# Yates v. The State of Illinois

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · December 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10145943

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEIA YATES, LEONARDO RODRIQUEZ, and )
JOHNNY JIMMERSON, as representative of that )
class of individuals working as Aviation Security )
Officers of the City of Chicago, Department of )
Aviation, )
)
Plaintiffs, ) Case No. 18 C 2613
)
v. )
) Judge Robert W. Gettleman
CITY OF CHICAGO, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Keia Yates, Leonardo Rodriquez and Johnny Jimmerson, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated individuals working as Aviation Security Officers
(“ASOs”) of the City of Chicago, Department of Aviation, brought a four count putative class
action complaint against defendants State of Illinois and Brent Fischer as Executive Director of
the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (“ILETSB”) (jointly, the “State
defendants”), and the City of Chicago and Ginger Evans as Commissioner of the City of Chicago
Department of Aviation (“CDA”) (jointly, the “City defendants”), claiming that the defendants
stripped them of their histories as law enforcement officers. Counts I and II were brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause respectively. Counts III and IV were
state law claims for fraudulent inducement and promissory estoppel. All claims were brought
against all defendants. The State defendants and the City defendants brought separate motions
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court granted the State
defendants’ motion in full, and granted the City defendants’ motion in part, dismissing Counts I
and III, leaving plaintiffs’ due process and promissory estoppel claims against the City
defendants. Yates v. Illinois, 2018 WL 6179111 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2018). Plaintiffs then filed
an amended complaint against the City only, re-asserting their Fourteenth Amendment and

promissory estoppel claims. Thereafter, on September 25, 2021, the court granted the City’s
motion for summary judgment, entered judgment for the City, and closed the case. Plaintiffs
appealed the court’s decision, and that appeal is pending before the Seventh Circuit. The City
has filed a Bill of Costs with a supporting memorandum and affidavit, seeking $40,214.30 in fees
and costs. Plaintiffs have filed an objection. For the reasons described below, defendants Bill
of Costs is allowed.
Fed. R. Civ. 54(d)(1) provides that costs, other than attorney’s fees, should be allowed to
the prevailing party. There is a strong “presumption that the prevailing party will recover costs,
and the losing party bears the burden of an affirmative showing that taxed costs are not
appropriate.” Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2005). In

evaluating an application for costs, the court first determines whether the claimed expenses are
recoverable and then determines whether they are reasonable. Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218
F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 1995). The court has wide discretion in determining an award of
reasonable costs. Testa v. Village of Mundelein, 89 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1996). Recoverable
costs are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and include: 1) fees of the clerk; 2) fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; 3) fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses; 4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making

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copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; 5) docket
fees; and 6) compensation of court appointed experts and interpreters.
Service of Summons and Subpoena Costs and Fees
The City seeks $1021.57 in costs related to service of subpoenas and associated witness

fess incurred in deposing and obtaining documents from putative class members. The costs for
service were calculated either at the U.S. Marshal’s Service rate, or are accompanied by a
process server invoice, both of which the court finds reasonable. The court allows the $1,021.57
in costs.
Deposition Transcripts and Court Reporter Costs
The City seeks $29,111.55 for court reporter and transcript fees for depositions. These amounts
were calculated at the standard rate of $3.65 per page along with a court reporter attendance fee
of $110 for a half day and $220 for a full day and are supported by invoices. The City claims
that where any deposition cost exceeded those standards, it seeks only the portion that aligns
with the standards. The City also seeks reasonable overtime costs associated with a court

reporter’s attendance. Four depositions resulted in overtime costs for court reporter attendance
either before 8:00 a.m. or after 5:00 p.m. Three of the depositions were of the named plaintiffs
and because of the pandemic were conducted remotely. The other deposition was of a putative
class member and, according to the City, overtime was necessary to accommodate schedules.
Plaintiffs object to the overtime costs as unreasonable, but the court disagrees. Such
costs are recoverable, see Druckzentrum Harry Jung GmbH & Co. KG v. Motorola, Inc., 2013
WL147014 at * 2 (N.D. Ill. January 11, 2013). As in Drunkzentrum, it is likely that if the

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depositions were continued for an extra day other related and acceptable fees, such as the court
reporter’s appearance fee would be incurred.
Plaintiffs also object to videographer costs added to stenographer costs. Four
depositions were conducted by video, the three named plaintiffs and John Keigher, the key

witness in the case, who lives outside the court’s subpoena power. Plaintiffs argue that the
videorecording of these depositions was unnecessary because defendants submitted the
stenographic transcripts in support of their motion for summary judgment. That, of course does
not mean that the video depositions would not be used at trial if the motion had been denied.
Also, because these depositions were conducted in the midst of the pandemic, there is no telling
whether theses witness would be available at trial. Consequently, the court concludes that the
videorecording fees are recoverable and reasonable.
Plaintiffs next object to the City’s deposition exhibit costs. “[E]xhibits can be essential
to understanding the content of a deposition and, thus, can be reasonable.” Crabtree v. Experian
Info. Sols., Inc., 2018 WL 10127090 at *2 (N.D. Ill. October 15, 2018). Here, the depositions

were conducted remotely, and were necessary for their orderly conduction. The costs for the
deposition exhibits, and related incidental costs are recoverable and reasonable.
Plaintiffs next object to the City’s request to recover the costs for a rough draft of Ginger
Evan’s deposition transcript, arguing that such costs are not permitted. The case they cite for
this proposition, Singer v. Ethicon, Inc., 2018 WL 1453553 at *15 (N.D. Ill. March 23, 2018),
merely denied a request for a rough draft because the request contained no explanation as to why
the costs were reasonable. In the instant case, the City explains that it needed the rough draft to
prepare for two key depositions noticed by plaintiffs for the following week. Thus, the City did

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not have time to order a transcript at the regular rate and needed the transcript on an expedited
basis. The court finds this explanation reasonable and awards the cost of the rough draft.
Hearing Transcript Costs and Fees
The City seeks $1,942.30 in costs for transcripts of seven court hearings before

Magistrate Judge Wiseman and two hearing in the Illinois Labor Relations Board. Hearing cost
are recoverable under § 1920(2) if reasonably necessary. See Thayer v. Chiczewski, 2010 WL
3087447 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The cost for an expedited transcript may also be recoverable if
reasonably necessary. Id. Plaintiffs argue that the City has failed to demonstrate that the court
hearing transcripts were for anything other than its counsel’s convenience. The court disagrees.
The transcripts contained discussions of the discovery process and oral rulings by the court that
were not necessarily put into written orders. The City was reasonable in acquiring the
transcripts to be sure that both parties were complying with the court’s orders. The court also
agrees with the City that it acted reasonably in ordering expedited transcripts for six of the
hearings. Finally, the court concludes that the City’s request for the transcripts before the

Illinois Labor Relations Board is also reasonable and recoverable. The City relied on those
transcripts in its successful motion for summary judgment.
Document Costs and Fees
The City seeks $8,138.88 in costs related to photocopying, printing, and delivering
documents. Such costs are recoverable under § 1920(3-4) if reasonable. The City seeks
$917.00 in costs for copying and printing documents. Rates of $.20 per page for copying and
printing have been held reasonable. Teague v. Miehle, 2019 WL 1253985 at * 2 (N.D. Ill.

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March 19, 2019). Here, the City did all copying in-house at a $.10 per page rate. The court
finds this reasonable and awards copying and printing costs in the amount of $917.00.
Next, plaintiffs object to the City’s request for $648.66 in mailing and messenger fees
costs. The Seventh Circuit has construed § 1920 to include currier and delivery services.
Tchemkou v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 506, 512-13 (7 Cir. 2008). The City has demonstrated that it
had to review, copy, and send to counsel numerous documents maintained strictly in hard copy
format and that transmission of these documents was reasonable. Consequently, the court
awards $648.66 in copying and messenger costs.
Finally, the City seeks $6,573.22 in costs required to convert extensive ESI discovery
into a searchable and production-friendly format. The Seventh Circuit has held that costs
incurred for converting computer data into a readable format are recoverable under § 1920.
Heckler v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7 Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs object to the costs
incurred to render the raw data searchable, but without that function the production of the ESI to
plaintiffs would likely be useless. Converting ESI into a word searchable format is recoverable
under Heckler. See Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012 WL 4936598 (S.D. IIL. October 16,
2012). Consequently, the court concludes that the costs are reasonable and recoverable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above costs are taxed in the amount of $40,214.30.
ENTER:

United States District Judge
DATE: December 22, 2021

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10145943. Public record. Not legal advice.