# Horn v. Ford County Sheriff's Office

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · October 2, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137306

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** October 2, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137306

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the district court's failure to consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in remanding case to state court constituted an abuse of discretion

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID HORN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 21-cv-02253-JES
)
FORD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is now before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc.
27 (the “Motion”). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 28), and Defendant filed a Reply. Doc. 29. For
the following reasons, the Motion as to Count I is GRANTED and Count II is REMANDED to
State court for further proceedings. Thus, the Motion as to Count II is DENIED as moot.
I. Background
A. Procedural Background
On May 21, 2021, Plaintiff David Horn filed suit against the Ford County Sherriff’s Office
(“Defendant” or “the Sheriff’s Office”) in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Ford
County, Illinois. See Doc. 1-2 (Complaint) at 1. Mr. Horn alleges that Defendant withheld his
medication while he was imprisoned, which caused him to suffer a stroke. He claims that such
willful and wanton conduct violated his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also claims
that the conduct renders Defendant liable for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(“IIED”).1 On October 13, 2021, Defendant removed the case to federal court. See Doc. 1 (Notice
of Removal). Defendant answered on October 20, 2021. Doc. 6 (Answer). The Motion followed.

1 Significantly, Plaintiff has only named the Sheriff’s Office as a defendant. And, Plaintiff’s
sole state law claim is for IIED. So, the Court’s analysis is confined to the claims before it, which
are addressed in this Order and Opinion.
B. Summary Judgment Briefing
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff's brief disregards the Local Rules of the Central District
of Illinois and well-known standards applied in summary judgment briefing. As the Court has
informed parties in previous cases,

While strict, the requirements imposed on the parties by Rule 56 and Local Rule
7.1(D) are not meant to be punitive. “Rather, they are intended to alert the court to
precisely what factual questions are in dispute and point the court to the specific
evidence in the record that supports a party’s position on each of these questions.
They are, in short, roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to proceed
further, regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the relevant information
from the record on its own.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923
(7th Cir. 1994) .... Because summary judgment is such a drastic remedy, the Court
regularly informs the parties when they fail to adhere to these strict requirements,
and exercises its discretion to decide whether to apply the rule strictly or to overlook
any transgression. Id.
McMahon v. Dunlap Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 323, 274 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842–43 (C.D. Ill. 2017);
see also Lugg v. Sutton et al., JES-18-1412, 2021 WL 3673824, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2021).
As relevant to Plaintiff's failures here, Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b) provides that a response to
a summary judgment motion must state, in separate subsections: undisputed material facts,
disputed material facts, disputed immaterial facts, undisputed immaterial facts, and additional
material facts. With regard to the undisputed material facts section, the plaintiff is instructed to
“[l]ist by number each fact from Section B of the motion for summary judgment which is conceded
to be undisputed and material.” CDIL-LR (D)(2)(b)(1) (emphasis added). Local Rule
7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) cautions, “[a] failure to respond to any numbered fact will be deemed an admission
of the fact.” Id. Likewise, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) provides that when a party fails to properly
address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may, inter alia,
“consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion.”
Here, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment failed to address
any of Defendant’s statements of material fact, by number, noting whether such facts were
undisputed or disputed and material or immaterial. Instead, Plaintiff skirted the rule and
“incorporated by reference the Statement of Facts contained within Defendant’s instant Motion,”
and, in narrative format, added “additional facts, including disputed facts.” Doc. 28 at 2.
The court has fully considered Defendant’s concern regarding Plaintiff’s failure to abide

by the Local Rules in drafting the facts section. See Doc. 29 at 1-6. Notably, Defendant suggests
that the “Court would be within its authority to simply strike Plaintiff’s ‘Statement of Facts.’” Id.
at 2. This would be too extreme a remedy. Even though Plaintiff failed to adhere to the Local
Rules, Plaintiff at least cites to the transcript of Mr. Horn’s deposition to support his narrative of
facts. See Doc. 28 at 2-4; cf. Sanders v. Moss, JEH-16-1366, 2023 WL 2164520, at *2 (C.D. Ill.
Jan. 24, 2023). Furthermore, Defendant devotes a significant amount of briefing to distinguishing
what it believes are the additional and disputed facts discussed by Plaintiff. See Doc. 29 at 3-5.
Although Defendant was under no impetus to prepare such briefing, it nonetheless alleviates at
least some prejudice that Defendant may otherwise suffer. However, to the extent it appears that
Defendant could not properly respond to Plaintiff’s additional or disputed facts due to Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the Local Rules, the Court shall deem Defendant’s statement of fact to be
admitted. See Poole v. United States GAO, 1 Fed. Appx. 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2001); Bordelon v.
Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Moreover, Latko v. Cox, No. 20-2634, 2021 WL 5234863 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 2021),
provides guidance as to the effect of a plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(D) on a
court’s ability to consider the record outside the parties’ briefings. The court stated, id. at *2:
As a threshold matter, we note that Latko failed to submit a compliant statement of
undisputed material facts. See C.D. Ill. R. 7.1(D)(1)(b). Rather than strike his filing,
the district court, in its discretion, consulted “other materials in the record.[sic]”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3), namely the transcript of Latko’s deposition, which Cox
had submitted. See Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948,
957 (7th Cir. 2021). Neither the district judge nor this court must comb the record
in search of factual disputes, but we are “free to consider” the evidence placed in
the summary-judgment record. Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278,
285 (7th Cir. 2015). In this case we find it prudent to consider the same evidence
that the district judge relied upon to fill in the gaps in the parties’ submissions. See
Horne v. Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., Inc., 987 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2021).
So, too, does the Court here exercise its discretion in reviewing the transcript of Mr. Horn’s
deposition and other materials, as the Court “is confident in its ability to understand which material
facts are actually in dispute, as supported by the record.” White v. Felchner, SEM-19-3181, 2021
WL 3223067, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 29, 2021).
C. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts2
As indicated above, Plaintiff failed to properly respond to Defendant’s statement of
undisputed material facts, therefore, unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
See CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).3
Medication Verification and Administration at the Jail
During the relevant time, Defendant contracted with a third-party company, Advanced
Correctional Healthcare (“ACH”), to provide medical services at the Ford County Jail (the “Jail”).
SOF ¶ 3 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 1-3 (Bruens Decl.)).4 The Jail has a licensed medical physician on
call at all times. SOF ¶ 4 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2). The Sheriff’s Office’s written policy requires

2 I note that Defendant has, at times, submitted duplicates of its exhibits. For example, Doc.
27-6 at 52-57 and Doc. 27-12 are the same exact document, i.e., Plaintiff’s booking information.

3 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court takes the undisputed facts from Defendant’s Motion
at Doc. 27, which are cited as SOF ¶ ___. Given the narrative format of Plaintiff’s facts section,
when a disputed or additional fact is appropriately before the Court, it shall be relegated to a
footnote. The Court notes when a fact proffered by Defendant is not supported by the record.

4 Stacie Bruens serves as a lieutenant in the Sheriff’s Office, where she acts as the head
administrator for the Jail. Doc. 27-6 at 1. And, the Sheriff’s Office is responsible for operating the
Jail. SOF ¶ 2 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 1).
officers to follow the instructions of ACH medical personnel regarding inmate medical issues.
SOF ¶ 5 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2; (Doc. 27-6 at 4-50 (the “Policy”)).
The Policy provides officers with guidance on how to properly order, dispense, administer,
and record medication, and, the Policy requires that officers be trained on these procedures by the

responsible physician (or the physician’s designee). SOF ¶ 6 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2, 41-43). Per the
Policy, an officer cannot administer an inmate’s medication unless the officer receives prior
approval from ACH’s physician. SOF ¶¶ 7-9 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 2-3, 41-43). And, the physician’s
instructions for administering an inmate’s medicine are to be catalogued in a Medication
Administration Record and followed accordingly. Id. Significantly, the Policy provides that an
officer is not to administer medication if there is an error in the Medication Administration Record
or if the officer has any other question. Doc. 27-6 at 42. Instead, the officer is directed to contact
ACH. Id.
Mr. Horn’s Medical History5
Mr. Horn had at least one stroke in March of 2020 and was also diagnosed as being diabetic.

SOF ¶ 10 (citing Doc. 27-1 (Horn Depo.) at 9, 10, 12.). As a result, he was prescribed: “Aspirin,”
for stroke prevention; “Lyrica,” to treat seizures; ‘Glimepiride,” to treat Type II diabetes; and

5 The Defendant, not Plaintiff, proffered Mr. Horn’s medical records. Neither party
petitioned the Court to seal Mr. Horn’s medical records. But, under the circumstances, the Court
believes sealing is appropriate as to certain medical records, not integral to the resolution of the
Motion. See Chapman v. Raemisch, LA-05-1254, 2009 WL 425813, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20,
2009) (sealing medical records that are not “so relevant to plaintiff’s claim that they have been
cited or quoted by the parties or the court in other documents.”).

To the extent the MVR and MAR are relevant to the outcome of the case, they are excerpted
into the facts section. Otherwise, the issue of causation relies so heavily on the expert reports and
testimony, so those filings shall not be subject to sealing.

The parties are free to raise an objection to the Court’s sua sponte decision to seal certain
records.
“Atorvastatin,” to treat high cholesterol. SOF § 11 (citations omitted).° Mr. Horn did not miss a
dosage of his medication prior to his arrest on July 2, 2020. SOF § 11 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 20).
Mr. Horn’s Arrest and Booking’
At 11 pm on July 2, 2020, Mr. Horn was arrested and taken to the Jail, pursuant to an arrest
warrant. SOF 1, 13 (citing Doc. 27-6 at 1; Doc. 27-1 at 16; Doc. 27-11 (the warrant)). Mr.
Horn’s medications were also transported to the Jail. SOF 4 14 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 15, 16).
Mr. Horn was booked into the Jail during a process that lasted about one hour, from 11:30
pm on July 2, 2020, until 12:41 am on July 3, 2020. SOF § 15 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2); see also
Doc. 27-12. During the process, Mr. Horn indicated to the booking officer that he required an
aspirin before bed and his other medicines before breakfast. SOF 4 16 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 17).
At 11:45pm, Officer Timothy Woodmansee completed Mr. Horn’s Medication
Verification Record (“MVR”). SOF § 16 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 1-3 (Woodmansee Decl.)). The MVR
is contained in the record as follows, Doc. 27-7 at 4 (blank space intentionally omitted:
Medication Verification Form
Date 27/52/30 Time Ales Detaineename: Aiann Do wet) O Ih _
Allergies: Oeohenkwcd racine load sugar ectlts (ffindforhd)1__——= Peale fe
Vitale (findleted BYP Temp: Repel
me
ae Pe2—] Ose Tab ia the am | ¥
Tree
we | z/ineninidhe fue Yuh in then 2
= er

ee a re eee

6 Lyrica is also referred to in the record as pregabalin. Defendant does not offer a citation
for the assertion that Lyrica is used by Mr. Horn to treat his seizures. However, Plaintiff does not
dispute this statement of fact.
7 Any reference to the exact time that a particular event occurred is only an approximation.

After finishing the MVR, Officer Woodmansee called Dr. Lochard, the Jail’s on-call
physician, who approved all of Mr. Horn’s medications and then gave Officer Woodmansee a
schedule for administering the medications. SOF □□ 17-19 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2, 4).° By the time
Dr. Lochard instructed Officer Woodmansee as to Mr. Horn’s medication schedule, it was the
early morning of July 3, 2020. SOF § 20 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2).
Dr. Lochard indicated to Officer Woodmansee that Mr. Horn should take his Lyrica before
bed, and that Mr. Horn’s other medications could be administered in the morning. SOF § 21 (citing
Doe. 27-7 at 2).? Officer Woodmansee then documented Dr. Lochard’s instructions in Mr. Horn’s
Medication Administration Record (“MAR”). SOF 4 22 (citing Doc. 27-7 at 2). The MAR is
proffered into the record as follows, Doc. 27-7 at 5 (blank space and allergy information
intentionally omitted):
(MEDICATION ADMINISTRATION RECORD C DIAMOND PHARMACY SERVICES
3 alimepiride ewol | oigd | PP
Viet □□□ irr
eee rly Ne cely Oe
FM ne {tte POPPE EEE
tT TT
1-3 toroastehin OEE EEE EEE EEE
me Ory ROCA
| fab ome chily COCR
ee OO
15 Asprin Po Serr rr rrr
me alma | CAPE CECE CECE Pe eeee
| J Aas olan TOP rrr yyy reper ly □□

8 Dr. Lochard’s full name and credentials do not appear in the record.
° Defendant devotes a significant amount of briefing to inform the Court that Officer
Woodmansee mistakenly filled out the MAR, as he supposedly misunderstood Dr. Lochard’s
instructions that Mr. Horn’s medications were to be given on the morning of July 3, 2020, rather
than the morning of July 4, 2020. See SOF {[§| 23-25 (citations omitted). As noted infra, in
discussion, this characterization of the facts is not persuasive, and is also undermined by the record.

After Mr. Horn was fully booked into the Jail, sometime between 11:20 pm on July 2,
2020, and 12:40 am on July 3, 2020, the booking officer gave Mr. Horn one of his Lyrica pills.
SOF ¶ 26 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 17, 37).10 Mr. Horn did not communicate with any other officer after
being placed in his cell and prior to falling asleep. SOF ¶ 27 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 19).

Mr. Horn’s Stroke on July 3, 2020
After Mr. Horn woke up July 3, 2020, he told officers throughout the day that he was
concerned about not receiving his medications. SOF ¶ 28 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 19-20). The officers
uniformly responded by telling Mr. Horn that they would investigate the status of his medications,
but the officers never followed up with Mr. Horn. SOF ¶ 29 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 19, 21). And, Mr.
Horn’s wife called the Jail several times to express apprehension that Mr. Horn was not receiving
his medications. SOF ¶ 30 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 23).11
On the evening of July 3, 2020, Mr. Horn’s physical condition quickly deteriorated. SOF
¶ 31 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 21). Mr. Horn then fell over on his bed and shortly after, a guard shook
him awake. SOF ¶ 32 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 22).12 Mr. Horn was not given his medication until he

was being placed on the stretcher. Doc. 27-1 at 23. At that point, a guard arrived at Mr. Horn’s cell
to administer his medications. SOF ¶ 34 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 24). Mr. Horn was then rushed away
from the Jail, by ambulance, to a hospital. SOF ¶ 35 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 22-23). It was then

10 Plaintiff asserts that, during this time, the booking officer indicated that Mr. Horn would
not receive any medication while in the Jail, aside from the Lyrica. Doc. 28 at 3 (citing Doc. 27-1
at 17). As discussed, infra, the record does not support Plaintiff’s statement.

11 Plaintiff points to Mr. Horn’s testimony that officers at the Jail ordered his wife to stop
contacting them, and also threatened to file harassment charges against her if she did not stop
calling. Doc. 28 at 3 (citing Doc. 27-1 at 22-24). Defendant suggests the Court should not consider
this fact as it is immaterial and only supported by inadmissible hearsay. Doc. 29 at 2-3.

12 It is unclear as to how the guard discovered that Mr. Horn’s needed medical care. SOF
¶ 33 (citing Doc. 27 at 22).
determined that on July 3, 202013, Mr. Horn suffered a stroke while imprisoned in the Jail. SOF ¶
36 (citations omitted).14
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 7477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party has the
burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 323-24. Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must
come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations, or denials of the pleadings, which
demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d
291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for summary judgment can prevail just by showing
that the other party has no evidence on an issue on which that party has the burden of proof.”
Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183(7th Cir. 1993). 15

13 Both in the Complaint (Doc. 1-2 at 3) and in the Response (Doc. 28 at 3), Plaintiff
incorrectly states that he suffered a stroke in the Jail on July 2, 2020.

14 Defendant also provides, in its statement of undisputed material facts, a description of
expert testimony regarding medical causation. See SOF ¶¶ 37-38. These facts are detailed, infra,
in the discussion section.

15 Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Court should be wary of the self-serving nature of
the sworn statements provided by Defendant in support of its Motion. Doc. 28 at 5. The Court
recognizes that “self-serving statements in affidavits without factual support in the record carry no
weight.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted).
But, the record “may include the self-serving affidavit itself, provided that the affidavit meets the
usual requirements for evidence on summary judgment—including the requirements that it be
based on personal knowledge and that it set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine
issue for trial.” Accordingly, only to the extent that Defendant’s affidavits, in whole or in part,
meet the necessary requirements, shall the Court consider the affidavits in resolving the Motion.
See Cooper–Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., 361 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s
argument belies the fact that he largely relies on his own deposition testimony in support of his
Response. See Doc. 28.
The non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a
genuine triable issue; he “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986) (quotation

and citation omitted)); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally,
a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is not sufficient to successfully
oppose a summary judgment motion; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
III. Discussion
A. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I)
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is liable under § 1983 for violating Mr. Horn’s civil
rights by displaying deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Doc. 1-2 at 3.
Notably, the Sheriff’s Office “is not a legal entity separable from the county government
which it serves and is therefore” considered a municipality for the purpose of ascertaining potential

liability under § 1983. Whiting v. Marathon County Sheriff's Dept., 382 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Vasquez v. Will County Sheriff’s Office, MFM-18-3137, 2019
WL 4189477 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2019); Wuerffel v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, CPK-14-3990,
2016 WL 1660497 (N.D. Ill Apr. 27, 2016); Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff’s Department, 968
F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Ill. 2013). And, a § 1983 claim may only be lodged against a municipality
pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). Thus,
Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is analyzed under the framework set forth in Monell.
“To begin, a § 1983 plaintiff must always show that he was deprived of a federal right.”
Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation
omitted). Furthermore, “[m]unicipalities do not face respondeat superior liability under section
1983 for the misdeeds of employees or other agents. Only actions of the entity will suffice.” Flores
v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). So, “[t]he central question is always
whether an official policy, however expressed ... caused the constitutional deprivation.” Glisson v.

Ind. Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Accordingly, the Plaintiff must
satisfy “three requirements to establish [his] Monell claim—policy or custom, municipal fault, and
‘moving force’ causation.” Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2022).
Defendant argues that the case should be dismissed as Plaintiff cannot show a constitutional
injury. Doc. 27 at 10-11. And, Defendant asserts that even if Plaintiff was subject to a constitutional
deprivation, Plaintiff cannot connect Woodmansee’s conduct to an official custom or policy of the
Sheriff’s Office (id. at 11-13), nor can Plaintiff show causation between Woodmansee’s actions or
omissions and Plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 13-14. In response, Plaintiff argues that he has adequately
pled deliberate indifference by Defendant as to his medical care. Doc. 28 at 4. Plaintiff also avers
that he is entitled to further discovery to uncover additional evidence of an institutional policy or

custom, and that a determination as to the issue of causation is premature. Id. at 5.
Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee (Doc. 27-6 at 1; Doc. 27-7 at 1), his rights arise
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018).
Detainees are entitled to adequate medical care. Id. at 353-54. To establish a Fourteenth
Amendment violation, a detainee must show: “(1) there was an objectively serious medical need;
(2) the defendant committed a volitional act concerning the [plaintiff's] medical need; (3) that act
was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in terms of responding to the [plaintiff's]
medical need; and (4) the defendant act[ed] purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly
with respect to the risk of harm.” Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir.
2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a challenged action
is reasonable, the court must consider the “totality of facts and circumstances,” Mays v. Dart, 974
F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 2020).
As to the first element, it is abundantly clear from the record that Plaintiff had a serious

and objective need for his medication, as his medication was, inter alia, prescribed to treat his
diabetes and prevent stroke. Doc. 27 at 4. Plaintiff’s satisfaction of the remaining three elements,
however, is more opaque. And, prior to analyzing these elements, it is important to distinguish the
actors and the conduct in question.
In particular, the Motion focuses on Officer Woodmansee’s apparent blunder in filling out
the MAR. See Doc. 27. It is true that nothing in the record can be fairly construed to find that
Officer Woodmansee acted intentionally and maliciously in completing the MAR. Rather, Officer
Woodmansee’s mistake appears to derive from some level of negligence or even gross negligence.
If this were the only complained-of incident, it would not appear that the error would rise to the
level of a constitutional injury. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353-54. But, the thrust of Mr. Horn’s

alleged injury is not isolated to Officer Woodmansee’s faulty completion of the MAR. Rather,
relevant actions and omissions also occurred on July 3, 2020, from the time Mr. Horn woke up
until his stroke which occurred that evening. During this time, Mr. Horn, as well as his wife,
repeatedly informed the Jail officers throughout the day that Plaintiff required medication. Yet, the
record does not indicate whether any officers followed up on Plaintiff’s requests. As to Officer
Woodmansee, the record is not clear as to whether he was even working at this time.
I pause to note that, non-medical personnel, like the officers here, are generally justified in
relying on the instructions of medical professionals. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th
Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Tyner v. Nowakowski, JRB-19-1502, 2021 WL 4318085, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
23, 2021) (“As Plaintiff himself alleges, [the defendant] was aware of Plaintiff’s condition, aware
he had medication on order, and aware that he was receiving care from medical staff. [The
defendant] thus was justified in his reliance on the medical expertise of those tasked with Plaintiff’s
care.”); Daniels v. Janca, GF-17-906, 2019 WL 2772525, at *5 (N.D. Ill July 2, 2019) (“[I]t was

not unreasonable for [the defendant] to decline [plaintiff’s] request for his medication instead of
“second-guess[ing]” the pill line report and [plaintiff’s] medical records.”). Indeed, it is the rare
case where “it would be evident to a layperson that a prisoner is receiving inadequate or
inappropriate treatment.” Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation omitted).
Notwithstanding the above, non-medical professionals cannot “simply ignore an inmate’s
plight,” and a plaintiff must show that his “communication, in its content and manner of
transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Once an official knows of such a risk, “the refusal or

declination to exercise the authority of his or her office may reflect” the requisite disregard. Arnett,
658 F.3d at 756 (internal quotation omitted); see also Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938,
940 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] guard who is aware of complaints of pain and does nothing to help a
suffering prisoner obtain treatment is likewise exhibiting deliberate indifference.”).
Mr. Horn and his wife pleaded with several officers to administer Plaintiff’s medication.
Doc 27 at 7; Doc. 27-1 at 22. But the officers refused the request, despite Mr. Horn’s warning that
he would be at risk of death or stroke if he did not take his medication. Doc. 27-1 at 17, 18.
Nevertheless, Defendant suggests that an officer would be trained to review the MAR as
not requiring the dispensation of Plaintiff’s medication until 11 pm on July 3, 2020. See Doc. 27-
1 at 3. However, it is indisputable that the MAR stated that three of Mr. Horn’s medications should
be given at 6:30 am on a daily basis. See Doc. 27-7 at 5. And, the MVR was consistent, indicating
that Mr. Horn’s medications should be administered in the morning on a daily basis. See Doc. 27-
7 at 4. Furthermore, the record clearly shows that Mr. Horn was booked into the Jail on July 2,

2020, i.e., well before 6:30 am on July 3, 2020. See Doc. 27-6 at 1; Doc. 27-7 at 1. And, it would
be reasonable to expect, in the event of a shift change or some other occurrence, that any given
officer would have the ability to readily determine whether Mr. Horn had been given any
medication on the morning of July 3, 2020. In light of the above, it would be unreasonable for an
officer to ignore Mr. Horn’s continued requests for his medication.
That is not to suggest, however, that an officer should have actually given Mr. Horn any
medications. The Defendant admits that the Jail utilizes a licensed medical physician who is
available and on-call 24-hours a day and seven days a week. See Doc. 27-6 at 2. So, at the very
least, the physician should have been contacted, as is required by the Policy. Id. at 43 Nothing in
the record suggests that an officer actually contacted the physician, or for that matter, did anything

to respond to Mr. Horn’s complaints, outside of stating that the issue would be investigated. Doc.
27 at 7. Moreover, the act of calling an ambulance to take Mr. Horn to the hospital for treatment
after he began to experience severe medical symptoms does not serve to remedy what seems to be
an appropriately characterized willful ignorance in the face of Mr. Horn’s repeated requests for
medication. See Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 565 (7th Cir. 2017) (condemning prison personnel
for doing “literally, nothing” despite having notice of prisoner’s medical complaints and issues).
Viewing the inferences in favor of Plaintiff as the non-movant, there is, at a minimum, a
question of material fact as to whether the officers’ conduct in ignoring Mr. Horn’s continued
requests for needed medical care was objectively unreasonable and in reckless disregard of risk to
Mr. Horn’s health. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met the threshold inquiry of showing an infringement
of his constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s “claim fails on the basic proposition that he has sued for damages
under § 1983 and alleged a constitutional tort [] without then developing evidence of a recoverable

injury.” Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
278 (1985)). Indeed, “to succeed in a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must ‘establish not only that a state
actor violated his constitutional rights, but also that the violation caused the plaintiff injury or
damages.’” Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 945 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 864 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th
Cir. 1982) (“Section 1983 is a tort [and] [a] tort to be actionable requires injury.”).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered injury due to the alleged
constitutional deprivation, i.e., Plaintiff’s stroke, was caused by a delay in receiving his
medication. Doc. 27 at 13-14. Defendant has retained two medical experts who have provided
reports and testimony as to the issue of causation, and which Defendant cites in support of its

Motion. Id. The first expert, Dr. Abraham Kocheril, the Director of Cardiac Electrophysiology at
OSF HealthCare Cardiovascular Institute Urbana, reports that Mr. Horn’s neurological episode on
July 3, 2020, is characterized as a lacunar stroke. See Doc 27-2 at 1-3 (Dr. Kocheril’s Report); id.
at 4-53 (Dr. Kocheril’s Curriculum Vitae); Doc. 27-4 (Dr. Kocheril Depo.)16 The second expert,
Dr. Paul Later, the Neurology Medical Director at North Region Northwestern Medicine, is in
agreement as to the type of stroke suffered by Mr. Horn. See Doc. 27-3 at 1-4 (Dr. Later’s Report);

16 The Court notes that the digital pagination of Dr. Kocheril’s deposition testimony is
inconspicuously omitted.
id. at 5-9 (Dr. Later’s curriculum vitae); id. at 10 (Dr. Later’s Fee Schedule); Doc. 27-5 (Dr. Later
Depo.).
After an extensive review of Mr. Horn’s medical history, Dr. Kocheril determined, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty (Doc. 27-2 at 3), that “[i]t is not reasonable to say that lack

of access to the medications he was taking, over a 24 hour period, led to his stroke.” Id. at 2. In
particular, Dr. Kocheril reported that “[m]issing a day or two of aspirin or atorvastatin would not
have caused [the] kind of clot” suffered by Mr. Horn. Id. And, “Pregabalin would not have had
any bearing on causation of stroke.” Furthermore, “[a]fter review of the medical records from OSF
and Riverside,” i.e., where Mr. Horn received medical treatment on July 3 and July 5, 2020, Dr.
Kocheril “f[ou]nd no evidence of any physicians’ opinion that the patient missing medications
caused the stroke of July 2020.” Id.
Consistent with Dr. Kocheril’s report, Dr. Later made the following finding (Doc. 27-3 at
3) (emphasis added):
In summary, it is unfortunate that Mr. Horn suffered a stroke recurrence on
7/3/2020 but his not receiving aspirin, atorvastatin and gliperimide for 1 or even 2
days while in the Ford County Jail was not to blame for his 7/3/2020 stroke. Rather,
the risk factors above overwhelmingly are responsible for causing the 7/3/2020
stroke. Tobacco abuse, diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, sedentary lifestyle
(family history of stroke plays some role) are the risk factors that put him at risk
for this stroke 7/3/20 as well as the previous 2 strokes identified on his MRI scans.
A lack of long term control of these risk factors predisposed him to all of his 3
strokes including the stroke on 7/3/2020. The stroke he suffered 7/3/20 was no
more the fault of the Ford County Jail than his 2 prior strokes had been.
Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that refutes these reports. Indeed, Plaintiff has
failed to cite to the deposition testimony of either medical expert as somehow contradicting or
undermining the information contained within the reports. Instead, Plaintiff only addresses these
reports by arguing that “the testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physicians in the case at bar regarding
causation, specifically that Defendant’s failure to administer medication to Plaintiff and his strokes
were likely coincidental, is more in the nature of an estimation and not based on definite
physiological evidence, as the question of whether Defendant’s failure (or refusal) to provide
Plaintiff with his medication led to his suffering strokes would better be decided at trial.” Doc. 28
at 5.

The Court notes that Plaintiff mistakenly states that the expert witnesses were Plaintiff’s
treating physicians. Doc. 28 at 5: see Doc. 27-4 at 3; Doc. 27-5 at 4. And, it appears, contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertion, that the expert reports are based on definite physiological evidence. Dr.
Kocheril and Dr. Later both reviewed an extensive array of Mr. Horn’s medical records, including
radiologic images taken during Mr. Horn’s treatment of his stroke in July 2020. See Doc. 27-2 at
1; Doc. 27-3 at 3-4. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s position, as Plaintiff’s argument is
“underdeveloped, conclusory, [and] unsupported by law.” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709,
718 (7th Cir. 2012).
In light of the evidence proffered by Defendant, and the complete dearth of evidence
provided or even alluded to by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury would find

that Mr. Horn’s delay in access to his medication, i.e., his constitutional injury, caused his stroke.
See Arce v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 75 F.4th 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding that plaintiff
failed to support that “the ten-day gap in medical care caused him some harm.”) (citing Williams
v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the constitutional injury resulted in a stroke, that
would not be enough to establish a § 1983 claim, as filed by the Plaintiff. As previously noted, the
Plaintiff did not bring action against any individual defendants but chose instead to bring the action
against the Sheriff’s Office. The Sheriff’s Office is not liable under § 1983 for the actions or
omissions of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Instead, Plaintiff must connect
his constitutional injury to a policy or custom of the Sheriff’s Office.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege a constitutionally violative policy or custom.
But, even if Plaintiff had made such a claim, it would not pass muster. Under Monell there are

“three bases for municipal liability: ‘(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation
when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a
custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with
final policymaking authority.’” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007)). Additionally, a
“‘policy of inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the
functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.’” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 395 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

Defendant argues that it has proffered evidence showing the existence of a constitutionally
compliant policy concerning medication administration. Doc. 27 at 11-12. Defendant avers that it
trains its employees on how to administer medication, and that its policies provide for the timely,
not untimely, administration. Id. at 12-13. Defendant’s undisputed statement of fact supports its
assertion. See SOF ¶¶ 3-9. Plaintiff does not controvert any of Defendant’s arguments concerning
the policy or identify facts to the contrary. See Doc. 28. Rather, Plaintiff seems to suggest that it
is not required to demonstrate at the Motion for Summary Judgment phase “that Defendant’s
misconduct and/or ineptitude was part of a custom, policy and/or practice in its treatment of

Plaintiff…” Id. at 5 (citing Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Plaintiff misstates the holding, standard, and facts set forth in Daniel, 833 F.3d 728. For
one, the Seventh Circuit clearly stated that a plaintiff “must show more than the deficiencies
specific to his own experience, of course.” Id. at 734 (citation omitted). And, the plaintiff “must
come forward with evidence that could allow a reasonable trier of fact to find… systemic and gross

deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures in a detention center’s medical care
system.” Id. at 735 (citing Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016)). But, a
plaintiff “need not present evidence that these systemic failings affected other specific inmates.”
Daniel, 833 F.3d at 735 (citing Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 695 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff has proffered a pittance of evidence. Nothing in the record, or even posited by
Plaintiff, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s failure to provide Mr. Horn’s
medication was more than a single, isolated incident. In contrast, the plaintiff in Daniel “provided
substantial evidence of systemic deficiencies in the Jail's medical care, including extensive
testimony from Jail medical staff.” Daniel, 833 F.3d at 735.
To further buttress his argument as to the required evidentiary burden under Monell at

summary judgment, Plaintiff makes the rather bizarre assertion that further “discovery in the
instant case should enable Plaintiff to uncover additional evidence of lapses by Defendant in
administering medication to other prisoners at the Ford County Jail…” Doc. 28 at 5. The deadline
for discovery has long since passed. See Text Order Dated July 18, 2022. And, “[t]he flow of cases
through a busy district court is aided, not hindered, by adherence to deadlines.” Spears v. City of
Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed, judges routinely admonish counsel for
failing to abide by the terms of a discovery deadline. See Alight Solutions v. Thomson, JC-20-3043,
2021 WL 5119111, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2021) (“In the end, a scheduling order is not a frivolous
piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not identified an entitlement to additional
discovery or even asked for it. This is not the time for conjecture as to what additional discovery
might have revealed. See Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (“[I]f
the non-movant [in a summary judgment proceeding] does not come forward with evidence that

would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court
must enter summary judgment against her.”) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986)). Summary judgment is the stage where a plaintiff “‘must
show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.’”
Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 953 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson v.
Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003)).
While it is not clear, Plaintiff appears to suggest that Defendant is liable under a failure-to-
train theory. Plaintiff suggests that Defendant is liable under Monell for deliberately refusing “to
accurately follow and competently adhere to the regimen established by the consulting physician
on call for Defendant, for administering Plaintiff’s medication.” Doc. 28 at 4. This argument fails,

however, as liability for the failure to train carries “a stringent standard of fault” that requires a
“pattern of similar constitutional violations,” except for a “narrow range of circumstances” in
which “a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.”
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62-94 (citation omitted). In such cases, the “risk of constitutional violations
[is] so high and the need for training so obvious that the municipality's failure to act can reflect
deliberate indifference and allow an inference of institutional culpability, even in the absence of a
similar prior constitutional violation.” J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 380 (7th Cir. 2020).
“Qualifying circumstances under this doctrine are rare; [a] constitutional violation must be a
blatantly obvious consequence of inaction for single-incident liability to apply.” Giese v. City of
Kankakee, 71 F.4th 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotation and citation omitted).
Nothing in the record indicates a pattern of similar constitutional violations. Nor is it
blatantly obvious that the Sheriff’s Office medication dispensation training program was so
deficient that it created a high risk of constitutional injury.17 No reasonable jury could conclude

that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a policy or custom that contributed to the violation
of Mr. Horn’s constitutional rights.18
In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion as to Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint is
GRANTED.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count II)
Plaintiff also brings a state law claim for IIED. Doc. 1-2 at 4.19

17 Similarly, a claim lodged under a failure to supervise theory would fail as well, as such
claims “are a ‘tenuous’ form of Monell liability.” Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592,
599 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

18 As Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutionally violative policy or custom, Plaintiff cannot
show that the Sheriff’s Office “policy or custom demonstrates municipal fault.” First Midwest
Bank ex rel. LaPorta v. City of Chi., 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation and
citation omitted); see also Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep’t., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.
2010) (“To demonstrate that the County is liable for a harmful custom or practice, the plaintiff
must show that County policymakers were ‘deliberately indifferent as to [the] known or obvious
consequences.’”) (quoting Gable v. City of Chi., 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)). For the same
reason, Plaintiff cannot possible connect a custom or policy with his constitutional injury. See
Orozco v. Dart, 64 f.4th 806, 824 (7th Cir. 2023) “[A] plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality
liable must show causation. ‘That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken
with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.’”) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan
Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).

19 Plaintiff’s claim is presumably lodged under a theory that the Defendant is vicariously
liable for the conduct of its employees. It is true that “[a]n employer may be vicariously liable for
the tort of an employee[, including IIED], if the tort is committed within the scope of the
employment.” Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill.2d 154, 308 Ill. Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985,
991 (2007); see also Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 565-68 (7th Cir. 2017). And, “[f]or
“[T]he general rule [is] that ‘when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district
court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on
the merits.’” McHugh v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lalowski
v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2015)). “But, judicial economy, convenience,

fairness and comity may point to federal retention of state-law claims ... when it is absolutely clear
how the pendent claims can be decided.” Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451,
461 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir.
1994)). As a result, the Court will examine the sufficiency of the IIED allegations, as well as the
merits of the Motion, to determine whether it should retain or relinquish jurisdiction.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s IIED claim should be rejected, as Plaintiff cannot
establish that Officer Woodmansee’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Doc. 27 at 15-16. And,
Defendant asserts that Officer Woodmansee did not intend to cause Plaintiff’s injury (id. at 14-
15), nor did a delay in administering medication to Plaintiff cause an injury. Id. at 16. In response,
Plaintiff argues that he is not required to show intent, rather, reckless disregard suffices. Doc. 28

at 6. Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant’s refusal to act on Mr. Horn’s repeated requests for
medication, as well as the booking officer’s comments regarding Mr. Horn’s access to medication,
is conduct that satisfies the basis of a claim for IIED. Id. at 6-7.
“Illinois sets a ‘high bar’ for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.” Trahanas
v. Northwestern University, 64 F.4th 842, 859 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted). Under
Illinois law, a plaintiff may recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress only if

conduct to be within the scope of employment it must: (1) be of the kind the employee is employed
to perform; (2) occur substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and (3) be
performed, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d
455, 467 (7th Cir. 2016).
the plaintiff shows “‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent by the defendant to cause or a
reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe or extreme emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) an actual and proximate causation of emotional distress
by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’” Carter v. Illinois State Police Dep’t, SLD-22-01089,

2023 WL 4747669, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 25, 2023) (quoting Hayes v. Illinois Power Co., 225
Ill.App.3d 819, 826, 167 Ill. Dec. 290, 294 587 N.E.2d 559, 563 (1992)); see also Feltmeier v.
Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 Ill. Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (2003)).
“To meet the ‘extreme and outrageous’ standard, the defendants’ conduct ‘must be so
extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as intolerable in a
civilized community.’” Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864 (7th Cir.
2010) (quoting Kolegas v. Heftal Broad. Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 21, 180 Ill. Dec. 307, 317, 607 N.E.2d
201, 211 (1992)). In determining whether conduct meets the “extreme and outrageous” standard,
courts consider three main factors: “(1) “the more power or control the defendant has over the
plaintiff, the more likely the conduct will be deemed extreme”; (2) “whether the defendant

reasonably believed its objective was legitimate”; and (3) “whether the defendant was aware the
plaintiff was ‘peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental
peculiarity.’” Franciski v. Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 338 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 127 Ill. Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1998)). The Illinois
Supreme Court has explained, “Conduct is of an extreme and outrageous character where
‘recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374,
204 Ill. Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d 498, 507 (1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt.
D, at 73 (1965)).20
Moreover, “emotional distress alone is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. The
emotional distress must be severe.” Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1030 (7th

Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). “Although fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, worry,
etc. may fall within the ambit of the term ‘emotional distress,’ these mental conditions alone are
not actionable.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Kleidon v. Rizza Chevrolet, Inc., 173 Ill.App.3d 116, 122 Ill.
Dec. 876, 527 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1988)). “‘Severe emotional distress’ is distress so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Lifton v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,
416 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Fuerst, 345 Ill. App. 3d 929, 281 Ill. Dec.
215, 803 N.E.2d 619, 625 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2004)). “[W]hen the distress has manifested itself either
through physical symptoms or has necessitated medical treatment, Illinois courts have been more
inclined to characterize the emotional distress as severe.” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 495
(7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Courts often “merge the issue of the outrageousness of the

defendant's conduct with the issue of the severity of the plaintiff's emotional distress.” Bristow v.
Drake Street Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994).
Under the above referenced framework, the Court does not find it abundantly clear whether
Mr. Horn’s can satisfy the elements necessary to establish his IIED claim. And so, the Court

20 Of relevance here, federal district courts in Illinois routinely conclude that denying a
prisoner access to necessary medication may lay the foundation for an IIED claim. See, e.g., Hardy
v. Butler, GCS-15-437, 2020 WL 888039, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2020); Dorsey v. Obaisi, ARW-
16-7884, 2019 WL 1254896, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2019); Hardy v. Illinois Dept. of Corr.,
Wexford Health Serv. Inc., MJR-15-437, 2016 WL 7099964, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2016); Awalt
v. Marketti, 74 F. Supp. 3d 909, 941-43 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Liebich v. Hardy, RWG-11-5624, 2013
WL 4476132, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2013); cf. Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., JBM-
17-1383, 2018 WL 659862, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) (highlighting that a single instance of
conduct including, inter alia, withholding medicine, was not sufficiently severe or outrageous).
concludes that remand is appropriate. In particular, the evidentiary record as to Mr. Horn’s IIED
claim, especially when contrasted to his § 1983 claim, is presently underdeveloped by both parties.
Furthermore, the Court cannot properly address the IIED claim due to the deficiencies in the
parties’ argumentation. See White Eagle Co-Op Association v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir.

2009). Specifically, certain key areas, such as whether the individual officers acted within the
scope of their employment with Defendant and whether Plaintiff suffered severe emotional
distress, are inadequately briefed. Additionally, both parties’ briefing appears misguided at
times.21 As such, because both the record and briefing are insufficient, the Court has not expended
substantial enough resources to warrant keeping the claim in federal court on the basis of furthering
judicial economy.
Although the Court cannot decide whether Plaintiff’s IIED claim should ultimately be
heard at trial, it is nevertheless not the type of “‘doomed litigation’” that would undoubtedly be
dismissed on remand, and therefore not serve federal-state comity. Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193
F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir.1998)).

And, the Court’s decision to remand the case the state court in which the cause of action was
originally filed certainly seems to convenience the parties. Furthermore, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s
federal claim does not have a “preclusive effect” on the supplemental state-law claim, nor are the

21 For example, Defendant seems to conflate the causation aspect of the IIED claim in
arguing that the officers’ conduct did not cause Mr. Horn’s stroke, rather than addressing whether
the relevant conduct caused Mr. Horn’s emotional distress. See Doc. 27; Doc. 29. Similarly, As
was the case with Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, Defendant ignores the facts surrounding Mr. Horn’s
repeated requests for his medication, and almost exclusively briefs the Court on the relevance of
Officer Woodmansee’s conduct to Plaintiff’s IIED claim. See id.

As to Plaintiff’s briefing on the IIED claim, he cites to the Complaint as evidence of the
mental or emotional harm he suffered. Doc. 28 at 4-5. At this stage in the litigation, Plaintiff “can
no longer depend on the allegations in [his] complaint.” Blanton v. RoundPoint Mortgage
Servicing Corp., 825 Fed. Appx. 369, 372 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020).
supplemental and federal claims “so entangled” that “the rejection of the latter probably entails
rejection of the former.” In re Repository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 725 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
Finally, the Court cannot ignore the undisputed fact that two important events occurred on

July 3, 2020, that is, Mr. Horn was denied medication that was prescribed to prevent strokes and
that he subsequently suffered a stroke. While the court is unable to address the contours of liability
that may or may not attach in state court, Mr. Horn, in the spirit of fairness, deserves to have his
claim heard in an appropriate forum. Therefore, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity weigh in favor of remanding the case to State court. See Taflinger v. U.S. Swimming, Inc.,
435 Fed. Appx. 559, 562 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the district court's failure to consider
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in remanding case to state court constituted
an abuse of discretion) (citations omitted).
In light of the foregoing, Count II is REMANDED to State court for further proceedings.22
Thus, the Motion as to Count II is DENIED as moot. See Barnett v. Alcoa, Inc., RLY-06-184, 2007

WL 1183823 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2007) (denying dispositive motion as moot upon remanding case
to state court).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) as
to Count I is GRANTED and as to Count II is DENIED as moot.
This cause of action is hereby REMANDED to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Ford County,

22 The Court reminds Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Dunn, of his ethical and moral duty to
zealously represent his client. This duty obliges Mr. Dunn to brief reasoned arguments relevant to
the posture of the case and to adequately develop the record in support of his client’s claims.
Illinois without apportionment of costs or expenses. The District Clerk is to mail a certified copy
of this order to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereafter conduct all further
proceedings in this case.

The District Clerk is directed to SEAL the following docket entries: Doc. 27-6 at 53-57;
Doc. 27-7 at 4-5; Doc. 27-8; Doc. 27-9; and Doc. 27-12 at 2-6.
The District Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case.

Entered on this 2nd day of October 2023.

/s/ James E. Shadid
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137306. Public record. Not legal advice.