# Sanchez v. Dart

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · April 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10142651

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Eddie Sanchez , )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Judge Marvin E. Aspen
) Case No. 1:19-cv-4139
Thomas Dart, et al. )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This civil rights lawsuit is about an in inmate who claims he was retaliated against for
serving as a confidential informant into an officer-run jailhouse contraband ring. (Amend.
Compl. (Dkt. No. 23) ¶¶ 1, 28.) Plaintiff Eddie Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) brings two counts:
deprivation of his due process and free speech rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 39 – 45.) All named individual
defendants answered the amended complaint except one, Defendant Cook County Sheriff
Thomas Dart (“Dart”). (See Dkt. No. 47.) Presently before us is Defendant Dart’s Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. (Mot. (Dkt. No. 45).) Also before us is Plaintiff’s Motion for the Reimbursement of
$231.35 into his Inmate Trust Fund Account. (Dkt. No. 26.) For the following reasons, we deny
both motions.1 (Plaintiff’s Mot. (Dkt. No. 26); Dart’s Mot. (Dkt. No. 45).)

1 We deny Plaintiff’s motion for a $231.35 reimbursement because we ordered Plaintiff’s trust
fund officer deduct his income until his accrued filing fees were paid. We first ordered a 40%
deduction. ((Dkt. No. 5) (“Plaintiff’s trust fund officer must collect 40% of all income into
Plaintiff’s trust account until accrued filing fees are paid.”)) Then we issued a similar Order in
Plaintiff’s other case before us for the remaining 60%. Sanchez v. Miles, 19-cv-4143 (Dkt. No. 5)
(“Plaintiff’s trust fund officer must collect 60% of all income into Plaintiff’s trust account until
accrued filing fees are paid.”) We thus find that Plaintiff’s trust fund officer appropriately
collected 100% of all its income until accrued filing fees were paid per our two orders.
Plaintiff’s motion for reimbursement is denied. (Dkt. No. 26.)
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and are deemed true
for the purposes of this motion. See Bell v. City of Chi., 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016); see
also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant Dart was the Sheriff of Cook County,
Illinois and was ultimately responsible for administration and implementation of the policies,
practices, and/or customs of its jail. (Amend. Compl. (Dkt. No. 23) ¶ 10.) He was also
responsible for supervising officer conduct and jail staff and, among other things, to prevent the
operation of contraband rings within the jail. (Id.) According to the Amended Complaint, Dart
was personally involved in the investigatory operation into a ring that used Plaintiff’s
confidential informant role. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff was caught buying marijuana from an officer who worked in a jailhouse
contraband ring. (Id. ¶ 26.) After he was caught, he was interviewed by Defendant Officers
Tapia, Burke, Williams, and Johnsen. (Id.) They told Plaintiff that he would not be disciplined if

he became a confidential information into the ring, and that they would protect him and would
transfer him out of the jail if necessary. (Id.) Plaintiff was told that the matter had been
discussed with Dart, and that Dart had given authority to drop his charges if he cooperated. (Id.)
Based on these supposed promises, Plaintiff agreed to the plan. (Id.) But despite these promises
and Plaintiff’s assent, he contends that he was retaliated against and that the defendants
(including Dart) failed to protect him. (Id.)
As an example of the failure to protect against retaliation, Plaintiff alleges that on May 3,
2017, Defendant Perry cursed and shouted at him while Defendant Jefferson shoved him against
the wall, handcuffed him, and squeezed his testicles with hard force while saying he had “big
balls” to snitch on them. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 28; id., Ex. 1 (Dkt. No. 23-1) at 2.) Plaintiff alleges
that Dart had knowledge that Defendants Jefferson and Perry were members of the ring and
would likely retaliate against Plaintiff, yet Dart did not take any reasonable steps to protect
Plaintiff from them. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 28.) After formally reporting this retaliatory sexual

assault, Plaintiff was transferred to the same wing in the same division that housed the inmate
allegedly leading the ring, Inmate Thomas. (Id. ¶¶ 28 – 31.)2 Once there, Defendant Officer
Llerenas spoke with Inmate Thomas (who Plaintiff served as a confidential informant against),
unlocked a storage closet, and left Inmate Thomas unsupervised while Sanchez was nearby with
the apparent forethought that Thomas would attack Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 32.) Inmate Thomas
proceeded to take a broom from the open storage closet and used it to strike Sanchez several
times. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this attack was done in retaliation for Sanchez’s snitching. (Id.)
Two weeks later, a state court judge ordered Plaintiff be housed out of Cook County, and for a
second time, that Order was apparently disobeyed. (Id. ¶¶ 24 and 33).
In March 2018, under the supervision and orders of Defendant Officer Greer, Defendant

Officers Medina and Monroy entered Sanchez’s cell and destroyed his personal property. (Id.
¶ 34.) This personal property included legal books, folders with lawyer and court information,
legal letters, personal books, and family pictures. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges retaliatory motive by
citing Defendant Officer Greer’s statement that it was “payback” for snitching. (Id.) Again,
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants (including Dart) did not take any reasonable steps to protect
Plaintiff from this type of retaliatory conduct. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 28.)

2 Particularly concerning is that Plaintiff alleges that a few weeks after this incident a state court
judge ordered Plaintiff be transferred away to Livingston County, but that order was apparently
disobeyed. (Id. ¶¶ 24 and 30.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is meant to test the
legal sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. See McReynolds v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510,

1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all
possible inferences in her favor.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081. A court may grant a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only if a complaint lacks enough facts “to state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although a facially plausible complaint need not give “detailed factual
allegations,” it must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S. Ct. at 1949. These requirements ensure that the defendant receives “fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964.
III. ANALYSIS
Liability under 42 U.S. Code § 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“to be liable under § 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated
in a constitutional deprivation.”) (internal citations omitted).3 An official satisfies the personal
responsibility requirement if they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone
it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Brown v. Bryant, No. 15 C 10445, 2018
WL 2201584, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2018) (Castillo, J.) (citing Matthews v. City of East St.

Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiff pleads generally that the defendants collectively failed to protect him and his
personal property from retaliatory harm. The key facts pleaded against Dart are that he was an
administrator and supervisor; that Plaintiff “was told that” the confidential information
agreement “had been discussed with the Sheriff, Defendant Dart[,] and Defendant Dart had
already given authority to drop the charges against Sanchez if he cooperated with the
investigation”; and that Dart had knowledge about the ring and Plaintiff’s informant status yet
did not take any reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 26, 29, and 38.).
At this juncture, Plaintiff need not actually prove his case. Instead, all he must do is
show that these facts, accepted as true, are enough to state a claim for upon which relief may be

granted. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65. We find that, although minimal,
these foregoing allegations against Dart plausibly allege that Dart had personal involvement in
the investigation (including Plaintiff’s role), acquiesced to the real retaliatory risks Plaintiff
incurred, and did not take any reasonable steps to protect him like transferring him to another jail
as a state court judge twice ordered. (See id. ¶¶ 26, 29, and 38.) See, e.g., Matthews, 675 F.3d at
708 (7th Cir. 2012); Brown, 2018 WL 2201584, at *3. We deny Dart’s motion. (Dkt. No. 45.)

3 Dart argues in part that Plaintiff’s lawsuit is legally deficient because § 1983 does not give rise
to liability under a respondeat superior theory. But Plaintiff does not proceed under such a
theory. (Pl.’s Resp. (Dkt. No. 50) at 4.) So we need not address how such a theory would be
legally deficient.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we deny Defendant Dart’s Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's
Motion for Reimbursement. (Dkt. Nos. 26 and 45.)

Marvin E. Aspen
United States District Judge

Dated: April 30, 2020
Chicago, Illinois

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10142651. Public record. Not legal advice.