# Patterson v. McLean County Sheriff's Department

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · March 20, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137045

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 20, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137045

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding there is no entitlement to (and thus no due-process property right in) the enforcement of the law because law enforcement agencies possess discretion as to when and how to undertake enforcement activities
- finding plaintiffs established they were beneficiaries of federal funding by stating they were local residents seeking to use the parks operated by defendant grantees

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

WAYNE PATTERSON II, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:20-cv-01073
)
McLEAN COUNTY SHERIFF JON )
SANDAGE, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by the remaining plaintiff, Wayne Patterson II (doc. 63), and the remaining
defendant, the office of the McLean County Sheriff (doc. 61). Both motions are fully
briefed and ready for disposition. For the following reasons, the Court grants
summary judgment for Defendant on the sole remaining count, denies Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, and orders this case be terminated.
BACKGROUND
In 2020, Plaintiff (and his father, later dismissed from the case) brought suit
against various individuals and entities associated with the McLean County Sheriff,
alleging that on several occasions he—a black man—was arrested by law enforcement
in the Bloomington-Normal area, while similarly situated white women were allowed
to go free. (Doc. 1). At this stage in the proceedings, a single claim against a single
defendant remains: that when sheriff’s deputies, motivated by a discriminatory policy
and practice, detained Plaintiff and conspired with the Bloomington Police
Department to have him arrested on gun charges—while two white women living
with him in the home where the gun was located were neither detained nor arrested—
the McLean County Sheriff violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which

prohibits racial discrimination by recipients of federal funding. Plaintiff asserts he is
entitled to damages (to compensate him for harm to his dignity and reputation) and
injunctive relief. Unless otherwise indicated, the narrative recounted below is drawn
from undisputed facts appearing in the parties’ briefing.1
On February 14, 2019, McLean County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a call
for service at the home shared by Plaintiff; his then-girlfriend, Autuam Scheel; and
another woman, Nicole Allen. The home was owned by Scheel’s stepfather, Robert

Nichols.2 Deputies arrested both Plaintiff and Scheel and questioned them and Allen
about their altercation. The next day, both Plaintiff and Scheel were released without
having been charged in connection with the February 14 incident.

1 Although Plaintiff originally filed claims related to arrests in both 2016 and 2019, the claims
pertaining to the 2016 incident have been dismissed, and Plaintiff’s inclusion in his Motion
of allegations and evidence related to the 2016 arrest can serve only to assist his claim that
Defendant has engaged in a pattern of discriminatory conduct. Likewise, his reference to a
2020 traffic stop is relevant only to the issue of damages, in that Plaintiff claims the inclusion
in the police report from that stop of a reference to Plaintiff’s association with drugs and
weapons is proof that he now has a negative reputation thanks to his 2019 arrest. (Doc. 65
at 12). As will become clear in the remainder of this Opinion, it is not necessary for the Court
to reach either point, and so for simplicity’s sake, narration of the 2016 and 2020 incidents
has been omitted.
2 Both parties alternately refer to Scheel as “Autuam Scheel” and “Autumn Scheel.” On the
McLean County Circuit Clerk’s website, identical court records are available under the
names “Autuam Scheel,” “Autom Scheel,” and “Autumn Scheel.” It is unclear which is
Scheel’s legal first name. The Court refers to her as “Autuam Scheel” (the name on the
subpoena issued to her on Sept. 7, 2022) and thereafter “Scheel.” Likewise, Scheel’s
stepfather is referred to in some places in the briefing and the record as “Robert Nichols” and
in others as “Robert Nicholas.” As it does not have an independent basis for determining
which is the correct spelling, the Court will refer to him as “Nichols.”
On February 15, while Scheel was still in custody, her stepfather arrived at
the building shared by the McLean County Sheriff and the Bloomington Police
Department (BPD) to report that he had gone into the trailer in which Plaintiff,

Scheel, and Allen lived and had found a gun and ammunition under the bed his
stepdaughter shared with Plaintiff. Detective Aaron King, an employee of the
McLean County Sheriff, spoke to Nichols and then questioned Scheel about the
firearm. Scheel told King that Plaintiff had shown her the gun and ammunition about
two months before, in December of 2018. King asked her if she wanted the weapon in
her home; she replied that she did not. Scheel then gave consent for deputies to search
the trailer. Deputy Brandon Jones did so, finding the gun and ammunition and

bringing them into headquarters.
Meanwhile, as Plaintiff was leaving the building, having been released after
his night in the jail due to the February 14 altercation, King approached him. Plaintiff
contends King forced him to accompany him to an interview room, where he was
interrogated behind a locked door for several hours; King, on the other hand, wrote
in his incident report and repeated in his sworn declaration that he asked Plaintiff if

he would be willing to answer some questions and that Plaintiff agreed to go with
him.
At first, Plaintiff denied possessing any weapon besides a BB gun, but upon
being told the gun had been located, he admitted he was holding it for a friend, Ricky
Devoe. He then asked King if he was being detained; King stated, “at this time he
was detained for possession of a firearm without a FOID.” (Doc. 61 at 9). King asked
Plaintiff for permission to search the home, but Plaintiff refused.
Once Jones had returned to the law enforcement building with the firearm and

ammunition, deputies ran a check and determined both had been stolen in the same
Bloomington burglary. Because the BPD was the agency investigating that crime,
deputies contacted the BPD’s Detective Steve Moreland and apprised him of the
situation. Moreland interviewed Plaintiff, obtained similar answers to King’s, then
placed him under arrest and had him transferred to the county jail. Next, Moreland
spoke to Scheel, who told him she believed Devoe had taken the gun back and that it
was no longer in the trailer. She also admitted she had once held the gun.

Allen also gave a statement about the firearm that day. She told King she
found out about the gun about two weeks prior, when Scheel told her it was in the
home but did not show it to her or tell her where it was located. Allen was not
detained; she answered questions and then left the building voluntarily.
At some point on February 15, Scheel was released from custody with no
charges having been filed with respect to either the domestic battery or the firearm.

Neither Scheel nor Allen was ever charged in connection with the weapon. Plaintiff
was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card, a Class
A Misdemeanor under Illinois law. 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1). He subsequently pled guilty
to this charge.
One point relating to these facts is worth special emphasis given the history of
this action. In the Complaint and throughout the dismissal stage, Plaintiff alleged
that the McLean County Sheriff was the law enforcement agency that arrested him,
and his claims regarding the February 15, 2019, incident focused on the arrest itself
(and the fact that neither Scheel nor Allen was arrested). (Doc. 1 at 7). During his

deposition, Plaintiff admitted that the Bloomington Police Department was the actual
arresting agency. Plaintiff attempted, too late, to amend his complaint after the close
of discovery to add the BPD and the arresting officer, Moreland, to the suit; this Court
denied his motion. (Doc. 72). As a result, Plaintiff describes in his current Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. 63) a theory that has been materially altered by
comparison to his Title VI claim in the Complaint: He alleges that employees of the
McLean County Sheriff conspired with the BPD to effectuate his arrest in furtherance

of a policy of the Sheriff (and the BPD) to treat black suspects less favorably than
white ones. (Docs. 63 at 3, 63-1 at 1, 77 at 7). However, at other points in his filings,
he focuses not on the formal arrest itself, but on his and Scheel’s treatment by King
before Moreland arrived. (Doc. 68 at 4, 15–16). In his version of events (which
Defendant in part disputes), King forced him to go with him to answer questions
about the gun, informed him he was being detained, and locked him in an

interrogation room, whereas Scheel was not detained for questioning. These
allegations do not depend on showing that the two law enforcement agencies
conspired together to arrest Plaintiff, or that Defendant “directly caused” the BPD to
arrest Plaintiff. (Doc. 63 at 4).
In the interest of liberality toward a party proceeding without representation,
the Court will consider both theories, even though they are plainly novel
accommodations to Plaintiff’s inability to sue the true arresting agency; however,
Plaintiff must still meet the summary-judgment standard in order to prevail at this
stage or proceed to trial.

LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.’ ” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The nonmovant bears the

burden of demonstrating that such genuine issue of material fact exists.” Aregood v.
Givaudan Flavors Corp., 904 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 2018). “The parties must support
their assertions that a fact is disputed or cannot be genuinely disputed by citing to
admissible evidence in the record.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir.
2018). However, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment…. [I]t is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are
critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” Id. at 248.
The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the
Court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the nonmovant’s
favor. BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Continental Carbon Co., 900 F.3d 529, 536 (7th

Cir. 2018). When presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court
must consider the motions separately, which necessarily means the nonmovant
differs depending on the motion being considered. Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC,
899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154
F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998)). This, however, does not alter the standard for
reviewing a motion for summary judgment or the parties’ respective burdens.
Plaintiff here is proceeding pro se, while Defendant is represented. While

“there are no exemptions from the requirements of Rule 56 under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,” Thomas v. Meister Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.¸ No. 03-1038,
2006 WL 898144, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2006), “[a]llegations in pro se pleadings are
to be construed liberally, applying substantially less stringent standards than those
applied to pleadings drafted by professional counsel.” Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594,
598 (7th Cir. 1992).

DISCUSSION
I. Disputed Facts
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. According to the logic of Rule
56, this should mean both agree on a set of undisputed facts and disagree only on
which side should prevail on the law. In reality, the parties disagree to a significant
extent about what happened in February 2019. However, almost all of these
differences are immaterial (e.g., whether or not Allen pushed Plaintiff during the
domestic altercation for which he was arrested on February 14 (doc. 68 at 8)—an
arrest that is not at issue here), constitute conclusions of law (e.g., “ ‘Patterson,
compared with others similarly situated, was [not] selectively treated,’ Plaintiff

disputes” (doc. 68 at 3); or are not supported by citations to the record as required by
Rule 56 and Local Rule 7.1(D), for example, Plaintiff’s contention that King
“detained” him upon finding him in the lobby of the sheriff’s building, followed by a
citation to an incident report that says no such thing (docs. 68 at 4, 61-2 at 13).
The briefing of the parties’ motions reveals only one fact that may be in dispute
and material to the resolution of the case: whether or not Scheel was in custody while
being questioned about the firearm on February 15. Plaintiff’s Motion states it is

undisputed that Scheel was not detained, arrested, or charged in connection with the
gun (doc. 68 at 2) and, furthermore, that McLean County Sheriff’s personnel never
locked her in a room in connection with suspected firearm violations (doc. 68 at 3, 4,
11). Defendant, meanwhile, identifies this as a disputed material fact and contends
that Scheel was still in custody pursuant to her battery arrest from the night before
and continued to be in custody while she was interviewed about the gun. (Doc. 61 at

6–7).3

3 The parties also disagree about when Plaintiff was detained in connection with the
investigation of the firearm in the trailer; Defendant lists as an undisputed fact that King
asked Plaintiff to answer some questions and that he did so voluntarily, after having been
released without charges on the domestic violence incident (doc. 61 at 8), while Plaintiff
claims it is equally undisputed he was forced into a locked room for questioning about the
weapon (doc. 67 at 4). But regardless of whether Plaintiff voluntarily followed King to the
interview room, the parties agree (based on King’s report) that once he was there, he asked
King if he was being detained, and King replied that he was. (Doc. 61 at 9). At that point, a
reasonable person would conclude he was not free to leave (whether or not the door was
This point matters because as part of his intentional discrimination claim
under Title VI, Plaintiff must demonstrate that non-black comparators were
similarly situated to him yet were treated differently by Defendant. Unless he can

prove a conspiracy between Defendant and the BPD (as discussed below), he cannot
rely on the fact that he was ultimately arrested and charged while his roommates
were not, because Defendant did not take those actions; the BPD did. He can only
argue their treatment was different (and that difference was motivated by deliberate
racial bias) before the BPD took over the investigation. If Scheel, like Plaintiff, was
detained in a locked room while being questioned about the gun, then she and
Plaintiff were not treated differently by Defendant (the sheriff’s office), and the only

difference in the ultimate disposition of their respective cases was the decision of the
BPD (not a defendant here) to arrest and book Plaintiff and not Scheel.4 Plaintiff
would then be able to use only Allen as a comparator, since the parties agree Allen
was never detained.
The summary-judgment standard requires a party to cite a particular portion
of the attached record in support of an allegation that a fact either is or is not

genuinely in dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, the party may “show[]
that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,

actually locked at the time). Furthermore, the parties agree that Allen was not detained
during questioning and was at all times free to leave. Thus, the only fact genuinely in dispute
is Scheel’s freedom of movement during questioning.
4 The record does not indicate who made the decision not to arrest and charge Scheel, whether
sheriff’s deputies consulted with Moreland or other BPD officers about that decision, or at
what point in the day she was allowed to leave. However, it is undisputed that she was
released from custody on February 15, 2019, and was never charged with possessing a
firearm without a FOID card.
or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). In support of its statement that Scheel continued to be in
custody during questioning, Defendant cites King’s declaration (Doc. 61-2 at 2); this

is consistent with his probable cause statement and supplemental incident report on
the subject (Doc. 61-2 at 13, 17). These documents state that correctional officers
brought Scheel to the interview room where King spoke with her; while the record
does not clearly state that she continued to be detained after King concluded his
questioning, it would be reasonable to assume she was not given the option of leaving
the building while deputies waited for Moreland to arrive, and Plaintiff does not
contest this particular point.

In fact, Plaintiff cites no materials that offer any support to his assertion that
Scheel was not in custody during the February 15 interrogation; his only attempt to
do so is a reference to an admission in which Defendant concedes Scheel was never
arrested on weapons charges—not that she was never detained that day. (Doc. 68 at
2). Inasmuch as Plaintiff threads the needle at times by stating Scheel was not
detained “for FOID violations” (doc. 68 at 3), the distinction is semantic and

meaningless, since she could not have been detained again (other than by being
arrested on new charges) when she was already in custody. The reason (whether the
previous night’s arrest, or suspicions about her involvement with the gun Nichols
found) is immaterial; if Scheel was in custody during questioning as Defendant avers,
then she and Plaintiff were subject to identical conditions: confined in a room and not
free to leave.
In its Reply, Defendant identifies Scheel’s status as a disputed, material fact
(doc. 76 at 4)—even though by filing a motion for summary judgment, it had posited
that no such facts existed. However, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion

of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e). Since Plaintiff has introduced no evidence from the record that Scheel
was not in custody, nor explained how the materials Defendant cites fail to establish
this fact, the Court deems it undisputed that Scheel was not free to leave while being
questioned about her knowledge of the firearm.
Because there are no material facts in genuine dispute, no question of fact

remains for the jury, and the Court now turns to the question of which party must
prevail as a matter of law. The answer depends on whether Plaintiff has made out a
case that Defendant violated Title VI.
II. The Prima Facie Case Under Title VI
A. Recipient of Federal Funding
Title VI applies only to recipients of federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). As
long as some program or activity conducted by the defendant entity receives such

funds, the entity must comply with Title VI in “all of [its] operations.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-3(A)(ii). Some courts still repeat (as does Defendant) the mantra that the
plaintiff “must be the intended beneficiary of the federal spending program” that
brought the defendant within the scope of Title VI. See, e.g., Brown-Dickerson v. City
of Philadelphia, WL1623438, *8 (E.D. Pa. 2016). However, in noting that statutory
changes enacted in 19875 abrogated Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d
1226 (7th Cir. 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made explicit that
the new law expanded not only the scope of Title VI liability for defendants, but also

the class of potential plaintiffs with standing. T.S. by & through T.M.S. v. Heart of
CarDon, LLC, 43 F.4th 737, 746 (7th Cir. 2022) (“After the CRRA was passed, a
plaintiff who had not been able to sue . . . because he was not an intended beneficiary
of the specific program or activity receiving federal financial assistance now could
sue.”)
The change does not render the plain language of Title VI meaningless; the
law still protects only those who are participants in, applicants to, or beneficiaries of

the overall entity that operates a program receiving federal funds. But it does relieve
the plaintiff of the burden of establishing a strict nexus connecting the precise
purpose of the federal assistance, the alleged discrimination, and the plaintiff
himself. During the episode he complains of, Plaintiff was an arrestee who ultimately
pled guilty to criminal conduct, yet he remained a resident of McLean County and
member of the public able to avail himself of (and potentially benefit from) the

protection of its law enforcement functions. This likely suffices in the post-1987 Title
VI landscape. See, e.g., Epileptic Foundation v. City and Cty. of Maui, 300 F. Supp.
2d 1003, 1012–13 (D. Hawai’i 2003) (finding plaintiffs established they were
beneficiaries of federal funding by stating they were local residents seeking to use the
parks operated by defendant grantees).

5 Pub. L. No. 100-259.
Here, Plaintiff makes the bare assertion that “[a]s a resident of McLean
County, Plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of any funds the McLean County Sheriff’s
Department receives.” (Doc. 77 at 8). He attaches to his Reply an intergovernmental

agreement among the Town of Normal, the City of Bloomington, and McLean County
to reallocate funds received from the federal government through the Byrne Justice
Assistance Grant Program, finding “that the undertaking will benefit the public.”
(Doc. 77 at 14).
Defendant does not dispute the fact that it receives federal funds but argues
Plaintiff does not sufficiently identify the source and purpose of those monies, explain
why he is an intended beneficiary, or establish a “logical nexus” as required by Section

604 of Title VI. (Doc. 67 at 12–13). But Section 604 only applies to claims of
employment discrimination, and Defendant holds Plaintiff to a more demanding
standard than currently exists in this circuit. Particularly given that Plaintiff is
unrepresented, the Court finds he has adequately alleged the first prong of a prima
facie case under Title VI: that Defendant is a recipient of federal assistance.
B. Intentional Discrimination
The applicable portion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states as

follows: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). While this provision is typically enforced through the withdrawal
of federal funding from a recipient that has persisted in violating its terms, it may
also give rise to a private right of action brought by an individual who has suffered
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 686 (1979). When an individual brings suit against a funding recipient, he or she
is limited to suing under the statute itself, not the anti-discrimination regulations

promulgated under Title VI’s authority to govern federal grantees’ conduct, and for
that reason, the Title VI plaintiff may recover only for acts of intentional
discrimination, not policies or practices that have a racially disparate impact but no
requisite intent. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
The defendant who has intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff has
“acted with a discriminatory purpose and discriminated against him because of his
membership in an identifiable group.” Dunnet Bay Const. Co. v. Borggren, 799 F. 3d

676, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). The bar a plaintiff must clear to survive summary judgment
in these cases has been described thus:
To establish a genuine issue of material fact that the defendants
intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff’s son on the basis of his
race, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the decision to exclude [her son]
from a federally financed program was motivated by race and that his
race was a determining factor in the exclusion. . . . It follows that where
the decisionmaker is motivated by a factor other than the excluded
party’s race, there can be no intentional discrimination.
Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, Tenn., 99 F. 3d 1352 (6th Cir. 1996).
There are two ways in which a plaintiff suing under Title VI may prove the
defendant intended to discriminate: direct and indirect.
1. Direct Method of Proof
A defendant may overtly manifest a discriminatory motivation through direct
evidence of such intent: words and other expressions readily understood to describe
animus toward the protected group and an intent to treat members of it unfavorably.
Sirpal v. University of Miami, 509 Fed. Appx. 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2013). A “facially
discriminatory policy” (i.e., a policy that explicitly treats a protected group
differently) may also serve as direct evidence of discrimination. Cmtys. for Equity v.

Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F. 3d 676, 694 (6th Cir. 2006). Defendant finds
in the record no evidence that the McLean County Sheriff or any of his agents made
racially derogatory remarks, commented on Plaintiff’s race (or, for that matter,
Scheel’s or Allen’s race), or maintained an express policy of treating black and white
suspects differently from one another. (Doc. 61 at 18). Plaintiff does not contest this.
2. Indirect Method of Proof
If no direct evidence of the decisionmaker’s motive is available, the plaintiff

may use an indirect method of proof. This framework, originally established in the
context of employment law, also applies to Title VI discrimination suits. Brewer v.
Bd. of Trustees of University of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2007); see McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). First, the plaintiff must make out
a prima facie case: 1) that he is a member of a protected class, 2) that the defendant
took an adverse action against him, and 3) “that similarly-situated non-class
members were treated more favorably than he.” Id. at 915. Once these elements are

established, the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to put forth a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If the defendant does so, then
the plaintiff must show that this reason is merely pretextual—in other words, that
the defendant’s true motive for taking the action was discriminatory. Id.
Plaintiff’s attempt to prove intentional discrimination indirectly must proceed
differently for each of his theories: first, that Defendant conspired with the BPD to
arrest him or directed the BPD to make the arrest (and thus that the arrest itself can
be imputed to Defendant); and second, that even if Defendant was not responsible for
his arrest and Scheel’s release, their treatment of the three roommates before the

BPD arrived on the scene was disparate and discriminatory. The conspiracy
allegation is considered first.
According to this theory, Defendant and the BPD have the same discriminatory
policy of arresting black persons and allowing white persons who have committed the
same offense to go free. (Doc. 63-1 at 1–2). At various points, Plaintiff alleges that
King knew Moreland would wrongfully arrest him and failed to stop him from doing
it (doc. 77 at 8), that Defendant caused Plaintiff to be arrested by the BPD (doc. 63 at

4), and that sheriff’s deputies worked hand in hand with Moreland to arrest and
charge Plaintiff while releasing Scheel (doc. 68 at 15–16). It is unnecessary to
examine the other elements of indirect proof on the theory that Plaintiff’s arrest can
be imputed to Defendant, because Plaintiff simply offers no evidence to back up his
story: no evidence that the two agencies share a racially discriminatory policy, no
evidence that King told Moreland to arrest Plaintiff, and no evidence that any

sheriff’s deputy discussed with any BPD officer a plan to charge Plaintiff and not his
roommates. While Defendant cannot prove a negative, it offers proof that Moreland
did not review King’s interviews before talking to the suspects (doc. 61 at 11), along
with a reasonable explanation for the coordination that did take place between the
two agencies: once Jones checked the gun and ammunition found in Plaintiff’s home
using the LEADS database, he discovered they had been stolen in a burglary the BPD
was actively investigating. Plaintiff does not dispute this was the case. Thus, the
Court proceeds on the assumption that there was no conspiracy and no shared policy.
To prevail, Plaintiff must show the adverse actions he suffered at the hands of

Defendant (not his arrest by the BPD) were motivated by an intent to discriminate.
Plaintiff has established he is a member of a protected class based on his race;
he is black, and Defendant admits at all times its personnel knew him to be black and
Scheel and Allen to be white. He has also shown he suffered an adverse action:
Defendant detained him for questioning. The final step is more complicated. It first
hinges on the question of whether Scheel and Allen were “similarly situated” to
Plaintiff, yet treated differently.6

As discussed supra, Defendant’s conduct towards Plaintiff and Scheel in the
matter of the stolen gun was virtually identical. Both were detained for questioning,
with the only distinction being that Plaintiff had already been released before King
questioned him about the firearm, while Scheel had not yet been released after her
February 14 arrest and was still in custody. Neither was free to leave while King
conducted his interviews concerning the weapon found in their home. Nor does

Plaintiff assert his treatment while in detention was worse than Scheel’s; while he
states in his declaration that he was sleep-deprived and thirsty during the interview,
he offers no evidence Scheel was not in a similar state of distress. Thus, Scheel fails

6 Although his focus is typically his roommates, Scheel and Allen, Plaintiff also states at times that
Ricky Devoe, Joel Long, and Robert Nichols were similarly situated to himself with respect to the gun
at issue. (Doc. 63-1 at 2–4). Defendant offers ample argument as to why they were not, and Plaintiff
fails to rebut it. The record reflects that the BPD, not Defendant, investigated and interviewed Devoe
and Long. And Nichols’ contact with and knowledge of the firearm was limited to finding it under the
bed, placing it on top of the bed, and immediately contacting law enforcement. Only Scheel’s and
Allen’s situations are similar enough to Plaintiff’s to warrant further discussion.
as a comparator to Plaintiff—not because she was not similarly situated, but because
she was subjected to the same adverse actions of Defendant.
This leaves Allen, who was not detained while King questioned her about the

gun. Plaintiff states (and Defendant does not dispute) that like himself, Allen lived
in the trailer home during the time the gun was also located there, knew at some
point that the firearm was in the home, and did not hold a valid FOID card. (Doc. 63-
1 at 4–5).
Defendant, asserting a nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate treatment,
counters that there were relevant differences between the two women’s relationship
to the firearm and Plaintiff’s. (Doc. 68 at 14). Only Plaintiff affirmatively agreed to

possess the gun and bring it into the home. While Scheel and Allen eventually learned
of the gun’s presence, it was not their decision to keep it on the property, nor is there
evidence before the Court that Plaintiff asked their permission to store it there. The
February 15 interviews determined neither had actual knowledge that the gun was
still in the home at all; in fact, Scheel indicated she believed Patterson and Devoe had
sold it to a third party. Allen, the remaining comparator, learned of the gun

secondhand, and there is no evidence she ever saw it or handled it. Plaintiff, by
contrast, eventually admitted to King that he knew the firearm was still under the
bed in the trailer.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues against the significance of the factual
differences between himself and Allen, citing cases in which convictions for
possession of a firearm were upheld even where a housemate or guest shared control
over the contraband with the primary occupant. (Doc. 63-1 at 4–6). He
misunderstands what he must do in order to prove Defendant’s rationale was a mere
pretext. His task is not to demonstrate that Allen hypothetically could have been

convicted of a crime, but instead to show that a law enforcement agency’s decision not
to detain them in connection to that offense violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. To defeat
Defendant’s Motion, he must show that a reasonable jury could find Defendant’s
rationale so absurd that it must have been an after-the-fact rationalization of
Defendant’s true motivation: racial animus.
Plaintiff fails to achieve this logical leap. It is axiomatic that law enforcement
officers do not arrest everyone whose conduct offers probable cause they might have

committed a crime. They may conserve resources, prioritizing more serious offenses
and the arrest of individuals who seem, based on their investigation and factors such
as those Defendant describes, to bear a greater degree of responsibility or pose a
higher degree of risk to the community than others. Recognizing this, courts have
held time and again that there is no private right against the government to have the
law enforced. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding

there is no entitlement to (and thus no due-process property right in) the enforcement
of the law because law enforcement agencies possess discretion as to when and how
to undertake enforcement activities). A corollary of this principle must surely be that
the criminal offender possesses no right to have all others who may have violated the
same law detained, questioned, arrested, or charged in exactly the same manner as
himself.
Plaintiff’s right under Title VI is only to be free from intentional racial
discrimination. And while “[a] selective enforcement claim does not require proof that
the plaintiff was arrested without probable cause,” the plaintiff still must

demonstrate “that the officer exercised his or her discretion to enforce the laws on
account of the plaintiff’s race, nationality, or other characteristics.” Here, Plaintiff
falls far short of proving that Defendant’s actions—detaining him for questioning,
referring the investigation to the BPD, and allowing Allen to leave after giving her
statement—were motivated by such intent, even if it is possible Allen’s conduct also
violated state law.
The Court recognizes the wide discretion afforded law enforcement offers an

opportunity for racially selective enforcement, which can be notoriously difficult to
prove and remedy. See generally Guy Rubinstein, Selective Prosecution, Selective
Enforcement, and Remedial Vagueness, 2022 Wis. L. Rev. 825, 829–33 (2022). Here,
though, with no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, a defendant that was not
the arresting agency, and significant distinctions between Plaintiff and the relevant
white roommate with respect to their involvement in illegal activity, the connection

is simply too attenuated to permit a reasonable jury to return a finding of selective
enforcement or discriminatory treatment on the basis of race.
The parties also address the question of whether a “decisionmaker” with “final
policymaking authority” within the office of the McLean County Sheriff knew about
or approved an intentionally discriminatory policy or pattern of conduct. (Docs. 67 at
14, 77 at 6). Because the Court finds no intentional discrimination in the incident
that is the subject of the claim, either by the office itself or any of its employees, it
does not reach this issue.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 63)
is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 61) is GRANTED.
All issues having been disposed of, the case is TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

Entered this 17th day of March 2023.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137045. Public record. Not legal advice.