# Taylor v. Cook County Sheriff's Office

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · March 4, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10142254

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 4, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PERCY R. TAYLOR,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 13-cv-1856
v.
Judge Mary M. Rowland
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This lawsuit arises from Percy Taylor’s termination from his job as a police officer
with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. Taylor brought this lawsuit against Defendants
Cook County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Thomas Dart, Gregory Ernst, Patrick Fitzgerald,
the Estate of Patrick Murphy, Joseph Ways, and Zelda Whittler, alleging violations
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), as well as state law claims for malicious prosecution and
breach of contract. Cook County is sued for purposes of indemnification only. Taylor
has moved for partial summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, Taylor’s
partial summary judgment motion [418] is denied.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are
material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the

adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted).
The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and [] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884
F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). In doing so,

the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the
evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d
837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is
whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the
evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).
BACKGROUND1

Taylor began his employment with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office in 1995 as a
Deputy Sheriff, and in January 2000, was promoted to Police Officer. (PSOF ¶12; D.
Resp. ¶12).2 On March 22, 2011, Taylor appeared for a Loudermill hearing at the

1 Taylor’s long procedural history before the administrative boards, in state court and in
this Court need not be recited in detail for purposes of this order.

2 These facts are taken from Taylor’s statement of uncontested facts in support of his
partial summary judgment motion (Dkt. 419, “PSOF”) and Defendants’ response to Taylor’s
Statement of Facts (Dkt. 431, “D. Resp.”).
Cook County Sheriff’s Police Headquarters.3 (PSOF ¶17; D. Resp. ¶17). The same
day, the Loudermill Board ruled that Taylor should be suspended with pay. (PSOF
¶19; D. Resp. ¶19). On October 30, 2013, the Merit Board ordered that Taylor be

separated from his employment with the Sheriff’s Office. (PSOF ¶23; D. Resp. ¶23).
Taylor appealed his case to Illinois state court, and the state court remanded the
case to the Merit Board. (See Dkt. 443-1; PSOF ¶¶37, 38; D. Resp. ¶¶37, 38). On
August 19, 2014, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Neil Cohen vacated the Merit
Board’s decision after finding that the Board that terminated Taylor was improperly
constituted in violation of 55 ILCS 5/3-7002. (PSOF ¶26). The appellate court

affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Sheriff Dart’s petition for leave to
appeal. (Id. ¶¶30, 31).
At the conclusion of the appellate proceedings, the Circuit Court on April 6, 2018,
ordered the Merit Board to “take additional evidence and determine the back pay for
Mr. Taylor.” (Id. ¶38). On August 22, 2018, Merit Board member James Nally ruled
that Taylor’s motion for backpay and reinstatement would be taken with the case and
decided as part of the final decision to be issued in the case (PSOF ¶40; D. Resp. ¶40).

On August 15, 2019, the Circuit Court found that because the Merit Board had no

3 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (providing for hearing
pursuant to the due process clause, prior to the loss of certain property interests). State law
also requires officers in the Sheriff’s Office receive a hearing before the Merit Board prior to
suspension or termination. 55 ILCS 5/3-7011.
statutory authority to act when it terminated Taylor in 2013, Taylor is entitled to
backpay. (Taylor v. Dart, 13 CH 26319, Aug. 15, 2019 (Dkt. 443-1)).4
ANALYSIS

Taylor’s partial summary judgment motion asks this Court to make findings that:
“(1) Percy Taylor has the right to be returned to the Sheriff’s Office payroll; (2) Taylor
has the right to an award of back pay; (3) there is no basis for the [Sheriff’s Office]
not to have returned Taylor to the payroll; (4) there is no basis for the Sheriff’s Office
not to have provided Taylor with back pay”. (Dkt. 418 at 1). Taylor also requests the
Court to enter “an order requiring the Sheriff’s Office to reinstate Taylor to the

payroll.” (Id.). Taylor argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact that
Defendants must “return Taylor to the payroll and provide Taylor with the more than
$500,000 in back pay and benefits that he would have otherwise received since the
October 30, 2013 Merit Board decision.” (Id.). Taylor further contends that his “right
to backpay and to be returned to the Sheriff’s Office payroll is not contingent on
Taylor prevailing on any of his underlying causes of action.” (Id. at 2). Defendants
respond that (1) Taylor’s requested relief is premature; (2) the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars the relief sought; and, (3) this Court lacks authority under the Illinois
Administrative Review Law (“ARL”) to decide that Taylor is entitled to backpay and
reinstatement. (Dkt. 430).

4 The parties did not have the benefit of Judge Cohen’s August 15, 2019 decision when
briefing Taylor’s partial summary judgment motion, however, Taylor moved to supplement
his motion with the August 15 decision, without objection. (See Dkt. 479).
A. Taylor’s Motion Must be Denied

This Court does not have authority to grant the relief Taylor requests in his
motion. Taylor’s claims in this case do not include a claim for review of the Merit
Board decision pursuant to Illinois’s Administrative Review Law, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/3-110, as Taylor filed his administrative review complaint in Illinois state court.
(see Am. Compl., Dkt. 294, ¶ 95; see also Dkt. 434, ¶ 5).5 In this case, he alleges that
the Sheriff and others violated his First Amendment rights and discriminated against
him based on race in seeking his termination under Section 1983 and Title VII. If

Taylor had challenged the composition of the Merit Board in the present case (he did
not), the Court would be limited in the remedy it could award (remand to the Merit
Board). See Bless v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Office, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120267 (N.D.
Ill. July 19, 2018); 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155426 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2019). But Taylor
has waged that battle in the state court. Indeed his claims for backpay and
reinstatement have been remanded to the Merit Board by the state court. Moreover,
on August 15, 2019, the Cook County Circuit Court held that “the Sheriff’s

termination of Taylor was illegal and void” and the Sheriff is “required to pay Taylor
for the period he was unlawfully terminated.” (Dkt. 443-1 at p.3).6

5 Under the Administrative Review Law, “The court first acquiring jurisdiction of any
action to review a final administrative decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of the
action until final disposition of the action.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-104.

6 The judge further held that Taylor’s right to backpay “is not contingent upon his
prevailing before the new Merit Board” and the only remaining issue was the amount of
pay and benefits that would have been paid to Taylor “if he had remained on the Sheriff's
In Campos, a former Cook County Corrections officer challenged his termination
by the Merit Board alleging that the process violated his right to substantive due
process because the Board was improperly constituted causing his post-termination

process to be delayed unnecessarily. Campos v. Cook Cty., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
190729, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2018), aff’d, 932 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2019). Campos
asked the district court to reinstate him to paid status, award full back-pay, and
reinstate his healthcare benefits. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190729, at *16. The court
denied that request, explaining that “[s]ince the circuit court already remanded
Plaintiff's matter to the Merit Board this issue is moot. The Court cannot adjudicate

the Circuit Court's decision.” Id.
Similarly, here, the state court already remanded Taylor’s case to the Merit Board.
In addition, the state court recently determined that Taylor is entitled to backpay.
This Court cannot circumvent the procedures that are underway pursuant to Illinois
law. More importantly, this Court cannot order damages in this case absent a finding
of liability on one of the grounds pending in this Court.
B. Motion to Strike

Taylor objects to Defendants filing a supplemental statement (Dkt. 439) in support
of their response to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. In addition to
the fact that motions to strike are generally disfavored (see Teague v. Healthcare Dev.
Partners, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142655, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2019)), this
Court did not rely on the additional information in Defendants’ supplement [439] in

payroll at the same rate of pay and benefits he was receiving on the date of illegal
termination.” Id. at p. 4.
order to reach its decision here. Accordingly Taylor’s motion to strike [440] is denied
as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Taylor’s motion for partial summary judgment [418] is
denied.

ENTER:

Dated: March 4, 2020 Mauve MV bok L/
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10142254. Public record. Not legal advice.