# Campbell v. Swanson

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · March 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137116

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137116

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the plaintiff stated a claim for violation of procedural due process based on allegations that a child “was removed based on knowingly false statements of child neglect”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

CHARIOT CAMPBELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-04013-SLD-JEH
)
OFFICER SWANSON, OFFICER SAGE, )
LISA ZIMMERMAN, ELENA )
RODRIGUEZ, KIM DUTTON, JORDAN )
TIMMONS, MISTY LAMPLEY, )
SHANNON BLIND,1 OFFICER )
SWEENEY, OFFICER OLINGER, )
OFFICER WILLIAMS, OFFICER LEWIS, )
JESSICA VOTAVA, GALESBURG )
POLICE DEPARTMENT, LUTHERAN )
SOCIAL SERVICES OF ILLINOIS,2 )
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN )
AND FAMILY SERVICES,3 and )
CHILDREN’S HOME ASSOCIATION OF )
ILLINOIS, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Chariot Campbell’s motion for default summary
judgment (“First Motion for Default Summary Judgment”), ECF No. 11; Plaintiff’s addendum to
the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment (“Addendum”), ECF No. 12; Plaintiff’s
subsequent motion for default summary judgment (“Second Motion for Default Summary

1 The complaint refers to this Defendant as “Shannon (Lutheran).” Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. Attorney James L.
Sipchen entered an appearance of behalf of Shannon Blind, stating that she had been incorrectly sued as “Shannon
(Lutheran).” See Sipchen Not. Appearance, ECF No. 24.
2 The complaint refers to this party as “Lutheran Social Services.” Compl. 1. Attorney Sipchen entered an
appearance on behalf of Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, indicating that this is the full name of the party. See
Sipchen Not. Appearance.
3 The complaint refers to this party as “Dept. Child & Family Services.” Compl. 10. Attorney Barbara L.
Greenspan entered an appearance on behalf of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, indicating that
this is the full name of the party. Greenspan Not. Appearance, ECF No. 8.
Judgment”), ECF No. 13; Defendants Officer Lewis, Officer Olinger, and Officer Swanson’s
(collectively, “Officer Defendants”) motion to dismiss for improper service (“Officers’ Motion
to Dismiss”), ECF No. 15; Defendants Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(“DCFS”), Lisa Zimmerman, and Misty Lampley’s (collectively, “DCFS Defendants”) motion to
dismiss (“DCFS Motion to Dismiss”), ECF No. 19; and Defendants Lutheran Social Services of

Illinois (“LSSI”), Shannon Blind, Elena Rodriguez, Jordan Timmons, and Kim Dutton’s
(collectively, “LSSI Defendants”) motion to dismiss (“LSSI Motion to Dismiss”), ECF No. 27.
For the following reasons, the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment is DENIED; the
Addendum, construed as a motion to supplement the First Motion for Default Summary
Judgment, is GRANTED; the Second Motion for Default Summary Judgment is DENIED; the
Officers’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED; the DCFS Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and the
LSSI Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND4
Plaintiff has four children, the older two with Travis Walker and the younger two with

Tim Davis. She and Davis lived together with the four children, although the children frequently
stayed with Plaintiff’s parents. On January 1, 2021, Officer Swanson of the Galesburg Police
Department (“GPD”) arrived at Plaintiff’s house and asked to go inside to see whether the power

4 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015).
The factual background is therefore drawn from the complaint, ECF No. 1. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or . . . 21 days
after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).” On July 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in
support of her complaint, ECF No 10. This was filed more than 21 days after the complaint was filed and does not
otherwise fall under Rule 15(a)(1), so the Court will not consider it. On July 26, 2022 and August 1, 2022, Plaintiff
filed what she labeled “exhibits” to her complaint. See Exs. Letter, ECF No. 17; Numbered List of Exs. of Evid.,
ECF No. 18. These were filed within 21 days of the filing of the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss, so the Court will
consider them properly filed. Because they are labeled exhibits to the complaint, the Court will consider them
supplements to, rather than replacements of, the complaint. Thus, the Court will also draw factual background
information from these exhibits.
and water were working. While Swanson was in the house, Plaintiff told him that Davis was
abusive towards her and attempted to show him messages as evidence of the abuse. Swanson
refused to look at the messages and left the house. After, he “wrote a biased report” stating that
Plaintiff was “uncooperative and that [she] did not care about [her] home responsibilities.”
Compl. 16, ECF No. 15 (quotation marks omitted). The report also included “several lies” that

Davis had told to Swanson, such as that Plaintiff was a prostitute and that she “refuse[d] to do
anything for [her] kids or home.” Id. Swanson sent this report to DCFS, and DCFS used the
report to open an investigation into Plaintiff.
On January 4, 2021, Lisa Zimmerman, a caseworker with DCFS, came to Plaintiff’s
house and asked to speak with Davis. Plaintiff told her about the abuse and threats she had been
receiving from Davis, but Zimmerman did not seem to care. Zimmerman interviewed Davis
outside the house. Davis returned to the house shortly after, and he got into a fight with Plaintiff.
Zimmerman, who was still outside, called the GPD because she could not get back in the house,
and the police removed Davis from the house. Zimmerman refused to interview Plaintiff,

“falsely alleging [she] was drunk.” Id.
The next day, Zimmerman returned to the house. Plaintiff had cleaned the house
overnight, and Zimmerman “remarked how pleased she was” by this. Id. at 17. Zimmerman
conducted an interview with Plaintiff and neither “exhibited nor expressed any concerns with
[Plaintiff’s] home and . . . seemed to be pleased with the answers [Plaintiff] provided.” Id.
Towards the end of the interview, Zimmerman said that she wanted Plaintiff to accept her
recommended services of “AA” and counseling. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff said no,

5 The pages in the complaint are not consecutively paginated, so the Court uses the page numbers generated by
CM/ECF.
and Zimmerman’s “demeanor shifted negatively.” Id. Zimmerman said that she needed to speak
with her supervisor about what would happen next.
On January 15, 2021, Zimmerman called Plaintiff to tell her that she was adding medical
neglect to Plaintiff’s “list of charges”; Plaintiff had not previously been informed that she had
charges against her. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The two spoke a few other times on the

phone, during which Zimmerman did not express any other concerns with Plaintiff. Zimmerman
later wrote a report in which she listed some concerns with Plaintiff. The report did not include
information Plaintiff had given her regarding crimes perpetrated against Plaintiff and her
children. Zimmerman ignored many of Plaintiff’s calls for a period of several months. Plaintiff
contacted Misty Lampley, Zimmerman’s supervisor at DCFS, at one point in January 2021
because of Zimmerman’s refusal to respond to her calls. Plaintiff told her that she had “tangible
evidence . . . that [she] believed [Zimmerman] to be working against [her].” Id. at 21. Lampley
responded that Plaintiff had to resolve her issues directly with Zimmerman. Lampley then
denied Plaintiff’s request for a new caseworker.

On February 24, 2021, Walker went to Plaintiff’s parents’ house, where the children had
been staying, and forcefully removed the older two children. An order of protection had been
entered against Plaintiff, affecting her ability to see her children, and Walker apparently believed
the order granted him permission to remove his children from Plaintiff’s parents’ house. Officer
Sweeney of the GPD “stood by and watched [Plaintiff’s] kids be illegally and forcefully removed
from the physical custody of [her] parents.” Id. at 22. Officer Olinger was also there and filed a
falsified report stating that he did not know the whereabouts of one of Plaintiff’s older children,
although he had observed Walker depart with both children. Officer Sweeney permitted this
falsified report to be filed.
On or about March 5, 2021, Zimmerman came back to Plaintiff’s house and introduced
her to Jordan Timmons, a caseworker with LSSI, who was to be Plaintiff’s new caseworker.
Both Timmons and Zimmerman said they would look into what legal actions could be taken
regarding the order of protection. When Timmons returned for a second visit, she said that
nothing could be done about the order until it expired in 2025. Plaintiff later found out that this

was a lie and that had she contested the order within thirty days of its entry, she could have
gotten the order terminated. Timmons generally was not able to provide answers to any of
Plaintiff’s questions about her case, and she refused to help Plaintiff with the “multiple crimes”
Plaintiff reported to her between March 2021 and July 2021. Id. at 21. Eventually, in early May
2021, Timmons’s supervisor, Shannon Blind, called Plaintiff and told her that Timmons had
reported that Plaintiff was harassing her and that Plaintiff should leave Timmons alone. Plaintiff
responded that she no longer wished to cooperate with LSSI. On or about May 14, 2021,
Timmons asked the police to perform a well-being check on Plaintiff because she had not heard
from Plaintiff in a week. Plaintiff attempted to call Timmons, and when Timmons finally

responded, she said that “she felt [they] needed a break.” Id.
A few days later, Blind called Plaintiff and said that she and Timmons were going to help
Plaintiff get visits with her two oldest children. However, on or about May 24, 2021, Timmons
informed Plaintiff that she was not going to get these visits because she was “being accused of
taking nude pictures of [her] daughter . . . and of prostituting [her] child” even though her
daughter had been living in Peoria with Walker since February 24, 2021. Id. at 20. Plaintiff
never heard from Blind again and accuses her of being derelict and negligent in her duties.
Timmons continued to do nothing to assist Plaintiff with ongoing problems with Davis and
Walker, and Plaintiff did not hear from Timmons again after July 2021.
In late July 2021, Jessica Votava, a foster care caseworker with the Children’s Home
Association of Illinois, called Plaintiff and asked if her children could reside with her parents.
Votava asked for her parents’ social security numbers in order to run a background check. A few
days later, Votava called and said that Plaintiff’s children could stay with her parents and that it
would become official in court the following week. However, at the court hearing, Votava told

the judge that she had not been able to speak with Plaintiff’s parents before the hearing and did
not know if the children were there, so an Amber Alert was placed for the children. Votava told
Plaintiff that to terminate the Amber Alert, a police officer just had to go to the house and
physically see the children there. However, the following day, her children were removed from
her parents’ house by the Peoria Department of Children and Family Services, and Votava told
Plaintiff that she could not help her.
In September 2021, Elena Rodriguez, a caseworker from LSSI, came to Plaintiff’s home
and introduced herself as Plaintiff’s new caseworker. Rodriguez promised to help Plaintiff get
her issues resolved and get her two oldest children back home. However, in October 2021, when

Plaintiff called Rodriguez, Rodriguez told her that she and her supervisor, Kim Dutton, had
determined that Rodriguez was not Plaintiff’s caseworker. The following week, there was a
court hearing in a case Plaintiff had filed against Walker. She subpoenaed Rodriguez, but
Rodriguez lied in court by telling the judge that Plaintiff was involved in a DCFS case involving
Walker and Plaintiff’s oldest two children. During another court hearing on December 22, 2021,
Rodriguez’s attorney claimed that Plaintiff had been harassing Rodriguez, which Plaintiff states
was a “lie.” Id. at 18. In actuality, Rodriguez had been refusing to answer questions Plaintiff
asked her over text and phone calls.
The order of protection was still in place against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff succeeded in
getting it modified on her own. As the order had been what was keeping her from seeing her
children, once the modification took place, Plaintiff arranged with Rodriguez to visit with the
children on Saturdays for four hours. These visits took place four times between December 3,
2021 and January 1, 2022. At a court hearing on January 6, 2022, the judge terminated the order

of protection; Rodriguez had been subpoenaed but had failed to show up. The following day,
Rodriguez told Plaintiff that she could no longer have visits with her children because she was
“unstable.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff has not heard from Rodriguez since. She accuses Rodriguez of
“operat[ing] as a spy in collussion [sic] and conspiracy against the well-being of [her] and [her]
children in an effort to gather information from [her] about [her] ‘lawsuit’ against her colleagues
and associates, in order to help these previous wrong-doers to cover up their aggregous [sic]
misconduct.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff also alleges that Dutton was derelict in her duties, as she made
false promises to Plaintiff to give her answers to certain questions and then failed to divulge this
information; she also failed to make sure that Rodriguez was conducting herself appropriately.

Several other officers of the GPD also took actions against Plaintiff. In early February
2021, Officer Williams came to Plaintiff’s house to assist her after Davis posted nude
photographs of her to her Facebook page. Officer Williams asked Plaintiff to send the photos to
his email and promised to investigate the crime, but he did nothing. Officer Lewis “racially
profiled” Plaintiff and followed her in his car for two full minutes before putting his flashing
lights on. Id. at 22. Because she felt unsafe, she drove to her driveway, where she got out of the
car. Officer Lewis drew his weapon and aimed it at Plaintiff’s head; he “use[d] excessive force.”
Id.
During the relevant time period, Plaintiff attempted to get help from the GPD on
numerous occasions to no avail. She generally alleges that the GPD “has allowed widespread
corruption to take place as their official members operate against society.” Id. at 22. She also
generally alleges that DCFS “allowed multiple employees to get away with being derelict in their
[d]uties,” that LSSI “allowed multiple employees to get away with being blatantly derelict in

their [d]uties,” and that the Children’s Home Association of Illinois “allowed . . . Votava to be
blatantly derelict in her [d]uty, and has not reprimanded her for her misconduct or false-
promises.” Id.
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Officer Swanson, Officer Olinger, Officer Williams,
Officer Sweeney, Officer Lewis, Officer Sage, the GPD, DCFS, Zimmerman, Lampley, LSSI,
Rodriguez, Dutton, Timmons, Blind, the Children’s Home Association of Illinois, and Votava on
January 21, 2022. She brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. 1. She filed the
exhibits to the complaint, which the Court construes as supplements to the complaint, see supra
n.4, on July 26, 2022 and August 1, 2022.6

DISCUSSION
I. Motions for Default Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has filed three documents related to what she terms a request for default
summary judgment. On July 19, 2022, she filed the First Motion for Default Summary
Judgment. This document is lengthy, and the precise nature of the relief Plaintiff seeks is not
immediately apparent; for example, she asks “for sanction in the form of Petition For Summary
Judgment, Temporary Relief, Default Judgment and general legal protection from these
defendants that have abridged and obstructed the Rights of [her] and [her] four children” and to

6 The Court notes that these exhibits total nearly 1,000 pages.
“allow for the return of all four of [her] children while the case interim and other proceedings . . .
are still underway.” First Mot. Default Summ. J. 1. None of these requests identify the legal
basis for the request or the rule under which it is brought, as required by the Local Rules. See
Civil LR 7.1(B)(1) (“Every motion raising a question of law . . . must include a memorandum of
law including a brief statement of the specific points or propositions of law and supporting

authorities upon which the moving party relies, and identifying the Rule under which the motion
is filed.”); see Pearl Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants
are not excused from compliance with procedural rules.”).7 However, based on the final
paragraph of the document, the Court believes that Plaintiff’s central request is for the entry of
default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 against DCFS, Rodriguez, Timmons,
Dutton, Zimmerman, Lampley, LSSI, Officer Lewis, Officer Olinger, Officer Swanson, and the
GPD because of their failure to answer her complaint by the deadline. See First Mot. Default
Summ. J. 49.8
Next, on July 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Addendum, which the Court construes as a

motion to supplement the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment. See Addendum 1 (titling
the motion as “Addendum to Motion Filed 07.18.22; additional claims” and stating that the
contents of the motion are “in addition to the previously submitted Petition for Motion for
Default Summary Judgement”). So construed, the Court grants the Addendum and will consider
the material in the Addendum as part of the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment.

7 The First Motion for Default Summary Judgment does contain, at intervals, paragraphs containing strings of
citations to Illinois statutes, federal statutes, and constitutional provisions. See, e.g., First Mot. Default Summ. J. 2–
3. The Court finds the meaning of these clumps of citations—by and large unconnected to specific requests for
relief or factual statements—indecipherable, and they do not aid the Court in any way in discerning the basis for
Plaintiff’s requests for relief.
8 The motion requests default judgment, see First Mot. Default Summ. J. 1, but default, which is a necessary step
before default judgment, has not been entered yet. See Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Johnson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 963,
965 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (“Entry of default must precede an entry of default judgment.”).
Finally, on July 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Second Motion for Default Summary
Judgment. The text and requests of the Second Motion for Default Summary Judgment appear to
be essentially identical to that of the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment. Compare
Second Mot. Default Summ. J. 1–48 with First Mot. Default Summ. J. 1–49. The Court will thus
consider these two motions in tandem.

Entry of default is appropriate “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A defendant
must file an answer within 21 days after being served or within 14 days after a Rule 12 motion is
denied; any Rule 12 motion must be brought before the deadline for responsive pleadings. See
id. 12(a), (b). Plaintiff argues that as none of these Defendants have filed an answer by the
deadline, default is appropriate. See First Mot. Default Summ. J. 49; Second Mot. Default
Summ. J. 48.
According to the Summonses Returned Executed by Plaintiff on July 8, 2022, Officer
Lewis, Officer Olinger, Officer Swanson, and the GPD were served on June 13, 2022, with their

answers due July 5, 2022, and DCFS, Rodriguez, Timmons, Dutton, Zimmerman, Lampley, and
LSSI were served on June 15, 2022, with their answers due July 6, 2022. See Lewis Summons
Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 17–18; Olinger Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at
21–22; Swanson Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 23–24; GPD Summons Returned
Executed, ECF No. 6 at 19–20; DCFS Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 5–6;
Rodriguez Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 7–8; Timmons Summons Returned
Executed, ECF No. 6 at 9–10; Dutton Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 11–12;
Zimmerman Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 1–2; Lampley Summons Returned
Executed, ECF No. 6 at 3–4; LSSI Summons Returned Executed, ECF No. 6 at 15–16.
Plaintiff is correct that none of these Defendant filed an answer or Rule 12(b) motion by
those deadlines. However, several Defendants later sought and then received extensions of time
to file answers or motions to dismiss from the Court. On July 12, 2022, DCFS, Zimmerman, and
Lampley moved for an extension of time to file an answer or otherwise plead, DCFS Mot.
Extension Time, ECF No. 9, which the Court granted, July 13, 2022 Text Order (extending the

time for DCFS, Zimmerman, and Lampley to answer or otherwise plead to August 9, 2022). The
DCFS Motion to Dismiss was filed by that new deadline. On September 19, 2022, Rodriguez,
Timmons, Dutton, LSSI, and Blind filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to the
complaint, LSSI Mot. Extension Time, ECF No. 25, which the Court granted, Sept. 20, 2022
Text Order (extending the deadline for these Defendants to file an answer to November 3, 2022).
The LSSI Motion to Dismiss was on file by the new deadline. See LSSI Mot. Dismiss. Because
DCFS, Zimmerman, Lampley, Rodriguez, Timmons, Dutton, LSSI, and Blind filed their Rule 12
motions before the new deadlines set by the Court, entry of default against these Defendants is
not appropriate.

The GPD and the Officer Defendants did not move for an extension of time to answer or
otherwise plead. Thus, the Court will proceed to determining whether entry of default is
appropriate against these Defendants. “A party who moves for entry of default under Rule 55(a)
has the burden of showing that service of process was proper[l]y effected consistent with Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Williams v. Kessler, CAUSE NO.: 2:17-CV-161-JPK,
2019 WL 1762957, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 19, 2019) (quotation marks omitted). “If the moving
party is unable to show proper service or that proper service was waived, the party should not be
granted entry of default.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Officer Defendants have filed a
motion to dismiss for improper service, see Officers’ Mot. Dismiss, and, as discussed below, the
Court finds that service on them was not proper, see infra Section II. As such, entry of default
against them is not warranted.
The GPD has not filed a motion to dismiss for lack of proper service, but the Court
nevertheless finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that service was properly effected. First, the
Court notes that the GPD should actually be sued as the City of Galesburg. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), where a party is neither an individual nor a corporation, the
capacity of the party to sue or be sued is determined “by the law of the state where the court is
located.” “It is well-established in Illinois that a police department is not a suable entity, even
regarding claims arising under § 1983.” Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, No. 08 C 3780, 2010
WL 145860, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2010). Rather, “[p]olice departments are departments of the
municipalities they serve; they do not have distinct legal existences under Illinois law,” and the
municipality should therefore be sued instead. See Hall v. Vill. of Flossmoor Police Dep’t, No.
11-CV-5283, 2012 WL 379902, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2012). The Clerk is directed to replace
“Galesburg Police Department” as a party with “City of Galesburg.”

To serve a municipality, a copy of the summons and complaint must be delivered to its
chief executive officer or served “in the manner prescribed by . . . state[] law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(j)(2). In Illinois, a city is considered a municipality, 65 ILCS 5/1-1-2(1), and a city may be
served by leaving a copy of the summons with the mayor of the city or the city clerk, 735 ILCS
5/2-211. “Generally, the filing of a properly executed return of service is prima facie evidence of
effective service.” Esquivel v. Doc Able’s Auto Clinic, Inc., No. 15 C 8141, 2016 WL 1463768,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2016). The GPD Summons Returned Executed was directed to Chief
Russ Idle of the GPD at 150 S. Broad St., Galesburg, IL 61401, and the summons was left with
Kay Nolan in Records at that address. See GPD Summons Returned Executed. Given that the
summons was directed to the GPD Chief of Police and was ultimately served on Kay Nolan in
Records at what is presumably the GPD’s address, it does not appear from the face of the
Summons Returned Executed that a proper person was served on behalf of the GPD. And
Plaintiff has put forth nothing to show that the GPD was properly served, as is her burden. See
Kessler, 2019 WL 1762957, at *2. The Court therefore will not enter default against the GPD.

Because entry of default is not appropriate against DCFS, Zimmerman, Lampley,
Rodriguez, Timmons, Dutton, LSSI, Blind, the GPD, or the Officer Defendants, Plaintiff’s First
Motion for Default Summary Judgment and Second Motion for Default Summary Judgment are
DENIED.
II. Officers’ Motion to Dismiss
Officers Lewis, Olinger, and Swanson move to dismiss the complaint against them
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) or, in the alternative, to quash service,
asserting that none of them have been properly served. Mem. Supp. Officers’ Mot. Dismiss 1–2,
ECF No. 15-1. Plaintiff has not responded to this motion to date. See Civil LR 7.1(B)(2) (“If no

response is timely filed, the presiding judge will presume there is no opposition to the motion
and may rule without further notice to the parties.”).
A plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that the summons and complaint are served on a
defendant within the allotted time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). “If a defendant is not served within
90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service
be made within a specified time.” Id. 4(m). A defendant may file a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) to enforce the service of process requirements.
Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011). “The plaintiff bears the
burden to demonstrate that the district court has jurisdiction over each defendant through
effective service.” Id.
The Summonses Returned Executed purporting to show service on Officers Lewis,
Olinger, and Swanson indicate that service was made on Kay Nolan in Records at 150 S. Broad
Street, Galesburg, IL 61401. See Lewis Summons Returned Executed; Olinger Summons

Returned Executed; Swanson Summons Returned Executed. According to the Officer
Defendants, this is the address of Galesburg’s Public Safety Building, at which none of them
reside. Mem. Supp. Officers’ Mot. Dismiss 1. The Officer Defendants further state that they
have not received service in any other manner. Id. at 3.
An individual defendant may be served by delivering the summons and complaint to the
individual personally, leaving copies at the individual’s usual place of abode with a suitable
person who resides there, delivering copies to an agent authorized to receive service of process,
or following the service rules of the state where the district court is located or where service is
made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Illinois law provides that service may be made on an individual by

delivering the summons and complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies at the
individual’s usual place of abode with a suitable resident and mailing a copy of the summons
addressed to the individual at his usual place of abode. 735 ILCS 5/2-203(a). Notably, service
on a person other than the individual defendant at the defendant’s place of work is not a proper
method of service. The summonses were served on Nolan, not the actual Officer Defendants, at
the Galesburg Public Safety Building, not any of the Officer Defendants’ home addresses. See
Lewis Summons Returned Executed; Olinger Summons Returned Executed; Swanson Summons
Returned Executed. Because the service made was not of a type sanctioned by Rule 4(e) or by
735 ILCS 5/2-203(a), service on Officers Lewis, Olinger, and Swanson was not proper.
A final question is whether to grant the Officer Defendants’ motion to dismiss or to
merely quash service and permit Plaintiff additional time to serve them. “[T]he decision of
whether to dismiss or extend the period for service is inherently discretionary.” Cardenas, 646
F.3d at 1005; see Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Even if
a plaintiff does not establish good cause, the district court may in its discretion grant an

extension of time for service.”). However, upon a showing of good cause by the plaintiff, “the
court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The
Court acknowledges that Plaintiff did not respond to the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss.
Nevertheless, mindful of the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will give Plaintiff
additional time to effectuate proper service on the Officer Defendants. See Simmons v.
Parkinson, Case No. 1:19-cv-01231-SLD-JEH, 2021 WL 4494605, *4 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2021)
(denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) and extending the service deadline in part
because of the plaintiff’s pro se status). The deadline for service of the summons and complaint
on Officers Lewis, Olinger, and Swanson is extended to May 30, 2023. As such, service is

quashed, and the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
III. DCFS Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff brings claims against the DCFS Defendants pursuant to § 1983. See Compl. 1.
DCFS, Zimmerman, and Lampley move to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that all
claims against DCFS and against Zimmerman and Lampley in their official capacities are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment; respondeat superior liability is not available under § 1983
regarding Lampley’s actions; Zimmerman and Lampley are entitled to qualified immunity; and
Plaintiff has failed to state any constitutional claims. See Mem. Supp. DCFS Mot. Dismiss 11–
16, ECF No. 20.
a. Legal Standard
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). At the motion to dismiss stage, the key
inquiry is whether the complaint is “sufficient to provide the defendant with ‘fair notice’ of the
plaintiff’s claim and its basis.” Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934

(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). While “detailed factual
allegations are unnecessary, the complaint must have ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When deciding on a motion to dismiss, “[t]he complaint’s well-pleaded factual
allegations, though not its legal conclusions, are assumed to be true,” Phillips v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013), and the court must also “draw all inferences in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th
Cir. 2014). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
b. Analysis
i. Eleventh Amendment
The Court looks first to the DCFS Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment argument. The
Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. Courts have interpreted this to mean that private individuals cannot sue the
state itself, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities in federal court, a
doctrine known as sovereign immunity. See Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun.
Emps., AFL-CIO v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2012). Three exceptions to sovereign
immunity have been recognized: 1) Congressional abrogation, 2) waiver, and 3) the Ex parte

Young exception. Id. at 882. The Ex parte Young exception “allows private parties to sue
individual state officials for prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law.” Id
(quotation marks omitted). Because the exceptions to sovereign immunity are dependent upon
the type and capacity of the defendant being sued, the Court will address each of the DCFS
Defendants individually.
1. DCFS
DCFS is a state agency. See, e.g., Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 906 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“The [Illinois] DCFS is a state agency; it was established by state statute and is funded by the
state.”). As such, the claims against DCFS may only proceed before this Court if an exception to

sovereign immunity applies. Because DCFS is an agency and not a state official, the Ex parte
Young exception is inapplicable; waiver and abrogation are the only possible exceptions. For a
state to waive its sovereign immunity defense, its consent to suit must be “unequivocally
expressed,” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); mere failure to
raise a defense of sovereign immunity does not constitute waiver, nor can a state constructively
consent to a suit, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 677–78 (1974). Nothing before the
Court shows that the state has consented to suit; indeed, the DCFS Motion to Dismiss compels
the opposite conclusion, see DCFS Mot. Dismiss 2. And Plaintiff bring her claims pursuant to
§ 1983, Compl. 1, a statute which the Supreme Court has specifically found does not abrogate
state sovereign immunity, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340–41 (1979). As no exceptions
to sovereign immunity apply, the Court finds that the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit from
being brought against DCFS. All claims against DCFS are dismissed.
2. Zimmerman and Lampley in their Official Capacities
As noted above, the doctrine of sovereign immunity covers state officials acting in their

official capacities. See Quinn, 680 F.3d at 881. However, in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), the Supreme Court created an exception to sovereign immunity under which private
parties can sue state officers in their official capacities “to enjoin prospective action that would
violate federal law.” Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 1999). As the Ex
parte Young exception “is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief,” a suit brought in
federal court pursuant to the exception may not seek “a retroactive award which requires the
payment of funds from the state treasury.” See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677; see, e.g., Ind. Prot. &
Advoc. Servs. v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the plaintiff’s requested relief was prospective where it sought access to records that state

officials had denied them in violation of federal law).
Whether a plaintiff’s desired relief is sufficiently prospective and injunctive turns on the
effect the relief would have on the state, not on the type of relief the plaintiff alleges he seeks.
Quinn, 680 F.3d at 883. Claims which purport to be prospective in nature that would
nonetheless “impose[] upon the State a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty
on the part of defendant state officials” are considered to be claims for monetary damages,
precluding use of the Ex parte Young exception. Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587
(7th Cir. 2002). However, where granting the plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief would
merely have an ancillary implication upon the state treasury, the Eleventh Amendment will not
bar the suit. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667–68.
In the complaint, Plaintiff states that she is seeking money damages from Zimmerman
because Zimmerman allegedly tampered with evidence, left information out of her report, and
failed to assist Plaintiff and her children; she does not identify any future relief she seeks from

Zimmerman. See Compl. 2. Plaintiff claims that she is seeking injunctive relief from Lampley
because Lampley “refused to help [her] resolve [her] ongoing issues with . . . Zimmerman
regarding [Zimmerman’s] seemingly inappropriate conduct and apparent neglect of duty”
between January and February 2021. Id. at 4. Neither of these requests for relief can properly be
characterized as prospective, so the Ex parte Young exception does not apply. Nor do the other
exceptions to sovereign immunity apply. See supra Section III(b)(i)(1). All claims against
Zimmerman and Lampley in their official capacities are dismissed.
ii. Qualified Immunity
The Court turns next to whether Zimmerman and Lampley are entitled to qualified

immunity for claims against them in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity is intended
to “protect[] government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
To evaluate whether qualified immunity is warranted, courts engage in a two-part analysis,
determining “(1) whether facts alleged or shown by a plaintiff make out a violation of a
constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019).
“If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is protected by qualified
immunity.” Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (quotation
marks omitted). A right is clearly established when “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that
right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alterations in original) (quotation marks
omitted). “[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate,” although “a case directly on point” is not necessary. Id. Alternatively, a party may
“show[] that the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person would have known of the
unconstitutionality of the conduct at issue.” Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7th
Cir. 2000). “When attempting to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity, the burden is on the
plaintiffs to show that a particular right is ‘clearly established.’” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d
816, 820 (7th Cir. 2019).
Because Zimmerman and Lampley are employees of a state agency, see supra Section
III(b)(i), they may be entitled to qualified immunity. Both steps of the qualified immunity
analysis are addressed in turn.

1. Violation of Constitutional Rights
In her complaint, Plaintiff does not point to particular constitutional rights she believes
these Defendants violated, although she need not do so at the complaint stage. See Shah v. Inter-
Cont’l Hotel Chi. Operating Corp., 314 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[In the complaint,] [t]he
plaintiff is not required to plead facts or legal theories or cases or statutes, but merely to describe
his claim briefly and simply.”).9 The DCFS Defendants suggest that Plaintiff is attempting to

9 In Plaintiff’s response to the DCFS Motion to Dismiss—filed long after the deadline for responding had expired—
she includes many string cites to various constitutional amendments and purported federal and state statutes. See,
e.g., Resp. DCFS Mot. Dismiss 3–4, ECF No. 26 (arguing that Zimmerman violated a number of federal criminal
statutes). Many of these citations are in an incomprehensible format. Others simply have no apparent connection to
the facts at issue. In the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court will only address legal claims that are reasonably
related to the facts of this case.
allege violations of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and of her Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. See Mem. Supp. DCFS Mot. Dismiss 13–15.
Having reviewed the complaint thoroughly, the Court has not discerned other realistic potential
constitutional violations. Thus, the Court will address whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that Zimmerman and Lampley violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights or her

Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “State [shall]
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV. In the arena of child custody, a plaintiff may bring a claim for a violation of procedural
due process for the failure to provide adequate process before a deprivation of custody or a
violation of the substantive due process right to familial relations. See, e.g., H.P. ex rel. Parker
v. Kelley, 586 F. Supp. 3d 844, 850–55 (S.D. Ill. 2022).
To allege a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must first allege that the defendant

“deprived the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest”; second, she must allege that
she was not given the process due to her. See Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020. Plaintiff has a liberty
interest in familial relations, see id., of which she was allegedly deprived when she lost custody
of some or all of her children, see, e.g., Compl. 18–19. While “the amount of process due varies
with the particular situation,” the “Supreme Court has said that parental rights cannot be denied
without an ‘opportunity for them to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). Due
process requires, “at a minimum[,] . . . that government officials not misrepresent the facts in
order to obtain the removal of a child from his parents.” Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Zimmerman—and by extension, Lampley10—involve
Zimmerman’s alleged “tamper[ing] with evidence” and writing of a report which was “biased”
and based on “fiction.” Compl. 17; see also id. at 2 (“[Zimmerman] . . . adds false details and
often lies throughout her report.”). This suggests that Plaintiff intends to allege a procedural due
process violation based on Zimmerman’s falsification of her report. But the complaint does not

provide any detail as to how—or even if—these alleged falsehoods were connected to the loss of
custody of her children.11 A complaint must provide enough detail such that the defendant has
“fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The lack of allegations
explaining how Zimmerman’s report led to any deprivation on Plaintiff’s part means that the
complaint fails to put the DCFS Defendants on notice of how they allegedly violated Plaintiff’s
procedural due process rights. Cf. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1021 (finding that the plaintiff stated a
claim for violation of procedural due process based on allegations that a child “was removed
based on knowingly false statements of child neglect”).

In contrast to procedural due process, “the concept of substantive due process prevents
the state from taking certain actions even if it provides procedural safeguards.” Gauder v.

10 The Court does not find that the lack of supervisory liability under § 1983 is a reason to dismiss the claims against
Lampley. “[U]nder § 1983, a plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold supervisory
officials liable for the misconduct of their subordinates.” Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th
Cir. 2002). “Rather, the supervisory officials also must have had some personal involvement in the constitutional
deprivation, essentially directing or consenting to the challenged conduct.” Id. at 614–15. Plaintiff alleges that she
contacted Lampley to discuss Zimmerman’s behavior and that Lampley refused to view evidence of Zimmerman
allegedly working against Plaintiff and refused to assign Plaintiff a new caseworker. See Compl. 4, 21. As this
suggests that Lampley consented to Zimmerman’s actions, the Court considers this sufficient personal involvement
under § 1983.
11 Among the exhibits to the complaint filed by Plaintiff are several DCFS reports authored by Zimmerman, which
Plaintiff has annotated with commentary on the context of the reports. See, e.g., Jan. 4, 2021 Contact Note, ECF No.
18-9 at 10 (written annotation by Plaintiff stating, in regards to the content of the Contact Note, that “[t]his is not
how this occurred”); Jan. 13, 2021 Contact Note, ECF No. 18-10 at 5 (written annotation by Plaintiff refuting
statement in report that there were videos showing one of Plaintiff’s children taking beer away from Plaintiff). The
Court presumes that these notes are meant to illuminate the alleged “lies” included by Zimmerman in her reports.
Leckrone, 366 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786 (W.D. Wis. 2005). “A family’s right to remain together
without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state” is one aspect of substantive
due process. See Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 478 (7th Cir. 2011)
(quotation marks omitted). But this right is not absolute—it “must be balanced against the
state’s interest in protecting children from abuse.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “To achieve

this balance, ‘caseworkers must have some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion of past or imminent danger of abuse before they may take a child into
protective custody.’” Kelley, 586 F. Supp. 3d at 853 (quoting Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478).
Again, the complaint states that Zimmerman wrote several reports regarding Plaintiff and her
children, but it does not contain any allegations that Zimmerman or Lampley were involved in
taking Plaintiff’s children into custody and thus does not state a claim for a violation of
Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights.
Plaintiff also alleges that Zimmerman neglected her duty to Plaintiff and her children by
failing to include information regarding abuse at the hands of Walker and Davis in her report and

“fail[ing] to assist [Plaintiff] or [her] kids with [their] actual crisis/problems.” See Compl. 2, 4,
16–17. Such allegations do not support a claim for violation of due process. The due process
clause is not “a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security”—its language “cannot
fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State” to ensure that private actors
do not deprive others of life, liberty, or property, see DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989), unless the harmed individual is in the custody of the State, see
David B. v McDonald, 156 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 1998). Failure to protect an individual
against private violence does not constitute a violation of the due process clause. See DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 197. As Plaintiff does not allege that the harm she suffered occurred while in state
custody, she has failed to state a due process violation based on Zimmerman’s failure to report
Walker and Davis’s violence or otherwise solve Plaintiff’s problems.
B. Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. These protections apply to child welfare workers, and a child
may be “seized” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable person in the
child’s shoes would believe that he was not free to leave. See Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509,
510 (7th Cir. 2003). Such a claim should generally be brought by or on behalf of the seized
child. See id. at 510–15 (analyzing whether the parents of a seized child stated a cognizable
Fourth Amendment claim on his behalf); see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969) (noting “the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like
some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted”).
Plaintiff generally takes issue with the removal of her children from her home, see, e.g.,

Compl. 18–19, which could be considered a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. But the
seizure must be related to the DCFS Defendants’ individual actions, see Doyle v. Camelot Care
Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is well-established that a plaintiff only may
bring a § 1983 claim against those individuals personally responsible for the constitutional
deprivation.”), and Plaintiff does not connect any action taken directly by Zimmerman (much
less Lampley) to the actual removal of Plaintiff’s children from her home. Nor does she bring
suit on behalf of her children. Thus, her allegations are insufficient to state that the DCFS
Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff’s children.
2. Rights Clearly Established
Plaintiff has also not satisfied her burden to show that any rights she alleges were
violated were clearly established. It is Plaintiff’s burden to refute a claim of qualified immunity
by showing that the right was clearly established, see Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820, and nowhere
in her complaint, response, or other filings does she do so. Thus, she has failed to show that

qualified immunity is not warranted here. The claims against Zimmerman and Lampley are
dismissed based on qualified immunity. As such, the DCFS Motion to Dismiss is granted.
IV. LSSI Motion to Dismiss
The LSSI Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. They contend that the
Court should dismiss the claims against the LSSI Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6) because
Plaintiff does not allege that the LSSI Defendants are state actors or that they deprived her of a
constitutional or federal right, as required by § 1983. Id. at 12–16. They further argue that
Plaintiff has not alleged a Monell claim against LSSI and that LSSI caseworkers are protected
from suit under the doctrines of absolute immunity and/or qualified immunity. Id. at 16–21.

The Court turns first to determining whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged claims
against the LSSI Defendants under § 1983.12 The legal standard for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is discussed above. See supra Section III(a). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The LSSI Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not

12 The LSSI Defendants first argue that the Court should dismiss this action under the Younger abstention doctrine
because continuing to hear this case would interfere with ongoing child custody and child welfare proceedings.
Mem. Supp. LSSI Mot. Dismiss 8–10. Because, as discussed below, see infra Section IV(b)(ii), it is not
immediately apparent what claims Plaintiff seeks to bring, it is also not entirely clear to the Court that resolution of
Plaintiff’s claims would interfere with ongoing state proceedings. Because the Court dismisses the claims against
the LSSI Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6), see id., it need not address whether Younger abstention would be
appropriate.
satisfactorily allege either of these elements as to the LSSI Defendants. Mem. Supp. LSSI Mot.
Dismiss 12–16.
a. Color of State Law
“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526

U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, to bring a § 1983 claim against a defendant,
that defendant must “fairly be said to be a state actor.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In the
complaint, Plaintiff states that LSSI “is employed as a Government Entity for the People in With
[sic] the State of Illinois” and that it is an “official[] agency.” Compl. 10. While the LSSI
Defendants assert that LSSI is a private, not-for-profit child welfare agency, Mem. Supp. LSSI
Mot. Dismiss 1, the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true at this stage, see
Phillips, 714 F.3d at 1019. The Court will therefore proceed at this stage by assuming that the
LSSI Defendants are state actors.
b. Violation of Federal Law

Plaintiff must still allege that the LSSI Defendants committed violations of constitutional
provisions or other federal laws. As discussed above, see supra Section III(b)(ii)(1), it is not
easy to discern from the complaint the claims Plaintiff seeks to bring against various Defendants,
but violations of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure are likely candidates. See Mem. Supp. LSSI
Mot. Dismiss 12 (“Plaintiff does not identify any specific constitutional right she was deprived
of by the LSSI Defendants. Instead, her Complaint is riddled with vague and general criticisms
of the caseworker services that the LSSI Defendants provided to her . . . .”). But again,
Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague to provide the LSSI Defendants with fair notice of the ways
in which they allegedly violated her constitutional rights. See Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083. In
essence, her allegations against the LSSI Defendants come down to the caseworkers’ supposed
failure to give her good advice, failure to live up to their promises to help her with her children,
failure to assist her with the abuse she received from Walker and Davis, and general dereliction
of their duties. See Compl. 3–5, 10, 18–22. She does not allege that the LSSI Defendants took

direct part in seizing her children. She does allege that Rodriguez lied to the court that she was
involved in DCFS proceedings, but this was apparently in a civil case Plaintiff herself had
brought against Walker, so it is unclear how that lie related to child welfare proceedings brought
against Plaintiff, if at all. See id. at 18. Nor does she bring suit on behalf of her children. See
supra Section III(b)(ii)(1)(B). As such, the Court cannot infer from her complaint that the LSSI
Defendants violated any of her constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state § 1983
claims against the LSSI Defendants, and the Court grants the LSSI Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Chariot Campbell’s motion for default summary

judgment (“First Motion for Default Summary Judgment”), ECF No. 11, is DENIED; Plaintiff’s
addendum to the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment, construed as a motion to
supplement the First Motion for Default Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED;
Plaintiff’s subsequent motion for default summary judgment, ECF No. 13, is DENIED;
Defendants Officer Lewis, Officer Olinger, and Officer Swanson’s motion to dismiss for
improper service, ECF No. 15, is DENIED; Defendants Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services, Lisa Zimmerman, and Misty Lampley’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 19, is
GRANTED; and Defendants Shannon Blind, Elena Rodriguez, Jordan Timmons, Kim Dutton,
and Lutheran Social Services of Illinois’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 27, is GRANTED.
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 30 days of service of this Order. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to file an amended complaint] when justice
so requires.). If she fails to do so, Defendants Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services, Lisa Zimmerman, Misty Lampley, Shannon Blind, Elena Rodriguez, Jordan Timmons,
Kim Dutton, and Lutheran Social Services of Illinois will be dismissed from the case.

The Clerk is directed to replace “Galesburg Police Department” as a party with “City of
Galesburg.” The Clerk is further directed to add Defendant Officer Sage to the docket. The
deadline for Plaintiff to serve Defendants Officer Lewis, Officer Olinger, and Officer Swanson is
extended to May 30, 2023. From the information before the Court, it does not appear that
Defendants City of Galesburg, Officer Sweeney, Officer Sage, Officer Williams, the Children’s
Home Association of Illinois, and Jessica Votava have been properly served. The deadline to
serve these Defendants is also extended to May 30, 2023. If they have not been served by this
deadline, they may be dismissed from the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
Entered this 31st day of March, 2023.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137116. Public record. Not legal advice.