# Barlow-Johnson v. The Center for Youth and Family Solutions

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · September 8, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137269

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 8, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137269

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Younger applies to the temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse context

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

KENDRA BARLOW-JOHNSON )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 22-cv-3214
)
THE CENTER FOR YOUTH AND )
FAMILY SOLUTIONS, HAYLEE )
MCAFEE in her individual and )
official capacity, ASHLYN FORE, )
in her individual and official )
capacity, )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants The Center for
Youth & Family Solutions, Haylee McAfee, and Ashlyn Fore
(“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (d/e 11). For the foregoing
reasons, the Motion (d/e 11) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint
(d/e 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety for failure to
state a claim.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff Kendra Barlow-Johnson
(“Plaintiff”) filed a six-Count pro se Complaint against Defendants
The Center for Youth & Family Solutions, a not-for-profit child
welfare agency, and its two caseworker employees, Haylee McAfee,

and Ashlyn Fore (“Defendants”). Count I alleges violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Count II alleges violation of Title III of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
and Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Count III alleges violation of
the Family First Prevention Act (FFPSA), 42 CFR § 1356.21(d).

Count IV alleges violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§
3729–3733. Count V alleges violation of the Bill of Rights, 42
U.S.C. § 9501. Count VI alleges defamation in violation of 28

U.S.C. § 4101.
On December 12, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss all
Counts for lack of federal question subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), as well as for failure to plausibly state a
claim for relief upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (d/e 11). On
December 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Response (d/e 14).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint
under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). “When a motion to dismiss is based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), as well as

other Rule 12(b)(6) defenses, the court should consider the Rule
12(b)(1) challenge first.” Rizzi v. Calumet City, 11 F. Supp. 2d 994,
995 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).

If the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the accompanying Rule 12(b)(6) defenses
become moot and need not be addressed. Id.

The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
depends on whether a factual or facial challenge has been raised.
Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). A factual
challenge contends that “there is in fact no subject matter

jurisdiction," even if the pleadings are formally sufficient. Id. at 444
(emphasis in original). Id. (citing Apex Dig., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009)). If, as here, a defendant
raises a factual challenge, the court may “look beyond the pleadings

and view any evidence submitted to determine if subject matter
exists.” Id. Moreover, the “presumption of correctness” usually
attributed to a complaint’s allegations “falls away on the

jurisdictional issue once a defendant proffers evidence that calls the
court’s jurisdiction into question.” Saperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d
852, 856 (7th Cir. 1999). Ultimately, the plaintiff must establish

the existence of subject matter jurisdiction by competent proof. Id.
(citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998)).

On the other hand, a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint.
Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). A

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing the pleader is entitled to relief” that puts the defendant on
notice of the allegations. Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court accepts all

well-pleaded facts alleged and draws all possible inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th
Cir. 2008).

The complaint must put forth plausible grounds to
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). A plausible claim is one from which the court is

able to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663
(2009). Additionally, the complaint must raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of liability. Id. at
663; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. A complaint merely reciting a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements without support is

insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
III. FACTS
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff Kendra Barlow-

Johnson’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint and are accepted as true at the
motion to dismiss stage.
In October 2021, Plaintiff Kendra Barlow-Johnson gave birth
to C.D. at Springfield Memorial Hospital. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶¶ 2, 3. In

January 2021, the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) had performed an investigation into Plaintiff and
had found a “significant risk for harm” due to DCFS’s concerns that
Plaintiff suffered from a mental health disorder. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 5.

While the Plaintiff does not elaborate on the January 2021 DCFS
investigation, the Court presumes that the investigation relates to
Plaintiff’s other children. On October 24, 2021, a phone call was

placed to the DCFS abuse hotline. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 4. The caller
stated that Plaintiff “needed mental help” and that “the courts and
the judge” instructed the caller and her husband to contact Joe

Dabrowski to report Plaintiff’s pregnancy and subsequent delivery.
Id. On October 24, 2021, DCFS launched an abuse and neglect
investigation at Springfield Memorial Hospital after Plaintiff gave

birth to C.D. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff alleges that on the same
day, Springfield Memorial Hospital “seized” C.D. Id. On October
25, 2021, DCFS took protective custody of C.D. Id. On November

8, 2021, Defendant The Center For Youth and Family Solutions (the
“Center”) was assigned to manage Plaintiff’s case through a contract
agreement with DCFS. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants neglected to perform statutorily mandated duties. d/e

1, p. 6, ¶ 9. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hayley
McAfee and Ashlyn Fore, caseworkers at the Center, neglected to
make reasonable efforts to prevent C.D. from being placed outside
the home in foster care, despite Plaintiff agreeing to relocate to her

mother’s home, which has secured access, security surveillance,
and on-sight security personnel. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶¶ 10, 11.
Plaintiff also alleges that she was deprived of constitutional

rights and civil liberties due to the perception that she has a mental
illness. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that she has not been
diagnosed with a mental health disorder, does not have a medical

history of mental illness, and does not suffer from delusions. d/e 1,
p. 6, ¶¶ 12, 13. Plaintiff asserts that she is not a danger to anyone
and has always been capable of meeting the needs of her children.

d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that the Center’s
“unsubstantiated concerns for mental illness, based on speculation,
stereotypes, and generalizations about mental health disorders

rather than facts, resulted in Plaintiff’s family being unnecessarily
separated.” d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 15. Plaintiff also alleges that the Center’s
implemented barriers to family visitations based on its perception
that Plaintiff had a disability, which prevented visitations with C.D.

from taking place. d/e 1, p. 6, ¶ 16.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to conduct the
“initial and ongoing assessments that are required of permanency

workers in case management,” and that the Center’s “permanency
worker copied and pasted the erroneous assessment” from the
January 2021 DCFS investigation. d/e 1, p. 7, ¶ 17.

Plaintiff alleges that she has completed five mental health
evaluations by three different facilities that found no mental health
issues and no medical need for services. d/e 1, p. 7, ¶ 18. Plaintiff

alleges that the Center’s worker presented, documented, and
communicated subjective opinions and false information about
Plaintiff’s mental health status, preventing family unification. d/e

1, p. 7, ¶ 19.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Center’s permanency worker
McAfee and supervisor Fore omitted relevant information by

neglecting to document significant events and exculpatory evidence
from the case record and presented false information to the Court.
d/e 1, p. 7, ¶ 20.
Plaintiff also alleges that the service plan created by the

Center’s permanency worker was not based on accurate information
and that Plaintiff was not involved in the development of the service
plan. d/e 1, p. 7, ¶¶ 21, 22. Plaintiff also asserts that she was not
permitted to choose her own service providers, she was not treated

with dignity and respect, she was not informed, she was not
provided appropriate services and not provided with information for
filing grievances, and that her requests for a change in case

managers or agencies were rejected by the Center. d/e 1, p. 7, ¶¶
23–27.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Requires The Court to
Abstain From Interfering with Plaintiff’s Ongoing State
Court Proceedings.

Defendants argue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) that the
application of Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine is appropriate
here because all of Plaintiff’s allegations involve her parental rights
to her child, which is the subject of the juvenile proceedings
currently pending in Sangamon County in Illinois State Court. 401
U.S. 37 (19971); d/e 12, p. 6. The Court agrees.
Younger applies in only three limited categories of cases: (1)
criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings; and (3)

civil proceedings that promote the state’s ability to perform its
judicial functions. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). If applicable, the Younger
abstention doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from

interfering with ongoing state proceedings that are (1) judicial in
nature, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) offer an
adequate opportunity for review of constitutional claims, (4) so long

as no extraordinary circumstances exist which would make
abstention inappropriate. Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 666 (7th
Cir. 2002).

In the instant case, abstention is appropriate. Plaintiff’s
ongoing juvenile court proceedings brought by the State of Illinois
implicate Illinois’ important interest in child custody and are still

pending in Sangamon County.1 Garner v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr.,
No. 16 C 10108, 2016 WL 11773850, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2016)
(citing Borum v. Bonk, No. 99 C 2069, 2000 WL 263958, at *1–2

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2000)) (“Child custody and placement proceedings
traditionally are considered as areas involving important state
interests, and therefore are the province of state courts.”); see

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the orders entered in the Circuit Court of
Sangamon County regarding Plaintiffs’ custody of child C.D. in case number 21
JA 129.
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (holding that Younger
applies to the temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse

context). Additionally, because Plaintiff may raise constitutional
issues during custody proceedings and on subsequent judicial
review, she has a sufficient opportunity to address all such

constitutional claims. See Garner, No. 16 C 10108, 2016 WL
11773850, at *3.
Furthermore, no extraordinary circumstances exist that would

render abstention inappropriate. Plaintiff claims extraordinary
circumstances exist here, specifically, the “gravity of th[e] situation,
the federal question, the irreparable harm sustained by the

Plaintiff’s family, the bad faith intent of these proceedings, and the
history of proceedings.” d/e 14, p. 6. A district court should not
abstain under Younger in the limited circumstances where: “(1) the

state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted
in bad faith, (2) there is an extraordinarily pressing need for
immediate equitable relief, or (3) the challenged provision is
flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional

prohibitions[.]” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 664
(7th Cir. 2007) (citing Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Mun.
Corp., 824 F.2d 567, 569–70 (7th Cir.1987)). The party claiming
extraordinary circumstances must demonstrate their existence.

Green, 281 F.3d at 667.
Plaintiff argues that bad faith exists in the state proceedings
for a litany of reasons, including that she was “coerced and

manipulated” into a voluntary safety plan; emergency orders were
granted pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, with “no
claim of abuse”; “custody [] and guardianship [were] decided out of

plenary proceedings”; she was not appointed counsel; “exculpatory
evidence was not allowed”; and “a record of proceedings [was] not
made available.” d/e 14, p. 10. However, the Court finds no

indication that the state juvenile proceedings were conducted in
bad faith. Plaintiff must demonstrate that state prosecution “was
brought in bad faith for the purposes of retaliating for or deterring

the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.” Collins v. Cty. of
Kendall, Ill., 807 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal citations
omitted). Mere allegations and conclusions of bad faith are
insufficient to warrant the bad faith exception. Crenshaw v.

Supreme Court of Ind., 170 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 1999). The
instances of alleged bad faith described by Plaintiff do not indicate
that Illinois initiated its juvenile proceeding with an intent to
retaliate or deter Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff also alleges that her family will suffer irreparable
harm. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not, at least on its face,
request the direct entry of a child custody order. Instead, Plaintiff

seeks a judgment against Defendants whose actions allegedly paved
the way for the state court proceeding for compensatory and
punitive damages. See d/e 1, p. 4. Plaintiff also cites to the

detrimental effect that separation of mother and child has on the
familial unit. d/e 14, p. 9. Allegations of irreparable harm alone,
however, are insufficient to satisfy the “extraordinary

circumstances” exception in Younger. 401 U.S. at 46. In addition
to establishing both “great and immediate” harm, Plaintiff must also
show that the threat to her rights under federal law cannot be

adequately adjudicated in the state proceeding. Younger, 401 U.S.
at 46. Plaintiff has not shown that the state court cannot
adequately address her claims and has failed to show extraordinary
circumstances which would distinguish this case from other child
custody cases in which federal courts routinely apply. See Moore,
442 U.S. at 423.

Although Plaintiff does not directly seek the custody of her
child C.D. in the instant case, Younger is appropriate here because
the resolution of the claims for monetary damages requires the

Court to question the validity of the underlying state proceedings,
which constitute the substance of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court
should normally stay the instant case until the state proceeding is

resolved because Plaintiff cannot bring her damages claim in the
state juvenile proceeding. Green, 281 F.3d at 667; see Nicole K. by
next friend Linda R. v. Stigdon, 990 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2021)

(when Younger applies, a federal court has discretion to put any
federal proceeding on hold while a state works its way through an
administrative process that was under way before the federal suit
began). However, the Court finds dismissal appropriate here
because Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to state a claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can Be Granted Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Each of Plaintiff’s claims in her Complaint fail to state a cause
of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
Court addresses each Count below.
1. Count I is Dismissed Because Defendant the Center
is Not a State Actor.

Plaintiff brings Count I under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
deprivation of civil rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant: (1) acted under the color of state law
and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action in Count I under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 because Defendants are not “actors under the color
of state law.” See Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police of Chi. Lodge
No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[The] Fourteenth

Amendment[ ] to the Constitution protect[s] citizens from conduct
by the government, but not from conduct by private actors, no
matter how egregious that conduct might be.”). Section 1983 may
be brought against government employees, and under certain

circumstances, non-government employees who are employed by a
private entity but provide services to the government. Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 823–27 (7th Cir. 2009).

Defendant Center is a private, not-for-profit Illinois child
welfare agency that works for DCFS through a contractual
agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the Center is a state actor by

implying that the existence of a contractual agreement makesthe
Center into a state actor. d/e 14, p. 15. However, the receipt of
public funds alone is insufficient to transform otherwise private

actions into actions of the State. Doe By and Through G.S. v.
Johnson, No. 92 C 7661, 1993 WL 75125, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 15,
1993) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) and

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982)). In Doe, the
Northern District of Illinois found that a private, not-for-profit social
service agency is not a state actor simply because the agency
assists DCFS in placing children into foster care and receives

funding from DCFS for it. Id. at *4. Plaintiff has failed to properly
allege that Defendant Center, and by extension, its employees, is a
state actor. As a result, the Court does not reach Defendant’s other
arguments.

Although the Court has the discretion to permit Plaintiff to file
an amended complaint, it is unnecessary when, as here, the Court
finds that any amendment to the claim raised in Plaintiff's pleading

would be futile. Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1025 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d
801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (“District courts, nevertheless, ‘have broad

discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue
prejudice to the defendants, or where the amendment would be

futile.’ ”) (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir.
2008)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations in Count I asserting
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail to state a claim and are dismissed

with prejudice.
2. Count II is Dismissed Because Defendant Center is
Not a Public Entity.

Plaintiff brings Count II under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. §
791, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of
constitutional rights and civil liberties due to the “perceptions of a

mental illness,” which resulted in the separation of her and her
child C.D. d/e 1, p. 6.
The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with

disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is
covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and
activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public

accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516–17 (2004). While the Plaintiff’s Complaint
identifies Title III of the ADA, d/e 1, p. 3, as Defendants correctly

argue, Title III only authorizes injunctive relief, which Plaintiff does
not seek. Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th
Cir. 2013); d/e 1, p. 4 (seeking compensatory and punitive

damages). Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court
presumes that Plaintiff intended Count II to be brought pursuant to
Title II of the ADA.
In the Seventh Circuit, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are

“functionally identical.” Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592
(7th Cir. 2015). To state a claim under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, an individual must allege that (1) she is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was denied the benefits

of the “services, programs or activities of a public entity”; (3) she
was denied those benefits or otherwise discriminated against on
account of her disability; and for the Rehabilitation Act claim, the

additional requirement that (4) the defendant is an entity which
receives federal funds. Carter v. City of Chicago, 520 F. Supp. 3d
1024, 1030 (N.D. Ill. 2021).

Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action in Count II under the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act against Defendants because
Defendant Center is not a “public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. For

purposes of the ADA, a “public entity” is a “department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government.” Id. The Center is not a government

agency. Rather, the Center is a not-for-profit Illinois child welfare
agency that works for DCFS through a contract agreement to assist
DCFS in its statutory duty to administer child abuse prevention
and service programs for abused and neglected children and their

families in the State of Illinois. d/e 12, p. 3, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 1, 3. The
“public entity” definition does not include private organizations that
have business or contractual relationships with public entities, and
Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that a

private entity becomes an “instrumentality of [the] State” merely by
contracting with a public entity for the provision of some services.
42 U.S.C. § 12131. While the Seventh Circuit has yet to address

this issue, other courts have rejected this interpretation. See
Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1308–10 (11th Cir. 2010) (“a
private corporation is not a public entity merely because it

contracts with a public entity to provide some service”); Maxwell v.
South Bend Work Release Ctr., 787 F.Supp.2d 819, 822 (N.D. Ind.
April 13, 2011) (citing cases). The Court agrees and finds that

although the Center is in a contractual relationship with DCFS to
further DCFS’ goals, the Center itself is not a public entity as
defined by the ADA.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not claimed that Defendant the Center
receives federal funding, which is a requisite to state a claim under
the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations in Count
II asserting violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act fail to

state a claim and are dismissed with prejudice. See Luevano, 722
F.3d at 1025 (unnecessary to allow amended complaint when any
amendment to claim raised in Plaintiff’s pleading would be futile).

3. Because the Family First Prevention Services Act
(FFSA), 42 CFR § 1356.21(d), Does Not Create
Enforceable Federal Rights, Plaintiff Cannot State
a Cause of Action in Count III.

Plaintiff brings Count III under the Family First Prevention
Services Act (FFPSA), 42 CFR § 1356.21(d), which provides that
judicial determination regarding reasonable efforts to prevent
unnecessary removal of a child from the home be explicitly
documented for public agencies to receive Title IV-E funding.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants McAfee and Fore
violated the FFPSA by “neglect[ing] to make reasonable efforts” to
prevent infant C.D. from being placed outside of the home in foster

care despite alternatives provided by Plaintiff. d/e 1, p. 6. Plaintiff
also argues that 42 CFR § 1356.21(d) creates a substantive federal
right that may be enforced in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

d/e 14, p. 18.
The Court finds that the FFPSA does not contain either an
express or implied provision providing a private right of action.
Plaintiff does not cite to any provision of the FFPSA that provides
for a private right of action. The Supreme Court articulated a four-
factor test to determine whether an implied right of action exists in

a federal statute: (1) whether the plaintiff is among the class of
persons intended to benefit from the enactment of the statute; (2)
whether there is any evidence of legislative intent to provide or deny

a private remedy; (3) whether a private remedy is consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether
the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law such

that it would be inappropriate to infer a federal remedy. Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). However, the Court has since focused
its analysis on whether Congress intended to create a private cause

of action. Saltzman v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 950
F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 179 (internal citation omitted) (“The intent of Congress

remains the ultimate issue . . . and unless this congressional intent
can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory
structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for
implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.”).

The stated purpose of the FFPSA is
to enable States to use Federal funds available under parts
B and E of title IV of the Social Security Act to provide
enhanced support to children and families and prevent
foster care placements through the provision of mental
health and substance abuse prevention and treatment
services, in-home parent skill-based programs, and
kinship navigator services.

Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 50702. As Defendants correctly suggest,
FFSA’s purpose is to govern funding for States to prevent the
placement of children into foster care, and to limit the use of group
home placements, not to provide civil remedies for the actions of
child welfare agencies. Despite Plaintiff’s arguments that Congress
has enacted “several laws in response to the harms caused by social
policy” and that the laws “are meant to direct those in authority
who are unable to direct themselves,” d/e 14, p. 19, Plaintiff fails to
point to any statutory language or legislative history that raises an
inference that Congress intended to create a private right of action
through the FFSA. The Court finds that the FFSA does not contain

an implied private cause of action. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (“courts may not create [a private remedy],
no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter”); Statland
v. Am. Airlines, 998 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts seldom

imply a private right of action where none appears in the statute,
for a strong presumption exists against their creation.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations in Count III asserting

violations of the FFPSA fail to state a claim and are dismissed with
prejudice. See Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1025 (unnecessary to allow
amended complaint when any amendment to claim raised in

Plaintiff’s pleading would be futile).
4. Count IV is Dismissed Because Plaintiff Fails to
Allege Fraud with Particularity, Does Not Bring a
Qui Tam Action, and Does Not Allege Defendants
Presented a False Claim to the Government for
Payment.

Plaintiff brings Count IV under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. The FCA “makes it unlawful knowingly (1) to
present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent claim for
payment to the United States, (2) to make or use a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim, or (3) to use a
false record or statement to conceal or decrease an obligation to pay
money to the United States.” United States v. Molina Healthcare of
Illinois, Inc., 17 F.4th 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2021). The FCA permits
private citizens, or “relators,” to file a civil action on behalf of the
government to recover monies that the government paid on account

of the false claims, referred to as qui tam actions. 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(1); United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics,
652 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2011).

Claims under the False Claims Act include four components:
“(1) falsity, (2) causation, (3) knowledge, and (4) materiality.”
Molina, 17 F.4th at 740. To survive a motion to dismiss, the

complaint must allege that (1) defendant made a false claim or
statement to receive money from the government, (2) the violation
proximately caused the alleged injury, (3) defendant knew that the

claim or statement was false, and (4) defendant’s misrepresentation
was material to the government's payment decision. Id. at 739–40.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s FCA claim for failure to state a

claim for several reasons. First, because a claim under the FCA
involved fraud, the complaint must overcome a heightened pleading
standard under Rule (b). To bring a claim under Section
3729(a)(1)(A) or Section 3729(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff must allege

“specific facts demonstrating what occurred at the individualized
transactional level.” Lanahan v. Cty. of Cook, 41 F.4th 854, 861–62
(7th Cir. 2022). This includes “the identity of the person making
the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the

misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation
was communicated” to the government.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s
complaint does not offer any details about the alleged fraud besides

a general assertion that Defendants “omitted relevant information
from the case record and presented false information to the court.”
d/e 1, p. 7. Such a conclusory assertion, without any supporting

details or information, fails to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Second, claims for violations of the FCA may only be brought
by private actors on behalf of the federal government in a qui tam

action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. The federal government has no monetary
interest in Plaintiff’s dispute with the Center, and Plaintiff is not
seeking to bring this claim on behalf of the government; rather, she

appears to bring the claim because she disagrees with how
Defendants McAfee and Fore handled her child C.D.’s case.
Third, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendants McAfee and Fore
misrepresented information to the court, Plaintiff makes no

allegations that Defendants presented a false claim to the
government for payment. See Molina, 17 F.4th at 739.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations in Count IV asserting violations of
the False Claims Act fail to state a claim and are dismissed with

prejudice. See Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1025 (unnecessary to allow
amended complaint when any amendment to claim raised in
Plaintiff’s pleading would be futile).

5. Because the Mental Health Bill of Rights, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9501, Does Not Create Enforceable Federal
Rights, Plaintiff Cannot State a Cause of Action in
Count V.

Plaintiff brings Count V under the Mental Health Bill of Rights,
42 U.S.C. § 9501, which provides:
It is the sense of the Congress that each State should
review and revise, if necessary, its laws to ensure that
mental health patients receive the protection and services
they require; and in making such review and revision
should take into account the recommendations of the
President's Commission on Mental Health and [certain
recommendations specified in the statute].

42 U.S.C. § 9501. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Center
permanency worker created a service plan based on inaccurate
information, that Plaintiff was not involved in the development of
the service plan, that Plaintiff was not permitted to choose her own
service providers, that Plaintiff was not informed, that Plaintiff was
not provided appropriate services, and that Plaintiff’s requests for a
change in case managers was rejected by the Center. d/e 1, ¶¶ 21–
27. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s claim, the Court presumes that

Plaintiff intended to argue that 42 U.S.C. § 9501 created a
substantive federal right that may be enforced in an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

However, the Mental Health Bill of Rights does not create
enforceable federal rights or duties or a private right of action. See
Green v. Lichtstein, No. 00 C 0563, 2001 WL 78915, at *3 (N.D. Ill.

Jan. 26, 2001) (citing cases). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations in
Count V asserting violations of the Mental Health Bill of Rights fail
to state a claim and are dismissed with prejudice. See Luevano,

722 F.3d at 1025 (unnecessary to allow amended complaint when
any amendment to claim raised in Plaintiff’s pleading would be
futile).

6. Count VI Is Dismissed Because Defendants Have
Qualified Immunity and the Court Declines to
Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff brings Count VI for defamation in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 4101. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “copied
and pasted the erroneous assessment” from the previous DCFS
investigation and that Defendant “presented, documented, and
communicated subjective opinion[s] and false information about the
claimant[’]s mental health status, behavior, action, and

statement[s].” d/e 1, p. 7.
Section 4101 does not provide a cause of action for defamation
and pertains only to foreign defamation judgments. Section 4101

has no applicability to Plaintiff’s case as there is no allegation of a
foreign defamation judgment. However, liberally construing
Plaintiff’s claim, the Court presumes that Defendant intended to

bring an Illinois state law claim of defamation.
Under Illinois law, to state a claim for defamation, the plaintiff
must allege (1) that the defendant made a false statement

concerning her and (2) that the defendant caused an unprivileged
publication of that false statement to a third party, (3) which
damaged the plaintiff. Kransinski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 530

N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ill. 1988). In Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff refers
to general defamatory remarks, but fails to specify what remarks
allegedly defamed her. The only allegedly defamatory remark
Plaintiff identifies is in her Response: “Justin was chasing Kendra

with a hammer.” d/e 14, p. 22. Plaintiff fails to allege that this was
an unprivileged publication to a third party.
Moreover, Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from civil suit.
Under Illinois’ Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (ANCRA),

as licensed case workers and a child welfare agency, Defendants are
in the class of persons required to report if they have “reasonable
cause to believe a child known to them in their professional or

official capacity may be an abused child or a neglected child.” 325
ILCS 5/4(a); see d/e 12, Ex. 1, ¶ 5 Under ANCRA, mandated
reporters “shall have immunity from any liability, civil, criminal or

that otherwise result” from reports made in “good faith.” 325 ILCS
5/9. As mandatory reporters, Defendants have a presumption
protecting them from Plaintiff’s state tort claims unless Plaintiff can

overcome it. See Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir.
2017). Plaintiff makes no allegations of bad faith as to any allegedly
defamatory statement in her Complaint or her Response.

Furthermore, having dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
allegations in Count VI asserting violations of defamation fail to

state a claim and are dismissed with prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 11) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety for failure to state a claim.
Because amendment would be futile, leave to file an amended
complaint is not granted. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case

and enter judgment. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

ENTERED: September 8, 2023.

FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137269. Public record. Not legal advice.