# In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · September 22, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10143324

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 22, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE BROILER CHICKEN ANTITRUST No. 16 C 8637
LITIGATION
Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This antitrust price-fixing conspiracy case consists of a number of actions
consolidated for pretrial management. Four newly consolidated complaints1 and one
amended complaint2 include claims that Defendants engaged in “bid-rigging,”
mimicking charges in a recent criminal indictment in the District of Colorado.
Defendants move to strike or sever these bid-rigging claims, arguing that they are
not part of this case, because the original complaints only alleged claims of
conspiracies to reduce Broiler supply and to manipulate the Georgia Dock price index.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that bid-rigging has been at the heart of the case since
its inception and indicate that they intend to amend all the consolidated complaints
to include this claim.
The Court has consolidated actions in this case pursuant to Local Rule 40.4,
which provides that “[t]wo or more civil cases may be related if . . . the cases involve
some of the same issues of fact or law; [or] the cases grow out of the same transaction
or occurrence.” Designating a case as related under Rule 40.4 is only permitted if:

1 20 C 3450; 20 C 3454; 20 C 3458; 20 C 3459.
2 20 C 2013.
the handling of both cases by the same judge is likely to
result in a substantial saving of judicial time and effort; the
earlier case has not progressed to the point where
designating a later filed case as related would be likely to
delay the proceedings in the earlier case substantially; and
the cases are susceptible of disposition in a single
proceeding.

Similarly, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), when actions “involve
a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other
orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” In addition, under Rule 42(b), “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a
separate trial of one or more separate issues [or] claims.” These rules give the Court
“virtually unlimited freedom” to manage related or consolidated cases “in whatever
way trial convenience requires.” 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2387 (3d ed.); see also
id. § 2388 (3d ed.) (“sound discretion”); id. § 2388 (“the district court may order
separate trials on its own motion”); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir.
2008) (“The ultimate decision to order a separate trial under Rule 42(b) is at the
court’s discretion and will be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse.”). This
includes limiting discovery to a “possibly dispositive issue . . . until after its
resolution.” 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2387. A district court may also “order a
separate trial of independent issues raised in pleadings that are interposed by any
party subsequent to the initial complaint[.]” Id. § 2389. In other words, “Rule 42(b)
provides the district court with discretion to subdivide the case in whatever manner
seems dictated by the circumstances.” Id.; see also id. § 2383 (“In addition, the district
court may deny consolidation when one of the actions has proceeded further in the
discovery process than the other.”).
The Court is aware that some courts in this district have found there to be a

distinction between “relatedness” under Local Rule 40.4 and “consolidation” under
Federal Rule 42(a). See, e.g., Saleh v. Merch., 2017 WL 2424229, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June
5, 2017); Peery v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 2013 WL 5408860, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26,
2013). But the foregoing review shows that if there is a distinction, it is one of
semantics or degree only. A finding that cases are “related” is necessary for them to
be “consolidated.” But “consolidation”—and by extension “relatedness”—permits a

wide range of joint case management options, from the cases simply being presided
over by the same judge at one end of the spectrum, to a single trial at the other. Thus,
the Court does not see the utility in precisely delineating where “relatedness” ends
and “consolidation” begins.
In this case, the three putative class actions and numerous direct actions have
been found to be related, reassigned to the undersigned judge, and consolidated for
pretrial purposes. Plaintiffs point out that the cases have not officially been

consolidated for trial. See R. 256. But certainly, the Court and the parties have
contemplated that the cases likely will be consolidated to some extent, whether for
class certification determinations, summary judgment, or even for trial. And in any
event, the cases the Court has found to be related and “consolidated” under the
caption In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation are subject to this Court’s “virtually
unlimited” management discretion. This order is an exercise of that discretion.
There is a substantial relationship between the alleged bid-rigging claim and
the alleged supply reduction and Georgia Dock price index manipulation claims. All
three claims have the same goal of maintaining a high price for Broilers, involving

the same industry and defendants. These similarities mean that discovery for all
three claims is thoroughly intertwined in terms of the scope of relevant documents,
document custodians, and deponents. Further, legal rulings, factual findings, or
settlements regarding any of the claims will undoubtedly impact the others. This is
a sufficient basis for the Court to have found the four recently filed direct-action
complaints to be related and ordered them reassigned and consolidated at least for

pretrial purposes.
Defendants argue that the bid-rigging claim is distinct from the others because
it employed different means to fix prices during a different time period. But it is
plausible for a single conspiracy to use different means at different times. The Court
permitted the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims to proceed together for just
this reason. See R. 541 at 63 (In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d
772, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2017)). The Court does not perceive there to be a material difference

in the relationship between the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims, which
have proceeded together for almost four years; and the relationship between either of
those two claims and the bid-rigging claim. Absent such a difference there is not a
principled reason to force the bid-rigging claim to proceed in a separate action.3

3 Defendants’ argument that not all defendants have been implicated in the bid-
rigging allegations is well-taken with respect to the criminal indictment. But all
defendants would be at least significant third-parties in discovery on the bid-rigging
To the extent there is merit to Defendants’ argument that the bid-rigging claim
is substantively distinct such that severance is appropriate, there remains extensive
overlap among the parties, document custodians, deponents, and counsel. If the bid-

rigging claim was severed and filed before another judge, it is likely that scheduling
orders issued in that case would interfere with the progress of this case. The parties
and counsel would be required to negotiate the demands of an additional judge or
two, and it is likely that the judges already on this case would need to coordinate with
the new judges. There is no reason to add that complication to an already complicated
case.

However, in litigation as in life, timing is everything. Even though the bid-
rigging claim is properly related to this case, it cannot be denied that the bid-rigging
claim is new, while the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims have been in the
case since its inception four years ago.4 In that time, an immense amount of motion
practice and discovery has occurred. This sprawling case already consists of: 56
related actions, 40 direct actions, and three classes (including every purchaser of
chicken meat in the United States), with each complaint more than 100 pages long;

252 attorney appearances and more than 3,800 entries on the docket; discovery of
more than 8 million documents (totaling millions more in pages), hundreds of

claim whether they are named defendants or not. And Plaintiffs point out that there
are indications that more defendants will be implicated in that claim.
4 Plaintiffs contend that the bid-rigging claim is not so new because discovery has
revealed hints of bid-rigging. But the fact is the claim was not added to any complaint
until after the criminal indictment was returned on June 3, 2020, little more than
three months ago. While Plaintiffs claim that bid-rigging has always been at the
“heart” of this case, that contention is simply not credible.
document custodians, 220 depositions taken with more than 100 to go. On top of all
that, the parties agree that the bid-rigging claims will require more document
discovery and likely re-taking of hundreds of depositions. This additional discovery

will take time that is not accounted for in current Scheduling Order No. 14, which
has no room to spare, and yet anticipates a trial that is still two years away. The
deadline for amending the class complaints has passed. See R. 1230. Now the filing
of class certification motions and the close of fact discovery are relatively imminent.
This case is already on borrowed time.
Furthermore, the government has indicated that it will seek to stay much of

any permitted bid-rigging discovery to protect its criminal prosecution. While as the
government points out that particular issue is not yet ripe, the Court notes that it is
commonplace for civil actions based on the facts underlying criminal charges to be
stayed during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. The supply reduction claim
and Georgia Dock claim are not going to wait for the criminal case to resolve itself.
The upshot is all three claims belong together in the same case, but they cannot
proceed together. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides the solution to this

conflict. In accordance with the Court’s authority under Rule 42, and in order to
expedite and economize the process of bringing the supply reduction and Georgia
Dock claims to resolution, the bid-rigging claim is bifurcated from the original two
claims. See Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) (under Rule 42,
judicial economy is a sufficient basis to order bifurcation). The original claims will
continue to proceed on the course set, most recently, by Scheduling Order No. 14. The
bid-rigging claim is stayed until the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims are
resolved.
This is a feasible way forward, because although the bid-rigging claim is closely

related to the other two claims, evidence of bid-rigging is not necessary to prove the
supply reduction or Georgia Dock claims, so there is no prejudice to Plaintiffs in
resolving the original claims first. Proof of any of the three claims is sufficient to prove
liability under the Sherman Act. Under Plaintiffs’ theory of the case, all three claims
are means to the same end of manipulating Broiler prices. But because they are
concededly different means, litigation of those claims does not have to proceed

simultaneously. Notably, it was not until the criminal indictment returned three
months ago that Plaintiffs ever seriously suggested that they were going to rely on
bid-rigging evidence to prove their case.
This order also serves to deny the motion to compel currently pending before
Judge Gilbert, R. 3672. That motion turns, for the most part, on an argument that,
in February 2018, Judge Gilbert permitted discovery into bid-rigging in an oral ruling
on the scope of a request for production. Whether he did or did not is now irrelevant

because the Court has stayed litigation of the bid-rigging claim (in addition to
recently granting a protective order prohibiting discovery into the government’s
investigation). Discovery into bid-rigging is closed until the supply reduction and
Georgia Dock claims are resolved.
Some bid-rigging evidence has already come to light, either as a product of
discovery in this case or the government’s investigation and indictment. Plaintiffs
express an intention to use that evidence to help show intent or motive in the supply
reduction and Georgia Dock claims. See R. 3749 at 12. The parties spend many pages
addressing whether this evidence will prejudice defense of the supply reduction and

Georgia Dock claims or “taint” a trial on those claims. But this order is not a ruling
on those issues and it is not a preview of what evidence the Court will consider on
summary judgment or admit at trial of the supply reduction and/or Georgia Dock
claims. The Court will consider the evidentiary relevance or admissibility of any
evidence already discovered at the appropriate time in the future, whether summary
judgment or a motion in limine.

This order is simply a product of the fact that: (1) the three claims are related;
and (2) the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims are much further along than
the bid-rigging claim. The late appearance of the bid-rigging claim necessarily means
it is on a different track from the other two claims, and this order simply
acknowledges that obvious circumstance. Through massive discovery, a nine-month
stay to accommodate the government’s investigation, and delay due to the COVID-19
pandemic, Plaintiffs have consistently pushed for expedient resolution of this case.

That is also the Court’s goal. The proper administration of the case cannot wait for
the new claim to catch up to the claims that have already been litigated for four years.
All parties—not to mention the Court—are entitled to have the case resolved
in a timely manner. There is a valid perspective that this case has already taken too
long. The attorney fees generated on both sides are enormous and may be problematic
for smaller defendants. This should not be a war of attrition. If the claims in this case
are not bifurcated it could be a decade before a judgment of any kind is reached. That
is unacceptable. True progress towards an end must be made, and bifurcating the
claims is the way to do that.

Another consequence of this order is that the consolidated direct-action
plaintiff complaint the Court has ordered, see R. 3653; R. 3778, should contain the
bid-rigging allegations. The purpose of the consolidated complaint is to streamline
the docket and future motion practice. Even though this case will proceed with the
original two claims and the bid-rigging claim on separate tracks, the intent to
streamline the docket would be frustrated by maintaining two sets of pleadings.

The order also serves to permit further amendment of already filed direct-
action complaints to include bid-rigging claims. However, the Court does not see the
need for every direct-action plaintiff to actually file an amended complaint; the
consolidated complaint should contain sufficient notice of which direct-action
plaintiffs are making which allegations and claims. But this order does not serve to
grant leave for further amendment beyond bid-rigging allegations without a separate
motion.

The direct-action plaintiffs should prepare and file a consolidated complaint by
October 23, 2020. Defendants should file their consolidated answer by November 23,
2020.
It is unclear to the Court whether the putative classes intend to amend their
complaints to include bid-rigging claims. And it is not apparent to the Court that the
bid-rigging claim is necessarily amenable to class treatment. But if class plaintiffs
intend to amend their complaints to include bid-rigging claims, those amended
complaints should also be filed by October 23, 2020. Defendants are prohibited from
filing individual answers to each class complaint. Instead, Defendants’ answers to
the class complaints should also be consolidated into one answer for each class
complaint, which are due November 23, 2020.
Conclusion
Therefore, Defendants’ motions [3687] [3745] are denied in part and granted
in part in accordance with this opinion and order. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel [3672]
is denied.
ENTERED:
beanies M Luther
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: September 22, 2020

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10143324. Public record. Not legal advice.
