# Meneses v. Stuck

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · March 10, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137033

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 10, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JUAN MENESES, )
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 20-2233
)
GREGORY STUCK, et. al., )
Defendants. )

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

JAMES E. SHADID, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court for consideration of Defendants’ Gregory Stuck,
Charles Campbell, John Burger, and Nicklas Moody’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[39]. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. [39].
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Moody, Campbell, Stuck, and Burger violated his
constitutional rights at Danville Correctional Center. Plaintiff claims the Defendants
retaliated against him in June of 2018 for his refusal to provide information during an
investigation by placing him in segregation under investigative status, terminating his
employment, and transferring him to another institution.
The briefing provided in this case is concerning. The Defendants’ initial
attorney, an Assistant Illinois Attorney, filed the pending Motion for Summary
Judgment. In this document, the Defendants claimed Plaintiff and the seven other
inmates who worked in the Graphic Design Department were all moved to
investigative segregation during the relevant investigation, and all were transferred to
other facilities. (Def. Mot., [39], Ex. C, D, E, F). The affidavits from the Defendants each
pointed to sections of the Illinois Administrative Code or an Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC) Directive as the basis for moving the inmates to segregation and the
transfers. (Def. Mot., [39], Ex. C, D, E, F).
The pro se Plaintiff filed a response noting Defendants’ affidavits were incorrect.
Only three of the eight workers were placed in segregation and transferred. (Plain.
Resp., [46]).
A new Assistant Attorney General was assigned to this case and filed a Motion to

Withdraw the previously filed dispositive motion with leave to file a second motion for
summary judgment. [48]. The Defendants noted they had discovered factual
inaccuracies in the previous filing and sought leave to file a revised motion.
The Court also finds it would be a waste of judicial resources
to proceed with inaccurate information, and ultimately, it could
result in further delays. However, the Court does not believe an
additional dispositive motion is required. Defendants' filed their
motion within the time period allowed for their reply. Therefore,
the Court will deny the motion [48], but allow Defendants additional
time to file a reply explaining the inaccuracy and correcting the record.
The Court will also allow Defendants to make any revised argument
based on the correction. The reply must be filed on or before July 25,
2022. In addition, due to the new information, the Court will allow
Plaintiff to file a sur-reply on or before August 8, 2022. See July 8,
2022 Text Order.

The Defendants’ reply therefore included new affidavits. Defendants Moody,
Campbell, Stuck, and Burger each stated three separate paragraphs in their initial
affidavits “were not provided by me or based on my personal knowledge.” (Def. Reply,
[51], Moody Aff., p. 1; Camp. Aff., p. 1; Burger Aff., p. 1; Stuck Aff., p. 1).
I signed my previously filed declaration…under the mistaken belief
that the information provided in … my declaration was
factually accurate and based on my previously assigned attorney’s
investigation into Plaintiff’s claims. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 2;
Camp. Aff., p. 1; Stuck Aff., p. 1).

The Defendants have now corrected and agreed with Plaintiff that only three
inmates, including Plaintiff, were placed in segregation, and ultimately transferred. The
Defendants have also provided the specific reasons for that decision.
It is troubling to see the inaccuracies in Defendants’ previous briefing and, at the
least, the lack of diligence and attention to detail. Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro
se, he correctly noted the inaccuracies, and he was given additional time to file a sur
reply. The Court also notes Plaintiff’s summary judgment briefing has been on point,
with appropriate argument, and citation to relevant caselaw. The Court will now
consider the briefing provided.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center and worked in the
Industries Department from 1999 to 2018. Defendant Campbell was a Correctional
Lieutenant in the Internal Affairs Division, Defendant Burger was a Major and Shift
Commander, and Defendant Stuck was a Correctional Officer. Defendant Moody was
employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) as an Internal Security

Investigator. Defendant Moody says he was based in the IDOC Investigative Unit in
Danville, Illinois. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 1).
In approximately May of 2018, Danville’s Internal Affairs Unit began an
investigation into a possible inappropriate relationship between Correctional Vocations
Instructor SDW and Inmate VG who both worked in Danville’s Industries Graphic
Design Department. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 1). The investigation was

subsequently transferred to the IDOC’s Investigative Unit and Assigned to Defendant
Moody. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 1). However, Danville’s Internal Affairs
Officer, Defendant Campbell, assisted Moody in that investigation. (Def. Reply, [51],
Moody Aff., p. 1; Camp. Aff. p. 1).
Defendant Moody and Campbell conducted various interviews including
interviewing all 8 inmate who worked in the Graphic Design Department. (Def. Mot.,

[39], Moody Aff. p. 1 ; Camp. Aff., p. 1). Defendant Moody says they also found
inappropriate pictures on Inmate VG’s computer in the Graphic Design Department.
(Def. Mot., [39], Moody Aff. p. 1; [39-1], p. 3, 19).
Defendants Moody and Campbell first interviewed Plaintiff on June 1, 2018. (Def.
Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 2). Plaintiff maintains only Defendant Moody conducted the

first interview. (Plain. SR, [53], p. 13). Plaintiff stated Instructor SDW was “friendly,
respectful, and professional.” (Def. Mot., [39], Inv. Rept, p. 5). Plaintiff told the
investigators he never saw or heard anything inappropriate between the instructor and
the inmate.
Plaintiff did acknowledge Inmate VG would go into Instructor SDW’s office

“sometimes to watch tutorials on how to compete a project and sometimes other
Graphic Design Inmate Workers would be in there also.” (Def. Mot., [39], UMF #5).
However, Plaintiff also said there were large windows you could see through, and he
never witnessed anything inappropriate when the two were in the office. (Def. Mot.,
[51], Inv. Rept, p. 5).

After the interview, Danville’s Internal Affairs Department received a
handwritten letter from an unidentified informant on June 4, 2018. (Def. Reply, [51],
Moody Aff., p. 2). The letter was addressed “To the Investigators” and noted they were
on “the right track” as everyone knew about the relationship between the vocational
teacher and inmate. (Def. Reply, [51], Ltr, p. 1). In particular, everyone working in
Danville Industry knew it, “especially Graphic Design Inmates.” (Def. Reply, [51], Ltr,

p. 1).
Defendant Moody states the alleged inappropriate conduct “occurred in the L-
shaped office in the Industries Graphic Design Department” and the unknown
informant claimed Plaintiff and Inmate KN were “the main lookouts.”1 (Def. Reply,
[51], Ltr, p. 2). The unknown inmate stated Plaintiff could see who was coming through

the window at the entrance to the department and used “a code word” to warn
everyone. (Def. Reply, [51], Ltr, p. 2). In addition, the letter claimed Graphic Design
Inmates “are all communicating with each other at gym yard, so they could tell the
same story if (they were) called for questioning.” (Def. Reply, [51], Ltr, p. 2). In
particular, the letter stated Plaintiff and Inmate KN had lied to investigators. (Def.

Reply, [51], Ltr, p.

1 The letter referred to Plaintiff as “Juanito,” which Plaintiff admits was his nickname. (Def. Reply, [51],
Ltr, p. 2); (Def. Mot., [39], Plain. Depo, p. 6).
Defendants Moody and Campbell then conducted a second interview with
Plaintiff on the same day they received the letter. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 2).

Plaintiff says Defendant Moody began the second interview with a “very aggressive
tone” and asked if Plaintiff had forgotten to tell them anything. (Def. Mot., [39], Plain.
Depo., p. 69). Plaintiff denied he was ever a lookout and continued to maintain he did
not see inappropriate conduct.
The investigator’s report noted Plaintiff said Inmate VG began going into
Instructor SDW’s office about a month prior. Plaintiff stated he gave Inmate VG several

warnings about the time he spent in the Vocational Teacher’s office. For instance,
Plaintiff says he warned Inmate VG “to back off because it didn’t look good,” “the
appearance didn’t look right,” and to give the instructor “some space because it didn’t
look right with (Inmate VG) going in there.” (Def. Mot., [39], UMF #6). Nonetheless,
Plaintiff said he had never personally witnessed anything inappropriate. (Def. Mot.,

[39], Inv. Rept, p. 5).
In his response to the dispositive motion, Plaintiff explains the admonitions he
gave to Inmate VG concerning the time spent in the Vocational Instructor’s office were
“a work-related issue having nothing to do with inappropriateness between” the two.
(Plain. Resp.,[46], Plain. Aff., p. 3). Plaintiff says Inmate VG was close to his out date

and he was the “go to guy” for the other inmates because he knew the most about
graphic design. (Def. Mot., [39], Plain. Depo, p. 106). “So, we understood that he wanted
to do the tutorials, but at the same time we needed for him to teach us.” (Def. Mot., [39],
Plain. Depo, p. 106). Therefore, Plaintiff says it did not look good for Inmate VG to keep
going in the instructor’s office when the other inmate workers needed his help. (Def.
Mot., [39], Plain. Depo, p. 106).

Plaintiff says Defendant Moody also asked Plaintiff during the second interview
how much money he made in the Graphic Design Department and if he received good
time credits. Plaintiff claims Defendant Moody then threatened Plaintiff he “would lose
all of that once they spoke with” Vocational Instructor SDW. (Plain. Resp.,[46], Plain.
Aff., p. 2-3). Plaintiff also alleges he was threatened with long term segregation if he
did not provide more information. (Plain. Resp.,[46], Plain. Aff., p. 2-3).

Defendant Campbell asked whether Inmate VG and Vocational Instructor SDW
planned to get together when Inmate VG was released from custody, but Plaintiff said
he did not know. Plaintiff maintains “based on their intimidation and threats it was
clear (Defendants Moody and Campbell) wanted me to follow their narrative and lie.”
(Plain. Resp.,[46], Plain. Aff., p. 3).

Defendant Moody believed Plaintiff gave differing accounts in his two
interviews “which raised concerns regarding his truthfulness.” (Def. Mot., [39], UMF
#7). Plaintiff was then transferred to segregation on investigative status.
Plaintiff claims the Defendant ignores the fact that Plaintiff agreed to a Voice
Stress Analysis Test after this interview which determined his answers were truthful.

(Plain. Resp.,[46], Plain. Aff., p. 3);(Def. Reply, [51], Inv. Rept., p. 6).
Defendants Moody and Campbell also conducted a second interview with
Inmate KN on June 4, 2018, since he was also accused of being a lookout. (Def. Reply,
[51], Moody Aff., p. 3). However, none of the inmates who worked in the Graphic
Design Department ever admitted knowing about an inappropriate relationship
between the vocational instructor and Inmate V.G. However, Defendant Moody says

the investigation “resulted in substantiated findings against (Correctional Vocations
Instructor SDW) that she had engaged in inappropriate conduct.” (Def. Mot., [39],
Moody Aff., p. 3).
Defendant Moody and Defendant Campbell say it was their decision to issue
Plaintiff an investigative report on June 4, 2018, move him to segregation, and request a
transfer. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 3). Defendant Stuck was instructed to draft

the investigative report which simply stated Plaintiff “was placed on Investigative
Status to determine his possible involvement in an incident at this facility.” (Def. Reply,
[51], Camp. Aff., p. 3); (Def. Mot., [39-2] Ex. 1-D)
Defendants Moody and Campbell say the decision was made in part due to the
statements Plaintiff made during the second interview which they did not believe were

completely truthful and the letter sent to the Internal Affairs Unit. (Def. Reply, [51],
Moody Aff., p. 3; Camp. Aff., p. 3). Their subsequent “decision to requests a transfer for
(Plaintiff) also took into consideration the safety and security of the facility, as well as
the safety and security for (Plaintiff) himself.” (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 3). The
request was approved by the Transfer Coordinator’s Office, and Plaintiff was

transferred on June 27, 2018. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 3; Camp. Aff., p. 3).
Of the eight inmates who worked in the Graphic Design Department, three were
placed in segregation under investigative status: Inmate VG, who was accused of the
inappropriate relationship, and Inmates KN and Plaintiff, who were accused of being
lookouts. (Plain. Resp., 11], Plain. Aff., p. 2); see also (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 4).
Plaintiff says the same three were the only ones transferred to other facilities. (Plain.

Resp.,[46], Plain. Aff., p. 4); see also (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 4).
It does not appear that Plaintiff was ever issued a disciplinary report or found
guilty of a disciplinary charge. Defendant Moody says Plaintiff initially lost good time
credits which were restored, but there is no explanation for when and how this
occurred. (Def. Mot., [39], Moody Aff., p. 2). Plaintiff says he lost his job when he was
placed in segregation. Defendants Moody and Campbell maintain they did not decide

inmate work assignments. (Def. Reply, [51], Moody Aff., p. 3; Camp. Aff., p. 3).
Defendant Burger says his only involvement in the investigation into a
relationship between Inmate VG and Vocational Instructor SDW was “signing off on
the placement of individuals working in the Industries Graphic Design Department on
investigative status.” (Def. Mot., [39], Burger Aff. p. 1; Moody Aff., p. 2). Defendant

Burger says it is his understanding that the shift supervisor is required to sign off on all
investigative reports submitted during their assigned shift, but he did not make the
decision to issue the report or move Plaintiff to segregation. (Def. Reply [51], Burger
Aff., p. 1).
Defendant Officer Stuck’s only involvement was filling out the investigative

report as directed. The Defendant says he did not participate in the decision to issue an
investigative report or move Plaintiff to segregation. (Def. Reply, [51], Stuck Aff., p 1).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a
material dispute through specific cites to admissible evidence, or by showing that the
nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to support the [material] fact.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). If the movant clears this hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest
on his or her allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to admissible evidence
in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Id.; Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649

F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011).
At the summary judgment stage, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant, with material factual disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material
fact exists when a reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant.

IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants Stuck, Campbell, Burger, and Moody argue Plaintiff cannot
demonstrate they retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights.
The burden of proof in a retaliation claim “is split between the parties.” Kidwell v.
Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff must first demonstrate a prime

face case of retaliation by establishing: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3) the First
Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the
deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014).
“Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to
rebut the claim.” Manuel, 966 F.3d at 680. Defendants must demonstrate they would

have taken the same action regardless of the protected activity. Id.; see also Greene v.
Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2011).
“If the defendants meet this burden, then the plaintiff must show that the
defendants’ proffered reason was pretextual—in other words, a lie—and that the real
reason was retaliatory animus.” Lindell v. Kind, 2021 WL 6137381, at *6 (E.D.Wis. Dec.
29, 2021); see also Manuel, 966 F.3d at 680; Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 964.

Defendants note the Seventh Circuit has not resolved whether a prisoner’s
refusal to participate in an investigation is a protected activity. See Clark v. Reed, 772 F.
Appx. 353, 355 (7th Cir. 2019) (inmate's right to refuse to cooperate with an
investigation has not been clearly established in the Seventh Circuit); Martin v. Neal,
2022 WL 581013, at *2 (N.D.Ind Feb 24., 2022)(same); Arbuckle v. Wilcox, 2021 WL

5321552, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Nov 16, 2021); Daniels v. Seymour, 2020 WL 5405799 (C.D. Ill.)
(same).
However, Plaintiff is not claiming he refused to participate in the investigation or
refused to be an informant. Plaintiff instead maintains he did cooperate, but he had no
other information to provide. Plaintiff states he was truthful during both interviews,

but the Defendants retaliated against him because he refused to lie in order to help their
investigation.
In an unpublished order, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that an inmate's refusal to cooperate with an internal
investigation regarding another inmate's assault on staff was not
protected speech. Caffey v. Maue, 679 Fed.Appx. 487 (7th Cir. 2017)
(not published in Fed.Rptr). … However, in another unpublished
order, the Seventh Circuit limited Caffey to an inmate's refusal to
divulge known information versus an inmate not having any
information to divulge. McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 2018 WL 1830942
(7th Cir. 2018). The McKinley Court reasoned that, “[t]ruthfully
answering questions during an investigation, even if those answers
are not what the officers want to hear, is consistent with a prison's
penological objectives,” and, therefore, protected speech. McKinley,
2018 WL 1830942 *2.

Clark v. Reed, 2018 WL 11307318, at *6 (C.D.Ill. May 7, 2018). Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Plaintiff has alleged his statements were
protected speech and he was placed in administrative segregation and transferred as a
result.2
Defendants argue even if Plaintiff’s statements were protected speech, the
Defendants still would have placed him in administrative segregation and asked for his
transfer. Defendants claim it is important to note Plaintiff denied any knowledge of
inappropriate conduct in his first interview, but no action was taken. Defendants
reason if their intent was to retaliate against Plaintiff for his refusal to provide
information against Inmate VG, they would have sent him to investigate segregation at
this point and recommended a transfer. Plaintiff admits Defendant Moody was very
polite during this interview, and Plaintiff was able to return to his cell and his job in the
Graphic Design Department.

2 Defendants also argued they are entitled to qualified immunity due to the ambiguity concerning any
constitutional right to refuse to act as a prison informant, but “[i]t is undisputed that ‘truthfully
answering questions during an investigation, even if those answers are not what the officers want to hear’
are protected by the First Amendment.” Austin v. Spiller, 2022 WL 4095733, at *3 (S.D.Ill. Sept 7, 2022),
citing McKinley, 731 F. App'x 511, 514. Therefore, the qualified immunity defense fails.
However, Defendants maintain two important things happened between the two
interviews. First, they received a letter from an unknown informant claiming Plaintiff

was one of two main lookouts for Inmate VG and he and other inmates were actively
working to undermine the investigation by coordinating the information they provided.
Plaintiff says the Defendants still have no idea who sent the letter or what
motivated the inmate. In addition, Plaintiff says the letter is inadmissible hearsay
which should not be considered. Plaintiff is correct, offering the statements in the letter
for the truth of the matters asserted is inadmissible hearsay See Fed. R. Evid. 801

(defining hearsay). However, statements offered for a purpose other than to prove the
truth of the matter are not hearsay. See United States v. Norwood, 798 F.2d 1094, 1097 (7th
Cir. 1986). For instance, statements can be admissible to the extent the are offered to
show the impact on the Defendants rather than whether the information was accurate.
See Torry v. City of Chicago, 932 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2019)(admitting statements within

police report for their impact on the officer); Shaw v. Litscher, 715 Fed.Appx. 521, 523
(7th 2017)(statement “was offered as evidence of the defendants’ reason for
investigating” the property in inmate’s cell.)
Second, Defendants Moody and Campbell say Plaintiff provided additional
information he had not provided in his first interview. The Defendants believed this

suggested Plaintiff was not truthful during the first interview, or he withheld
information during the first interview. Therefore, the Defendants decided to issue an
investigative report, move Plaintiff to a segregation cell, and request his transfer to
another institution. The Defendants claim the decision to ask for transfer was also
motivated by concerns for the safety and security of the facility and Plaintiff.
Defendants finally argue decisive action was necessary to stop Plaintiff from

undermining the investigation.
Plaintiff says he provided more information in the second interview because
there were two officers, and they asked more questions. Plaintiff also says he explained
the work-related context of his admonitions to Inmate VG, but the officers did not
include this in their report. Furthermore, Plaintiff says he did nothing to undermine the
investigation, nor was he written a disciplinary ticket based on this claim.

The Court also notes the information provided to the Defendants in the
anonymous letter stated all inmates who worked in the Graphic Design Department
were attempting to coordinate their stories and lie to investigators, not just the Plaintiff.
Finally, Defendants do not explain their concerns about safety and security
beyond a blanket statement.

Plaintiff claims he gave truthful answers during both interviews. Nonetheless,
officers accused him of being a lookout, and when he again denied any knowledge of
inappropriate behavior, he was threatened with losing his job, losing his pay, and a stay
in segregation. Plaintiff continued to deny any knowledge, because Plaintiff maintains
he did not have any additional knowledge to give, and he was subsequently moved to

segregation.
In a similar case in the Southern District of Illinois, an inmate plaintiff also
claimed he provided truthful answers during a prison investigation, but the
investigators threatened him if he did not provide additional information, and when he
did not, retaliated by moving him to investigative segregation. Austin v. Spiller, 2022 WL
4095733, at *3 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 7, 2022). The defendants disputed the inmate plaintiff’s

claims and provided a different version of events. In particular, the Defendants alleged
five different confidential informants identified the inmate as a gang leader, “and it was
this information that led to (plaintiff’s) discipline.” Id. “However, the Court will not
weigh the two vastly different versions of events alleged, as this is exactly the kind of
dispute over material facts that is best left for a jury.” Id.
In this case, it is reasonable to infer Defendants Moody and Campbell were

angered at Plaintiff’s statements and retaliated against him with segregation, followed
by a transfer. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to Defendants
Moody and Campbell. The motion is also denied as to Defendants Burger and Stark.3
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary judgment is DENIED pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 [39].

2) The Court will set this matter for a telephone status hearing to set pretrial and
trial dates. The parties should also be prepared to indicate whether they have
any interest in a settlement conference before the Magistrate Judge.

3 While mentioning the actions of Burger and Stark in the “facts,” Defendants did not argue the
Defendants were not sufficiently, personally involved in the alleged retaliation and therefore Plaintiff did
not respond to this argument and it cannot be considered by the Court. (Def. Mot., [39], p. 6-7); (Def.
Reply., [51], p. 7-10).
Enter this 10th day of March, 2023.

s/James E. Shadid
_______________________________
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10137033. Public record. Not legal advice.