# Cooper v. Bond

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · April 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137587

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137587

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARNELL COOPER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-4031
)
WILLIAM BOND, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, files a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment
while he was incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”). (Doc. 1). This cause is before the
Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to
“screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint, and through such process to identify and dismiss any legally
insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915A. In reviewing the
Complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and
labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation
omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff files suit against Hill’s Medical Director Kurt Osmundson, optometrists Dr.
William Bond and Dr. Anthony Carter, and nurse practitioner Kasey Kramer.
Plaintiff received eye treatment at Illinois Eye Center in 2018. “Punctual plugs (little
needles that help relieve dry eyes)” were surgically placed in the lower part of Plaintiff’s left and
right eyes, which relieved his pain and blurred vision. (Doc. 1 at p. 18).
On April 12, 2022, Defendant Carter, the prison’s optometrist, informed Plaintiff that the
punctual plug in his left lower eye was missing.

On May 7, 2022, Plaintiff’s pain medication was discontinued. Plaintiff does not indicate
who was responsible for discontinuing his prescription.
On September 7, 2022, Defendant Osmundson authorized Plaintiff to receive an off-site
consultation with Defendant Bond at Bond Eye Associates.
Plaintiff had an appointment with Defendant Bond on September 7, 2022. Defendant Bond
determined that Plaintiff would benefit from permanent punctual plugs in his upper left and right
eyes. Defendant Bond prescribed Maxitrol (eye drops) to treat an infection (stye) and/or allergies
before placing the punctual plugs. Plaintiff alleges he never received the eye drops.
On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff had an appointment with Defendant Carter.

On September 27 and 29, 2022, Plaintiff received approval for another appointment with
Defendant Bond.
During an examination on October 4, 2022, Defendant Bond noted that the stye and/or
allergies were still present in Plaintiff’s lower left eye and prescribed Maxitrol again. Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Bond was supposed to replace the punctual plug in his lower left eye, but
instead, he placed a punctual plug in Plaintiff’s upper right and left eyes, which caused extreme
pain, severe headaches, blurred vision, infections, and daily suffering. In addition, Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Bond knew that placing the punctual plugs before the infection and/or allergies had
resolved would cause the plugs to have an adverse effect.
On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Carter to complain about the severe pain
and suffering he was experiencing due to the punctual plugs Defendant Bond placed in his upper
left and right eyes. Plaintiff had an appointment with Defendant Carter the same day.
On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kramer discontinued his pain medication
and did not provide an alternative medication, even though he was still in pain. On October 26,

2022, Defendant Kramer allegedly discontinued Plaintiff’s prescription for Tegretol.
On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff was referred for a follow-up appointment with Defendant
Bond. On October 27, 2022, Defendant Osmundson approved the off-site referral.
On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff was scheduled for an appointment with Defendant Bond.
Plaintiff also had an appointment with Defendant Carter, who indicated that he would be scheduled
to have the lower left eye punctual plug replaced.
On December 7, 2022, Defendant Bond prescribed Naphcon-A and discontinued the
prescription for Tobradex. Plaintiff complained about daily pain and severe migraine headaches
caused by the punctual plugs.

On December 13, 2022, Plaintiff had an appointment with Defendant Carter.
On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a medical request form to inform Defendant Carter that
he still had a stye in his lower left eye, his eye was swollen and turning black, the inside of his left
eye was “bloody red,” and he was still in pain. Id. at p. 22.
An appointment with Defendant Carter was scheduled for February 14, 2023, but was later
cancelled.
During an examination on February 28, 2023, Defendant Carter allegedly informed
Plaintiff the two punctual plugs Defendant Bond had surgically placed in his upper left and right
eyes were missing.
On March 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a medical request form complaining about severe pain,
due to Defendant Kramer discontinuing his pain medication.
During an examination on July 18, 2023, Defendant Carter informed Plaintiff that
Defendant Bond refused to see him; however, Plaintiff was scheduled for an appointment with
Illinois Eye Center.

On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a medical request form to complain about continued
pain and blurred vision. On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff submitted another medical request form
seeking treatment for his dry eye condition.
On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed another grievance complaining about pain and
requesting off-site treatment at Illinois Eye Center.
On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff had an appointment with Defendant Carter, who informed
Plaintiff he would be sent to the Illinois Eye Center for an evaluation.
Finally, in October 2023, Defendant Bond removed the punctual plugs from Plaintiff’s
upper left and right eyes. Thereafter, Plaintiff was sent to the Illinois Eye Center, where it was

determined that the lower left eye punctual plug was still there “down into the canal of [his] eye.”
Id. at p. 27.
ANALYSIS
It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is actionable as
a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008).
Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of a substantial
risk of harm to an inmate and “either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk.” Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). A claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
issue, however, unless the punishment is “deliberate or otherwise reckless in the criminal law
sense, which means that the defendant must have committed an act so dangerous that his
knowledge of the risk can be inferred or that the defendant actually knew of an impending harm
easily preventable.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Pyles v.
Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 411-12 (7th Cir. 2014) (healthcare providers may exercise their medical
judgment when deciding whether to refer a prisoner to a specialist). The failure to refer is

deliberately indifferent only if “blatantly inappropriate.” Id. at 411-12. Denying a referral in favor
of “easier and less efficacious treatment” may be blatantly inappropriate if it does not reflect sound
professional judgment. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug.
25, 2016).
“Within the universe of deliberate indifference cases is a narrower category where a
prisoner alleges not that his condition was ignored entirely, but that he received constitutionally
deficient treatment for the condition.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019).
“[T]hese cases are better framed ‘not [as] deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,’ but as
a challenge to ‘a deliberate decision by a doctor to treat a medical need in a particular manner.’”

Id. (citing Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996)). In such cases, courts defer to a
medical professional’s treatment decisions “unless ‘no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.’” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512
F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008)). A disagreement between the prisoner and his medical provider
“about the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (citing Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013
(7th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bond was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bond “went
rouge” and placed a punctual plug in his upper right and left eyes instead of replacing the lower
left eye punctual plug that was deemed missing on October 4, 2022. (Doc. 1 at p. 26). Plaintiff
alleges the procedure caused extreme pain, severe headaches, blurred vision, infections, and daily
suffering. Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bond placed the punctual plugs before his infection
and/or allergies had cleared, despite knowing this would cause adverse effects and previously

recommending that the infection and/or allergies needed to be resolved before placing the plugs.
Third, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bond refused to remove the punctual plugs until October 2023,
despite Plaintiff’s frequent complaints of severe pain, blurred vision, swelling, and discoloration.
It is unclear from the Complaint if Defendant Bond, an outside specialist, is a state actor. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 830 (7th Cir. 2009). Based on Plaintiff’s
allegations at this early stage of the litigation process, the Court finds that he has stated a plausible
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Bond.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant Kramer for allegedly discontinuing his prescribed pain medications on October 18 and

26, 2022, even though she knew he was experiencing extreme pain.
Regarding Defendant Carter, Plaintiff alleges he recklessly disregarded Defendant Bond’s
prescription for Maxitrol to treat the eye infection and/or allergies in October 2022. Plaintiff also
claims Defendant Carter knew that Defendant Bond’s treatment had been ineffective, but turned a
blind eye to Plaintiff’s pain and worsening condition for months until his medical needs were
considered “urgent” in October 2023. Based on his allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated
an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Carter.
Finally, regarding Defendant Osmundson, Plaintiff alleges he had the authority to ensure
Plaintiff received off-site eye care to relieve his pain and suffering. Although Defendant
Osmundson was allegedly aware Plaintiff needed further treatment after punctual plugs were
placed in his upper left and right eyes, he failed to refer Plaintiff for follow-up care for several
months, which caused Plaintiff to endure extreme pain and blurred vision. The Court finds that
Plaintiff has stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Osmundson for
delaying a referral for follow-up medical treatment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, this case shall proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Bond, Kramer, Carter, and Osmundson. Additional claims shall not be included in the
case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until
counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
3) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service. If
Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver
is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals
Service on Defendants and will require Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
4) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the
waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses
appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues
and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court
does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore,
no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not filed an answer
or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a
scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
5) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom
Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendants' current work
address, or, if not known, Defendants' forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of Defendants' forwarding address shall be retained only by
the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants' counsel has
filed an appearance, Defendants' counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion

or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants'
counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However,
this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not
filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to
Defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled
unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which
will explain the discovery process in more detail.
7) Defendants' counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place
of confinement. Defendants' counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.
8) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing
address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

9) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.
10) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release
medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to Defendants' counsel.
The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
11) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this
Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 4/2/2024

s/ James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137587. Public record. Not legal advice.