# Adamidis v. Cook County

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · February 23, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10146303

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 23, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE ADAMIDIS, Independent
Administrator of the Estate of John
Adamidis,
No. 19 CV 7652
Plaintiff,
Judge Manish S. Shah
v.

COOK COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Cook County Sheriff’s Department Police found Judy Glatz dead on her
living-room couch, surrounded by bottles of pills. Officers learned that Glatz’s Jeep
was not in her parking space and asked nearby police departments to help find it.
They also learned the name of John Adamidis from Glatz’s brother. Skokie police
officers quickly located the Jeep in Adamidis’s driveway. Cook County officers and
detectives arrived at the residence, placed Adamidis in handcuffs, told him he was
“being detained,” and took him to the police station for interrogation. Adamidis’s
detention lasted about three to four hours, and he was released without any charges
filed against him. Adamidis filed suit against Cook County and several officers
involved in his detention, alleging false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

1 John Adamidis died on March 27, 2021. [80]. George Adamidis, John’s brother and
administrator of his estate, is now the plaintiff in this case. [85]. For readability, I refer to
John Adamidis and “plaintiff” interchangeably in this opinion.
Defendants move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. The motions are denied. A jury could find that there was no probable
cause to believe that Adamidis committed a crime, and factual disputes about who

communicated the decision to seize Adamidis preclude a decision as a matter of law
on defendants’ qualified-immunity defense.
I. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
I construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the nonmoving

party. Robertson v. Department of Health Services, 949 F.3d 371, 377–78 (7th Cir.
2020). But the moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving
party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element” of his case for which
he has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also
Wade v. Ramos, ---F. 4th---, No. 20-1241, 2022 WL 483155, at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 17,
2022) (nonmovant’s version of events must be “backed up by a measure of plausible
evidence” in the record).

II. Background
On July 7, 2019, Cook County Sheriff’s Officers David Ribaldo and Susano
Viramontes arrived at Judy Glatz’s apartment for an “ambulance assist.” [88] ¶ 9.2

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except in the case of citations
to depositions, which use the deposition transcript’s original page number. The facts are
largely taken from plaintiff’s response to defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement, [88], and
defendants’ response to plaintiff’s statement of additional material facts, [92], where both the
asserted fact and the opposing party’s response are set forth in one document.
They met Glatz’s father outside the building, who told them that the apartment door
was unlocked and open, and that Glatz was on the sofa—black and blue and
unresponsive. [78] Ex. B, Ribaldo Body Worn Camera at 0:35–0:59. The officers

entered the apartment, found Glatz’s dead body on the living-room couch, notified
dispatch that it would be a death investigation, and began to secure the scene. Id. at
1:29–1:49; [88] ¶¶ 12–13, 18, 24. Officers found multiple prescription-drug bottles on
the table next to Glatz’s body—some bearing the names of other people. [92] ¶ 15. But
Ribaldo did not see any indication of forced entry or signs of violence. [92] ¶ 32.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Roger Guerra and Sergeant Steven Zepeda arrived.

[88] ¶ 14. Ribaldo, Viramontes, and Zepeda examined the inside of Glatz’s apartment.
[88] ¶¶ 26–27.3 Ribaldo told Zepeda that Glatz had cash in her hand, a purse
underneath her, and that he found a bunch of pill bottles. [88] ¶ 20; [78] Ex. B,

3 Defendants assert: “Officer Ribaldo found and examined the parts from the broken locking
mechanism, which was sitting on the kitchen counter, purportedly from the broken parking
lot entry door. Sgt[.] Zepeda pushes open the door to the apartment without pushing the
knob, consistent with [a] broken locking mechanism.” [88] ¶ 28. For support, they cite the
body worn camera videos and depositions of Ribaldo and Zepeda. But this fact is disputed
and neither video clearly shows a broken locking mechanism. At best, the state of the door’s
locking mechanism remains unclear, making an inference in favor of defendants improper at
this stage. Ribaldo’s video shows him standing at the counter, jingling something that sounds
like metal. See [78] Ex. B, Ribaldo BWC at 8:24–8:53. But all Ribaldo’s camera captures are
the cabinets, dishes, and toaster in front of him—it does not reveal what is on the counter.
Id. In fact, Zepeda’s BWC shows the deadbolt intact, and captures what appear to be a receipt,
a large keychain, and a pink screwdriver on the counter where Ribaldo stood. [78] Ex. D,
Zepeda BWC at 6:41–7:03. Ribaldo testified that he was playing with a metal object he
believed were parts of a lock, but he also qualified that he did not “remember exactly what
was on there,” and he did not recall telling anyone that the locking mechanism was a possible
sign of forced entry or making such a note in a report. [75-7] at 49:14–50:5, 81:1–82:4. Finally,
while Zepeda appears to have opened the apartment door without pushing or turning the
doorknob, he arrived after Glatz’s father, Ribaldo, and Viramontes had all already entered
through the same door. Defendants’ assertion that Zepeda’s entry was “consistent with a
broken locking mechanism” is just speculation.
Ribaldo BWC at 11:00–11:11. The cash was rolled up in a way that indicated it was
being used to snort a substance. [88] ¶ 22.
In the parking lot, Glatz’s father told Viramontes that his daughter’s Jeep was

not in her parking space; Viramontes contacted dispatch to help locate the vehicle.
[88] ¶ 15; [78] Ex. C, Viramontes BWC at 5:55–6:24, 7:56–8:40. Glatz’s father also
told officers that to the best of his knowledge, the vehicle had been recently repaired,
returned home, and then towed after Glatz was arrested. [92] ¶ 13. He further
reported that he last communicated with Glatz on June 24 (two weeks earlier), that
Glatz struggled with drugs, and that he had begged her to go to rehab. [88] ¶¶ 32–33;

[92] ¶ 14. The officers started to develop a timeline of Glatz’s death, and asked
dispatch to run a criminal history check to see if Glatz had any history of drug or
alcohol abuse. [88] ¶ 32.
After officers turned off their body cameras, Glatz’s brother arrived on the
scene to meet his father and told officers John Adamidis’s name; officers ran the name
through dispatch and learned Adamidis’s physical description and address. [88]
¶¶ 36–37. At the same time, more investigators continued to arrive at the scene,

including Sergeant Michael Dwyer, who took over the investigation after being
debriefed. [88] ¶¶ 39–41.4 Detective Sheryl Collins also arrived at the scene; officers

4 Dwyer testified that he believed locating the Jeep could be significant because “the vehicle
could have been taken in her death, there could be evidence of the death in the vehicle, there
could be proceeds that could have been taken by force[, and] [t]here’s a lot of questions that
need to be answered.” [88] ¶ 45. Plaintiff disputes this fact, focusing on Dwyer’s testimony
that he has no recollection of ever instructing anyone to question or take Adamidis into
custody, or having probable cause to arrest him. [88] ¶ 45; [75-9] at 9:18–20, 10:1–22. But the
two are not the same. “A response may not set forth any new facts, meaning facts that are
not fairly responsive to the asserted fact to which the response is made.” Local Rule 56.1(e)(2).
told her that Glatz’s death was likely related to a drug overdose but no one indicated
that any crime had been committed. [92] ¶ 8.
Cook County notified nearby police departments of the search for Glatz’s Jeep

and Skokie personnel quickly found it at Adamidis’s residence in Morton Grove. [88]
¶¶ 47–49, 54. There was never any message that the Cook County Sheriff was looking
for Adamidis or indicating that the vehicle was stolen. [88] ¶¶ 47, 56.5 After finding
the Jeep, Skokie Officer Shane Long’s superior told him to stay at Adamidis’s
residence until Cook County officers showed up. [88] ¶ 55.
Back at Glatz’s apartment, Dwyer told Detective Maureen Donohoe that

Adamidis was a suspect in the death investigation and told her to bring Adamidis in
for questioning; Collins also heard Dwyer say that Adamidis should be detained
(though she did not know who Dwyer told). [88] ¶¶ 43, 46; [92] ¶ 9. Collins never
heard Dwyer state that Adamidis was a suspect in any crime or explain why he should
be brought in for questioning. [92] ¶ 8. But according to Collins and Donohoe, Dwyer
instructed them to relocate to Adamidis’s residence. [92] ¶¶ 9–10.
Skokie officers did not arrest Adamidis because they had very little

information, it was not their case, and they were not aware of any reasons to do so.
[92] ¶ 16. After Skokie and Morton Grove police arrived, Adamidis got out of his
residence and approached the officers; according to Adamidis’s testimony, Skokie

Dwyer’s failure to recall these facts does not undermine his testimony that locating the
vehicle might be significant.
5 Adamidis would later testify that Glatz had parked her Jeep in his driveway with two flat
tires approximately a week before her body was discovered. [92] ¶ 2. Body camera footage
appears to confirm a flat front passenger tire. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 0:48–0:54.
officers told him to stop in the middle of the driveway and get on the ground. [88]
¶ 59. Collins told Skokie personnel that she wanted Adamidis taken into custody, and
plaintiff was handcuffed. Id.; [92] ¶ 16.6 When Donohoe, Collins, and Guerra arrived

at Adamidis’s residence, Skokie officers turned Adamidis over to Cook County
custody. [88] ¶¶ 61, 63.7
Guerra placed Adamidis in handcuffs. [88] ¶¶ 64, 69; [92] ¶ 22.8 Guerra’s body
worn camera indicates Adamidis was handcuffed for at least thirteen minutes before
being placed in a squad car (still handcuffed). [92] ¶ 17; [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC.
During that time, Adamidis was cooperative and did not refuse to answer any

questions or comply with any instructions. Id.
Early on, Adamidis asked Guerra if he could get his medicine from the house;
Guerra said “I’m going to take care of that in one second for you” and led Adamidis
over to Collins and two other officers. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 0:50–0:58. Collins
questioned Adamidis about his medications, and Guerra suggested that Adamidis tell

6 It’s unclear who originally handcuffed Adamidis. Adamidis testified that Skokie police
handcuffed him in the driveway before Cook County officials arrived. [75-11] at 36:11–37:23,
38:10–13, 43:5–13. Skokie Officer Shane Long, however, testified that no one placed
Adamidis under arrest or detained him before the Cook County Sheriff’s department
handcuffed him. [75-18] at 12:8–13:2, 43:6–22. Guerra further muddies the waters; he
testified that he replaced handcuffs from Morton Grove and placed Cook County handcuffs
on Adamidis. [75-15] at 7:19–22.
7 Skokie and Morton Grove personnel did not provide any information that influenced
Collins’s or Donohoe’s decision to detain Adamidis. [92] ¶ 12.
8 Defendants assert that Guerra switched out handcuffs to place Cook County handcuffs on
Adamidis, an assertion plaintiff does not contest. [88] ¶ 64. And Guerra’s body camera video
appears to show Guerra handing a Skokie officer a set of handcuffs as he fastens other
handcuffs on Adamidis. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 0:03–0:06. Yet as discussed in Note 6, the
record is unclear regarding which department—Skokie, Morton Grove, or Cook County—first
handcuffed Adamidis.
the officers where the medication was so they could escort Adamidis’s father into the
house to retrieve it. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 1:04–1:54. Adamidis then asked
Guerra and Collins if he was under arrest, to which Guerra responded: “Right now,

sir, you are being detained, and we’re going to transfer you over while you get, uh, for
our investigation.” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 1:54–2:02; [88] ¶ 65. Collins nodded
along and said, “Detained. Yeah.” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 1:57–2:01.
Several minutes later, Adamidis again asked officers what was going on. [78]
Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 6:52–6:57. Collins replied, “You are being detained as the
officer earlier told you, ok? Then we are going to take you to our office and follow up,

ok?” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 6:58–7:06. Collins then asked Adamidis whether he
had any identification; Adamidis said it was right inside and he could show her
where. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 7:08–7:15. Adamidis then told officers “I’m not
going to go nowhere,” to which Collins responded: “I know you’re not going anywhere,
but you can’t go back in the house. So can your dad bring, can you like tell me where
it is? Because if not, we’ll just take you and fingerprint you for positive I.D., that’s not
a problem.” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 7:16–7:27.

After a few more minutes, Guerra walked Adamidis from the driveway to a
squad car down the street and placed him in the backseat. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC
at 10:40–12:51. None of the officers asked Adamidis about Glatz, why Glatz’s vehicle
was parked in his driveway, or whether he would voluntarily travel to police
headquarters for questioning. [92] ¶ 18. Donohoe and Collins informed Guerra that
Adamidis would be taken to the Cook County Sheriff’s facility in Maywood, Illinois,
for further questioning. [92] ¶ 23.
Donohoe and Collins transported Adamidis—still in handcuffs—to the

Maywood station for questioning regarding the Glatz death investigation and his
possession of the Jeep. [88] ¶¶ 68, 70; [92] ¶ 25. Guerra stayed behind to handle the
tow of the Jeep. [88] ¶ 68. About an hour and a half after being handcuffed in his
driveway, Adamidis arrived at police headquarters, where Donohoe placed him in
locked room for questioning. [92] ¶¶ 24, 26. Dwyer assigned Detective Robert Lobacz9
to interview Adamidis. [92] ¶ 30. Dwyer and Collins told Lobacz that there was a

death investigation of a woman (Glatz) who had potentially died of a drug overdose
and whose vehicle was found in front of Adamidis’s house; they also told Lobacz that
there was no sign of a break-in at Glatz’s apartment. [88] ¶ 71; [92] ¶ 30. Collins and
Lobacz then questioned Adamidis, who signed a waiver of his Miranda rights, did not
ask for an attorney, and answered all of their questions. [88] ¶¶ 72–74; [92] ¶ 28.10
Adamidis told Collins and Lobacz that he had a relationship with Glatz, that her car
was the one in his driveway, and that he had previously seen Glatz use drugs. [88]

¶ 74. After two to three hours, detectives ended the interview and drove Adamidis
home. [88] ¶¶ 73–74. From the time he was placed in handcuffs outside his residence

9 Plaintiff dropped his claims against Lobacz in the third amended complaint. [55].
10 Adamidis testified that officers did not read him his Miranda rights and that he felt like
he had no choice but to sign the waiver. [75-11] at 58:16–59:7. To resolve defendants’ motions
for summary judgment, it is immaterial whether officers read Adamidis his rights or whether
Adamidis voluntarily and knowingly waived those rights. The issue is whether Cook County
officers unlawfully seized him, and the Miranda-related issues do not bear on that question.
until his interrogation ended at the station, Adamidis was detained for approximately
three to four hours total. [88] ¶ 76; [92] ¶ 33. He was never booked, put in a holding
cell, fingerprinted, or charged with any crime. [88] ¶ 77. The investigation never

became a homicide investigation—Glatz’s death was designated an accidental drug
overdose. [92] ¶¶ 1, 31.
Collins, Guerra, Donohoe, and Dwyer knew: (1) Glatz was dead; (2) Glatz’s
vehicle was at Adamidis’s residence; and (3) Glatz was not with the vehicle. [88]
¶ 66.11 None of the officers had any information suggesting that Glatz’s vehicle had
been stolen, and Guerra’s tow report did not indicate that the vehicle had been stolen.

[92] ¶¶ 4, 25. Donohoe and Collins did not have any other information about Adamidis
and testified that their supervisor Dwyer made the call to detain him. [88] ¶¶ 43, 46;
[92] ¶¶ 9, 21. Guerra, for his part, testified that he handcuffed Adamidis at the
direction of Collins and Donohoe, and that the detectives made the decision to take
Adamidis into custody, which Collins and Donohoe dispute. [92] ¶¶ 22–23.
Adamidis sued Dwyer, Collins, Donohoe, and Guerra under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.12 Defendants move for

summary judgment.

11 Defendants also assert that they knew Dwyer wanted Adamidis to be brought in for
questioning, but this fact is disputed. Dwyer testified that he could not recall ever instructing
anyone to question or arrest Adamidis, or whether there was probable cause to arrest
Adamidis. See [75-9] at 9:18–10:22, 17:21–18:7. Dwyer testified repeatedly that he could not
recall any details regarding the decision to detain plaintiff and was not aware of anything
that could refresh his recollection. Id.; [92] ¶¶ 3–6.
12 Cook County is also a defendant, for indemnification purposes. See [55] ¶¶ 51–53.
III. Analysis
Defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds. First, they say that
they had probable cause to arrest Adamidis. Second, they argue that they are entitled

to qualified immunity.
A. False Arrest
Section 1983 authorizes suits against officers who violate constitutional rights
while acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fourth Amendment,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable
seizures, including arrests lacking probable cause. See Bailey v. United States, 568

U.S. 186, 192–93 (2013); see also Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 301 (7th
Cir. 2011). To prevail on his false-arrest claim, Adamidis “must show that there was
no probable cause for his arrest.” Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir.
2016).
1. Adamidis’s Detention Required Probable Cause
Dwyer contests whether Adamidis was arrested within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.13 He does not dispute that Adamidis was seized; rather, Dwyer

contends that Adamidis’s detention amounted to an investigatory stop under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), requiring only reasonable suspicion. Handcuffing Adamidis
and taking him to the police station for hours of questioning, Dwyer argues, “is not

13 Defendants Guerra, Collins, and Donohoe do not dispute that Adamidis’s detention
required probable cause, although they elide the remainder of the operative phrase: probable
cause to “believe that the suspect had committed a crime.” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992
F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); see [74] at 2, 10–11 (arguing defendants had
“probable cause to detain [Adamidis] and bring him in for questioning” without basing such
cause on any crime).
sufficient, on its own, to reasonably conclude it constituted an arrest.” [72] at 6. Dwyer
also emphasizes that officers handcuffed Adamidis during transport for safety
purposes, told Adamidis that he was only being detained (not under arrest), and

questioned him for only as much time as necessary to determine whether he was
involved in Glatz’s death.
Officers may conduct brief investigatory stops “if they reasonably suspect that
an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.” Torry v. City of Chicago,
932 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2019). Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than
probable cause. See United States v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2020)

(reasonable suspicion is “more than a hunch but less than probable cause”). “Subtle,
and perhaps tenuous, distinctions exist between a Terry stop, a Terry stop rapidly
evolving into an arrest[,] and a de facto arrest.” United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221,
1224 (7th Cir. 1994). For a Terry stop to “pass constitutional muster, the investigation
following it must be reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances
that justified the stop in the first instance so that it is a minimal intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.” United States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548, 552

(7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). While there is no bright-line time limit, a stop that
lasts unreasonably long becomes an arrest and must be supported by probable cause.
See id. at 552–53.
This was not a Terry stop. While “certain seizures may be justified on
something less than probable cause,” neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh
Circuit have ever “sustained against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary
removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his detention there for
investigative purposes ... absent probable cause or judicial authorization.” See Kaupp
v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985)).

Here, officers handcuffed Adamidis in front of his home, did not allow him to re-enter
his residence, asked no questions and gathered no information to dispel their
suspicions, removed him from his property, and involuntarily transported him to the
police station for hours of questioning. Even if he were detained at the station only
briefly and for investigative purposes, “such seizures, at least where not under
judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that

arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.” Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.
Further, that officers told Adamidis he was being “detained” rather than
arrested does not matter. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979)
(“The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was not ‘booked,’
and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless,
while not insignificant for all purposes … obviously do not make petitioner’s seizure
even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its

progeny.”) Nor is it significant that officer safety allegedly motivated the decision to
transport Adamidis in handcuffs. See Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 632 (“The test is an objective
one … and stressing the officers’ motivation of self-protection does not speak to how
their actions would reasonably be understood.”). The undisputed material facts show
that officers arrested Adamidis, triggering the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause
requirement.
2. Probable Cause
The next question is whether the undisputed material facts compel a finding
that defendants had probable cause to arrest Adamidis. Probable cause is an absolute

defense to a false-arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983. See Farnik
v. City of Chicago, 1 F.4th 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Muhammad v. Pearson,
900 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir. 2018).
“Probable cause is a common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of
criminal activity; it exists whenever an officer or a court has enough information to
warrant a prudent person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Young v. City of

Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406,
411 (7th Cir. 2010)). The probable-cause determination hinges on the elements of the
underlying criminal offense. See Neita, 830 F.3d at 497; see also Pourghoraishi v.
Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Whether an officer has probable
cause to arrest depends on the requirements of the applicable state criminal law.”).
The subjective motivations of the arresting officer are immaterial. See Gibbs v.
Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 737

F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir.2013)). Instead, an officer has probable cause to arrest a
suspect only “when, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer would
believe that the suspect had committed a crime.” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d
633, 638 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants invoke the collective knowledge doctrine, which holds that an
officer may arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer “even if the officer
himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level
of suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 596
(7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252–53 (7th Cir.

2010)). For the collective knowledge doctrine to apply, “(1) the officer taking the
action must act in objective reliance on the information received, (2) the officer
providing the information—or the agency for which he works—must have facts
supporting the level of suspicion required, and (3) the stop must be no more intrusive
than would have been permissible for the officer requesting it.” Williams, 627 F.3d at
252–53. The collective knowledge doctrine “is not an end around” the probable-cause

requirement; the officer or agency providing the relied upon information must still
have probable cause to justify the arrest. See United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042,
1052 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401
U.S. 560, 568 (1971) (“[A]n otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge
by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.”).
Defendants highlight several facts to argue that they had probable cause to
arrest Adamidis. They knew (1) Glatz was dead in her apartment, surrounded by

bottles of prescription pills and clutching a rolled-up dollar bill in her hand; (2) Glatz’s
Jeep was not in her parking spot; (3) Glatz’s brother provided officers Adamidis’s
name; and (4) the Jeep was parked in Adamidis’s driveway. Dwyer believed, based on
these facts, that Adamidis could have been involved with the illegal drugs at the
apartment, stolen Glatz’s vehicle, or caused her death.
But a reasonable jury could find that the officers’ collective suspicion of
Adamidis amounted to nothing more than speculation. There are no facts, for
example, indicating that anyone other than Glatz caused her own death, let alone

connecting Adamidis to the death. Officers found no signs of violence or struggle,
there was never a homicide investigation, and a jury could infer from Zepeda’s body
camera and Lobacz’s testimony that there was no problem with the lock or signs of
break-in at Glatz’s apartment. See [92] ¶¶ 30–31; [78] Ex. D, Zepeda BWC at 6:41–
7:03.14 And while officers knew that Glatz had struggled with drug addiction, they
had no evidence connecting Adamidis to the drugs in Glatz’s apartment or the cause

of her death.15
A jury could reasonably infer, moreover, that the presence of Glatz’s Jeep in
Adamidis’s driveway was not evidence of a crime that Adamidis committed. Glatz’s
father told officers that the vehicle had been repaired, returned to Glatz’s parking
space, and then towed by police after she was arrested. No one told the police that
they believed the vehicle had been stolen, and no evidence in the record suggests that

14 All defendants contend that there were signs of forced entry into the apartment. But
whether there was a broken lock or any other signs of forced entry, and whether those facts
would support probable cause, are questions for the jury. See Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737,
740 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The probable cause determination must be made by a jury if there is
room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
15 Guerra, Collins, and Donohoe say that officers “learned Plaintiff and Judy both had a
history of drug use” and that officers shared this information with one another. [74] at 5. To
support this assertion, defendants cite ¶ 32 of their statement of facts, which states in its
entirety: “[Glatz’s father] told Officer Ribaldo that Judy had a problem with drugs and that
he begged her to go to rehab, but she did not go, and the officers asked dispatch to run a
[criminal history check], a criminal history, to help determine if Judy Glatz had any history
of drug use or alcoholism.” [75] ¶ 32. This fact does not support a finding that officers learned
that Adamidis had a history of drug use.
Adamidis’s unlawfully possessed the vehicle. Dwyer believed the Jeep was relevant
to the investigation, and defendants argue that they had a lot of questions, so
bringing Adamidis in for questioning was the “only way” their questions could be

answered. [74] at 11. But officers could have questioned Adamidis at his home or
asked him to voluntarily come to the station for questioning. They also could have
attempted to search the vehicle to confirm their suspicions. Defendants were not
authorized, however, to arrest Adamidis based on a hunch about what might be in
the Jeep. Drawing all inferences in plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could conclude
that officers lacked probable cause to believe Adamidis had committed a crime.

Defendants also have not identified what crime supplied the foundation of
their alleged probable cause. “Whether an officer is authorized to make an arrest
ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law.” See Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). “Federal law asks only whether the officers had probable
cause to believe that the predicate offense, as the state has defined it, has been
committed.” Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2001). Defendants
here simply list several Illinois statutes for the first time in their reply briefs. See [91]

at 5 n.3 (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 720 ILCS 5/9-3.4
(concealment of a homicidal death), 720 ILCS 570/402 (illegal possession of a
controlled substance); 720 ILCS 570/406.2 (unauthorized possession of a prescription
form)); [93] at 7 (same).
These arguments are waived for two independent reasons. First, it is well
settled that “arguments raised for the first time in [a] reply brief are waived because
they leave no chance to respond.” White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir.
2021); see also Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2019). Second,
defendants simply list these statutes without any analysis or application to the facts

of this case. Such perfunctory and undeveloped arguments provide independent
grounds for waiver. See M.G. Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer
Agency, Inc., 845 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017). Even looking past the waiver issue, a
jury could reasonably conclude that officers lacked probable cause to believe plaintiff
was involved in any homicide or possessed any illegal drugs or prescription forms.
Probable cause to arrest requires more than suspicion that someone may have

committed some unidentified crime. Officers must have an articulable factual basis
to believe that the suspect committed a crime. See Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 638. A
reasonable jury could find that defendants did not have one here.
3. Dwyer’s Personal Involvement
Finally, Dwyer contends that there is no evidence that he was personally
involved in Adamidis’s arrest. A government official is liable under § 1983 only for
his or her own personal involvement in a constitutional violation. See Taylor v. Ways,

999 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2021). To hold a supervisor like Dwyer liable, plaintiff
must show Dwyer knew about the conduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or
turned a blind eye to it. See Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir.
2017); Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).
There is evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that Dwyer knew
of plaintiff’s arrest and facilitated, approved, or condoned it. Donohoe testified that
Dwyer told her to go to “go to [Adamidis’s] house in Morton Grove to pick up a
suspect.” [92] ¶ 10. Collins testified that Dwyer told her and other officers to relocate
from Glatz’s apartment to Adamidis’s residence, and she personally heard Dwyer

state that Adamidis “should be detained.” [92] ¶ 9. And critically, Lobacz testified
that Dwyer assigned him to interview Adamidis at the station, and that Dwyer and
Collins told him that it was part of the death investigation. [92] ¶ 30. A trier of fact
could reasonably infer from these facts that Dwyer’s involvement throughout
Adamidis’s detention facilitated or approved his arrest, transport, and interrogation.
B. Qualified Immunity

In § 1983 suits, officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless: “(1) they
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their
conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 589 (2018) (quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800,
806 (7th Cir. 2021). This common-law doctrine aims “[t]o strike a balance between
addressing constitutional injuries committed by state actors and limiting the costs of
section 1983 suits.” Est. of Davis v. Ortiz, 987 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2021). When a

government official invokes qualified immunity at summary judgment, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to defeat the defense by showing (1) that a trier of fact could
conclude that the officer violated a federal right, and (2) that the unlawfulness of the
conduct was clearly established at the time the officer acted.” Ortiz, 987 F.3d 638–39.
Plaintiff has done so. A trier of fact could conclude that the defendants arrested
Adamidis without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. And
the constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly
established before Adamidis’s arrest. See, e.g. Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719,
725 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) and Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). As was the more specific right to be free from involuntary
detention for custodial interrogation without probable cause. See Kaupp, 538 U.S. at
630–32; Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815–16; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.
Still, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity if they arguably had
probable cause to arrest Adamidis. That is, even if they lacked probable cause,
defendants would be immune from suit “if a reasonable officer in their position could

mistakenly have believed that probable cause existed.” Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677,
684 (7th Cir. 2011).
But unresolved issues of material fact preclude a finding that any defendant
had arguable probable cause to seize Adamidis. A jury, for example, could find that
Dwyer ordered Donohoe and Collins to pick up Adamidis as a “suspect” and “bring
him to the station for questioning.” [92] ¶¶ 10–11. Both Donohoe and Collins testified
that Dwyer made the call to take Adamidis into custody. [92] ¶¶ 10–11, 21. Dwyer

was also involved in advising Adamidis’s questioners once he arrived at the station.
Based on the facts in record, a jury could find that Dwyer was personally involved in
the arrest and lacked even arguable probable cause to suspect Adamidis had
committed a crime. As plaintiff acknowledges, see [90] at 28, if a jury concludes that
Donohoe, Collins, and Guerra were simply acting on another officer’s orders, they
may be entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that they reasonably believed
there was probable cause. See United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir.
2007) (absent reason to believe otherwise, officer is entitled to deem reliable the
information received fellow officer); United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 764 (7th

Cir. 2005) (officers effecting an arrest need not know all facts that constitute probable
cause when they reasonably act at the direction of another officer).
Yet it is not clear from the record that Collins and Donohoe were acting at the
direction of Dwyer when they took Adamidis into custody. There was no
documentation of Dwyer ordering officers to take Adamidis into custody, and Dwyer
testified that he had no recollection of giving the order and would have expected such

an order to be documented. See [92] ¶¶ 3, 11. A jury might believe Dwyer that he did
not cause the arrest and simply ordered detectives to relocate to Adamidis’s residence.
[92] ¶ 10. Indeed, while Collins says she heard Dwyer say that Adamidis should be
detained, she does not recall who Dwyer said this to, and she never heard Dwyer state
that Adamidis was a suspect in a crime. [92] ¶¶ 8–9. If Collins and Donohoe arrested
plaintiff without Dwyer directing them to do so, then they would not be entitled to
qualified immunity. Similarly, Guerra testified that he handcuffed Adamidis at the

direction of Collins and Donohoe, but Donohoe testified that she did not instruct
Guerra to do so, and Collins claimed to have no knowledge of what led to Adamidis
being placed in handcuffs. [92] ¶ 22.
In short, the record is unsettled on what Dwyer told Collins and Donohoe, and
in turn, what Collins and Donohoe told Guerra. These factual gaps preclude a finding
that any defendant reasonably believed there was probable cause to arrest Adamidis.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Adamidis, a jury could find that the
defendants violated Adamidis’s clearly established constitutional rights by making a
full-scale arrest without probable cause.
V. Conclusion
The motions for summary judgment, [71] and [73], are denied.
ENTER:
hA CS HA_
Manish 8. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: February 23, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10146303. Public record. Not legal advice.