# Hoedebecke v. The City of Springfield

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · September 1, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136892

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 1, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136892

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that Rule 56 “imposes an initial burden of production on the party moving for summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not necessary” (internal citation omitted)
- explaining that Rule 56 “imposes an initial burden of production on the party moving for summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not necessary” (internal citation omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

CORY HOEDEBECKE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-3057
)
THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, )
and RHET SPENGEL )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 43)
filed by Defendants the City of Springfield (“the City”) and
Springfield Police Officer Rhet Spengel (collectively, “Defendants”).
The City has shown that it is entitled to summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Monell claim, while Plaintiff has shown genuine issues of
fact as to all other claims. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown that the
facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, amount to
a constitutional violation which was clearly established in July
2019. Accordingly, Officer Spengel is not entitled to qualified
immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims, and
Defendants’ Motion (d/e 43) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.

I. BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following facts from the parties’
statements of material facts, taking into account each party’s

objections thereto. The Court discusses material factual disputes, if
any, in its analysis. Any fact submitted by any party that was not
supported by a citation to evidence will not be considered by the

Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response to an allegedly
disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary documentation is deemed
admitted. Id.

The facts of this case surround a traffic stop in which
Defendant Officer Rhet Spengel arrested Plaintiff Cory Hoedebecke.
Plaintiff and a group of friends began bar-hopping in and around

Springfield, Illinois on the evening of July 6, 2019. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e
43) p. 3; Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 44) p. 15. Plaintiff and Officer Spengel had
been friends for nearly 15 years beginning in 2003, though the pair
had a falling out in the fall of 2018. Id. pp. 14–15. Officer Spengel

was on duty the night of July 6, 2019 and was assigned to Beat 400
in Springfield. Pl.’s Resp. p. 15. Beat 400 did not include any of
the bar-hop locations. Id.

Before starting his shift in Beat 400, Officer Spengel
communicated with Erika Carlove, a mutual friend of both him and
Plaintiff, to learn about Plaintiff’s involvement in the outing. Id. In

fact, Officer Spengel was kept apprised of Plaintiff’s whereabouts
the entire evening of July 6 and into the early morning of July 7
through a series of text messages with Carlove. See id. pp. 15–18.

The entire evening, Officer Spengel and Carlove exchanged text
messages from various points on the bar-hop route in which
Carlove informed Officer Spengel about Plaintiff’s movements,

including to both Weebles bar and the Butternut Hut in Springfield.
Id. pp. 16–18.
Carlove knew Plaintiff’s whereabouts because Plaintiff was

driving her in Plaintiff’s Jeep along the route that night. Id. p. 17.
Carlove told Officer Spengel at 7:34 p.m. that she and Plaintiff had
arrived at Weebles. Id. p. 16. When Officer Spengel learned about
Plaintiff going to Weebles, he left Beat 400 and parked in a parking

lot just south of Weebles. Id. p. 16. Officer Spengel stayed in that
parking lot for approximately 45 minutes, all the while texting
Carlove, including asking Carlove “How drunk is fat ass?” in
reference to Plaintiff. Id.

Plaintiff and Carlove then left Weebles to go to the Butternut
Hut, and Officer Spengel asked Carlove to let him know when “tons
of shit,” another reference to Plaintiff, was going to leave that bar.

Id. p. 17–18. In the meantime, Officer Spengel drove to and parked
his car north of the Butternut Hut and waited there for
approximately three hours. Id. To justify his time outside of his

assigned Beat, Officer Spengel changed his activity log to reflect
that he was performing a “premises check” and a “burglary detail.”
Id. at p. 18.

Plaintiff and Carlove left the Butternut Hut at around 12:40
a.m. in Plaintiff’s car. Id. at p. 19. At about 12:44 a.m., Officer
Spengel initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s car. Id. Officer Spengel

was assisted by Patrol Officers Kyle Duvall and Taylor Sullivan. Id.
Spengel eventually arrested Plaintiff on charges of driving under the
influence of alcohol in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) and also
cited Plaintiff for disregarding a traffic control light and improper

traffic lane usage in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-306 and 625 ILCS
5/11-709(a) respectively. Id. at pp. 19–21 (citing Ex. M). Plaintiff
was released from the Sangamon County Jail and retained an
attorney to represent him on the charges. Id. at p. 19. All the

charges against Plaintiff were dismissed by a judge of the Seventh
Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Sangamon County on motion of the
Sangamon County State’s Attorney on August 15, 2019. Id. at p.

21 (citing Ex. M). The order stated the reason for the dismissals
were due to “insufficient evidence.” Id. The mandatory suspension
of Plaintiff’s license which had been in place under 625 ILCS 5/11-

501.1 was rescinded in the same order. Id.
Before the charges were dismissed, Plaintiff’s attorney in the
criminal cases notified the Sangamon County State’s Attorney, the

Corporate Counsel for the City, and the Chief of Police of the
Springfield Police Department of the actions Officer Spengel took
prior to Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. An internal investigation was initiated

by Deputy Chief Ken Scarlette, which resulted in a formal complaint
against Officer Spengel filed by the Springfield Police Department
(“SPD”). Id. at pp. 19–20. Following the investigation, Lieutenant
Andrew Dodd issued a report that recommended six of seven official

charges of violations of the SPD Rules should be sustained. Id. at
pp. 20–21. Specifically, the charges to be sustained alleged
violations of Rule 11 – Neglect of Duty, Rule 14 – Arrests and Due
Process, Rule 20 – Abuse of Position, Rule 21 – Unbecoming

Conduct and Associations, Rule 27 – Internal Investigations, and
Rule 33 – Lying and Untruthfulness. Id. at p. 21 (citing Ex. Y).
Lieutenant Dodd then recommended that Officer Spengel be

terminated for his behavior. Id.
Springfield Police Department Deputy Chief Kenneth Scarlette
then issued a report in which he restated Lieutenant Dodd’s

findings on each charge and recommended Officer Spengel be
terminated. Id. at p. 22 (citing Ex. Z). Springfield Police
Department Chief Kenny Winslow agreed with that

recommendation. Id. (citing Ex. AA 53:19–20). However,
Springfield Mayor James Langfelder, who had final authority on
SPD disciplinary decisions, instead suspended Officer Spengel for

45 days without pay as discipline for Spengel’s actions surrounding
Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. at pp. 22–23 (citing Ex. AA 55:17–56:2 & Ex.
E).
Plaintiff then filed suit against Officer Spengel and the City on

February 25, 2020 alleging six violations of federal and Illinois state
law. Defendants now move for summary judgment on each count
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On such a motion, the facts and all
reasonable inferences derived therefrom are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007); Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir.
2016) (citing Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016)).

A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Modrowski v. Pigatto,
712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Rule 56

“imposes an initial burden of production on the party moving for
summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not
necessary” (internal citation omitted)). After the moving party does
so, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings and

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation and footnotes omitted).
Summary judgment is warranted when the moving party carries its

initial burden and the non-moving party cannot establish an
essential element of its case on which it will bear the burden of
proof at trial. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir.

2012). “[S]ummary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in
a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would
convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Johnson v.

Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions amount to six

violations of federal and Illinois law. Plaintiff alleges in Counts I
and II that Officer Spengel’s actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably seizing and falsely
arresting Plaintiff. Count III alleges that Mayor Langfelder’s

disciplinary decision amounted to a violation of Plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights under Monell v. Department of Social Services
of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Counts IV and V,
Plaintiff alleges state law tort claims for false arrest and intentional

infliction of emotional distress against both the City and Officer
Spengel. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges state law indemnification in Count
VI and that the City is liable for any compensatory damages

awarded against Officer Spengel.
A. Officer Spengel is not entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims as stated in
Counts I and II.

Officer Spengel asserts the defense of qualified immunity as to
each of Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983. Generally, the doctrine of
qualified immunity is a shield police officers may use when faced
with a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a plaintiff
claims constitutional violations. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity “involves a two-
pronged inquiry: (1) whether the facts, read in favor of the non-
moving party, amount to a constitutional violation; and (2) whether
the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation.” Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th
Cir. 2019). The two prongs of this question may be addressed in
either order depending on the claim. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 242 (2009).

The Court need not always address both questions in the
qualified immunity analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236–42 (2009). “[I]f the law was not clearly established, there is no

need to tackle the (often harder) question whether the challenged
conduct violated the Constitution.” Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647.
But where the law was clearly established, both qualified immunity

questions must be addressed. Id.
i. Officer Spengel is not entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s § 1983 unreasonable seizure claim in Count I.

The Court first considers Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Spengel
violated the Fourth Amendment by executing an unreasonable
seizure.
1. Plaintiff’s right to be free from a seizure not based
on a reasonable and articulable suspicion was clearly
established in July 2019.

“Undoubtedly the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription
against unreasonable seizures was clearly established at the time”
Officer Spengel stopped Plaintiff. Phelan v. Vill. of Lyons, 531 F.3d
484, 488 (2008). For qualified immunity purposes, though, the
application of this right to these particular set of circumstances
must have been “clear enough that a ‘reasonable officer would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). The plaintiff need not
identify a case directly on point to show the law was clearly

established. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Instead, the plaintiff must show that it was “sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was]

doing violate[d]” the alleged right when he acted. Lovett v. Herbert,
907 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577
U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

Because “[a] traffic stop and accompanying detention constitute a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment,” a traffic stop will violate the
Fourth Amendment if it is unreasonable. Phelan v. Vill. of Lyons,
531 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2008). A traffic stop is unreasonable if

the officer performing the stop does not have a “reasonable and
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Huff v.
Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2014). And while “[t]he
Fourth Amendment permits pretextual traffic stops,” i.e., traffic

stops based partially on the ulterior motives of the officer, stops are
only reasonable if they are otherwise independently “based on an
observed violation of traffic law.” Id. (quoting Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). It, therefore, would have been
clear to any reasonable officer in Spengel’s position that some
reasonable and articulable suspicion was required to stop Plaintiff’s

car. However, as explained below, a question remains for trial as to
whether Officer Spengel’s stop of Plaintiff in the early hours of July
7, 2019 was reasonable.

2. Plaintiff has fulfilled his burden to establish a
genuine issue for trial as to whether Officer
Spengel’s stop of Plaintiff’s car was reasonable.

Plaintiff has raised questions of fact for trial regarding the
reasonableness of the traffic stop. Officer Spengel testified in his
deposition that he saw Plaintiff change lanes without signaling and
stopping past a stop line after seeing Plaintiff leave the Butternut
Hut. Ex. C at 65:7–12; 78:23–79:5. In his probable cause
statement submitted with the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office,
Officer Spengel wrote that he saw Plaintiff “fail to make a complete
stop at [a] stop light” and “straddle[] a lane line for several seconds.”
Ex. I. However, Erika Carlove, who was in Plaintiff’s car with

Plaintiff at the time of the traffic stop, stated that she “as the
passenger in [Plaintiff’s] car, did not see any reason for [Plaintiff] to
be pulled over.” Ex. Q at p. 7. Carlove further stated that she

observed “no traffic violation that would’ve warranted an officer
pulling [Plaintiff] over that [she] noticed.” Id. Moreover, Carlove
never stated in any text message that she believed Plaintiff was

intoxicated, despite Officer Spengel questioning her regarding
Plaintiff’s intoxication. See Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 44) p. 18. While Carlove
is not a police officer, her statements dispute what Officer Spengel

says he observed prior to initiating the traffic stop.
Patrol Officer Sullivan also disputed other statements Officer
Spengel made in his probable cause statement, including Spengel’s

statements that Plaintiff showed signs of intoxication. Patrol Officer
Sullivan stated in her interview during the internal investigation
that Plaintiff seemed coherent, spoke coherently, and was not
slurring his speech or swaying. Ex. N. at p. 3.

Plaintiff has presented ample evidence to raise a question for
the fact finder regarding Officer Spengel’s veracity and the accuracy
of his probable cause statement. When the facts are viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, as they must be at this stage, the

Court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding the
reasonableness of the traffic stop. Accordingly, Officer Spengel is
not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I.

ii. Officer Spengel is also not entitled to qualified
immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim as
stated in Count II.

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Spengel
violated the Fourth Amendment by executing an arrest without
probable cause.
1. Plaintiff’s right to be free from arrest without
probable cause was clearly established in July 2019.

The “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry is easily met for Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim. “There
is no question that [Plaintiff’s] constitutional right to be free from
arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the time of
[his arrest].” Fleming v. Livingston Cty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 879 (7th
Cir. 2012). This case presents a Fourth Amendment claim of false
arrest, so the question may also be understood as whether Officer
Spengel had “arguable probable cause” to arrest Plaintiff for driving
under the influence because arguable probable cause to arrest “is
‘an absolute defense’ to a wrongful arrest claim under § 1983.”

Huff, 744 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 740
(2014)). This standard has been repeatedly stated and employed by
the Seventh Circuit, clearly establishing that an officer must have

at least arguable probable cause to arrest an individual. See Burrit
v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 2015) and Fleming, 674 F.3d
874. The ‘clearly established’ prong of the qualified immunity

inquiry is met, and the only question that remains is “whether the
facts, read in favor of the of the non-moving party, amount to a
constitutional violation.” Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647.

2. Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the existence of arguable probable cause
when Officer Spengel arrested Plaintiff.

“A police officer has probable cause to arrest when, at the
moment the decision [to arrest] is made, the facts and
circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [the
officer] has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a
prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or was
committing an offense.” Fleming, 674 F.3d at 878–79 (quoting Qian
v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999)). But in the context of a
claim of qualified immunity, the reasonableness of the officer’s
actions is evaluated under the standard that has been called

“arguable probable cause.” Burrit, 807 F.3d at 250.
The presence at the time of arrest of arguable probable cause
entitles defendant officers to qualified immunity for § 1983 claims

arising under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 249–250; Fleming,
674 F.3d at 880. “Although closely related, a determination of
actual probable cause is separate and distinct from a determination

of what is sometimes referred to as ‘arguable probable cause’ for
qualified immunity purposes.” Burritt, 807 F.3d at 250 (citing
Fleming, 674 F.3d at 880). “Arguable probable cause is established

‘when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and
with the same knowledge and possessing the same knowledge as
the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable

cause existed in light of well-established law.’” Fleming, 674 F.3d
at 880 (quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (2012))
(additional citation and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in
original). Furthermore, “[t]he fact that criminal charges are

eventually dropped . . . has no consideration in the determination of
arguable probable cause at the time of arrest.” Fleming, 674 F.3d
at 249. Neither does an officer’s subjective motives. Nieves v.
Bartlett, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1725 (2019) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at

736 (“[W]hen reviewing an arrest, [the Court] ask[s] ‘whether the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’
and if so, conclude[s] ‘that action was reasonable whatever the

subjective intent motivating the relevant officials.’”) The precise
question before the Court, then, is whether, at the time of Plaintiff’s
arrest when presented with the facts then-known, a reasonable

officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed
to arrest Plaintiff for driving under the influence. Burritt, 807 F.3d
at 250. This question is a question of fact for a jury to decide “if

there is room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.” Maxwell v. City of
Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff has presented evidence to create a genuine issue for
trial on whether Officer Spengel had arguable probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff. As stated, the only evidence Officer Spengel puts
forth to support his probable cause finding is his own testimony

and his probable cause statement. Plaintiff has presented Erika
Carlove’s statements who was the passenger in Plaintiff’s vehicle at
the time of the stop, and those of Patrol Officer Sullivan, who
assisted Officer Spengel that night, to dispute the facts asserted in

Officer Spengel’s statements. Carlove stated plainly that Plaintiff
was not intoxicated, and Patrol Officer Sullivan stated she did not
believe Plaintiff seemed intoxicated when she arrived on the scene.

Ex. N. And while Officer Spengel did know of previous DUI charges
against Plaintiff from 2005 and 1994, “a suspect’s criminal history
is a legitimate factor in a probable cause determination” only if such

history is supported by other corroborating information. Hardiman
v. Ford, 41 F.3d 1510, 1994 WL 585409, *3 (7th Cir. 1994) (Table).
Indeed, “[a] prior arrest . . . shows very little, if anything, about the

likelihood that a person committed a crime a decade later.” Huff,
744 F.3d at 1007. The corroborating information Officer Spengel
offers is clearly disputed, and the disputes create “a room for a

difference of opinion concerning” the reasonableness of Officer
Spengel’s actions, especially in light of Spengel’s behavior in
tracking Plaintiff throughout the night and disparaging Plaintiff
while doing so. Maxwell, 998 F.2d at 434.

Officer Spengel’s arguments to the contrary do not correctly
state the law. First, Officer Spengel concedes that “there are
genuine disputes over some of [Officer Spengel’s] statements” in his
statements of probable cause. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e 43) at p. 7. Officer

Spengel then argues that Plaintiff cannot show Officer Spengel
violated clearly established law for either the traffic stop or the DUI
arrest because Officer Spengel has been “unable to identify a case

which clearly establishes the lack of probable cause for a DUI stop
and arrest where the officer knew of the driver’s history of 3 DUI
arrests, the driver had spent hours on a bar-hopping expedition

(during which he admitted to consuming 9 beers, and the driver
refused both a field sobriety test and a breathalyzer test.” Id. at p.
9. But providing a case on point to that level of specificity is not

required. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Moreover, a plaintiff need not
identify an analogous case “where the constitutional violation is
patently obvious.” Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir.

2018)
Plaintiff here has raised disputes in the form of Carlove’s and
Officer Sullivan’s statements regarding Officer Spengel’s finding of
probable cause and on the question of whether Officer Spengel had

arguable probable cause. It would have been plainly obvious to a
reasonable officer that arresting an individual without even
arguable probable cause after following the individual for hours to
perform a traffic stop on said individual would offend the

Constitution. Reed, 906 F.3d at 548 (quoting Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009)). (“Outrageous
conduct ‘obviously will be unconstitutional.’”) When viewed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undisputed facts how that
Officer Spengel followed Plaintiff throughout the night and left his
own Beat assignment to do so. They also establish that Officer

Spengel asked Carlove repeatedly about Plaintiff’s intoxication,
though Carlove never stated Plaintiff was intoxicated. And as stated
above, Plaintiff has presented evidence to raise a dispute as to

Officer Spengel’s police reports. Accordingly, Officer Spengel’s
request for qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim
must be denied.
B. Plaintiff has not carried his burden to offer evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find in his favor as to the
Monell claim stated in Count III.

Plaintiff also brings a claim under Monell v. Department of
Social Services oof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under
Monell, “[a] local governing body may be liable for monetary
damages under § 1983 if the unconstitutional act complained of is
caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its
officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not

officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official
with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). “Liability under Monell is

difficult to establish, requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to prove that a
municipality, either through an express policy or an implied policy
of inaction, took ‘deliberate’ action that was the ‘moving force’

behind a constitutional injury.” Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F.4th 419,
435 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–07 (1997)). The municipal action which

forms the basis of a Monell claim “can take the form of an express
policy (embodied, for example, in a policy statement, regulation, or
decision officially adopted by municipal decisionmakers), an

informal but established municipal custom, or even the action of a
policymaker authorized to act for the municipality.” J.K.J. v. Polk
Cty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). But in any case,
the plaintiff must show that the “municipal policy or custom caused

the constitutional injury.” Id.
Plaintiff here argues that the City is responsible for Officer
Spengel’s actions because Mayor Langfelder “ratified” Spengel’s

actions when Mayor Langfelder, pursuant to his authority as the
final authority on disciplinary decisions of SPD officers, suspended
Spengel for 45 days rather than terminating Spengel’s employment.

Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 44) p. 40–41. In support of that argument, Plaintiff
cites M.A. v. County of San Bernardino, 2021 WL 4706716, at *13
(C.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (slip copy). The court there noted that a

local government may expose itself to Monell liability when “an
official with final policy-making authority ratifie[s] a subordinate’s
unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id.

(quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir.
1992)). However, the court also noted that “[t]he mere failure to
discipline [individual officers] does not amount to ratification of

their allegedly unconstitutional actions.” Id. (quoting Sheehan v.
City & Cty. of S.F., 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014), reversed in
part on other grounds, 575 U.S. 600, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 191 L.Ed.2d
856 (2015)).

Notwithstanding the fact that a case from the Central District
of California is not binding on this Court, M.A. v. County of San
Bernardino plainly does not support Plaintiff’s argument. Like the
plaintiffs there, Plaintiff here only objects to the degree to which

Officer Spengel was disciplined. Plaintiff does not argue that the
City engaged in a widespread practice of inadequate disciplinary
actions by the City as an institution, which can amount to a Monell

claim if such widespread failure to discipline rises to such a level
that it “permeates a critical mass of an institutional body.” Rossi v.
City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead,

Plaintiff only argues that, because Mayor Langfelder did not
discipline Officer Spengel to the degree to which the City’s policies
would allow, see Ex. F p. 13, Mayor Langfelder ratified and

condoned, after the fact, Officer Spengel’s actions.
But “a Monell claim requires more than” showing a final
policymaker did not discipline within his full authority. Rossi, 790

F.3d at 737. A Monell claim requires a showing of “a widespread
practice that permeates a critical mass of an institutional body” and
“for this reason, misbehavior by one or a group of officials is only
relevant where it can be tied to the policy, customs, or practices of

the institution as a whole.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege such a
widespread practice here, or present any evidence to show as much,
and so his Monell claim falls short. Indeed, the injury of which
Plaintiff complains is the unreasonable stop and arrest at the hands

of Officer Spengel. Without facts showing that Officer Spengel was
either inadequately trained or that the City engaged in a
demonstrable pattern of widespread inadequate disciplinary

procedure, Plaintiff cannot show Mayor Langfelder’s disciplinary
decision was the “moving force” behind either Officer Spengel’s
deliberate actions or Plaintiff’s injury. Taylor, 26 F.4th at 435; see

J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 377. Because Plaintiff has not offered any
evidence to prove the causation element at the center of a Monell
claim, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Count III.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 404–405.
C. Plaintiff has raised genuine issues for trial as to the Illinois
state law claims stated in Counts IV and V.

In Counts IV and V, Plaintiff alleges Illinois state tort claims
against Officer Spengel and the City for false arrest and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue only that each
state law claim falls because, in their view, Officer Spengel’s actions
constituted legal police action and so Plaintiff cannot show at least
one essential element for either false arrest or intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The Court disagrees.

i. A reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Spengel
committed the Illinois tort of false arrest as stated in
Count IV.

To establish a claim of false arrest under Illinois state law, a
plaintiff must prove “that the plaintiff was restrained or arrested by
the defendant, and that the defendant acted without having
reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by the
plaintiff.” Meebrey v. Marshall Field & Co., Inc., 139 Ill.2d 455, 474
(1990). Defendants correctly state that a plaintiff in a false arrest
case will not be able to prove his claim if the traffic stop and arrest

were supported by probable cause. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e 43) p. 11 (citing
Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 626
(7th Cir. 2010). But as stated above, there exist issues of fact for a

jury on the question of whether Officer Spengel had either a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop and arrest Plaintiff.
Such issues also raise questions of fact for a jury as to whether
Officer Spengel “acted without having reasonable grounds to believe

that an offense was committed by” Plaintiff. Meebrey, 139 Ill.2d at
474. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion (d/e 43) must be denied as to
Count IV.

ii. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Officer
Spengel committed the Illinois tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as stated in Count V.

Under Illinois law, to survive summary judgment on his claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff “must
present evidence showing that (1) the defendant's conduct was truly
extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant either intended to inflict
emotional distress or knew there was at least a high probability that
he would cause severe emotional distress, and (3) the conduct in
fact caused severe emotional distress.” Stokes, 599 F.3d at 626.

Officer Spengel’s conduct throughout the night on July 6, 2019
clearly raises issue of fact from which a reasonable jury could find
in favor of Plaintiff. Officer Spengel left his Beat assignment,

continued to communicate with Carlove in ways which disparaged
Plaintiff, and executed a traffic stop and arrest on Plaintiff for
reasons that are disputed.
Defendants argue that Officer Spengel’s actions cannot be said

to be “beyond all possible bounds of decency” as required under
Illinois law because, again in their view, both the traffic stop and
arrest were legal. Defs.’ Mot. (d/e 43) p. 12 (citing Stokes, 599 F.3d
at 626). But questions exist as to the legality of Officer Spengel’s

actions as to the degree to which Spengel’s actions went beyond the
bounds of decency. When viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the facts plainly establish that Officer Spengel followed

Plaintiff all night, left his duty station, and stopped and arrested
Plaintiff for disputed reasons. A reasonable jury could find that
such actions by a public official are beyond the pale. Therefore,

Defendant’s Motion (d/e 43) must be denied as to Count V.
D. If a jury finds in favor of Plaintiff and against Officer Spengel
as to the state law claims in Counts IV and V, the City may
be required to indemnify Officer Spengel.

The final Count alleged by Plaintiff is that of indemnification.
Title 745 Section 10/9-102 of Illinois’ Compiled Statutes states,
A local public entity is empowered and directed
to pay any tort judgment or settlement for
compensatory damages (and may pay any
associated attorney's fees and costs) for which
it or an employee while acting within the scope
of his employment is liable in the manner
provided in this Article.

Defendants only argue that Plaintiff’s indemnification claim under
745 ILCS § 10/9-102 is void because, as Defendants argued, each
state law claim fails. However, as just stated, each of Plaintiff’s
state law claims survives summary judgment. If Defendants are
found liable as to any of those claims, the City may be required to

indemnify Officer Spengel for any judgment against him. Therefore,
summary judgment must also be denied as to Plaintiff’s
indemnification Count.

IV. CONCLUSION
When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Officer Spengel’s actions

were not reasonable and were without probable cause in stopping
and arresting Plaintiff on the night of July 6, 2019. Officer Spengel
is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims. Plaintiff has also shown genuine issues for
trial as to each of Plaintiff’s Illinois state law claims. However,
because Plaintiff has not fulfilled his burden to show evidence from

which a reasonable juror could conclude that Mayor Langfelder
disciplinary decision caused Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury,
Defendant’s are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
Monell claim. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (d/e 43) is GRANTED as to Count III and DENIED as to
all other Counts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 1, 2022.
FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136892. Public record. Not legal advice.