# Engle v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · May 28, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10140742

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 28, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10140742

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the vagueness doctrine prohibits the enforcement of laws that “fail[ ] to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or [are] so standardless that [they] authorize[ ] or encourage[ ] seriously discriminatory enforcement”
- holding that disciplinary proceedings brought by the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation against a clinical psychologist were “plainly judicial in nature”
- explaining that the presumption that administrators are impartial can be rebutted only by proof that an adjudicator has “a pecuniary interest in the outcome” or has been “the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him”
- concluding that IDFPR disciplinary proceedings brought against an unlicensed timeshare broker were judicial in nature

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ELIZABETH ENGLE, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 19 C 402
)
v. ) Judge John Z. Lee
)
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL )
REGULATION and MARIO J. TRETO, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Elizabeth Engle filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants, Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (“IDFPR”)
and its Acting Director, Mario J. Treto,1 have inappropriately commenced
administrative proceedings to revoke her real estate appraiser license.
Contemporaneously with the filing of her complaint, Engle moved for preliminary
injunctive relief to stop the administrative process. Defendants, in response, have
moved to dismiss the complaint based on the Younger abstention doctrine. For the
reasons stated herein, Engle’s motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order [2] [3] is denied, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss [9] is granted.
This case is dismissed without prejudice to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to proceed
in state court. Civil case terminated.

1 The Court substitutes Mario J. Treto, Acting Director of the IDFPR, for Jessica Baer,
former Director of the IDFPR, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Factual and Procedural Background2
The IDFPR is an Illinois agency that regulates the practice of real estate
appraisals pursuant to the Real Estate Appraiser Licensing Act of 2002, 225 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 458/1-1 et seq. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. Engle, an Illinois resident,
trained to receive such a license from 2011 to 2014. See id. ¶¶ 7, 13–14, 21.
To receive a real estate appraiser license in Illinois, an applicant must pass a
licensing exam, complete 2,500 hours of training, and submit a written application,
among other things. Id. ¶ 10. For the training hours, applicants must complete
appraisals under the supervision of an authorized licensed appraiser. Id. ¶ 11.
Applicants record their training hours on IDFPR forms known as “Experience Logs,”

which are signed by the supervising appraiser and submitted along with the
application materials. Id. The Experience Logs are used in conjunction with another
IDFPR document known as the “Matrix,” which contains recommended training
hours for given types of appraisals. Id.
The IDFPR’s Disciplinary Board reviews applications and decides whether to
grant or deny real estate appraiser licenses based on the information contained in the

applications and supporting materials. Id.
While Engle was completing her training hours in November 2011, one of her
supervisors, Hal London, passed away. Id. ¶ 13. Engle continued training, and in

2 At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court assumes the alleged facts in the complaint
are true and draws all possible inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
2013, was ready to submit her licensing application. Id. ¶ 14a.3 She, along with
colleague Glenn Brown, who had also trained under London, were not sure how to
report their training hours given that London had not signed all the necessary

paperwork before his death. Id. They also had questions about reporting training
hours that exceeded the number of recommended hours listed in the Matrix. Id.
Accordingly, Brown contacted the IDFPR for guidance in August 2013. Id. ¶ 14b.
Brown spoke to Brian Weaver,4 Acting Director of the IDFPR’s Division of Real
Estate, and Mary Bates, the Disciplinary Board liaison, about this issue and conveyed
this information to Engle. Id. Based on Weaver’s and Bates’s recommendations,
Engle transposed London’s signature onto her Experience Log and submitted a cover

letter to the Disciplinary Board explaining that she had done so. Id. ¶ 15. She also
recorded her training hours only up to the amounts listed on the Matrix, leaving off
any excess hours. Id. Engle submitted her application and related materials in
October 2013. Id.
Despite his conversation with Brown, Weaver, who also serves on the
Disciplinary Board, initiated fraud charges against Engle for “submitting a false log”

on October 29, 2013. Id. ¶ 16. Weaver later issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the

3 The complaint contains two paragraphs labeled 14. Accordingly, the Court refers to
the first paragraph as ¶ 14a, and the second as ¶ 14b.
4 In various places in the complaint, Engle describes Weaver as “Defendant Weaver.”
See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14b, 41. But the complaint does not list Weaver in either the caption or
the description of the parties. See id. ¶¶ 7–9. Nor does it appear that summons was issued
to Weaver. Accordingly, the Court does not consider Weaver to be a party to this litigation.
license to Engle, charging that she had falsified London’s signature on her Experience
Log. Id.
The IDFPR commenced disciplinary proceedings against Engle, and Engle

(with the aid of her counsel) reached an agreement with the IDFPR whereby the
Disciplinary Board would withdraw the charges and allow Engle to reapply for a
license, if she made up the hours she worked under London and submitted an
application reflecting the actual number of training hours she had worked. Id. ¶¶ 17–
18. Engle withdrew her application in May 2014, and the disciplinary proceedings
were closed. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
After redoing her training hours, Engle submitted a new application in

September 2014. Id. ¶ 21. This application included an Experience Log that
documented all of her training hours, including those that went above and beyond
the recommended amounts listed in the Matrix. Id. As a result, the training hours
Engle recorded on her second application were higher than those listed on her first
application. Id. The Disciplinary Board granted Engle a real estate appraiser license
on December 8, 2014. Id.

Soon thereafter, Weaver raised the discrepancies in the hours reported on
Engle’s two applications to the IDFPR, and the Disciplinary Board again charged
Engle with fraud. Id. ¶ 22. In April 2015, Christopher Hage, the IDFPR’s Chief of
Real Estate Prosecutions, called Engle and told her to return her license immediately
or he would “press charges.” Id. ¶ 23. He then followed up with a letter, informing
Engle that she had ten days to return her license, or the IDFPR would begin
administrative action to revoke it. Id. Engle alleges that this request was in violation
of a statement on her IDFPR application, which required “appropriate due process”
to be given before she could be forced to give up her license. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28.

The Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against Engle on June 29, 2015,
alleging that Engle had made 126 false statements in her 2014 application, based on
the differences in training hours listed on that application as compared to the 2013
application. Id. ¶ 29. The complaint also alleged that Engle failed to explain these
discrepancies. Id.
Disciplinary proceedings commenced, and an administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
held Engle in default for failing to timely answer or otherwise plead. Id. ¶ 24. The

ALJ then referred Engle’s case to the full Disciplinary Board, which recommended
that her license be revoked. Id. The Director of the Real Estate Division accepted
the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and revoked Engle’s license on March 8,
2016. Id. ¶ 25.
Engle subsequently filed a complaint for administrative review in the Circuit
Court of Cook County. Id. ¶ 26. The Circuit Court granted the IDFPR’s motion to

dismiss the complaint, but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded to the
IDFPR for further proceedings. Id.; see generally Engle v. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l
Regulation, 103 N.E.3d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
Engle filed this lawsuit in January 2019, alleging that the IDFPR is violating
her right to due process. In particular, she states, the IDFPR’s charges against her
are based on actions she took in compliance with her settlement agreement with the
agency following the 2013 disciplinary proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. Furthermore,
Engle alleges that the IDFPR is improperly enforcing an unwritten rule that an
applicant should not list more than the recommended Matrix hours on his or her

Experience Log. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.
Along with her complaint, Engle moved for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to stop the renewed proceedings from going forward. See Mot.
TRO & Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 3. In the motion, she argues that Weaver will be a fact
witness at any renewed hearing, given that he participated in the discussions about
how to fill out the 2013 application and made statements about the IDFPR’s alleged
unwritten rule. See id. at 15. Accordingly, she argues, Weaver should not be allowed

to participate in the disciplinary proceedings as a member of the Disciplinary Board.
Id. at 15–18.
At an initial hearing, the Court entered and continued Engle’s request for a
temporary restraining order, based in part on the IDFPR’s agreement that it would
stay the disciplinary proceedings pending the Court’s ruling. See Minute Entry of
1/24/19, ECF No. 8. After the Court set a briefing schedule on Engle’s motion,

Defendants moved to dismiss her complaint under the Younger abstention doctrine,
see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Accordingly, now before the Court are
Engle’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Analysis

I. Applicability of Younger Abstention
Defendants contend that the Court must abstain from hearing Engle’s
complaint or issuing any injunctive relief pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine. This doctrine “generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking
jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question
ongoing state proceedings.” FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir.
2007). The Supreme Court’s holding in Younger “was based partly on traditional
principles of equity, but rested primarily on the even more vital consideration of
comity.” Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,

491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989)).
Although the Younger doctrine originated in the context of criminal
prosecutions, it “has since been expanded beyond criminal prosecutions to various
civil proceedings in state court implicating important state interests.” Id. at 595 n.5
(quotation omitted); see SKS & Assocs., Inc. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“The civil brand of Younger extends only to a federal suit filed by a party that is the

target of state court or administrative proceedings in which the state’s interests are
so important that exercise of federal judicial power over those proceedings would
disregard the comity between the states and federal government.”) (citations
omitted). Such civil proceedings include state administrative proceedings that are
judicial in nature. Id.; see Tr. & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 294–95
(7th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, under Younger, “federal courts must abstain from enjoining or
otherwise interfering in ongoing state court proceedings that are (1) judicial in
nature, (2) involve important state interests, and (3) provide an adequate opportunity

to raise federal claims, as long as (4) no exceptional circumstances exist that would
make abstention inappropriate.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 662
(7th Cir. 2007); see Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir.1998) (citing
Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 429 (1982)).
Exceptional circumstances include when “(1) the state proceeding is motivated by a
desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, (2) there is an extraordinarily pressing
need for immediate equitable relief, or (3) the challenged provision is flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” Stroman Realty, Inc., 505
F.3d at 664 (internal quotations and citation omitted). If Younger abstention is
warranted, either a stay or dismissal of the action may be appropriate based on the
circumstances. See FreeEats.com, Inc., 502 F.3d at 600.
Here, as Defendants correctly point out, the IDFPR proceedings meet the
necessary criteria for Younger abstention. First, Engle does not challenge the notion

that the disciplinary proceedings are judicial in character. Nor could she. An
administrative proceeding that is “coercive” and involves investigation and
enforcement of liability, such as the proceeding here, is generally considered to be
judicial in nature. See Stroman Realty, Inc., 505 F.3d at 662. It is well-established
in the Seventh Circuit that administrative disciplinary proceedings—including those
specifically brought by the IDFPR or its predecessor—are judicial. See id. (concluding
that IDFPR disciplinary proceedings brought against an unlicensed timeshare broker
were judicial in nature); Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding
that disciplinary proceedings brought by the Illinois Department of Professional

Regulation against a clinical psychologist were “plainly judicial in nature”); see also
Majors, 149 F.3d at 712 (concluding that disciplinary proceedings brought against a
nurse by the Indiana State Board of Nursing were judicial in nature).
Nor does Engle challenge the important state interests involved in Illinois’s
real estate appraisal licensing program. These interests are apparent from the fact
that Illinois has codified an extensive set of statutes regulating real estate appraisals.
See 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 458/1-1 et seq. Furthermore, as Defendants point out, the

Seventh Circuit has recognized Illinois’s “legitimate and substantial interest in
setting and enforcing the standards for those who deal with property sales involving
its citizens.” Stroman Realty, Inc., 505 F.3d at 663. Although Stroman Realty dealt
with a real-estate broker as opposed to an appraiser, the same interests are
implicated here.
Furthermore, the state disciplinary proceedings offer an adequate forum for

Engle to raise her due-process claims. Engle contends that the IDFPR routinely
refuses to hear constitutional claims such as hers, and this may be true. But there is
still a state-court administrative review process available, where she can seek review
of the agency proceeding, even on due-process grounds. In fact, she has already done
so successfully. See generally Engle, 103 N.E.3d 382 (reversing and remanding the
dismissal of Engle’s complaint for administrative review on unrelated due-process
grounds). Contrary to Engle’s assertions, courts widely agree that the availability of
state administrative review constitutes an adequate forum under the Younger
analysis. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619, 629

(1986) (“[E]ven if Ohio law is such that the Commission may not consider the
constitutionality of the statute under which it operates . . . it is sufficient . . . that
constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the
administrative proceeding.”); Stroman Realty, Inc., 505 F.3d at 662 (“We see no
reason why [a constitutional claim] could not also be adequately addressed on judicial
review in the event of an adverse administrative decision.”); Green, 281 F.3d at 666–
67 (“[S]tate-court administrative review of the . . . proceedings constitutes an

adequate opportunity for [the plaintiff] to raise his due process and equal protection
challenges.”). Nor does an administrative-review suit need to be presently underway
for this reasoning to apply. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 629.
Finally, Engle fails to show that there are any exceptional circumstances that
would make abstention inappropriate. First, as Defendants point out, Weaver has
agreed that he will not participate in any Disciplinary Board deliberations or have

any ex parte communications with board members about Engle’s case. See Defs.’
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A, Weaver Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 10-1. Although this
would seem to moot Engle’s request for a preliminary injunction (which focuses
almost exclusively on Weaver’s role on the Disciplinary Board), she now argues that
even Weaver’s presence at the hearing as a witness will taint the proceedings.
Because Weaver is a member of the Disciplinary Board, she posits, the other board
members will simply take his testimony at face value.
But, although Engle cites a number of cases suggesting that an impartial

disciplinary panel may violate her right to due process, she does not explain why that
issue could not be adequately addressed in the agency or state-court proceedings.
Instead, the Court concludes that Weaver’s presence at the hearing does not
constitute an extraordinary circumstance for three reasons.
First, the disciplinary hearing will proceed first before an ALJ, not the full
Disciplinary Board. Yet Engle does not argue that the ALJ has any relationship with
Weaver or is biased in his favor.

Second, Engle only speculates that the Disciplinary Board members have an
inappropriate relationship with Weaver that would undermine their impartiality.
This speculation is insufficient in light of the presumption that agency officials are
unbiased quasi-judicial officers. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–97
(1982). Because agency proceedings often involve overlap between investigative and
judicial functions, it is not automatically apparent that Weaver’s testimony would

require the recusal of the entire Disciplinary Board. See Amundsen v. Chi. Park Dist.,
218 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the presumption that
administrators are impartial can be rebutted only by proof that an adjudicator has “a
pecuniary interest in the outcome” or has been “the target of personal abuse or
criticism from the party before him”). This is not to say that Engle could never prove
that individual Disciplinary Board members are biased, but her mere speculation is
not enough to show the type of flagrant constitutional violation necessary to avoid
the application of Younger. See Stroman Realty, Inc., 505 F.3d at 664.
Furthermore, even if the result of the proceedings were to be tainted in some

way by Weaver’s testimony, Engle can raise that issue in an administrative-review
complaint. For instance, in one case Engle cites, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed
and remanded the denial of an administrative-review petition, finding that an agency
board member had an impermissible conflict of interest and should have recused
herself. Bd. of Educ. of Niles Twp. High Sch. Dist. 219, Cook Cty. v. Reg’l Bd. of Sch.
Trs. of Cook Cty., 468 N.E.2d 1247, 1249–50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Engle does not
explain why the state process is so inadequate that it requires federal-court

intervention. Accordingly, Weaver’s participation as a witness—particularly where
Engle’s own allegations establish that he has relevant information to provide about
her license applications—does not show that the proceedings are motivated by a
desire to harass, require immediate equitable relief, or are based on any flagrant
constitutional violation.
Engle next contends that the IDFPR’s use of an “unwritten rule” about how to

record training hours violates her due-process rights. She argues that the unwritten
rule—that recorded hours should not exceeded the recommended hours listed on the
Matrix—is both contrary to advice given to her by IDFPR employees and unsupported
by the IDFPR’s written standards. As a result, Engle contends, this rule violates the
due-process requirement that she be given sufficient notice of the standards to which
she is being held. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 478–79
(7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the vagueness doctrine prohibits the enforcement of
laws that “fail[ ] to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited, or [are] so standardless that [they] authorize[ ] or encourage[ ] seriously

discriminatory enforcement”).
But even if Engle could establish that the so-called unwritten rule violates her
due-process rights, she has not shown that it constitutes an extraordinary
circumstance for purposes of the Younger doctrine. Assuming the IDFPR is enforcing
an unwritten rule or inconsistent standards with respect to the recording of training
hours, it still does not necessarily follow that the agency is targeting Engle for
harassment or that enforcement of the rule is incapable of being cured on appeal or

administrative review. As the Supreme Court has noted, even a “constitutional
attack on state procedures themselves” does not “automatically vitiate[ ] the
adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffman line of cases.”
Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 628 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The Circuit Court of Cook County has demonstrated its willingness and ability to
adjudicate due-process claims on administrative review, see Engle, 103 N.E.3d at

391–97, and it is in a better position than the federal courts to interpret the IDFPR’s
standards. Accordingly, this issue also does not present a flagrant constitutional
violation or other extraordinary circumstance.
Because the Court holds that Younger abstention is warranted, the next
question is whether the Court should stay or dismiss this action. See FreeEats.com,
502 F.3d at 600 (citing Majors, 149 F.3d at 714). In determining whether to stay or
dismiss, the “pivotal question” facing the Court is “whether any of the relief sought
by the plaintiff in its federal action is unavailable in the state action.” Id. Here,
Engle seeks only injunctive relief concerning the agency proceedings, which as

already described, can be addressed effectively in the state agency or on
administrative review in the Circuit Court. As a result, the Court concludes that
dismissal is the appropriate course of action.5
II. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) that its case has “some
likelihood of success on the merits,” and (2) that it has “no adequate remedy at law
and will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is denied.” Ezell v. City

of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). If the moving party meets these threshold
requirements, the district court “weighs the factors against one another, assessing
whether the balance of harms favors the moving party or whether the harm to the
nonmoving party or the public is sufficiently weighty that the injunction should be
denied.” Id. The district court’s weighing of the factors is not mathematical in nature;
rather, it is “more properly characterized as subjective and intuitive, one which

permits district courts to weigh the competing considerations and mold appropriate
relief.” Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992)).

5 Because the Court concludes that Younger abstention applies, the Court does not
reach Defendants’ alternative argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the
IDFPR as an arm of the state.
In determining that Younger abstention applies, the Court necessarily holds
that injunctive relief is not available from this Court. Since dismissal is warranted
under Younger, it would be impossible for Engle to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 694. Furthermore, as already described, it is
not clear that Engle will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, given the
availability of comparable state remedies. See id. Accordingly, even if there is no
adequate damages remedy for Engle, the balance of harms weighs strongly against
Engle and in favor of Defendants. See id. Engle’s motion for a preliminary injunction
is therefore denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Engle’s motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction and grants Defendants’ motion to
dismiss on Younger abstention grounds. This action is dismissed without prejudice
to refiling in state court. Civil case terminated.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ENTERED 5/28/19
Jam fe
John Z. Lee
United States District Judge

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10140742. Public record. Not legal advice.