# Gruver v. Montesa

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · May 1, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137550

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 1, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137550

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying this rule “with equal vigor to expert testimony”
- applying Illinois law and writing “[t]he test of agency is whether the alleged principal has the right to control the manner and method in which work is carried out by the alleged agent and whether the alleged agent can affect the legal relationships of the principal”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

TIMOTHY GRUVER and KARRI )
GRUVER, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Case No. 1:21-cv-1210
v. )
)
MONTESA EXPRESS, INC., PINOY )
TRUCKING, INC., REX EXPRESS, INC., )
TENNESSEE COMMERCIAL )
WAREHOUSE, INC., NOLASCO )
MONTESA, REX MONTESA, and )
ANTHONY DUNN, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on motion by Defendant Tennessee Commercial
Warehouse, Inc., for summary judgment. (Doc. 75). Plaintiffs Timothy and Karri
Gruver have responded (doc. 82), and Defendant replied (doc. 83). This matter is
therefore ripe for review. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (doc. 75) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2019, Plaintiff Timothy Gruver’s motor vehicle was struck as he
was driving northbound on Illinois Route 47 near Livingston County. (Doc. 82 at 2).
The collision occurred when Anthony Dunn, who was operating a tractor going
southbound, rear-ended the vehicle in front of him and then swerved into oncoming
traffic. (Doc. 82 at 1–2). At the time, Illinois Route 47 was under construction,
requiring the southbound lanes to split into single paths of traffic going both
directions. (Doc. 75 at 1–2). Plaintiff Timothy Gruver suffered various injuries from
the accident. (Docs. 5 at 37–38, 82 at 2). His wife, Plaintiff Karri Gruver, alleges a

loss of consortium due to the injuries suffered by her husband. (Doc. 5 at 16).
The instant lawsuit was filed on July 28, 2022. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint is now the operative pleading. (Doc. 5). It names seven Defendants:
Montesa Express, Inc. (“Montesa Express”), Pinoy Trucking, Inc. (“Pinoy Trucking”),
Rex Express, Inc. (“Rex Express”), Tennessee Commercial Warehouse, Inc. (“TCW”),
Nolasco Montesa, Rex Montesa, and Anthony Dunn (“Dunn”). (Doc. 5). TCW, Montesa

Express, Pinoy Trucking, and Rex Express are listed as “Corporate Defendants” by
Plaintiffs. (Doc. 5 at 4). TCW, who moves for summary judgment, is an “asset leasing
company and equipment owner” which owned the chassis, or the base frame, attached
to the tractor involved in the accident. (Doc. 82 at 3). The chassis (identified as “TCWZ
417132”) was leased as a part of a Master Lease Agreement between TCW and North
American Chassis Pool Cooperative (“NACPC”). (Doc. 82 at 3). The equipment was
then placed by NACPC into the Chicago-Ohio Valley Consolidated Chassis Pool LLC

(“COCP”) to be used by various motor carriers. (Doc. 82 at 3). Pinoy Trucking signed
a Uniform Intermodal Interchange Agreement (“UIIA”) with the chassis pool. (Doc.
83 at 4). Through this agreement, Pinoy Trucking gained access to the chassis and
used it to transport a shipping container on the day of the accident. (Docs. 83 at 4, 82
at 2). Pinoy Trucking employed Anthony Dunn, who was assigned as the driver of the
tractor, which pulled the chassis and container. (Doc. 82 at 5).
Plaintiffs allege each Defendant is liable for the accident on August 23, 2019,
through various legal theories. (See doc. 5). Count I is directed at Montesa Express
for negligent hiring, training, entrustment, supervision, retention, and maintenance.

(Doc. 5 at 16). Counts II and III contain the same claim against Pinoy Trucking and
Rex Express, respectively. (Doc. 5 at 20, 24). Count IV is aimed at TCW, alleging a
claim of negligence in hiring, entrustment, and maintenance. (Doc. 5 at 28). Counts
V, VI, and VII allege a claim of negligence against Nolasco Montesa, Rex Montesa,
and Anthony Dunn, respectively. (Doc. 5 at 30, 31). Count VIII alleges gross
negligence by one or more of the Corporate Defendants. (Doc. 5 at 35). Count IX

contains the loss of consortium claim and is generally aimed at all Defendants. (Doc.
5 at 36). Count X is similarly directed at all Defendants and alleges Plaintiffs have
suffered damages. (Doc. 5 at 37).
The procedural history of this case has been somewhat convoluted. Defendants
Rex Express, Rex Montesa, Pinoy Trucking, Nolasco Montesa, and TCW answered
the Amended Complaint. (See docs. 30, 31, 37, 39, 55). A special representative of the
estate of Anthony Dunn, who passed away in the time between the accident and

Plaintiffs’ filing of this lawsuit, also answered. (See doc. 61). TCW filed crossclaims
against both Pinoy Trucking and Dunn, seeking contribution and indemnity. (See doc.
66). Default was entered against Montesa Express for failure to file an answer or
responsive pleading. (Text Order dated May 3, 2023). The parties then moved into
discovery, and Defendant TCW moved for summary judgment on the claims against
it.1 (Doc. 75).
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law
controls which facts are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary

judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted).
The Court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003), “resolving all factual
disputes and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of [the nonmovant],” Grant
v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). It “must refrain from making
credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.,

951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the Court does not give the non-moving party
“speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th

1 While the instant Motion was pending, default was entered against both Defendants
Rex Montesa and Rex Express for failure to appear at a hearing and subsequent
failure to respond to a Show Cause Order. It appears that Defendant Rex Express no
longer retains corporate counsel. (Text Order dated January 3, 2024).
Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a
reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence
submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id.

(citation omitted). Not all factual disputes will preclude the entry of summary
judgment, only those that “could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”
Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendant TCW moves for summary judgment on the claims asserted by
Plaintiffs. (Doc. 75). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332. (See docs. 4, 5). “In a diversity case, the federal court must apply the choice of
law rules of the forum state to determine applicable substantive law.” Thomas v.
Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2004). Personal injury actions,
under Illinois law, are presumptively governed by the law of the state where the
accident occurred, unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the
matter. Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 Ill.2d 147, 163 (2007). Thus, the Court
will apply Illinois law as the accident occurred within the state and the parties agree.

In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege Defendant TCW is liable for negligent
entrustment, negligent hiring, and failure to maintain the chassis. (Doc. 5 at 28–30).
TCW, as a Corporate Defendant, is also alleged to have been grossly negligent in
Count VIII. (Doc. 5 at 35–36). Next, Plaintiffs allege a loss of consortium claim (Count
IX) and damages (Count X) against TCW. (Doc. 5 at 36–38). As an initial matter,
Plaintiffs’ claim for damages is not a cause of action. Damages are a remedy;
therefore, Count X is summarily dismissed. This is not to say Plaintiffs are prevented
from seeking damages. The Court will address the remaining claims in turn.
I. Negligence – Counts IV & VIII

Plaintiffs allege TCW was negligent in various ways scattered throughout
Counts IV and VIII. Some of the claims pertain to actions by other parties, such as
Dunn or Pinoy Trucking. (See e.g., doc. 5 at 29, 35–36). Some relate to TCW’s actions,
including a claim of negligent entrustment. (See e.g., doc. 5 at 28–30, 36).
A. Negligent Entrustment
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege TCW is liable for its own
negligence in entrusting the chassis to Pinoy Trucking and Dunn when it knew or
should have known that both were unfit. (Doc. 5 at 28). As an initial matter within

the Response, they argue that several factual statements are in dispute and preclude
summary judgment, including whether Plaintiffs have identified evidence that Dunn
had TCW’s permission to use the chassis; whether TCW had direct involvement with
the chassis after transferring it to NACPC; and whether TCW had the right to use
the chassis after transferring it to NACPC. (See doc. 82). After considering the factual
statements and responses, this Court disagrees that a genuine dispute exists.

In response to TCW’s factual statement that Plaintiffs have no evidence to
support the necessary elements of a negligent entrustment claim, Plaintiffs cite
testimony that demonstrates TCW knew the leased chassis would be placed in a
chassis pool to be used by various motor carriers. (Doc. 82 at 12). This, as argued by
Plaintiffs, demonstrates implied permission on the part of TCW for Pinoy and Dunn
to use the chassis. (Doc. 83 at 12). Plaintiffs’ contention that TCW’s actions constitute
permission is not a fact, but rather a legal conclusion related to this claim. For that
reason, the Court does not find the dispute to be genuine and deems the factual
statement that Plaintiffs have not identified evidence to support the element of

permission, admitted. Also, in disputing factual statements that TCW did not have
further direct involvement nor the right to use the chassis after the transfer,
Plaintiffs state “[t]he lease agreement speaks for itself, and contains provisions for
TCW to recall the chassis[,]” citing Paragraph 11 of the Master Lease Agreement.
(Doc. 82 at 10–11). However, Paragraph 11 describes the termination rights of the
parties. (See doc. 75-7 at 3). To label this as a right of recall held by Defendant TCW

is misleading, and the Court views this type of response as argumentative rather
than providing evidentiary support to a dispute. Responsive statements that amount
to legal argument will not be considered. Thus, those facts are also not in genuine
dispute, and are deemed admitted. The listed disputes do not impede the Court’s
ability to resolve this argument on the merits.
To state a negligent entrustment claim, Plaintiffs must allege that TCW “gave
another express or implied permission to use or possess a dangerous article or

instrumentality which [defendant] knew, or should have known, would likely be used
in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” Evans v. Shannon,
201 Ill.2d 424, 434 (2002). Here, relevant considerations are: “(1) whether the owner
of the vehicle entrusted the car to an incompetent or unfit driver, and (2) whether the
incompetency was a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury.” Id. Entrustment may be
given by either express or implied permission; the latter “can be inferred from a
course of conduct of the parties, their relationship, or from the behavior of the parties
in specific circumstances.” Bishop v. Morich, 250 Ill. App. 3d 366, 369 (1st Dist. 1993).
This includes “a mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances

signifying permission.” Watson v. Enter. Leasing Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d 914, 922 (1st
Dist. 2001) (quotation omitted).
TCW argues that summary judgment is appropriate on this claim because
Plaintiffs cannot establish any of the necessary elements. (Docs. 75 at 17–18, 83 at
14–15). It points out that Plaintiffs admitted that TCW did not control the chassis,
had nothing to do with booking the chassis, did not know Pinoy Trucking would use

it, had no contact with Dunn, did not hire or retain Pinoy Trucking, and was “four
steps removed from the driver of the tractor involved in the accident and did not have
any relationship with the driver or the motor carrier transporting the chassis (TCW
– NACPC – chassis pool – Pinoy Trucking – Anthony Dunn).” (Doc. 83 at 14).
Considering these admissions, TCW argues that the suggestion that it gave implied
permission to either Pinoy Trucking or Dunn is misplaced. (Doc. 83 at 15). TCW then
contends that a successful negligent entrustment claim under these circumstances

would be akin to finding TCW strictly liable “for the negligence of a truck driver who
is involved in an accident while driving a truck that fortuitously happens to be
transporting a chassis that TCW leased to NACPC.” (Doc. 83 at 15).
A situation resembling the circumstances presented here was discussed in
Johnson v. XTRA Lease, LLC, 2010 WL 706037 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2010). There,
Defendant XTRA leased equipment, including semi-tractor trailers, that was
involved in an accident. Id. at *4. A negligent entrustment claim was leveled against
XTRA; however, the district court found no evidence to support it. Id. at *5. Various
courts outside of the Seventh Circuit have come to similar conclusions regarding a

lessor’s liability in negligent entrustment claims. While the Court applies Illinois law,
the out-of-state cases provide insight into an infrequent issue of law. In Guinn v.
Great West Cas Co., a court rejected a negligent entrustment claim against an
equipment lessor under Oklahoma law. No. CIV-09-1198, 2010 WL 4811042, at *6
(W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2010). There, the undisputed facts failed to establish that the
lessor authorized the driver to use the vehicle or could have known that the lessee

would fail to properly supervise trainees, and therefore did not “ha[ve] the requisite
knowledge to render it liable for negligent entrustment.” Id. at *8. Applying New
York state law, the court in Muller v. Gilliard held that a commercial lessor, Penske,
could not be liable as a matter of law for negligent entrustment when Penske’s lessee
later allowed another individual to drive the leased equipment. 2010 WL 2245567
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 26, 2010). The court wrote:
It is not disputed that Penske did not entrust the subject truck to
Gilliard, the operator of such truck. Rather, Penske leased the truck to
International who in turn, entrusted it to Gilliard. The moving papers
sufficiently established that Gilliard was not an employee, servant or
agent of Penske or otherwise known to it. The opposing papers
submitted by the plaintiffs failed to raise any question of fact regarding
knowledge, actual or constructive, on the part of moving defendant
Penske that its entrustee, International, had a propensity to use leased
vehicles in an improper or dangerous fashion.

Muller, 2010 WL 2245567 at *2.
Here, the chassis at issue was leased as a part of an agreement to lease over
one thousand pieces of equipment to NACPC, which then placed the equipment into
a chassis pool. (Doc. 82 at 3). There are no facts submitted by Plaintiffs that

demonstrate TCW was involved with any day-to-day operations concerning the
chassis, or that it had any knowledge of who was using it on the day of the accident.
(Doc. 82 at 4). The undisputed facts fail to establish that Dunn was an employee,
agent, or otherwise in service to TCW. (Doc. 82 at 5–8, 11). The Court agrees with
TCW that no reasonable jury could find it liable for negligent entrustment under
these circumstances because there is not enough evidence to support a finding of

implied permission. The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs fails to raise a question of
fact as to TCW’s knowledge that NACPC would place the chassis in a pool in which
motor carriers improperly use the equipment, and nevertheless, Plaintiffs do not even
make that argument. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that TCW should have ensured the
parties who utilized the equipment in the chassis pool were motor carriers with
adequate safety records, and because TCW did not take this affirmative action, it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used by an “unsafe carrier.” (Doc. 82 at 21–

22). However, TCW had never communicated with the parties involved in the
accident until this lawsuit, and so that argument fails to establish how TCW could
check the history of a motor carrier it did not know existed.
There are not enough facts to support the necessary foresight element of
negligent entrustment. See Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 925 (“To impose foresight on
defendant under the particular circumstances present in this case would render it
liable for anyone who drove the car, thus making it strictly liable.”). This Court cannot
say that under these circumstances, TCW knew or should have known that Dunn was
going to operate the chassis “in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to

others,” Evans, 201 Ill.2d at 434, when it did not retain control over the chassis after
leasing it to NACPC (doc. 82 at 4). Additionally, Plaintiffs do not submit authority to
support the argument that a lessor like TCW may be found liable for negligent
entrustment when TCW did not know who would have access to it and was not
required to track the motor carriers who use the chassis pool. See Mwangangi v.
Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2022) (“A litigant who fails to press a point by

supporting it with pertinent authority, or by showing why it is a good point despite a
lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority, forfeits the point.”).
Therefore, summary judgment is proper for TCW on the negligent entrustment claim
contained in Count IV.
B. Negligence in Leasing Chassis
Aside from negligent entrustment, Plaintiffs allege that TCW was negligent in
hiring, contracting with, and retaining Pinoy Trucking to use the equipment at issue.

(Doc. 5 at 28). In Plaintiffs’ Response, they argue TCW can be held liable under
“traditional common law principals for its own negligent breaches of its duties,” like
ensuring that its equipment was operated by “safe, qualified motor carriers and
drivers, and not conjoined with unsafe commercial motor vehicles.” (Doc. 82 at 27–
29). TCW rejects this, stating that Plaintiffs fail to explain how such safety screening
could occur when it had no knowledge of which motor carriers would utilize the
equipment in the chassis pool. (Doc. 83 at 15).
Here, Plaintiffs attempt to invoke a common-law duty to safeguard motorists
who share the roadway with those who may use the leased equipment owned by TCW.
(Doc. 82 at 28). There is no cited authority as to the existence of such duty under

Illinois law; instead, Plaintiffs ask this Court to infer a duty so “a jury can conclude
that TCW was negligent in leasing its chassis into a system that fails to take any
precautions to prohibit the use of the equipment by unsafe carriers.” (Doc. 82 at 27–
28). In Illinois, “[t]he existence of a duty depends on whether the plaintiff and the
defendant stood in such a relationship to each other that the law will impose upon
the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.”

Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 436 (2006). “This question turns
largely on public policy considerations, informed by consideration of four traditional
factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the likelihood of the injury;
(3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.” Simpkins v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 18. Whether a common-law duty exists is a
question of law for the court. Iseberg v. Gross, 227 Ill.2d 78, 87 (2007).

After considering the factors, the Court rejects the argument that TCW owed
a duty of care to motorists, as the equipment lessor under these circumstances is not
in the best position to prevent injuries like those suffered by Plaintiffs. In Abdo v.
Trek Transportation Co., Inc., 221 Ill. App. 3d 493 (2nd Dist. 1991), the plaintiff’s
decedent was killed when his vehicle struck the flatbed trailer of a truck that was
making a delivery to a facility owned by a different company. Id. at 496. The plaintiff
sued the facility owner for negligence, alleging that it “had the duty to insure that
deliveries to and pickups from its facility were made in a safe manner[.]” Id. at 495.
The Abdo court noted that the plaintiff was attempting to impose a duty on the facility

owner to ensure that its invitees acted in a reasonably safe manner, attributing the
defendant’s liability “not to the foreseeability of an injury resulting from a condition
of a landowner’s property, but rather resulting from the alleged negligent actions of
another.” Id. Even though the court held that “the driver’s alleged violation of his
statutory duty not to obstruct traffic was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
configuration of driveway and the materials there placed[,]” it did not impose a duty

upon the owner. Id. Because the defendant “had neither the right nor ability to control
the truck driver’s conduct . . . [t]he trucking company and truck driver, rather than
[the defendant], were in the best position to prevent plaintiff’s decedent’s injury.” Id.
at 252–53. The circumstances there reinforced “the soundness of the policy of not
imposing a general duty to guard against the negligence of others.” Id.
Turning to the instant matter, Plaintiffs largely argue that the parties
ultimately responsible for their injuries are Dunn and his employer, Pinoy Trucking,

but contend that a duty to protect motorists should fall on TCW. While they argue
that it is customary in the commercial trucking industry to screen motor carriers for
adequate safety records (doc. 82 at 28), Plaintiffs do not point to evidence that the
chassis at issue posed any danger to motorists absent independent, negligent actions
or omissions by third parties.2 Nor do they explain why the burden should fall on
TCW and not others like NACPC or the chassis pool. While the factual circumstances
differ from those in Abdo, it is undisputed that TCW had “neither the right nor ability

to control” the conduct of Pinoy Trucking and Dunn, and no control over the day-to-
day use of the chassis. (Doc. 82 at 4, 7). Therefore, it logically follows that TCW is
likely not in the “best position” to prevent injuries of this nature, and Plaintiffs fail
to cite any case law justifying placement of this burden on the equipment owner and
lessor. Illinois law is clear that “ ‘[the] imposition of a general duty to anticipate and
guard against the negligence of others would place an intolerable burden on society.’

” Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill.2d 42, 53 (1991) (quoting Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co., 127 Ill.2d 350, 366 (1989)). Thus, this Court rejects the plea to find
TCW owed a common-law duty to protect motorists at large from the negligence of
others.
C. Liability Related to the FMCSR
Plaintiffs next argue that TCW has duties and responsibilities under the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”) and point to several factual

disputes to contend summary judgment is inappropriate. (See doc. 82). Many of these
relate to TCW’s classification under the regulations. Namely, it is disputed whether

2 Plaintiffs do not allege the chassis was defective when TCW leased it to NACPC.
(See docs. 82 at 4–5, 83 at 18). Another consideration is that relevant, uncontested
facts include “[t]here were no defects or deficiencies in the chassis, including the
brakes of the chassis, involved in the incident at the time of the incident[,]” and
“Plaintiffs have not identified any evidence to support their contention that there was
any mechanical defect, defect in the brakes, and/or improperly maintained brakes on
chassis TCWZ417132 on the date of the accident.” (Doc. 82 at 4–5).
TCW is considered a “motor carrier” under the definitions found within 49 C.F.R. §
390.5 (“Section 390.5”); whether TCW was acting as a “motor carrier” with respect to
the chassis; whether TCW has the duties and responsibilities attendant on the “motor

carrier” classification, including “to see that companies that are allowed to operate
their vehicles hire properly qualified commercial motor vehicle operators” and
operate within the FMCSR; and whether either TCW or Pinoy Trucking qualifies as
a statutory employer of Dunn under Section 390.5. (See docs. 82, 83).
Plaintiffs rely on an expert witness, Lewis Grill (“Mr. Grill”), to establish that
TCW is considered a “motor carrier” under the applicable regulations and is therefore

responsible for duties like maintenance and inspections. (Doc. 82). TCW asks the
Court to ignore Mr. Grill’s opinion, as it relates only to legal conclusions and the
interpretation of federal regulations. (Doc. 83 at 10). In part, the disputes Plaintiffs
identify include that
6. TCW is not a registered motor carrier and does not function as a motor
carrier. (Ex. 4. Dep. of Ben Banks, 24:14-23; 74:15-20).

Disputed: . . . Under § 390.5 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (“FMCSRs”), 49 C.F.R. § 390.5, as applied in the standards,
customs, and practices of the trucking industry, the owner of a
commercial motor vehicle qualifies as an employer, and an employer is
included within the definition of a motor carrier. [Plaintiff’s Ex. 1,
Affidavit of Lewis Grill, pp. 31-32] . . .

9. TCW was not responsible for the maintenance and repair of the
chassis. Section 4 of the Master Lease Agreement States:

Lessee [NACPC] agrees, at its expense, to maintain Equipment
[chassis] at all times during this Lease in good repair and
operating condition and in safe condition in accordance with
FMCSA standards and all applicable laws and regulations, free
of any and all liens and encumbrances. All repairs made by
Lessee shall be in accordance with FMCSA standards issued
from time to time. It is understood and agreed that NACPC has
contracted with Consolidated Chassis Management, LLC (CCM)
to perform maintenance for the chassis contributed by NACPC
to the Midsouth Consolidated Chassis Pool. (Ex. 7).

Disputed: The lease agreement speaks for itself; however, as owner of
the chassis, TCW remained ultimately responsible for the maintenance
of the chassis. [Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, Affidavit of Lewis Grill, pp. 32].

(Doc. 82 at 8–10). Within the cited affidavit, Mr. Grill lists verbatim the definitions
of driver, employee, employer, person, motor carrier, and motor vehicle as written in
the FMCSR. (Doc. 82-1 at 30–31). He then includes the statement: “OPINION: As
both an employer and a motor carrier, TCW is responsible for the following and
abiding by the [regulations].” (Doc. 82-1 at 31). The following sections include
verbatim paragraphs from the FMCSR on inspections, repairs, maintenance, and
other requirements placed on motor carriers. (Doc. 82-1 at 31–3). Mr. Grill then
writes:
The [regulations] clearly layout the procedures to be followed regarding
the responsibilities of each party regarding the pre-trip maintenance,
and overall safety of the commercial equipment in use . . . As a motor
carrier and owner of the chassis, TCW had a responsibility to follow up
on who was operating their chassis and whether or not they were safe
and complying with the [regulations] . . . As the [regulations] show, TCW
is responsible for their own equipment and compliance . . . TCW is
responsible for this accident occurring.

(Doc. 82-1 at 32).
Evidence presented to defeat a summary judgment motion must be admissible
in content. Payne, 337 F.3d at 775 n.3; see also Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561
F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying this rule “with equal vigor to expert
testimony”). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits the admission of
expert testimony if “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” To
determine the admissibility of an expert opinion, the Court acts as a “gatekeeper” to

analyze whether the proffered expert testimony is reliable and relevant. See Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
In the Seventh Circuit, it is well established that expert witnesses are not
permitted to give testimony “as to legal conclusions that will determine the outcome
of the case.” Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557,

564 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, experts generally may not testify on pure issues of law,
such as the meaning of statutes or regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 517
F.3d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 2008); Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898,
900 (7th Cir. 1994) (extending the prohibition to the meaning of the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards and whether a defendant complied with those standards).
Courts have declined to allow testimony from trucking industry experts regarding
the applicability of federal regulations. See, e.g., Ashley v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers,

Inc., No. 12-cv-8309, 2016 WL 3125056, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2016) (finding
expert’s testimony regarding violation of Illinois laws and regulations regarding
traffic accident to be inadmissible, as there was “simply too large of an analytical gap
between [the expert’s] factual assertions and his legal conclusions—a gap that [the
expert] fills with his own statutory and regulatory interpretation—to allow [the
expert] to offer these legal conclusions”). Most relevant, the same reasoning has been
applied to “exclude testimony from trucking industry experts regarding the
applicability of the FMCSR to a particular set of facts.” Kucharski v. Orbis Corp., No.
14-cv-05574, 2017 WL 1806581, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2017) (collecting cases from

various circuits on the preclusion of expert testimony that seek to interpret the
FMCSR).
Plaintiffs offer Mr. Grill’s expert opinion to dispute whether the FMCSR
applies to TCW, and whether TCW violated those standards.3 As established in
Seventh Circuit case law, the applicability of the FMCSR is not a question for an
expert to resolve. See Bammerlin, 30 F.3d at 900–01 (“The meaning of federal

regulations is not a question of fact, to be resolved by the jury after a battle of
experts.”). Thus, the statements made by Mr. Grill on which Plaintiffs rely on to
dispute several facts are not taken into consideration by this Court. (See, e.g., doc 82
at 9–13) (using expert testimony to dispute Fact No. 6, 7, 9, 10, 27, 33, 37, 38, 39, 45).
This testimony is also used to support several statements in Plaintiffs’ additional
material facts section. (See, e.g., doc. 83 at 8–10) (relying on expert testimony in
disputed Fact No. 17, 18, 19). Because those statements are based on inadmissible

content, they are left unsupported and will not be considered. Put simply, it is the
Court’s role to determine whether TCW is subject to the FMCSR.

3 As noted in the cited case law, Mr. Grill may not give his opinion as to whether a
defendant is subject to or violated the FMCSR; however, testimony like his is
generally permitted as to the customs, standards, and practices within the
commercial trucking industry. See Kucharski, 2017 WL 1806581 at *4. The Court also
notes that Mr. Grill has been able to testify on almost identical legal conclusions in
state court, but that does not influence the analysis here. See McHale v. W.D.
Trucking, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, ¶ 77–86.
The first argument related to the FMCSR is that TCW is a “motor carrier”
under the definitions provided in Section 390.5, and therefore is responsible for the
maintenance and inspection of the chassis, along with “required driver inspection.”

(Doc. 82 at 30) (citing Sections 396.7, 396.3, 396.11, and 396.13 of the FMCSR). TCW
argues that it is not a “motor carrier” and does not have the authority to operate as
one. (Doc. 75 at 15). Nevertheless, TCW points to Seventh Circuit case law
demonstrating that even if it “had a motor carrier authority operating license at the
time of the accident [it] is not enough to impose liability under 49 C.F.R. § 390; the
motor carrier authority must actually be in use in the incident.” (Doc. 75 at 15) (citing

Camp v. TNT Logistics Corp., 553 F.3d 502, 507–10 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Statutory, nondelegable duties arise out of the FMCSR and apply to motor
carriers authorized to operate by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(“FMCSA”). The purpose of the regulations was to prevent motor carriers from
immunizing themselves from liability by leasing trucks and characterizing drivers as
independent contractors. The regulations create a statutory employment
relationship, allowing an interstate motor carrier to be held vicariously liable as a

matter of law for the negligence of its statutory employee drivers. A “motor carrier”
is either a for-hire motor carrier, engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers
for compensation, or a private motor carrier, which provides transportation of
property or passengers by commercial motor vehicle but is not for hire. 49 C.F.R. §
390.5. The term “motor carrier” also includes the term “employer,” which is a person
who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with a business affecting
interstate commerce. Id. “[T]he crucial inquiry” in determining whether a defendant
constitutes a motor carrier “is in what capacity [the defendant] was acting during the
transaction.” Camp, 553 F.3d at 507.

TCW is the owner-lessor of the chassis involved in the accident. The
regulations provide a definition for “intermodal equipment,” which explicitly includes
a chassis. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. Plaintiffs first point to the “employer” piece of the “motor
carrier” definition, arguing that a lessor of a commercial motor vehicle falls within
those considered statutory employers. However, they fail to address how a chassis is
a “commercial motor vehicle” and offer no authority on the contention that TCW, as

an asset-leasing company, may be considered an “employer” or “motor carrier” when
it is not registered as one with the FMCSA. This does not persuade the Court that
TCW is subject to the regulations.
Plaintiffs take a second approach, arguing that TCW was a “statutory
employer” of Dunn by way of the FMCSR and thus liable for his actions, but it is also
not persuasive. (Doc. 82 at 29–30). They attempt to label TCW as an “employer” and
Dunn as an “employee” by again citing Section 390.5. (Doc. 82 at 29–30). Case law

within the Seventh Circuit rejects the idea that a lessor, such as TCW, can be a
statutory employer for purposes of liability under the FMCSR. See Johnke v. Espinal-
Quiroz, No. 14-cv-6992, 2016 WL 454333, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2016) (“Plaintiffs’
reliance on a broad reading of the definition of “employer” in 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.5 and
390.5 to include lessors . . . is not persuasive, and does not alter the fact that the
FMCSR imposes liability on carrier-lessees and not equipment owners or lessors.”).
The regulations provide “definitions, not bases for liability.” Lynch v. Collins, No. 20
C 02477, 2022 WL 2159826, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2022). Even if TCW falls under
the label of “employer,” it remains illogical that TCW would become liable simply

because it meets a definition. See id. (“It cannot be the case that [the lessor] is liable
as an employer simply because it meets this definition. This would result in a
nonsensical situation where any employer could be sued for any crash in the country
involving a person who qualifies as [a statutory employee under the FMCSR]. So
there must still be some evidence of an actual employer-employee relationship
between the parties involved, and such evidence is completely absent here.”). No

definition changes the record that clearly outlines the details of the accident,
including how TCW’s only connection was as the lessor of the chassis. The undisputed
record does not support the existence of an employer-employee relationship. If this
Court found TCW liable for the actions of Pinoy Trucking and Dunn based solely on
a definition in the regulations as Plaintiffs ask, it would be completely unhinged from
related case law.
Without more, Plaintiffs cannot successfully argue that TCW is subject to the

FMCSR by virtue of the “motor carrier” or “employer” definitions. Derivative
arguments made by Plaintiffs, including that TCW failed to ensure safe operation of
and maintain the equipment as mandated by the FMCSR, are not persuasive, as
Plaintiffs have not successfully demonstrated that TCW is subject to the
requirements. (Doc. 5 at 29).
The third approach taken by Plaintiffs asks this Court to “pierce the corporate
veil,” and apply the alter ego doctrine because TCW is affiliated with TCW, Inc. (Doc.
82 at 30–32). TCW, Inc., is a registered motor carrier. (Doc. 83 at 10). While Plaintiffs

do not state this explicitly, the Court interprets this argument as an effort to classify
TCW as a “motor carrier” and render it responsible for the duties required under the
FMCSR. (Doc. 82 at 30). TCW dismisses the successful application of this argument,
stating Plaintiffs offer no authority “for the proposition that if an entity is related to
another entity that is a motor carrier, it too is a motor carrier, even if it is not
registered as a motor carrier and does not function as one.” (Doc. 83 at 17).

Under Illinois law,4 “a corporate entity will be disregarded and the veil of
limited liability pierced when two conditions are met.” Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper
Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chemical
and Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1985)). Those two conditions are “such unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual [or other corporation] no longer exist” and “circumstances . . . that an

4 Plaintiffs use Illinois law to argue that this Court should apply the alter ego
doctrine. (See doc. 82). However, under Illinois choice-of-law rules, the law of the state
of incorporation typically governs these issues. Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v.
Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2008). TCW is incorporated
in Tennessee (doc. 53-1 at 4), indicating that the application of Illinois law by
Plaintiffs was erroneous. However, because TCW did not argue in its Reply that
Tennessee law applies, this Court will continue evaluating the issue under Illinois
law. (Doc. 83 at 17). See Garner v. Bumble Inc., No. 21-cv-50457, 2023 WL 6065481,
at *7, n.4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2023) (quoting Joiner v. Ryder Sys., 966 F. Supp. 1478,
1482–83 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (“[S]ince both parties assume [without discussing] that
Illinois law applies to the alter ego issue, the Court will not disturb that assumption,
nor will it hold otherwise.”)).
adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or
promote injustice.” Id. “A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must make a
substantial showing that one corporation is a dummy or sham for another.” Buckley

v. Abuzir, 2014 IL App (1st) 130469, ¶ 9.
Plaintiffs only offer evidence that TCW, Inc., leases the entirety of its
equipment from TCW and that the two corporations share staff at the management
level. (Doc. 82 at 30–32). However, neither condition required for piercing the
corporate veil is met, as Plaintiffs offer no authority that this is evidence of “such
unity of the interest and ownership” between TCW and TCW, Inc., or fraudulent

conduct. There is no cited support that shared management staff or leased equipment
can supply either missing condition. In Johnke v. Espinal-Quiroz, No. 14-CV-6992,
2017 WL 3620745, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2017), the plaintiffs made an argument
nearly identical to the one here when they sought to hold “Steel Warehouse Company
LLC liable as a motor carrier under the theory that Steel Warehouse Inc. is an empty
shell and that Steel Warehouse Company LLC is its alter ego” in the aftermath of a
multi-vehicle accident. Id. at *1. However, there, the district court weighed numerous

factors that ultimately satisfied the necessary conditions and found the relationship
between the two corporations went well beyond an affiliation. For example, the court
discussed how the creation of one of the corporations was a “mere façade” for the other
when faced with regulatory problems, their assets were treated as a common
resource, the “Steel Warehouse Company” employees wore “Steel Warehouse” badges
and had “Steel Warehouse” email addresses, certain payments to “Steel Warehouse
Company” employees came solely from “Steel Warehouse,” and the two corporations
had overlapping ownership. Id. at *8. From this undisputed evidence and more, the
district court found one corporation existed solely for the benefit of the other and to

shield assets from incurred liabilities. Id.
Looking at the record here, there are simply no facts to support that the
affiliation between the two corporations is improper, and for Plaintiffs to suggest
otherwise begins to cross the line into frivolity. Without more to suggest that TCW
was an instrumentality of TCW, Inc., and that its existence included committing
fraud or promoting injustice, this Court declines to exercise the alter ego doctrine.

It is worth noting that TCW was operating as an equipment lessor in the
factual circumstances present here, rendering this argument a nonstarter and the
disputed fact of whether TCW and TCW, Inc., share managerial staff immaterial.5
(Doc. 82 at 12). Even if the Court agreed there was substantial evidence to allow
application of the alter ego doctrine, TCW’s role in this matter is as a lessor of the
chassis. Plaintiffs’ argument would remain that TCW (now combined with TCW, Inc.)
is liable for the actions of Pinoy Trucking and Dunn, and responsible for the required

duties under the FMCSR, because it now squarely fits under the definition of “motor

5 Plaintiffs also rely on this information to dispute several of TCW’s factual
statements without explanation. (See doc. 82 at 8–9, 13). However, the Court views
this type of response as argumentative and evasive. A response to a factual statement
is not a place to introduce argument or additional facts. See Ciomber v. Coop. Plus,
Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2008) (argumentative responses that
simultaneously deny the veracity of a defendant’s proposed material fact and present
separate, additional facts risk the possibility that the Court will consider defendant’s
proposed fact as undisputed).
carrier” within Section 390.5. Not only is arguing that a definition creates a basis for
liability misplaced, but it is not the purpose of the alter ego doctrine. This doctrine,
and piercing the corporate veil, are means of imposing liability when the corporation

does not have the necessary assets. It is not intended to be used as the basis of an
argument that the licensure or registration of one corporation should belong to
another. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot establish liability by way of the FMCSR.
D. Negligence of Other Parties
A final claim alleged by Plaintiffs is that TCW is vicariously liable for the
negligence of other parties. (Doc. 5 at 28–29, 35–36). When Plaintiffs submitted
additional material facts in response to the instant Motion, statements regarding

Pinoy Trucking and Dunn were included. (Doc. 82 at 14–16). Of those, it is disputed
whether Pinoy Trucking was required to submit safety records before accessing the
chassis pool; whether it is customary to use a publicly available website to screen for
a motor carrier’s safety records; whether Pinoy Trucking had “continuous ‘Alert’
Safety Assessment status for vehicle maintenance” on the website; whether an
inquiry into Pinoy Trucking’s history would have revealed its “poor safety and

maintenance history”; whether the inspection by the Illinois State Police revealed
defects in the brakes that would have been detected in a “proper pre-trip inspection”;
whether the tractor should not have been in service on the day of the accident; and
whether defective brakes were a contributing cause of the collision. (See docs. 82, 83).
The factual statements related to Pinoy Trucking and Dunn are immaterial to
the resolution of this Motion. While it is true that these disputed facts would be
material if this Motion was brought by a different defendant, they are not material
to the resolution of the claims leveled against TCW. As discussed, Plaintiffs include
various allegations at to TCW’s liability for its own actions and liability for the actions
of others throughout the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 5). The disputed facts are

immaterial to determining TCW’s liability with respect to its own actions. Similarly,
the Court can determine whether TCW can be held liable for the actions of others as
a matter of law, like Pinoy Trucking or Dunn, without resolving the disputed facts
related to the accident.
In its Motion, TCW contends that the Graves Amendment bars the claims
brought by Plaintiffs based on vicarious liability. (Doc. 75 at 21–25). Successful

application of the Amendment is generally conceded in Plaintiffs’ Response. (See doc.
82 at 18) (“These causes of action for TCW’s direct negligence are not preempted by
the Graves Amendment.”). In relevant part, the Amendment provides:
(a) IN GENERAL. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the
vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under
the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being
the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons
or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession
of the vehicle during the period of the rental or the lease, if—

(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or
business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the
owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

49 U.S.C. § 30106 (definitions omitted). The purpose was “to protect rental companies
who are sued simply because they own a vehicle that was involved in an accident.”
Johnke v. Espinal-Quiroz, No. 14-cv-6992, 2016 WL 454333, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5,
2016). As such, courts have held the Graves Amendment preempts liability claims
against commercial lessors of motor vehicles after the effective date. See Johnson,
2010 WL 706037, at *3 (dismissing motor vehicle liability claim against defendant
“engaged in the business of leasing a fleet of approximately 100,000 trailers”).

However, courts differ in their interpretation of the scope of the statute’s protection
against claims based on a lessor’s vicarious liability. The two interpretations of the
statute are that it acts as an absolute bar on any vicarious-liability claims against a
lessor, or that it allows vicarious-liability claims against a lessor if that lessor has
been negligent. See Parker v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-374, 2020 WL 488366,
at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2020) (collecting cases on the application of both

interpretations). Here, however, either approach to the Graves Amendment will bar
the indirect liability claims because Plaintiffs have failed to show negligence on the
part of TCW.
With respect to first requirement, it is undisputed that TCW leased the chassis
that was later involved in the accident on August 23, 2019. (Doc. 82 at 3). The chassis
was one of 1,100 pieces of equipment leased pursuant to the agreement between TCW
and NACPC. (Doc. 82 at 3–4). At least one district court has applied the Graves

Amendment to the lessor of an intermodal chassis, Holder v. Suarez, No. CV-14-1789,
2016 WL 593620, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016), and Plaintiffs do not argue
otherwise. Thus, the first subsection of the Graves Amendment required for
preemption is satisfied. The second requirement is that there is no negligence on the
part of TCW. As thoroughly discussed herein, Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence
that demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact exists to preclude summary
judgment on the claims of direct negligence. Because both subsections are met, TCW
cannot be liable for the actions of others, like Pinoy Trucking or Dunn, pursuant to
the Graves Amendment.6

As summary judgment is appropriate for all negligence claims, the Court
grants TCW’s Motion in its favor as to Counts IV and VIII.
II. Loss of Consortium – Count IX
Plaintiff Karri Gruver’s loss of consortium claim is derivative of those claims
asserted by her spouse, Plaintiff Timothy Gruver. See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Hall, 363 Ill. App. 3d 989, 994 (1st Dist. 2006) (“[L]oss of consortium is a derivative
claim to the direct injury that causes it.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, as the

claims asserted by Timothy Gruver failed to establish liability on the part of TCW for
the accident, Karri Gruver’s loss of consortium claim fails against TCW, too. See

6 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged a few legal theories to establish
vicarious liability, like agency and joint venture. (Doc. 5 at 28–30). While the agency
argument has been relatively abandoned by Plaintiffs, it is worthwhile to mention
that it does not bar this Court from granting summary judgment for TCW on this
count, as Plaintiffs have failed to prove any of the necessary elements. See Sosa v.
Onfido, Inc., 8 F.4th 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying Illinois law and writing “[t]he
test of agency is whether the alleged principal has the right to control the manner
and method in which work is carried out by the alleged agent and whether the alleged
agent can affect the legal relationships of the principal”) (citations omitted). There
are no facts in the record that establish TCW had the right to control any aspect of
the work of Pinoy Trucking or Dunn.

Plaintiffs additionally alleged that TCW was in joint venture with the other
Defendants, but later admitted that TCW was not acting in joint venture with any
other named party. (See doc. 82 at 8) (looking at Fact No. 58). Therefore, even if the
Graves Amendment did not apply to the lessor of an intermodal chassis, Plaintiffs
have failed to establish evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact to
preclude summary judgment regarding TCW’s vicarious liability for the actions of
Pinoy Trucking, Dunn, or another Defendant.
Johnson v. May, 223 Ill. App. 3d 477, 488 (5th Dist. 1992) (“To recover on a loss of
consortium claim, the deprived spouse must prove liability on the part of the
defendant, marriage to the injured spouse, and damages.”). As such, summary

judgment on Count IX is granted for TCW.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Tennessee Commercial
Warehouse’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 75) is GRANTED. The Court
grants summary judgment for Defendant Tennessee Commercial Warehouse on
Counts IV, VIII, IX, and X of the Amended Complaint (doc. 5). Defendant Tennessee

Commercial Warehouse’s crossclaims (doc. 66) against Defendants Pinoy Trucking
and Anthony Dunn remain unless properly dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Entered this 1st day of May 2024.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137550. Public record. Not legal advice.