant economic analysis of reverse payments also addresses the facts as they exist
at the time of the agreement. As Dr. Keith Leffler, one of Plaintiffs’ economists, testified at trial,
cases settle based on the parties’ expectations at the time of settlement. Tr. 1135:4-1136:16,
1164:22-24. A large reverse payment, if unexplained, is anticompetitive because it is expected to
delay the generic entry date that the brand and generic negotiate. Tr. 1150:18-20. Professor
Thomas McGuire, another of Plaintiffs’ economists, demonstrated that at the time of the actual
settlement, Endo and Impax could have resolved the risk of the litigation without a reverse
payment, and that it would have been profitable for them to agree to an earlier entry date without

a reverse payment. Tr. 1682:14-19. As a matter of economics, Dr. Sumanth Addanki, Endo’s
expert economist, agreed. Although he claimed that parties that settled with a reverse payment
might not be able to reach an alternative agreement without a reverse payment, he agreed that if
they could reach settlement agreements with and without a payment, the agreement with a
reverse payment would have a later entry date. Tr. 2122:18-2123:22.
Despite the law and economics of reverse payments, Endo failed to offer any evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Endo’s reverse payment was procompetitive at
the time that Endo agreed to make it. Instead, Endo argued that the settlement later turned out to
be procompetitive because the license in the SLA permitted Impax to stay on the market when
Endo acquired patents years after entering into the reverse-payment agreement that it
successfully asserted to prevent other generic manufacturers from selling generic Opana ER. In
closing, Endo’s counsel did not identify any evidence to show that the reverse payment was
procompetitive at the time of the agreement. To the contrary, Endo’s counsel told the jury that
on the question of competitive effects, “there are really three things to remember that are

important”:
Impax generic has been on the market so far for nine-and-a-half years with
another seven years to go under the broad license while the patents are still in
effect.
So, that would not have been possible without this license. That’s the second
thing. The sole reason for that 16-and-a-half years during the patent’s life is the
broad license.
And I think the third thing to remember – and you saw the evidence – is every
other generic was ordered off the market by the courts when the additional patents
came along. You heard the evidence that that is what would have happened to
Impax without that broad license.
Tr. 2726:23-2727:11.
None of these points showed that the reverse payment found by the jury was
procompetitive at the time that Endo agreed to make it. Dr. Addanki, Endo’s only expert to
address purported procompetitive effects, admitted that he did not identify any procompetitive
effects as of the time of the reverse-payment agreement. In fact, he testified that he only
considered competitive effects as of the time that he issued his expert report in 2019. Tr.
2130:15-16 (“I analyzed the settlement agreement as a whole, but I didn’t do it as of any time
except the time I did my report.”); id. at 2126:8-14 (agreeing that his analysis of competitive
effects was as of the date of his report in 2019). He further told the jury that an analysis of
competitive effects at the time of the agreement (the analysis required by the law) was “needless
speculation because we know what actually happened.” Tr. 2126:23-2127:1.
Endo’s claimed procompetitive justification failed to address the relevant issue in
Actavis. Endo claimed that its settlement as a whole was procompetitive in hindsight because
subsequent events showed that Impax would have been found to infringe patents that were issued
years after Impax agreed to delay its launch of generic Opana ER. Because Endo’s claimed
procompetitive justification did not address the relevant issue in Actavis at the relevant time,

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Endo violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act by agreeing to make an anticompetitive reverse payment.
B. Endo Offered No Evidence of Any Procompetitive Justification Resulting
From the Reverse Payment Found by the Jury.
Endo’s evidence also failed to rebut the anticompetitive effects of the reverse payment
that the jury found for the separate and independent reason that none of its evidence explained
the reverse payment or in any way showed that the reverse payment had any legitimate
procompetitive justification. Instead, Endo only sought to show that its settlement with Impax
was procompetitive because it contained the broad license that allegedly permitted Impax to
continue to operate after Endo secured the later-issued patents years later.
Impax made the same argument in the FTC’s case challenging Endo’s reverse payment.
While an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) agreed with Impax (and Endo’s trial argument
here) that the license in the SLA “benefitted competition and salvaged the entire agreement from
antirust condemnation,” the Commission rejected that argument as a legal matter. As the
Commission explained:

Impax failed adequately to link the alleged procompetitive justifications to the
challenged restraint, which – as the ALJ acknowledged – was the use of a reverse
payment to eliminate the risk of generic entry before January 2013. Impax does
not make any argument that the No-AG Commitment or Endo Credit (or any
portion of the $10 million DCA payment) have themselves protected Impax from
the threat of patent litigation or that it needed to accept these payments in order to
enjoy the procompetitive benefits of the patent license. Impax thus fails to
overcome the anticompetitive effect, which Actavis anticipated, from reverse
payments “independen[t] from other services for which it might represent
payment,” and “lack[ing] [] any other convincing justification.”
Impax, 2019 WL 1552939, at *30 (citing and quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157, 159). Endo’s
assertion of the same claimed procompetitive justification fails for the same reason.
In Actavis, the Supreme Court identified the “specific restraint at issue” as “a purchase by
the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right it already claims but would lose if
the patent litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not infringed.” Actavis,
570 U.S. at 153-54. It further explained that a “payment in return for staying out of the market”
would “keep[] prices at patentee-set levels,” allowing brand and generic manufacturers to divide
the brand’s continued monopoly. Id. at 154. The Court did not hold that all Hatch-Waxman
settlements risked antitrust liability. To the contrary, it explained that “the fact that a large,

unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from
settling their lawsuit” by agreeing on a generic entry date without any payment. Id. at 158
(emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained, a defendant’s burden under the rule of
reason is to justify the reverse payment, not the settlement containing the reverse payment: “[A]
reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant
anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a payment may be unable to explain and to justify
it . . . .” Id.; see also In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 256 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that
“defendants have the burden of justifying the rather large reverse payment here, and they offer
no reason why those other elements of the settlement agreement do so”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.

983 (2018). A defendant like Endo cannot simply point to unrelated terms in its settlement
agreement to justify its payment but rather must justify “the presence of the challenged term and
show[] the lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.” Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156 (emphasis
added). It must explain the reason for the payment because the “likelihood of a reverse payment
bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon,” inter alia, “its independence from other
services for which it might represent payment and the lack of any other convincing justification.”
Id. at 159.
The requirement that a defendant establish a specific link between a challenged restraint
and any claimed procompetitive justification is well-established. In NCAA v. Board of Regents

of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a
restraint on televised college football games could be justified by a legitimate interest in adopting
rules to promote “competitive balance” among football teams. The Court held that the specific
restraint was “not even arguably tailored” to serve the identified interest. Id. at 117-19. To
establish a procompetitive justification, a defendant must instead show that the restraint bears a
“logical nexus to [the] claimed efficiencies.” N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346,
368 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1170 (2009). Claimed efficiencies that do not “result
from or are [not] in any way connected to” the restraint cannot be used to justify the restraint. Id.
at 369. See also Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 835 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming FTC’s

finding that the respondent had not “demonstrated a connection” between the restraint and the
proffered rationale), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 942 (2011); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d
229, 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that defendants “must provide a procompetitive
justification for the challenged restraint” and sustaining the district court’s finding that “no
evidence” showed that the restraint advanced the proffered justifications), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
811 (2004); In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 347 (2003) (requiring defendant to
“articulate the specific link between the challenged restraint and the purported justification”),
review denied, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶¶ 1505a,
1511c (explaining that defendants’ claimed justifications are “entirely immaterial” unless they
“are actually promoted significantly by the restraint”).
Like Impax in the FTC litigation, Endo did not offer a shred of evidence that the no-AG
agreement, Endo Credit, or the $10 million nonrefundable payment under the DCA protected
Impax from future patent infringement suits. To the contrary, Dr. Addanki, Endo’s economist,
admitted that none of his opinions about purported procompetitive effects was dependent on

whether there was a reverse payment by Endo to Impax (Tr. 2084:21-24) and that he had no
opinion that the broad license explained the no-AG agreement, the Endo Credit, or the $10
million payment under the DCA (id. at 2185:7-14). He did not even offer an opinion that the no-
AG agreement or the Endo Credit were necessary for Endo and Impax to reach a settlement of
their patent litigation. Id. at 2185:15-20.
Nor did any fact witness establish such a link. For example, Margaret Snowden, Impax’s
former Vice President of Intellectual Property, could not identify anything that Impax gave to
Endo in exchange for the broad license. Id. at 612:7-9 (“Q: What did Impax give to Endo to get
that broad license? A: I don’t – I don’t know that there was a horse trade for that. We just dug in

and insisted on it.”). Neither the reverse payment nor the January 2013 entry date changed after
Endo and Impax agreed to the broad license. Id. at 498:22-500:9 (entry date); id. at 503:23-
505:4 (components of the reverse payment).
Unable to link the broad license to the reverse payment as required by the law, Endo
argued to the jury that the evidence showed that it never would have offered a settlement to
Impax with an earlier entry date and the broad license. Tr. 2729:10-23, 2733:23-2734:3. But,
like Impax’s argument to the FTC that Impax would not have settled without the broad license,
Endo’s argument does not address the correct legal question. See Impax, 2019 WL 1552939, at
*36. As the FTC explained, the “appropriate question is whether Endo and Impax could have
reached a similar licensing agreement without a reverse payment for delayed generic entry.” Id.
On this question, the FTC found that because “both the payment and the license were
benefits flowing to Impax, Impax readily could have accepted the license without also accepting
a payment.” Impax, 2019 WL 1552939, at *36 (citation omitted). This Court made the same
point in denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, explaining:

Defendants would like to use the Broad License as a counterbalance to the reverse
payment, but the Broad License is a concession in the same direction as the
reverse payment – from Endo to Impax. As a result, while the Broad License has
potentially beneficial effects to consumers, it does not counterbalance the $102
million reverse payment from Endo to Impax. Instead, the Broad License
concession serves only to highlight how much Endo valued Impax’s delayed start,
suggesting monopolistic effects instead of procompetitive ones.
Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *25.
At trial, Prof. McGuire also made that point, explaining that the broad license was a
benefit to Impax under the settlement agreement and that it did not make economic sense to
conclude that an alternative settlement that removed one benefit to Impax (the reverse payment)
would also eliminate an additional benefit to Impax (the broad license). Tr. 1684:9-1685:16. In
response, Dr. Addanki testified that Prof. McGuire’s opinion did not “make sense at all” because
any “alternative agreement has to be agreeable to both parties.” Id. at 2078:18-19. But Dr.
Addanki’s response was the same legally deficient argument that the FTC rejected when Impax
made it. The issue is not what Endo was willing to offer when it had the opportunity to pay
Impax to delay its entry. The issue is whether it was economically rational for Endo and Impax
to agree to an earlier entry, or, as the FTC put it, whether they “could” enter into an agreement
with an earlier entry date without a reverse payment. Impax, 2019 WL 1552939, at *36.
Because Endo failed to identify any evidence at trial linking the broad license to the
reverse payment found by the jury, the broad license cannot justify Endo’s reverse payment as a
matter of law. Endo obviously did not pay Impax to take the broad license. The broad license
was a separate provision that Impax demanded to settle the patent litigation. It was not tied in
any respect to the reverse payment. Endo’s failure to identify any procompetitive benefit to
justify the reverse payment found by the jury requires judgment as a matter of law in Plaintiffs’
favor.
C. Endo Offered No Evidence to Rebut Plaintiffs’ Showing That a Settlement
Without a Reverse Payment Was a Less Restrictive Means of Achieving the
Benefits of Settlement.
Finally, even if the broad license could be a legally cognizable procompetitive
justification, Endo failed to rebut Plaintiffs’ evidence that there was a less restrictive means of
obtaining its benefits by settling with the same broad license but without the challenged reverse
payment. Endo did not identify any evidence that the broad license was conditioned on Endo’s
reverse payment or anything else in the SLA. Thus, even if Endo preferred to pay Impax to
avoid the risk of competition, there was nothing preventing it legally or economically from
agreeing to an entry date without a reverse payment and the same broad license that it actually
granted. As the FTC held, such a settlement agreement “is a practical, less restrictive
alternative.” Impax, 2019 WL 1552939, at *39.

In NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021), the Supreme Court recently agreed with the
conclusion of a prominent antitrust treatise that a “legitimate objective that is not promoted by
the challenged restraint can be equally served by simply abandoning the restraint, which is surely
a less restrictive alternative.” Id. at 2162 (quoting P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 1505).
That is certainly true here. As discussed above, there is no evidence that any benefits from the
broad license were promoted by or tied to the reverse payment from Endo to Impax. See supra
pp. 13-17. Endo did not offer any evidence that the benefits of the broad license were linked in
any way to the reverse payment found by the jury. Dr. Addanki did not opine that the broad
license explained Endo’s reverse payment (Tr. 2185:7-14) nor did he suggest that the no-AG
agreement or the Endo Credit were necessary for Endo and Impax to settle the patent litigation
(id. at 2185:15-20). It is entirely illogical to believe that Endo paid Impax in order to convince it
to accept the benefits of the broad license. In almost three weeks of trial testimony, no fact or
expert witness made such a claim.
In Actavis, the Supreme Court recognized the ability of parties to settle without reverse

payments. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158 (“[P]arties may well find ways to settle patent disputes
without the use of reverse payments.”); id. (recognizing that parties in Hatch-Waxman litigation
may settle without risking antitrust liability simply by “allowing the generic manufacturer to
enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without . . . paying the challenger to
stay out prior to that point”). Indeed, the “premise” behind Actavis “is that there are better, less
anticompetitive ways to settle these disputes.” P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 2046c2.
All of the economic experts who testified at trial – including Dr. Addanki, Endo’s economist –
recognized that a reverse payment delays the entry date that a brand and generic would otherwise
negotiate. See supra pp. 10-11.

At trial, Endo argued that it never offered a payment-free settlement to Impax or to any
other generic company that contained both an earlier entry date and a broad license. Tr.
2729:10-23; 2733:23-2734:3. But this argument does not rebut the existence of a less restrictive
alternative. To rebut a less restrictive alternative, a defendant must show that “the proffered
alternative is either unworkable or not less restrictive” based on the evidence. P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 1914c; see also Wilk v. Am. Med. Assoc., 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1483 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (concluding that defendant had failed to establish that an alternative was impractical or
unworkable), aff’d, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990). Cf. United
States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 91 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting a proffered efficiency
for a merger where defendant failed to present evidence of why an alternative would not be
feasible).
Endo’s desire to keep generics off the market until January 1, 2013 does not establish that
a no-payment settlement with a broad license was not workable or practical. Rather, all that
Endo’s evidence demonstrated was that Endo preferred to pay Impax to refrain from competing

until January 1, 2013. That is unsurprising. As the evidence showed, Endo expected to make
$20 million a month for every month that it delayed generic entry. See PTX-0078, at 78.0005;
ECF No. 961, at 15. The fact that Endo would earn less in profits under a less restrictive
settlement without a reverse payment does not make that alternative unworkable. Competitors
always make more by conspiring with each other to limit competition. See United States v.
Consolidated Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117, 128 (7th Cir. 1978) (“If the conspirators could
make the conspiracy work and minimize price competition, all conspirators could expect a more
profitable survival . . . .”); In re Surescripts Antitrust Litig., 2022 WL 2208914, at *13 (N.D. Ill.
June 21, 2022) (antitrust conspiracies are “premised on the . . . logic” that “it is better to divide a

bigger pie of monopoly profits by agreement than to compete to win a larger share of a smaller
pie of competitive profits”). See also H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust & the Patent System: A
Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 493 (2015) (“Dividing the monopoly proceeds is virtually
always more profitable than competing, even within a duopoly.”); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP,
supra, ¶ 2002c (“Rivals are naturally more receptive to an invitation to participate in monopoly
profits as opposed to an action directed at eliminating their profits . . . .”). When a less restrictive
alternative reduces prices as expected, it does not mean that the less restrictive alternative is
unworkable or not feasible.
Endo’s failure to identify any link between the broad license and the reverse payment or
any other evidence that a payment was necessary to settle with a broad license requires entry of
judgment as a matter of law in Plaintiffs’ favor. Endo’s preference for a reverse-payment
settlement only shows that it preferred to act anticompetitively rather than to compete against
lower-priced generic Opana ER. That is not sufficient to rebut Plaintiffs’ evidence of the
availability of a less restrictive alternative settlement without a reverse payment.

II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A NEW
TRIAL TO CORRECT THE COURT’S ERRONEOUS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, VERDICT FORM, AND EVIDENTIARY RULINGS.
While the Court should enter judgment as a matter of law for Plaintiffs because no
reasonable jury could find that Endo identified any cognizable procompetitive justification for its
reverse payment, Plaintiffs alternatively request a new trial because the Court did not properly
instruct the jury on the law governing Endo’s claimed procompetitive justification, omitted the
possibility of a less restrictive alternative from the verdict form, and permitted Endo to offer
irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence about the later-issued patents that Endo obtained after
paying Impax to delay its generic entry.
A. The Jury Instructions and Verdict Form Were Contrary to the Law
Governing the Competitive Effects of a Reverse Payment.
Plaintiffs’ proposed instructions and arguments during the charge conference repeatedly
asked the Court to instruct the jury on key legal principles governing Endo’s claim that the broad
license was procompetitive. See, e.g., ECF No. 991-1 (proposed instructions); Tr. 2509:4-20,
2521:22-2522:18, 2574:16-19, 2577:18-2578:3. Individually, and as a whole, the Court’s
omissions from the jury instructions and verdict form left the jury without a proper
understanding of the applicable law and substantially prejudiced Plaintiffs. See AutoZone, 809
F.3d at 922.
1. Time for Assessment of Competitive Effects
A central issue in this case was the relevant time for consideration of the competitive
effects of Endo’s reverse payment. Plaintiffs’ proposed Instruction No. 8 in part asked the Court
to instruct the jury that: “Under the antitrust laws, the competitive effects of agreements are
evaluated at the time that they were formed. Accordingly, in applying the rule of reason, you

should only consider the facts known or that could have been known to the parties in June 2010.”
Instr. No. 8 (ECF No. 991-1, at 16) (citing, inter alia, Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *28).
Plaintiffs extensively argued at the charge conference for an instruction informing the jury that
the competitive effects of a reverse payment must be assessed at the time of the reverse payment
agreement. Tr. 2518:24-2519:18, 2521:22-2511:18, 2529:5-2530:5, 2533:2-21, 2536:10-2537:5.
As discussed above, there should have been no dispute about this bedrock legal principle
of antitrust law. See supra pp. 8-11. The Seventh Circuit unambiguously held that courts in
antitrust cases must ask “whether an agreement promoted enterprise and productivity at the time
it was adopted,” Polk, 776 F.2d at 18 (emphasis added); this Court specifically cited that law in
its summary judgment opinion; the Fifth Circuit relied on it in rejecting Impax’s challenge to the

FTC’s finding that Endo’s reverse payment violated the antitrust laws; various other courts have
stated and applied this principle; the DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines recognize it; the ABA
Antitrust Model Jury Instructions have adopted it; jury instructions in other reverse payment
cases have explained it; and commentators agree. See supra pp. 7-9.
However, at Endo’s urging, the Court refused to instruct the jury that it was required to
consider competitive effects at the time of the agreement and instead told the jury: “When
deciding as to whether there was an unreasonable restraint on trade, you should take into
consideration a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and
effect.” See Instr. 8 (ECF No. 1004, at 9). This instruction was based on language from this
Court’s summary judgment and Daubert opinion citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997). See Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *23.
Khan addressed whether vertical maximum price fixing was illegal per se under the
Sherman Act. In the passage that the Court quoted, Khan cited Chicago Board of Trade v.

United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the very first Supreme Court case describing the rule of
reason. Under that hundred-year old formulation, the rule of reason considers “a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” Id. at 238. But this
general statement of the rule of reason fails to identify significant refinements of the rule of
reason in the hundred years since Chicago Board of Trade. As then-Professor Frank Easterbrook
noted in criticizing the Chicago Board of Trade formulation of the rule of reason as “empty,”
“[w]hen everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.” F. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984). Since Chicago Board of Trade, the rule of reason has been

significantly refined—most notably, through development of the “three-step, burden-shifting
framework.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018). See also Stop & Shop
Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing
Chicago Board of Trade is a “warhorse” that should not be taken literally as “an endorsement of
kitchen-sink antitrust in which anything that might alarm a jury is made admissible”); P. AREEDA
& H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 1505 (explaining that the Court’s modern cases represent a
“significant improvement over” Chicago Board of Trade, where “the parties were invited to
throw in everything relevant to the business and see what sticks”).
One of the refinements of the rule of reason in the century since Chicago Board of Trade
is that the competitive effects of agreements must be assessed as of the date that they are made.
See supra pp. 8-9. Chicago Board of Trade’s passing reference to business “before and after”
does not squarely address this issue and provides no reason to reject the consistent subsequent
rulings made by courts (including the Seventh Circuit) in the years since the Supreme Court’s
first rough articulation of the rule of reason. Given Actavis’s central concern with whether the

brand made a reverse payment to avoid “the risk of competition,” it was particularly prejudicial
for the Court to fail to instruct the jury that it must consider that risk at the time that Endo agreed
to make the reverse payment and to permit Endo to argue that the effects of the challenged
restraint could be assessed at some later time.
The Court’s failure to instruct on this central issue was directly relevant to the verdict
question that the jury decided against Plaintiffs – i.e., whether the anticompetitive effects
outweighed Endo’s procompetitive justification. In closing, Plaintiffs correctly argued that the
jury had to assess competitive effects at the time of the agreement. Tr. 2648:3-22, 2744:15-17,
2750:9-13. In response, Endo’s counsel told the jury that Plaintiffs’ focus on the effects of the

reverse payment at the time of agreement was wrong. Tr. 2686:7-22. She then emphasized the
“before and after” language from Instruction No. 8 based on Khan and Chicago Board of Trade
to argue that the jury should consider competitive effects long after the date of Endo and Impax’s
agreement:
But your consideration is not limited to one moment in time. The Court will give
you instructions later this afternoon, and those instructions will tell you what you
surely already know by now because you have heard so much about the events
that happened after the settlement. You are allowed to consider before and after.
Those patents are evidence in the case that you can consider. And I will show
you why they make such a difference to the questions that you’ll be asked to
answer at the end of the case.
Tr. 2686:14-22 (emphasis added). Instruction No. 8 based on Chicago Board of Trade together
with the Court’s failure to instruct the jury that competitive effects must be considered as of the
date of the agreement misstated the law.
The relevant question under Actavis is not whether Endo’s later acquisition of patents
showed that the June 2010 SLA was procompetitive compared to the result that would have
resulted from litigation in the absence of a settlement. The question is whether a brand
manufacturer agreed to pay its generic competitor to eliminate the risk of competition. Actavis,

570 U.S. at 156. Given the specific emphasis that Endo’s counsel put on this erroneous
instruction, the Court’s failure to instruct the jury that competitive effects must be considered on
the date of the agreement must be found to have prejudiced Plaintiffs.
2. Need to Justify the Reverse Payment
Plaintiffs also asked the Court to instruct the jury that the challenged restraint consisted
of Endo’s reverse payment, and that, under the second step of the rule of reason, Endo had to
show that its reverse payment was procompetitive. Plaintiffs’ proposed Instruction No. 8
provided in part: “[I]f you find that Plaintiffs satisfy the first step [of the rule of reason], the
burden shifts to the Defendants to show the challenged payments to be justified by one or more
procompetitive objectives. Again, Defendants must show that the challenged reverse payments,

not the overall agreement between the Defendants, enhanced or helped competition.” Pl. Prop.
Instr. No. 8 (ECF No. 991-1, at 15); see also Pl. Prop. Instr. No. 17 (ECF No. 991-1, at 36) (“If
you find that Plaintiffs satisfied the first step of the rule of reason, the burden shifts to
Defendants to show that the challenged reverse payments were justified by some procompetitive
objective. The second step of the rule of reason requires Defendants to establish that the
challenged reverse payments, not the overall agreement between the Defendants, enhanced
competition.”); Pl. Prop. Instr. No. 19 (ECF No. 991-1, at 40) (“[Y]ou may not consider
procompetitive effects unless Defendants can show a specific link between the challenged
reverse payments and the purported justification.”).
In contrast, the Court’s instructions did not identify the reverse payment as the restraint
nor explain that it was Endo’s burden in the second step of the rule of reason to justify the
reverse payment. Rather, the Court’s instruction told the jury that its duty was to “decide
whether the settlement agreement imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade” and that “the
burden shifts to the defendants to show procompetitive benefits of the restraint.” Instr. No. 7

(ECF No. 1004, at 8). The third question in the court’s verdict form compounded the problem by
failing to ask whether Endo had justified the reverse payment. Instead, it asked: “Was the
settlement between Endo and Impax with the reverse payment unreasonably anticompetitive?
That is, did the anticompetitive effects of that settlement outweigh any procompetitive
justifications?” Verdict Int. No. 3 (ECF No. 1005, at 2) (emphasis added).
Without a clear instruction that the reverse payment was the relevant restraint, and that
the reverse payment was what Endo had to justify, the jury was free to accept Endo’s argument
that the broad license justified the settlement as a whole. This is the same legal error that the
ALJ made in finding in favor of Impax in the FTC’s case. In reversing its ALJ, the Commission

explained that the broad license could not explain the reverse payment: “For purposes of
procompetitive justifications, we look at the specific restraint, not the agreement as a whole.
Even if an agreement between competitors generally benefits competition, this does not validate
a restraint that ‘makes no significant contribution to the alleged justification.’” Impax, 2019 WL
1552939, at * 31 (quoting P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 1505a). The failure to instruct
the jury that the law required Endo to connect its alleged procompetitive justification to the
reverse payment rather than to the settlement as a whole allowed the jury to make the same error
as the ALJ.
In its Daubert and summary judgment opinion, this Court recognized that Plaintiffs
challenged Endo’s reverse payment, Opana ER II, 2021 WL 2291067, at *18, and that the broad
license could not explain why Endo paid Impax. Id. at *25 (“[W]hile the Broad License has
potentially beneficial effects to consumers, it does not counterbalance the $102 million reverse
payment from Endo to Impax.”). However, the Court did not instruct the jury about the law that
it cited in its own Daubert and summary judgment opinion.

Whether Endo had to justify its payments or the settlement agreement as a whole was not
a factual issue for argument by the parties. See, e.g., Tr. 2485:16-20 (Court’s concern about
“overloading the jury with instructions on reverse payments” and desire to provide “some
relatively innocuous description of what Actavis provides and let the jury then take the facts as
they heard them and apply Actavis . . . .”); id. at 2573:25-2576:12 (Endo’s counsel arguing that
whether the reverse payment or the settlement as a whole must be shown to be unreasonably
anticompetitive is “something that can be argued”). It was a legal issue on which an instruction
was necessary, especially given Endo’s claim that the broad license was a procompetitive
justification. Actavis unambiguously recognized that reverse payments are the challenged term

in cases like this one, and that defendants must justify that term. See supra pp. 12-17. This
approach is consistent with settled law under the rule of reason that only considers the
competitive effects of the specific challenged contractual term, not the contract as a whole. Id.
While some district court opinions have permitted defendants to rely on procompetitive
justifications unrelated to a challenged reverse payment,6 those decisions are erroneous because
they fail to appreciate that Actavis identifies reverse payments, not patent settlements, as the
anticompetitive restraint, and that settled rule-of-reason precedent requires the challenged

6 See, e.g., In re Glumetza Antitrust Litig., 2021 WL 3773621, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2021); In re
Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 3d 274, 317 (D.R.I. 2019); In re Solodyn (Minocycline
Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 734655, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2018).
restraint to be justified.
The absence of any instruction explaining that any procompetitive justification must have
a nexus to the challenged reverse payment prejudiced Plaintiffs. Endo’s entire defense was built
on the broad license, a contractual term that did not explain or even relate to Endo’s reverse
payment. The Court’s instructions left the jury completely unaware of the need to identify such

a nexus.
3. Avoidance of Risk of Competition
Relatedly, the Court’s instructions failed to explain the relevant competitive harm that
Endo had to justify.
Plaintiffs asked the Court to instruct the jury that: “The anticompetitive harm of a reverse
payment is that it eliminates the risk of competition. The fact that the settlement permitted
generic entry before the expiration of patents asserted in litigation does not justify this
anticompetitive effect.” Pl. Prop. Instr. 24 (ECF No. 991-1, at 46); see also Pl. Prop. Instr. 16
(ECF No. 991-1, at 34-35) (“[I]t is an antitrust violation for a brand manufacturer to pay a
generic manufacturer to avoid the risk of losing a patent case, no matter how small the risk of

losing. A reverse payment is unlawful if it is made ‘to prevent the risk of competition’ or to
‘avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.’”) (quoting Actavis, 570
U.S. at 156-57)); Pl. Prop. Instr. 20 (ECF No. 991-1, at 41) (“If the brand company pays the
generic company more than the fair value of the services, that overpayment may be a hidden
reverse payment to avoid the risk of competition (and delay generic entry).”); Pl. Prop. Instr. 21
(ECF No. 991-1, at 44) (“A payment made to ‘prevent the risk of competition’ or because the
Defendants were ‘risk averse’ constitutes the anticompetitive harm of a reverse payment, not a
legitimate justification.” (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157)); Pl. Prop. Instr. 25 (ECF No. 991-1,
at 47) (“[T]he question is whether Endo sought to pay Impax to avoid the risk of competition.”).
The Court’s instructions failed to advise the jury that the relevant harm that Endo had to
justify was the avoidance of the risk of competition. Its instructions did not even refer to the
“risk of competition.” But the central question in Actavis is whether the brand manufacturer paid
to avoid the risk of competition. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157. As Actavis explained, “the
relevant antitrust question is: What are those reasons [that the parties prefer settlements with

reverse payments]? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated
monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to
forbid the arrangement.” Id. at 158.
The absence of any instruction about the relevant harm of reverse payments was critical
to Endo’s success. Dr. Addanki, Endo’s expert, made no assessment of whether Endo’s reverse
payment avoided the risk of competition. To the contrary, he told the jury that competitive
effects are “what actually happened [in the] markets” (Tr. 2127:12-13), that the jury should not
“speculate” about what would have happened as of the date of the agreement “when you know
what actually happened” years later (Tr. 2127:19-20), and that the effects of the agreement

“depended on facts that have developed since June 8, 2010” (Tr. 2129:13-15). Endo’s counsel
made the same argument, telling the jury that it should assess the effect of the settlement based
on its actual, later effect on competition – i.e., that Impax’s generic had been on the market for
nine and a half years as of the date of trial, that it would not have been on the market absent the
broad license, and that every other generic was ordered off the market because of Endo’s
subsequently acquired patents. Tr. 2726:23-2727:9.
Endo and its expert essentially endorsed the rule of law that the Supreme Court rejected
in Actavis. In Actavis, the Eleventh Circuit applied what was known as the “scope of the patent”
test in which “the only pertinent question [was] whether ‘the settlement agreement . . . fall[s]
within’ the legitimate ‘scope’ of the patent’s ‘exclusionary potential.’” Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148
(quoting FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012)). In other
words, the patents at issue in Hatch-Waxman litigation were presumed to be valid and infringed
by the generic manufacturer’s product, and so long as the negotiated entry date was within the
scope of the facial, exclusionary potential of the patent, it was presumed legal. But Actavis flatly

rejected this test and reversed the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court explained that “what the
holder of a valid patent could do does not by itself answer the antitrust question” because the
patent at issue “may or may not be valid, and may or may not be infringed.” Id. at 147.
Unfettered by any instruction explaining the relevant anticompetitive harm to be the elimination
of the risk of losing the patent case and facing competition, Endo took the losing argument in
Actavis one step further. Dr. Addanki claimed that it was impossible to know if the settlement
was anticompetitive until well after the date of the reverse-payment agreement when it could be
known whether any of Endo’s patents, including those that did not even exist at the time of the
reverse payment, were likely infringed by Impax. Tr. 2126:23-2127:1, 2128:19-2130:11.

Endo’s argument that the broad license was a procompetitive justification is directly
contrary to the law established by Actavis and its progeny. The failure to instruct the jury that
the central concern in reverse payment cases is whether the payment was made to avoid the risk
of competition prevented the jury from properly evaluating Endo’s claimed procompetitive
justification.
4. Less Restrictive Means
The Court’s instructions also provided no guidance to the jury as to how it was to assess
whether any procompetitive justifications identified by Endo could be achieved using less
restrictive means or the significance of a conclusion that less restrictive means existed, and the
verdict form omitted the less-restrictive-means inquiry entirely.
Plaintiffs proposed that the Court instruct the jury on the less-restrictive-means analysis
as part of the third step of the rule of reason:
[I]f you find that the procompetitive benefits of the reverse payments outweigh
the anticompetitive harm of the reverse payments, you must consider whether the
procompetitive benefits could have been achieved in some other way less
restrictive of competition. If you find that the procompetitive benefits could have
been achieved in some other way less restrictive of competition, the reverse
payments violated antitrust law under the rule of reason.
Pl. Prop. Instr. 8 (ECF No. 991-1, at 16).
Plaintiffs also proposed a further instruction expanding on the issues relevant to
determining the existence of less restrictive means:
If Plaintiffs prove that the same benefits could have been achieved by other,
reasonably available alternative means that create substantially less harm to
competition, then the claimed procompetitive justifications cannot and do not
justify the reverse payments and the reverse payments violate the rule of reason.
For instance, if you find that Endo and Impax could have settled their patent
litigation without a reverse payment, the procompetitive benefit of settlement in
general cannot justify the reverse payments because the benefits could have been
achieved in settlement without a reverse payment. If you find that other
procompetitive benefits that Defendants have shown could have been achieved
without reverse payments, those other procompetitive benefits cannot justify the
reverse payments. Procompetitive benefits can only justify a reverse payment if
there is no less anticompetitive way to achieve the procompetitive benefits.
Here, Plaintiffs contend that any competitive benefits from the reverse payments
could have been achieved by Endo and Impax settling for an earlier generic entry
date without a reverse payment. If you find that Plaintiffs have proven such an
agreement to be a reasonably available alternative, then they have shown that any
procompetitive efficiencies could have been reasonably achieved through less
anticompetitive means and the reverse payments violated the rule of reason.
Pl. Prop. Instr. 28 (ECF No. 991-1, at 51-52).
These proposed instructions correctly state the law. They would have told the jury that, if
Endo identified a valid procompetitive justification, Plaintiffs could show that the
“procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.”
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2160 (quoting Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284) ; Sealy Mattress
Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 1985 WL 1737, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1985) (“If the defendants are able to
establish the existence of sufficient pro-competitive benefits to offset any anticompetitive effects
of any restraints shown by plaintiffs,” plaintiffs must “show that a less restrictive (i.e., one with
fewer anticompetitive effects) alternative would secure these same benefits[.]”). Plaintiffs’
proposed instructions also would have told the jury that if a plaintiff shows that a procompetitive

justification for a reverse payment could be achieved with a less restrictive means, the reverse
payment is anticompetitive under the rule of reason. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335-36; Impax, 994
F.3d at 497-498 (“A restraint is unreasonable when any procompetitive benefits it produces
could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means,” as the “idea is that it is
unreasonable to justify a restraint of trade based on a purported benefit to competition if that
same benefit could be achieved with less damage to competition.”) (quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ proposed instructions further would have explained to the jury that a less restrictive
means of settling a Hatch-Waxman case is settling without a reverse payment. See Actavis, 570
U.S. at 158 (explaining that the fact that “a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust

liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling” because they “may, as in other
industries, settle in other ways, for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the
patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to
stay out prior to that point”); Impax, 994 F.3d at 498 (noting that a settlement without a reverse
payment had been recognized by the Supreme Court in Actavis as a viable alternative
settlement); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 2046c2 (recognizing that the “premise”
behind Actavis “is that there are better, less anticompetitive ways to settle these disputes”).
In contrast, the Court’s sole instruction on less restrictive means told the jury: “If
defendants prove some procompetitive benefits, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to
show that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive benefits or that the benefits
could have been achieved with less restrictive effects on competition.” Instr. No. 7 (ECF No.
1004, at 8) (emphasis added). The failure to explain the less restrictive means test or how it fits
into the rule of reason was exacerbated by the failure of the verdict form to even include it in the
inquiry posed to the jury. Question 3 on the verdict form asked only: “Was the settlement

between Endo and Impax with the reverse payment unreasonably anticompetitive? That is, did
the anticompetitive effects of that settlement outweigh any procompetitive justifications?” ECF
No. 1005, at 2. Plaintiffs specifically objected to the omission of the less restrictive means
inquiry from Question 3. Tr. 2574:20-21.
Even Defendants’ proposed instructions would have told the jury that the existence of
alternative less restrictive means would mean that any procompetitive justification could not
justify the challenged restraint. Defendants’ Proposed Instruction 11 provided: “If plaintiffs
prove that the same benefits could have been readily achieved by other reasonable or available
alternative means that create substantially less harm to competition, then they cannot be used to

justify their restraint.” Def. Prop. Instr. 11 (ECF No. 988-1, at 16); see also Tr. 2518 (Endo’s
counsel agreeing that if there is a less restrictive means to achieve the procompetitive benefits
identified by defendants, the procompetitive benefits “fall away”). Unlike either Plaintiffs’ or
Defendants’ proposed instructions, the Court’s instructions did not explain that, if the jury found
a less restrictive means, it should find the reverse payment to be anticompetitive. The Court’s
final instructions also failed to explain that a less restrictive means of settling Hatch-Waxman
cases is to settle without a reverse payment, a significant part of the law established by Actavis.
Absent such explanation, the Court’s instructions left the jury without any understanding
of how it was to determine the existence of a less restrictive alternative.
B. The Extensive Evidence of the Later-Issued Patents and Related Litigation
Should Have Been Excluded as Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial.
Finally, Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial because Endo’s extensive evidence of the
later-issued patents and related litigation – Endo’s “most compelling and supportive evidence,”
Cullen, 195 F.3d at 324-25 – was irrelevant and never should have been admitted. Plaintiffs
moved in limine to exclude evidence of the later-issued patents (ECF No. 806) and objected
when Endo offered into evidence court opinions finding the later-issued patents to have been
infringed by other generic manufacturers (Tr. 2331:8-12, 2335:20-22, 2340:16-18, 2342:8-10).
For many of the same reasons explained above, the three patents that Endo obtained years
after it settled with Impax and the related litigation concerning those patents were entirely
irrelevant to the question of whether Endo violated the rule of reason at the time that Endo

agreed to pay Impax to avoid the risk of competition. As the Fifth Circuit explained in affirming
the FTC’s conclusion that Impax’s acceptance of Endo’s reverse payments violated the antitrust
laws:
Impax also argues that the settlement does not look anticompetitive in hindsight.
After all, since the settlement Endo has obtained more patents for Opana ER and
proven their validity in court. On top of that, the product hop [to reformulated
Opana ER] ended up failing once Endo had to take reformulated Opana ER off
the market due to safety concerns. So Impax’s generic is now the only version of
Opana ER on the market.
But it is a basic antitrust principle that the impact of an agreement on competition
is assessed as of “the time it was adopted.”
Impax, 994 F.3d at 496 (quoting Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189).
As discussed above, in its summary judgment opinion, the Court held, consistent with the
Fifth Circuit, that the later-issued patents were not material to whether there is an illegal restraint
of trade because a restraint of trade is “viewed at the time it was adopted.” Opana ER II, 2021
WL 2291067, at *28 (quoting Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189). While the Court elsewhere cited the
general description of the rule of reason from Khan and Chicago Board of Trade, Opana ER II,
2021 WL 2291067, at *23, the Supreme Court’s very first statement of the rule of reason over a
one hundred years ago does not represent the current law under the rule of reason and certainly
does not justify ignoring repeated subsequent specific rulings of the Seventh Circuit and other
courts that the anticompetitive effects of agreements are to be determined at the time of the

agreement. See supra pp. 8-9.
In addition, the later-issued patents were not relevant to Plaintiffs’ evidence of causation.
The only causation benchmark that Plaintiffs presented to the jury was that, absent Endo’s
reverse payments, it was in the economic interests of Endo and Impax to agree to an identical
settlement agreement that included the broad license but no reverse payment. As explained at
trial, such a settlement without a reverse payment would necessarily provide for an earlier
generic entry date. Tr. 1149:5-1150:19 (Dr. Leffler) (“[A] reverse payment is expected to delay
generic entry.”); Tr. 1682:7-19 (Prof. McGuire) (explaining that a settlement without reverse
payment “could have otherwise looked like the existing settlement, except with an earlier date”).

Because the but-for world must differ from the actual world only with respect to the challenged
conduct, the benchmark no-payment settlement agreement must necessarily contain the same
broad license as the SLA. See Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir.
2016) (explaining that a “plaintiff could satisfy its burden . . . [to] establish antitrust injury”
through a “‘but-for’ analysis” consisting of “an expert construction of a hypothetical market free
of any anticompetitive restraint”); Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc, v, Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,
850 F.2d 1286, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988) (“At base, an antitrust plaintiffs’ damages should reflect the
difference between its performance in a hypothetical market free of all antitrust violations and its
actual performance in the market infected by the anticompetitive conduct.”). See also In re Zetia
(Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., 2021 WL 6690351, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2021) (collecting
authorities); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra, ¶ 392b (explaining that a but-for world should
“isolate the effect of the antitrust violation” and “not include any other effects – good or bad –
that influence the financial condition of the plaintiff”); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 54-55 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that

“[t]o isolate the effect of the violation . . . it is important to modify the defendants’ conduct in the
but-for world only to the extent necessary to comply with the law.”).
Accordingly, the later-issued patents would no more prevent Impax from launching in the
but-for world without any reverse payment than they did in the actual world. Those later-patents
and related litigation are therefore irrelevant and should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid.
402.7
Even assuming arguendo that the later-issued patents and related litigation had some
marginal relevance, they should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because any alleged
probative value that they might have had was far outweighed by the likelihood of misleading and

confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Plaintiffs’ case. Allowing evidence of patents that
Endo did not acquire until November 2012, two and a half years after it agreed to pay Impax to
avoid the risk of litigation, created a substantial risk that the jury was misled or confused about
when the competitive effects of the reverse payments must be evaluated and whether the broad
license covering those later-issued patents should be considered a procompetitive justification for
Endo’s reverse payments. It should not.

7 Even if the law did not require the but-for settlement agreement to include the unchallenged broad
license, there was no reason for the jury to hear about what the later-issued patents covered and the
litigation brought to enforce them. The only relevant issue was whether a but-for settlement agreement
with a no-payment entry date would also include a broad license. The details of the later-issued patents
and the later litigation concerning those patents were entirely irrelevant.
The later-issued patents were the centerpiece of Endo’s case. Endo’s counsel featured the
later-issued patents prominently in opening. Tr. 187:17-191:7, 204:11-206:22, 219:2-20, 232:2-
234:1. Endo used them to cross-examine Plaintiffs’ fact witnesses (Tr. 369:11-370:10, 598:11-
24; ECF No. 962 at 21-27) and expert witnesses (Tr. 935:8-17, 1273:17-1278:2, 1449:20-1451:9,
1595:13-1596:14, 1602:4-1604:10, 1608:15-1609:2, 1657:21-1660:9, 1661:5-1663:7, 1748:14-

1750:13, 1763:21-1765:2, 1823:3-18, 1824:12-18, 1905:17-1908:22). Over Plaintiffs’ objection,
Endo offered into evidence copies of both the later-issued patents and the hearsay opinions of
courts finding them to be infringed by other generic manufacturers. Tr. 2329:3-20, 2337:22-
2338:6 (offering into evidence the later-issued patents); Tr. 2330:22-2331:7, 2335:13-20,
2339:22-2340:15, 2341:24-2342:7 (offering court opinion from litigation surrounding those
patents). In closing, Endo’s counsel dwelled on the later-issued patents at length, criticizing
Plaintiffs for failing to spend enough time addressing them (Tr. 2685:3-2686:2, 2687:9-10) and
arguing that they showed that Endo’s reverse payment settlement could not have had any adverse
competitive effects (Tr. 2684:13-2685:2, 2686:23-2687:5, 2733:14-18, 2742:12-15).

The admission of this irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence (without any limiting
instructions) created a “significant chance” that the jury was influenced by improperly admitted
irrelevant evidence. Shick, 307 F.3d at 611. Endo presented no evidence that the reverse
payment was procompetitive at the time of its agreement with Impax. See supra pp. 8-13. The
jury’s finding that the anticompetitive effects of Endo’s conduct did not outweigh its
procompetitive justifications is thus “inconsistent with substantial justice.” Shick, 307 F.3d at
611. If the Court does not enter judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, it should grant a new trial to
correct the wrongful admission of this evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court: (1) grant their Rule 50(b)
motion that Endo violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act (and the state laws asserted by EPPs)
because Endo failed to identify any cognizable procompetitive justification for the reverse
payment found by the jury; and (2) schedule a retrial on the questions of impact and damages. In
the alternative, Plaintiffs request that the Court order a new trial under Rule 59 at which: (1) the
jury will be properly instructed on Endo’s claimed procompetitive justification including the

less-restrictive-means inquiry; (2) the verdict form will correctly permit the jury to find a less
restrictive means of settling; and (3) the irrelevant and unduly prejudicial later-issued patents and
related litigation will be excluded.
Dated: July 27, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Lauren C. Ravkind /s/ Barry L. Refsin
Scott E. Perwin Barry L. Refsin
Lauren C. Ravkind Alexander J. Egerváry
Anna T. Neill HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN
KENNY NACHWALTER P.A. & SCHILLER
Four Seasons Tower – Suite 1100 One Logan Square, 27th Floor
1441 Brickell Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19103
Miami, FL 33131 Tel: (215) 496-7031
T: (305) 373–1000 brefsin@hangley.com
F: (305) 372–1861
sperwin@knpa.com Counsel for Plaintiffs Rite Aid Corporation,
lravkind@knpa.com Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., and CVS Pharmacy,
aneill@knpa.com Inc.

Counsel for Plaintiffs Walgreen Co., The
Kroger Company, Safeway, Inc., HEB
Grocery Co. L.P., and Albertson’s LLC
/s/ Andrew C. Curley__________ /s/ Bruce E. Gerstein
David F. Sorensen Bruce E. Gerstein
Andrew C. Curley Jonathan M. Gerstein
BERGER MONTAGUE PC GARWIN GERSTEIN & FISHER, LLP
1818 Market Street, Suite 3600 Wall Street Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19103 88 Pine Street, 10th Floor
T: (215) 875-3000 New York, NY 10005
F: (215) 875-4604 T: (212) 398-0055
dsorensen@bm.net F: (212) 764-6620
acurley@bm.net bgerstein@garwingerstein.com
jgerstein@garwingerstein.com
Co-Lead Counsel for Direct Purchaser Class
/s/ Gregory S. Asciolla /s/ Robert J. Wozniak
Gregory S. Asciolla Michael J. Freed
Karin E. Garvey Robert J. Wozniak
Matthew J. Perez Brian M. Hogan
DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN
One Grand Central Place LLC
60 East 42nd Street 2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
New York, NY 10165 Bannockburn, IL 60015
T: (646) 933-1000 T: (224) 632-4500
gasciolla@dicellolevitt.com F: (224) 632-4532
kgarvey@dicellolevitt.com mfreed@fklmlaw.com
mperez@dicellolevitt.com rwozniak@fklmlaw.com
bhogan@fklmlaw.com

Co-Lead Counsel for the End-Payor Classes

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10147229. Public record. Not legal advice.
