# Adams v. Board of Education Harvey School District 152

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · July 15, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10141061

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 15, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10141061

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming compensatory damages of $240,000 in employment discrimination case where plaintiff suffered from headaches and a recurring upset stomach
- finding $21,000 for emotional distress excessive where plaintiff’s distress was limited

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DR. DENEAN ADAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 15 cv 8144
v. )
) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
BOARD OF EDUCATION HARVEY SCHOOL )
DISTRICT 152, GLORIA JOHNSON, in her )
individual capacity, BETTY JOHNSON, in her )
individual capacity, DR. KISHA MCCASKILL, in )
her individual capacity, JANET ROGERS, in her )
individual capacity, TYRONE ROGERS, in his )
individual capacity, LINDA HAWKINS, in her )
individual capacity, FELICIA JOHNSON, in her )
individual capacity, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Dr. Denean Adams brought this action against Defendants Board of Education
Harvey School District 152 and its individual members, alleging retaliation in violation of her First
Amendment and due process rights. The Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on
Count III for First Amendment retaliation based on the filing of this lawsuit. Pursuant to
Defendants’ Rule 50(a) Motion, the Court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of
Defendants on Count II, the due process claim. Following trial, the jury found in favor of Adams
on the remaining claim for First Amendment retaliation based on her police report, awarding
$400,000 in compensatory damages. Defendants have now filed post-trial motions renewing their
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) [177] and
seeking remittitur of damages or a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 [175].
I. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Defendants first renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to Rule 50, a
“court should grant judgment as a matter of law when a party has been fully heard on an issue and
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the party on that
issue.” Alexander v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 484 F.3d 889, 902 (7th Cir. 2007). Defendants
contend that judgment as a matter of law is warranted because no reasonable jury could find that

Defendants violated Adams’ constitutional rights and because no reasonable jury would conclude
that Defendants failed to prove their affirmative defenses. Defendants’ renewed motion does not
put forward any argument which was not before the Court when Defendants initially moved for a
directed verdict at the close of Adams’ case, and the Court therefore denies it for the reasons
previously stated in open court.
II. Motion for Remittitur of Damages or a New Trial
Defendants next contend that remittitur of damages or a new trial is warranted under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Defendants assert that the compensatory damages awarded in
this case bear no rational connection to the evidence and are inconsistent with the verdicts in similar
cases. In deciding whether a damages award is excessive, this Court considers “whether (1) the
award is monstrously excessive; (2) there is no rational connection between the award and the
evidence, indicating that it is merely a product of the jury’s fevered imaginings or personal vendettas;
and (3) whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases.” G.G. v. Grindle,

665 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A monstrously excessive verdict is one that is
“a product of passion and prejudice,” an analysis that the Seventh Circuit has recognized overlaps
with the underlying question of whether the jury’s verdict was irrational. Adams v. City of Chicago, 798
F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2015). In deference to the jury’s role as the trier of fact, this Court reviews
the record as a whole and takes the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Id.
The jury in this case awarded Adams $400,000 in compensatory damages. Defendants
contend that the award is excessive because Adams “presented [no evidence] of extensive emotional
distress,” Adams did not lose her job, the only evidence of distress was that she was “stressed” after
the date of the threat, and Adams did not present evidence of “any sort of physical manifestations.”
(Dkt. 175 at 3, 5, 6.) The Court finds that this argument disregards evidence presented at trial
which, when taken in the light favorable to the jury’s verdict, clearly establishes Adams’ emotional

distress.
During the series of events with Defendants, Adams began experiencing migraines and
changes in her personality, including a loss of self-confidence and loss of interest in social outings
and in her relationship with her spouse. Adams testified that she received treatment from a licensed
therapist to help her cope with the stress stemming from the workplace incidents with Defendants.
Adams began treatment in August 2015 and continued in therapy through April 2016 when her
therapist put her on an unpaid medical leave that lasted through June 30, 2016, when her contract
terminated. During the final school year she worked for Defendants, Adams missed 83 days of
work, the majority of which were due to her therapy and subsequent leave.
“An award for nonpecuniary loss can be supported, in certain circumstances, solely by a
plaintiff’s testimony about his or her emotional distress.” Tullis v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 243 F.3d
1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001). “It is within the jury’s province to evaluate the credibility of witnesses

who testify to emotional distress,” and this Court will not disturb those credibility determinations.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The jury was able to observe Adams when she
was testifying and they apparently found her testimony to be sincere and sufficient to convince them
that she merited the award they gave her. Moreover, Reverend Gooch, Adams’ husband, also
testified credibly and specifically regarding the emotional distress that Adams underwent. The jury
observed Gooch’s demeaner and heard his testimony about the many changes Adams went through,
including that Adams’ behavior became reserved and withdrawn, that Gooch and Adams began
sleeping in separate bedrooms, and that he drove Adams to and from work each day; Gooch
explained that these were major changes from the formerly outgoing and independent Adams that
he knew before her experiences with the defendants. It is entirely possible that another jury might
have evaluated Adams’ damages more modestly, but that is not the standard. Because it is within
the jury’s domain to assess the credibility of Adams, and Gooch, the Court does not find that the

award was monstrously excessive or not rationally connected to the evidence. Further, since the
Court has “determined that the verdict was supported by the evidence, then necessarily it was not a
result of passion and prejudice.” Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1069.
Defendants further argue that the compensatory damages awarded in this case far exceed the
compensatory damages awarded in other emotional distress and retaliation cases. A comparison,
however, of the Adams’ verdict and others does not suggest that the amount was inappropriate.
That is especially so because when comparing past decisions to the jury award here, “an exact
analogy is not necessary.” Adams, 798 F.2d at 545. Defendants cite to several cases in which the
compensatory damages award was below $100,000. See, e.g., Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49
F.3d 1219, 1229 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding $21,000 for emotional distress excessive where plaintiff’s
distress was limited); Bennett v. Smith, No. 96 C 2422, 2000 WL 1849029, at * 8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18,
2000) (Coar, J.) (reducing damages for emotional distress from $240,000 to $45,000).
However, there are also numerous cases in which courts have found that compensatory

damages awards upwards of $300,000 were warranted, despite being awarded years earlier than the
verdict at issue. See, e.g., Moore v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, No. 02 C 4040, 2005
WL 2007291, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2005) (Nolan, M.J.) (denying motion for remittitur of
compensatory damages below the statutory maximum of $300,000 in a Title VII case where plaintiff
presented evidence that her personality and demeanor changed as a result of defendant’s action);
Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 612 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming compensatory damages of
$240,000 in employment discrimination case where plaintiff suffered from headaches and a recurring
upset stomach); Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cty., 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 776 (N.D. IIL 2002) (Keys,
J.) (allowing compensatory damages for emotional distress and reputational damage of $300,000).
These latter cases persuade the Court that an award of $400,000 for compensatory damages
in Adams’ case is not so high as to warrant remittitur. For one thing, “[d]ue to the highly fact-
specific nature of [employment retaliation] cases, [comparisons to other awards] are rarely
dispositive.” Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485 (7th Cir. 2003). ‘There is no exact
standard for fixing the amount to be awarded for compensatory damages. Moreover, as the Seventh
Circuit explains, “[a}wards in other cases provide a reference point that assists the court in assessing
reasonableness; they do not establish a range beyond which awards are necessarily excessive.”
Adams, 798 F.2d at 545. Therefore, this Court denies the motion for remittitur or a new trial on the
issue of the $400,000 compensatory damage award.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motions renewing their motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) [177] and seeking remittitur
of damages or a new trial under Federal Rule of Crvil Procedure 59 [175].

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Date: 7/15/2019 Ny (
Entered:
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Court Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10141061. Public record. Not legal advice.