# Umberger v. Mitchell

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · January 21, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136613

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 21, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136613

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the plaintiff’s discrimination claim failed under the Ortiz holistic approach and McDonnell Douglas framework
- holding a plaintiff’s prima facie case failed where she failed to identify any similarly situated employees to allow a factfinder to conduct a “meaningful comparison”
- holding a nonmovant’s failure to make an argument in response to a summary judgment motion amounted to waiver of that argument
- noting the silence resulting from the non-movant’s failure to file a response brief was deafening and resulted in waiver

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RYAN UMBERGER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 19-cv-1045-JES-JEH
)
CITY OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 50) for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 53) and Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 56).
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
After being terminated or forced to resign from the Peoria Police Department (“the
Department”) as a probationary employee, Plaintiff Ryan Umberger filed a ten-count Complaint
against Defendants City of Peoria, Illinois, former Chief Jerry Mitchell, Captain Michael Scally,
Captain Loren Marion, former Lieutenant Steven Roegge, former Field Training Sergeant
Bradford Venson, and unknown Defendants. Doc. 1, at 1. Plaintiff generally alleges Defendants
discriminated against him because of his disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”), which caused various constitutional deprivations.
On June 27, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See
Docs. 16; 17. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ motion on October 23, 2019 and
Defendants filed a Reply on December 13, 2019. Docs. 23; 27. On April 21, 2020, the Court
granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Doc. 28, at 22. The Court
dismissed the following Counts: the Section 1983 conspiracy claim against all individual
Defendants (Count III); the Title VII claim (Count IV) against all Defendants; the Monell claim
(Count V) against Peoria; the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(Count VIII) against all Defendants; and the Sections 1985 and 1986 conspiracy claim (Count X)

against all Defendants. The Court also dismissed Counts I and II only as to Defendants Peoria,
Mitchell, and Roegge and dismissed Count VII only as to Defendants Peoria, Mitchell and
Roegge. Doc. 28.1 Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint for various
Counts but chose not to do so. Thus, five Counts remain: the Section 1983 disability based
discrimination claim (Count I) against Defendants Venson, Scally, and Marion; the procedural
due process claims (Counts II and VII) against Defendants Venson, Scally, and Marion; the state
law indemnification claim (Count VI) against Peoria and the Violation of Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 and Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
701 claim (Count IX) against the City of Peoria.
B. Summary Judgment Briefing

Despite the assertion in the first sentence of his Response that Plaintiff, by and through
his attorneys, complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7.1, Plaintiff’s
brief is rife with blatant disregard for this District’s Local Rules and well-known standards
applied in summary judgment briefing. As the Court has informed parties in previous cases,
While strict, the requirements imposed on the parties by Rule 56 and Local Rule
7.1(D) are not meant to be punitive. “Rather, they are intended to alert the court to
precisely what factual questions are in dispute and point the court to the specific
evidence in the record that supports a party’s position on each of these questions.
They are, in short, roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to proceed
further, regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the relevant information
from the record on its own.” Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 923 . . . Because summary

1 As stated in the Court’s previous Order (Doc. 28), the Complaint misnumbers the claims in Counts V– IX. To
prevent confusion, the Court follows the numeric sequence of the preceding Counts and refers to them as Counts
VI–X.
judgment is such a drastic remedy, the Court regularly informs the parties when
they fail to adhere to these strict requirements, and exercises its discretion to decide
whether to apply the rule strictly or to overlook any transgression. Id.

McMahon v. Dunlap Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 323, 274 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842–43 (C.D. Ill.
2017); see also Lugg v. Sutton et al., No. 18-CV-1412-JES-JEH, 2021 WL 3673824, at *2 (C.D.
Ill. Aug. 18, 2021). As relevant to Plaintiff’s failures here, Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b) provides that
a response to a summary judgment motion must state, in separate subsections: undisputed
material facts, disputed material facts, disputed immaterial facts, undisputed immaterial facts,
and additional material facts. With regard to the undisputed material facts section, the plaintiff is
instructed to “[l]ist by number each fact from Section B of the motion for summary judgment
which is conceded to be undisputed and material.” CDIL-LR (D)(2)(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) cautions, “[a] failure to respond to any numbered fact will be deemed
an admission of the fact.” Id. Likewise, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) provides that when a party fails
to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may,
inter alia, “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion.”
Here, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment failed to
respond to any of Defendants’ statements of material fact to note, by number, whether such facts
were undisputed or disputed and material or immaterial. Instead, Plaintiff chose to re-write his
own “undisputed material facts” as he saw fit and to intermittently cite to pages in Defendants’
brief for support. A summary judgment brief is not evidence, it is the Parties’ argument which
cites to evidence in support. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (identifying examples of materials in
the record to include depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations, admissions, and interrogatory answers); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in
the record”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff did not even cite to the particular paragraph of
Defendants’ statement of material facts to which he was referring. To the extent it is difficult to
ascertain what evidence Plaintiff is trying to refer to, the Court disregards those facts because
they do not point to affidavits, depositions, or other evidence of an admissible sort. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(2); CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(5) (“Each additional fact [in a summary judgment
response] must be supported by evidentiary documentation referenced by specific page.”).
1. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
As indicated above, Plaintiff failed to properly respond to Defendants’ statement of
undisputed material facts, therefore, unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
See CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
Peoria Police Department Recruits and the Nature of their Employment
On February 27, 2017, Plaintiff was hired by the Department as a probationary police
officer or “recruit.” Doc. 50, SOF ¶ 1.2 Prior to his employment, Plaintiff had received formal
basic training at police academies through prior employers. SOF ¶ 15. Upon hiring, Plaintiff

attended an initial orientation where he received training on unlawful harassment and signed an
acknowledgment outlining his responsibility to submit a complaint if he felt that he was
“personally being harassed.” SOF ¶¶ 12-13. He also received an Employee Handbook, which
included an ADA policy and discussed reasonable accommodations and where to go if the
employee has questions. SOF ¶¶ 10-11.
Each newly appointed police officer is regarded as a probationary employee during the
first year of his or her employment plus one day for each of formalized training excluding the

2 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court takes the undisputed facts from Defendants’ Motion at Doc. 50, which are
cited as SOF ¶ ___. Where the Court minimally cites to Plaintiff’s SOFs in Doc. 53 throughout this Opinion, they
are cited as Pltfs. SOF ¶ ___.
Field Training Program (“FTP”). SOF ¶ 14. Plaintiff’s probationary period began on February
27, 2017, with an expected expiration date of February 27, 2018. SOF ¶ 16. During probation,
recruits are “at-will” employees. SOF ¶ 18. The Chief of Police does not need cause to separate a
probationary officer from employment. Id. (citing Ex. E, Mitchell Dep., pp. 90-91; Ex. Q,

Collective Bargaining Agreement, § 18.7 – “The retention of the probationary officer is at the
discretion of the City and his dismissal shall not be subject to the grievance procedure.”; Ex. R,
Sec. 2-176 and 2-178 of the Peoria City Code). General Order 300.11, which is used internally at
the Department, does not state that a recruit or probationary officer could only be fired “for
cause.” SOF ¶ 22.
Field Training Program and Expectations
During his probationary year, Plaintiff was required to successfully complete the
Department’s FTP, otherwise he could be let go. SOF ¶ 17. Understanding Department policies
and how certain people want the officer to perform are essential functions of the job of a PPD
police officer. SOF ¶¶ 63, 66. The FTP teaches recruits the essential functions of the job of a
patrol officer. SOF ¶ 23. It is outlined in General Order 300.11 and includes a 14-day orientation,
untimed written tests, recruit school, and five phases of field training under the supervision of

FTOs–phases I, II, III, IV (“shadow phase”) and V (“solo”). SOF ¶ 24. The FTP can be
completed in as little as 16 weeks, which would entail four weeks for each of the three phases,
two weeks of shadows at minimum, a week in a traffic unit, and a week encompassing two days
in the crime lab, two days in the technology bureau, and a day with the communications center.
SOF ¶ 32. During each phase, each recruit is assigned a different Field Training Officer (“FTO”)
who is responsible for training, evaluation, and supervision of the recruit. SOF ¶¶ 33-34. FTOs
use daily, weekly, mid-phase, and end-of-phase forms and reports as guidelines to detail their
observations and evaluations. SOF ¶ 40. To become an FTO, the officer must complete a training
program, which includes learning the standards for recruits, how to teach those standards, and
how to evaluate recruits, including training on how to apply the performance area ratings. SOF ¶
35. During Plaintiff’s time as a recruit, Defendant Sergeant Brad Venzon was the Field Training
Sergeant responsible for the FTP. SOF ¶ 6. Defendant Michael Scally was a Captain, Defendant

Loren Marion was the Investigations Captain, then Assistant Chief, and Jerry Mitchell was the
Chief of Police for the City of Peoria. SOF ¶¶ 2-3, 7.
During the first three phases of the FTP, the recruit is responsible for completing
different percentages of the workload prior to advancing to the next training phase: at least 25%
of the workload in Phase I; at least 55% of the workload in Phase II, and at least 95% of the
workload in Phase III. SOF ¶¶ 26-28. In Phase I, the recruit rides along with the FTO who
teaches the recruit how to take calls and perform as a patrol officer. SOF ¶ 26. Phase III is a field
training and evaluation period with an emphasis on reviewing the essential skills and knowledge
required of a competent police officer, as well as corresponding classroom instruction. SOF ¶ 28.
Phase IV is known as “shadow phase” wherein the FTO is in plain clothes and the recruit is in

uniform, then the FTO shadows the recruit in the same patrol unit. SOF ¶ 29. In this role, the
FTO serves solely as an evaluator of the recruit’s performance. Id. The recruit is responsible for
100% of the police functions and should not be making any serious fundamental mistakes. SOF
¶¶ 29-20. The recruit is expected to have a satisfactory rating in all 11 performance areas. SOF ¶
38. Upon successful completion of shadow, the recruit is certified for Phase V, the solo patrol
assignment, which spans the balance of the probationary employment period. SOF ¶¶ 29, 31.
As set forth by General Order 300.11, recruits are evaluated in each phase on 11
objective performance areas: (1) electronic communication skills; (2) motor vehicle operation;
(3) orientation skill/jurisdictional geography; (4) written communication; (5) field performance;
(6) criminal law/ordinances; (7) departmental policies/procedures; (8) self-initiated field
activities; (9) traffic/law enforcement; (10) attitude toward police work/dependability/
relationships; and (11) attire/dress/equipment. SOF ¶ 25 (citing Ex. A, Umberger Dep., p. 206-
207; Ex. D, Venzon Dep., p. 21, 23, 28; Ex. G, p. 8-11). Each phase also included written tests to

test the recruit’s knowledge in areas of radio, electronic communications, geography, criminal
law, and traffic law. SOF ¶ 41. The purpose of the testing is to check the knowledge gained in
police training or as recruits continue to study. SOF ¶ 42. Every recruit who has successfully
completed the FTP and was hired had satisfactory performance standards in all 11 areas at the
end of shadow phase. SOF ¶ 51. The FTOs may vary in how they grade recruits but know the
acceptable standard so that they grade recruits based on what they observe on the job and
compare it to the acceptable standard. SOF ¶ 39.
The FTOs reported directly to Venzon and, if there was a training issue, it was brought to
his attention to address and resolve. SOF ¶ 48. Venzon’s duties also included scheduling recruits
with FTOs and reviewing observations reports submitted by FTOs of the recruits. SOF ¶ 47. If a

recruit was struggling with training areas, meetings would be conducted to discuss the issues
and, when necessary, remedial training and/or extensions of a particular phase would be afforded
the recruit. SOF ¶ 49. If a recruit required remedial training, then a memorandum of the training
meeting and remedial training plan was sent to the Field Training Lieutenant. Id. A remedial
training plan references specific training for a specific issue or performance area and includes
training techniques that had been used with recruits in the past and showed results. SOF ¶ 50.
Plaintiff’s ADHD
Plaintiff has ADHD and has had it since childhood. SOF ¶ 60. In Plaintiff’s view, his
ADHD substantially impacts his ability to focus, learn, and comprehend what he reads. SOF ¶
61. ADHD has substantially limited his ability to work as a police officer by impacting his
ability to understand geography, department policies, logs, work performance, and how certain
people want things done. SOF ¶ 62.
Plaintiff testified that he disclosed that he had ADHD to an unknown individual in

Human Resources during his application process when he submitted urine for his drug screening.
SOF ¶ 67. He testified that this was during a phone call and the purpose was to inform the caller
that he took Adderall in case it showed up on his drug screen. Id. Plaintiff also testified he told
Venzon that he had ADHD and took Adderall during Phase I of his field training (March/April
2017). SOF ¶ 68. He expressed that ADHD meant he was unable to focus on one or two things at
a time, he did not learn the same as other individuals, that he took longer to understand and learn
new concepts, and that he may need extra time for training. Id. Plaintiff never submitted anything
in writing concerning his ADHD, his medication, or any request for accommodation. SOF ¶ 72.
Plaintiff never asked for any accommodation for his ADHD before November 20, 2017, after his
shadow phase was already extended. SOF ¶¶ 70, 121. During that meeting Plaintiff advised

Venzon he had ADHD since age 12 and it meant he needed extra time for training and different
ways to learn. SOF ¶ 71. Plaintiff also told an FTO that he had ADHD but does not recall who,
when, or at what point in his training this conversation took place. SOF ¶ 73. Plaintiff did not tell
anyone else at the City of Peoria or the PPD, including Marion and Scally, that he had ADHD.
SOF ¶ 74. Scally did not know Plaintiff had ADHD or that he took medication. SOF ¶ 75.
Mitchell did not know of Plaintiff requesting accommodations during training. SOF ¶ 76.
Plaintiff’s Test Taking
Geography is a critical skill, along with an understanding of Peoria’s 100-block divider
system, so that an officer is able to get where the officer is needed and arrive at a call. SOF ¶¶
55, 64. To meet the performance standard for orientation and geography, the recruit must: (1)
demonstrate knowledge of major streets and intersections, locations, landmarks, block
numbering, sequence, and patrol district and sector boundaries; (2) utilize street directories and
maps without FTO prompting to determine locations and destinations; (3) remember location

from previous visits and not need the district map to get there; (4) be aware of and utilize
shortcuts; (5) arrive within a reasonable time; (6) be able to relay and articulate the officer’s
location; (7) not rely on FTO/electronic communications to find call location, and (8) not
compromise public or officer safety by a lengthy call response. SOF ¶ 52. Much of the recruit’s
learning, such as being aware of and utilizing shortcuts, would be learned on the street with the
FTOs. SOF ¶ 58. Although the police vehicles have a vehicle locator that could be used to map
the route to a call, the Department did not want to recruits to rely on the technology because
there was a delay in updating location and computers went down at times SOF ¶ 59. Although
Venzon considers all performance areas important, he believes the most important area is field
performance. SOF ¶ 65.

Each recruit including Plaintiff was tested on the 100-block dividers by a written exam
which is essentially the study guide without the answers. SOF ¶ 57. Recruits, including Plaintiff,
were provided a study guide to learn each 100-block of Peoria, including maps and a list of the
hundred blocks. SOF ¶ 55. Plaintiff took the 100-block divider test a total of 22 times--18 times
before eventually scoring 100%. SOF ¶ 77. Although the 22 tests covered the same material
(geography and the 100-block dividers), the tests were not identical. SOF ¶ 78.
Additionally, on March 16, 2017, Plaintiff took a test on criminal law procedures with
another recruit present. SOF ¶ 79. The FTO proctoring the test, Keith Burwell, accused Plaintiff
of looking at another recruit’s test. SOF ¶ 80. Burwell and Plaintiff spoke to Venzon about the
alleged cheating and were required to provide written statements about the incident. SOF ¶ 81.
At the time, Plaintiff denied cheating on the test. SOF ¶ 82. According to Special Agent Matos,
during a background investigation interview with the Illinois State Police in 2018, Plaintiff
admitted that he cheated on the exam, lied to the FTO and the FTO supervisor, falsified his

report about the incident, and continued to lie to the Department in order to keep his job. SOF ¶
83 (citing Ex. J, Matos Dep., p. 42-43, 46, 50, 81). Plaintiff knew that honesty and truthfulness
were essential functions of the job of police officer and that cheating and lying could have led to
discipline and termination due to lack of integrity. SOF ¶¶ 84-85.
Plaintiff’s Training and Performance
Like all recruits, Plaintiff was trained in the areas of emergency medical care, traffic
operations, moving prisoners, making arrests, domestic violence, family disorders, juvenile
investigations, criminal investigations, interviewing and interrogations, vehicle stops, patrols
procedures, driving techniques, report writing, electronic communications, jurisdiction,
geography, and preparing for patrol. SOF ¶¶ 43-44. He also received an FTP manual and guide,

and a training checklist and orientation that described the field training he would receive. SOF ¶
45. The performance area ratings given by FTOs are: (a) “S,” meets performance standards; (b)
“B/R,” below performance standards but responding to training; (c) “B/F,” below performance
standards and failure to respond to training; and (d) “NR,” no rating. SOF ¶ 36. A B/R rating is
common for recruits in Phase I, but it is anticipated that progress would be shown in Phases II
and III, with the acknowledgement that recruits are responsible for more work. SOF ¶ 37.
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to review each daily, weekly, mid-phase, and end of phase
evaluation, ask questions, and sign off on the FTO’s evaluation of him. SOF ¶ 46.
Plaintiff’s Phase IA field training spanned from March 18, 2017 to May 6, 2017, with
FTO Grayson. SOF ¶ 86. At his mid-Phase I evaluation, Grayson rated Plaintiff B/R (below
performance standards/responding to training) on 9 of the 11 performance areas and B/F (below
performance standards/failure to respond to training) on the remaining 2 performance areas. SOF

¶ 87. Plaintiff read, understood, and initialed the evaluation and did not indicate that he wished to
discuss it with the training supervisor. SOF ¶ 88. Plaintiff received remedial training in Phase IA
but still scored a B/F on orientation and geography. SOF ¶ 89. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff met
with Venzon and Grayson to discuss his difficulties in Phase IA with four performance areas:
electronic communication, geography, written communication, and field performance. SOF ¶ 91.
Thereafter, a remedial training plan was implemented to assist Plaintiff in reaching satisfactory
levels in these areas. Id.
Plaintiff’s Phase IB training spanned from May 21 to June 17, 2017 with FTO Will
England. SOF ¶ 92. On May 22, 2017, Venzon gave Plaintiff a memorandum outlining a training
program to assist him in reaching satisfactory levels in four areas of performance. SOF ¶ 93.

Venzon also extended Phase I for Plaintiff by two weeks for this remedial training. Id. At his end
of Phase IB evaluation, England rated Plaintiff B/R in eight areas, B/F in one area (geography)
and S in two areas. SOF ¶ 94. Plaintiff read, understood, and initialed the evaluation and did not
indicate that he wished to discuss it with the training sergeant. SOF ¶ 95. Plaintiff’s Phase IIA
training spanned from June 18, 2017 to July 15, 2017, with FTO Elifritz. SOF ¶ 96. On June 20,
2017, Plaintiff met with Venzon and Elifritz to discuss his training. SOF ¶ 97. Another remedial
training plan was implemented to help Plaintiff improve his performance. Id. At the end of Phase
IIA, Elifritz rated Plaintiff an S in five areas, B/R in four areas, and B/F in two areas (electronic
communication and geography). SOF ¶ 98. Plaintiff read, understood, and initialed the
evaluation but did not indicate that he wished to discuss it with the training sergeant. SOF ¶ 99.
Plaintiff’s Phase IIB training was from July 16, 2017 to August 10, 2017, with FTO
Justin Mitchell. SOF ¶ 101. On July 17, 2017, Plaintiff received another remedial training

program from Venzon to improve his performance. SOF ¶ 100. FTO Mitchell rated Plaintiff B/R
in seven areas and B/F in two areas (geography and self-initiated field activities). SOF ¶ 101.
Plaintiff read, understood, and initialed the evaluation and did not indicate that he wished to
discuss it with the training sergeant. SOF ¶ 102. Plaintiff’s Phase IIB training was extended from
August 13, 2017 to September 2, 2017 with FTO Elizabeth Blair, who rated him an S in all areas
but field performance, where she rated him B/R. SOF ¶ 104. On August 15, 2017, another
remedial training program was implemented for performance areas of electronic communication,
geography, written communication, and field performance. SOF ¶ 103. At the time of his
extended training in Phase IIC, Blair felt that Plaintiff was struggling with the program. SOF ¶
105. During the extended training, Plaintiff and Blair were assigned to the same district Plaintiff

had worked in for his Phase IIB training with FTO Mitchell so that Plaintiff would be familiar
with the geography and be able to focus on other areas needing improvement. SOF ¶ 106.
Plaintiff’s Phase IIIA training spanned from September 13, 2017 to October 7, 2017 with
FTO J. Smiles. SOF ¶ 107. Smiles rated Plaintiff an S in eight areas, B/R in two areas, and B/F
in geography. Id. Although Plaintiff disagreed with Smiles’ evaluation, he admitted he was still
performing below standards in geography. SOF ¶ 108. On September 22, 2017, another remedial
training program was implemented for Plaintiff to improve his performance in written
communications and field performance. SOF ¶ 110. Plaintiff’s Phase IIIB training occurred
between October 8, 2017 to November 14, 2017 with FTO N. Cox. SOF ¶ 111. FTO Cox rated
Plaintiff an S in seven areas, B/R in two areas, and B/F in two areas (geography and field
performance). Id. Plaintiff read, understood, and initialed his evaluation, and for the first time
indicated that he wished to discuss the evaluation with his supervisor. SOF ¶ 112. Plaintiff
agreed that Cox’s evaluation was his opinion but disagreed with the rating. SOF ¶ 113. On

October 20, 2017, Plaintiff met with Venzon and Cox. SOF ¶ 114. At the meeting, Plaintiff
admitted he was still performing below standards in areas of electronic communication,
geography, written communication, and field performance. Id. Because of the meeting, another
remedial training program was implemented to assist in these areas. SOF ¶ 115.
Following Phase III, Venzon did not recommend that Plaintiff proceed from Phase III to
the shadow phase because Plaintiff was not passing the program and all remedial training had
been exhausted. SOF ¶ 116. In spite of his recommendation, Scally authorized Plaintiff to
proceed. Id. Plaintiff moved into his shadow phase on November 5, 2017 with FTO Justin
Mitchell. SOF ¶ 117. Mitchell completed a weekly evaluation on November 13, 2017 for
Plaintiff’s first week and rated him an S in six areas, BR in three areas, and BF in two areas

(geography and field performance) SOF ¶ 117. Plaintiff agreed with the evaluation that he was
not meeting standards in the area of self-initiated field activities but disagreed with the remainder
of the evaluation. SOF ¶ 118. On November 14, 2017, Plaintiff met with Venzon and Mitchell to
discuss his performance. SOF ¶ 119. Plaintiff admitted that he missed radio traffic, used poor
routes to get to call locations, passed target addresses, failed to secure a suspect in a timely
manner, and did not interview a victim before closing a domestic violence call. SOF ¶ 120.
Plaintiff met again with Venzon and Mitchell again on November 20, 2017 about his
performance during shadow phase. SOF ¶ 121. Prior to the meeting, Plaintiff had spoken to
Venzon alone and disclosed that he had ADHD. Id. He also told Venzon that he was having
trouble multi-tasking when he was on medication, so he got off his medication and thought being
off the medication helped him perform. Id. He also asked that his condition not be disclosed to
anyone else. Id. Then, when speaking with Venzon and Mitchell during the meeting, Plaintiff
acknowledged that the FTO’s evaluations from the prior week were accurate, which included BF

ratings. SOF ¶ 122. Plaintiff also admitted that he was slow to put out information on the radio;
he failed to check a suspect for warrants even when prompted; he relied heavily on the computer
system to find locations; he made some officer safety errors putting himself and others at risk
several times; he was not engaging in self-initiated field activities, such as conducting traffic
stops and making citizen contacts, and Mitchell often had to correct his reports. Id.
On November 27, 2017, Plaintiff met with Venzon and Mitchell again to discuss his
performance in shadow phase. SOF ¶ 123. Before the meeting, Venzon spoke with Plaintiff
about his ADHD and asked him if he needed any accommodation. Id. Plaintiff only told Venzon
that he needed more time to learn; however, Venzon had already given Plaintiff additional time
to complete the program. SOF ¶ 124. During the meeting Plaintiff also admitted, he relied

heavily on the in-car geography system, still received 7 daily B/F ratings for his written reports,
put the public at risk during a traffic stop by making the northbound traffic cross into southbound
lanes, failed to get the names and ages of young children improperly restrained during a traffic
stop, and failed to pat down a bicyclist. SOF ¶ 125.
During the last days of shadow, Venzon rode with Plaintiff to observe him. SOF ¶ 126.
Plaintiff performed relatively well on two nights of the ride-along, but he still made some errors,
was extremely reliant on the vehicle locator set to Google Maps, and had many more days that
were below standard. SOF ¶ 127. On November 30, 2017, Mitchell completed Plaintiff’s end of
phase evaluation for shadow phase rating him B/F in one area (field performance), B/R in four
areas and S in the remaining. SOF ¶ 128. In the narrative portion, Mitchell noted that Plaintiff’s
lack of confidence and/or hesitation at scenes put himself and other officers’ safety at risk. Id.
Overall, Plaintiff had been given six extra weeks of training, which was more than the typical
recruit, but he still performed inconsistently and unsatisfactorily. SOF ¶ 129.

Termination Decision and Meeting
When termination for a recruit is considered, Venzon prepares a training log and outline
detailing the performance deficiencies as well as the extra and remedial training provided to the
recruit. SOF ¶ 130. Venzon then makes a recommendation on whether to terminate the recruit
and sends the files to the officer who is higher in command than Venzon. SOF ¶¶ 130-31. Here,
Venzon prepared a training log and outline recommending termination of Plaintiff because he
did not meet the performance standards of the FTP despite extra time in training and remedial
training plans. SOF ¶ 132. Venzon had previously spoken to Captain Scally about Plaintiff’s
performance and training. SOF ¶ 133. Venzon provided Scally with the prepared files, and
informed Scally that, while Plaintiff performed decently with Venzon and FTO Blair, Plaintiff

had at least 15 nights of poor performance during his shadow phase, struggled throughout the
program, remained inconsistent, was provided six extra weeks training, and all training tools
were exhausted. SOF ¶ 133-34.
Scally reviewed the training files, outline, and training log then recommend to Chief
Mitchell that Plaintiff be separated based on his review and that Plaintiff failed to meet the
requirements of the job. SOF ¶ 135. Chief Mitchell also reviewed Plaintiff’s file and concluded
“we had exhausted everything that was reasonable … that we could possibly do to help this
young man[,]” yet Plaintiff was still not meeting the minimal performance standards. SOF ¶ 136.
After reviewing Plaintiff’s file and speaking to Scally, Chief Mitchell made the decision to
terminate Plaintiff based on his failure to meet performance standards. SOF ¶¶ 137-38. Plaintiff’s
ADHD did not impact Chief Mitchell’s decision to separate Plaintiff’s Employment. SOF ¶ 139.
At that point, Venzon would be informed of the Chief’s decision to terminate and be provided a
meeting location and time to relay to the recruit. SOF ¶ 144.

Chief Mitchell delegated the task of carrying out the separation meeting to Scally and
Assistant Chief Marion because he was unable to attend. SOF ¶ 140. Marion did not have any
input or any role at all in the decision to separate Plaintiff’s employment. SOF ¶ 141. A recruit is
notified in advance that a meeting will occur regarding employment status and on December 4,
2020, Venzon advised Plaintiff of a meeting. SOF ¶¶ 143, 145. On his way to the meeting,
Plaintiff ran into a union representative who informed Plaintiff that he did not have a right to
union representation as a probationary employee. SOF ¶ 146. At the termination meeting,
Plaintiff met with Scally, Marion, and Venzon. SOF ¶ 147. During the meeting, Plaintiff was
given the opportunity to be heard regarding the decision to separate from employment. SOF ¶
150. Plaintiff disputed the termination decision, asked if there was more training or if his training

could be extended, and said he would be a good officer for Peoria. SOF ¶ 151. He did not raise
his ADHD or request any accommodations for his ADHD at the December 4, 2017 meeting.
SOF ¶ 153. Plaintiff was told that the Department was prepared to fire him that day if he did not
resign so Plaintiff decided to submit a resignation letter. SOF ¶¶ 148-49. If Plaintiff had brought
up something at the meeting that Marion believed was important or crucial, Marion would have
taken it back to Chief Mitchell to reconsider. SOF ¶¶ 154-55. Venzon was unaware of any recruit
around 2017 with similar below-standard performance issues as Plaintiff who was still retained
and allowed to go into the solo phase and become a permanent officer. SOF ¶ 156. Plaintiff did
not ask the union representative for further assistance because he was embarrassed that he got
fired and he was told that the union did not represent probationary officers. SOF ¶ 152.
Hostile Work Environment Allegations
The City of Peoria has an Employee Handbook which addresses discrimination and

harassment. SOF ¶ 8. The Handbook encourages employees who feel they have been the victim
of any harassment to promptly report the discrimination to the department head, HR Manager,
EEO Manager, or city attorney. SOF ¶ 9. Upon being hired, Plaintiff received and understood the
anti-harassment policy and training which referenced the procedures for submitting complaints
about harassment. SOF ¶ 168. Plaintiff was called “Dumberger” but none of the Defendants
called him that name. SOF ¶ 157. Some FTOs told him that he had to eat separately in the car
while the FTOs met together and ate. SOF ¶ 159. At monthly FTO meetings, FTO Blair
overheard some FTOs speaking negatively about Plaintiff. SOF ¶ 160. Plaintiff thought he was
targeted because he was accused of cheating on an exam. SOF ¶ 161. Venzon asked Plaintiff
multiple times in meetings if he “was stupid, lazy or just do[es]n’t care.” SOF ¶ 162. Plaintiff

also described one incident where he left his vehicle unsecured and another officer decided to
“teach [him] lesson to leave a vehicle unsecured” by taking the rifle, duty bag, and ammo out of
the vehicle. SOF ¶ 163. Venzon was unaware of any recruits being ridiculed or made fun of by
FTOs. SOF ¶ 165. Plaintiff never told Marion, Mitchell, or Scally about any harassment, name-
calling or discrimination. SOF ¶ 167. At no point during his employment did Plaintiff document
or report any incident of discrimination, harassment, hostile work environment, or failure to
provide an accommodation due to his disability. SOF ¶ 169. He also did not report any
harassment to HR, city administrators, city officials or the legal department. SOF ¶ 170.
2. Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts
As noted in Defendants’ Reply and identified by the Court, the following “undisputed
facts” listed in Plaintiff’s Response were revised but duplicative versions of Defendants’
proposed undisputed facts: Plaintiff’s SOF ¶¶ 1, 3-23, 26-36, 41-43, 46-50, 55-69. For most of

them, Plaintiff also did not cite evidence in the record to support them but rather a page of
Defendants’ summary judgment brief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Therefore, the Court
disregards those statements.
The following facts are additional to the undisputed facts provided by Defendants that
were cited with evidentiary support. Unless otherwise noted, Defendants do not dispute them.
Since leaving the Department, Plaintiff has held multiple law enforcement and security officer
jobs including working for the Mansfield Police Department, Illinois Central College, San Jose
Police Department, and Manito Police Department. Pltfs. SOF ¶ 2. Plaintiff thought his ADHD
was documented when he met with Venzon but had no idea what Venzon documented himself.
Pltfs. SOF ¶ 38. Plaintiff believed he told Venzon that he was not getting any accommodations or

extra training or any feedback in a proper amount of time to understand the training but did not
put this request in writing because he thought Venzon was documenting it. Pltfs. SOF ¶¶ 39-40.3
44-45. Plaintiff does not recall admitting to Special Agent Matos that he cheated on the exam and
believed that if Matos wrote that down, it was simply his interpretation of what was said. Pltfs.
SOF ¶ 52. Plaintiff also told Matos that if they were accusing him of cheating that he was not
going to sit there, argue, and debate this with him. Pltfs. SOF ¶ 51. In 2019, as part of his
application to the state police, Plaintiff was interviewed by Special Agent Lisa Osborn in which

3 Defendants marks this statement undisputed but immaterial because Plaintiff admitted he did not ask for any
accommodation for his ADHD before November 20, 2017. Doc. 56, at 8. The Court agrees. Plaintiff does not use
these statements to support his argument in his brief and it is undisputed that Plaintiff did receive additional training
and feedback from FTOs during his training.
he signed an Affidavit of Truthfulness and stated that he did not cheat on the exam. Pltfs. SOF ¶
53. In his deposition, Plaintiff maintained that he did not cheat on the exam. Pltfs. SOF ¶ 54. He
also testified that he believed the 100-block test was only changed for Plaintiff and no other
recruit. Pltfs. SOF ¶ 44 (citing Umberger Dep., p. 160-161). Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s SOF ¶

44 and asserts it is unsupported by the evidence cited. Doc. 56, at 9. Rather, Plaintiff testified the
test was changed after he failed the first one and he believed it was different for him because no
one else had to take the test multiple times, having passed it the first time Id. (citing Ex. A,
Umberger Dep., p. 159-161). Defendants also assert “[a]s can be seen by the tests themselves
(Defs.’ Ex. A, Umberger Dep. Ex. 8), the subsequent tests covered the same material but in a
different fashion to prevent test-takers from simply memorizing the answers.” Id. The Court
agrees that Defendants’ articulation of Plaintiff’s cited deposition is more accurate than
Plaintiff’s SOF ¶ 44. Plaintiff also testified the 100-block test continued to be changed after
Plaintiff had successfully passed it. Pltfs. SOF ¶ 45. The Court will address Defendants’ latter
assertion in the discussion section of this Opinion. The remaining facts in Plaintiff’s statement of

facts are immaterial and unnecessary to recite here.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows, through “materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations … admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
construe the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[] the temptation to
decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). In resolving the motion, “[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a
trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If the evidence, however, is “merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative” or merely raises “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” summary
judgment may be granted. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Thus, in order to overcome the undisputed facts
set forth in a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations
in his complaint but must point to affidavits, depositions, or other evidence of an admissible sort
that a genuine dispute of material fact exists between parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996). “[I]f the non-movant does not come forward with evidence
that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then

the court must enter summary judgment.” Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. Doc. 50.
Although Plaintiff has not moved for summary judgment, he agrees there are no disputed facts.
Doc. 53. Rather, Plaintiff argues (1) the undisputed facts demonstrate there was disability
discrimination under the ADA; (2) the undisputed facts demonstrate that he has stated a claim for
disability discrimination under § 1983; (3) he did not receive all procedural protections that were
due under the U.S. Constitution; (4) the individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity; and (5) The City of Peoria must indemnify the individual Defendants for the
violations Plaintiff alleges. Id. The Court will address each issue in the same order as the
Plaintiff, beginning with the disability discrimination claim premised on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act. Like the Parties, the bulk of the
Court’s analysis is devoted to this claim.

I. Violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

As Plaintiff articulates, a plaintiff may state a claim for discrimination under the ADA by
advancing either (1) a “failure to accommodate” theory—that the employer failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation for the employee’s disability—or (2) a “disparate treatment”
theory—that the employer treated the employee differently because of his disability. Sieberns v.
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff makes clear in his Response
that he is not making a failure to accommodate claim: his argument “is not that there should have
been an accommodation for the [100-block divider] test, since a formal request was not made at
the time,” but rather that Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff’s ADHD, so it “purposely
administered tests in this way to invoke failure.” Doc. 53, at 15. Plaintiff is the master of his own
complaint. Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2000). Therefore,
the Court need not address whether Defendants should have accommodated Plaintiff and if so,
whether they failed to reasonably do so regarding the 100-block test or any other aspect of
Plaintiff’s training.
To the extent one could infer Plaintiff sought to proceed on such theory based on remarks
elsewhere in his brief,4 he fails to explain what reasonable accommodation he should have been

4 See Doc. 53, at 13. In discussing the second prong of the McDonnell-Douglas framework, Plaintiff states:
Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not able to perform the essential functions of the job regardless
of with an accommodation or not. Plaintiff successfully held law enforcement jobs before and after
this occurrence demonstrating that is capable or at the very minimum, possesses the capability to at
some point, [to] perform those essential functions. (Pltfs. SOF, ¶ 2). When a disabled employee
cannot perform the essential functions of a job, the court in ADA suit must consider whether any
reasonable accommodation by the employer would help the employee to perform those functions.
given beyond the additional time he had to complete the training phases that no other recruit
received. See SOF ¶ 134. To establish a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of his
disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability. Bunn v. Khoury

Enterprises, Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417
F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2005)). It is proper to grant summary judgment where a plaintiff has
failed to meet prong three. Id. Here, Plaintiff did not attempt to make such argument to
demonstrate a dispute of fact exists as to whether his employer failed to reasonably
accommodate his disability.
Turning his disparate treatment claim, a disparate treatment claim based on disability
under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act requires Plaintiff to show (1) he was disabled; (2) he was
qualified to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3)
disability was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action. Scheidler v. Indiana, 914
F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503–04 (7th

Cir. 2017); Felix v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 828 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2016)). To demonstrate
causation, a plaintiff may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Castetter v.
Dolgencorp, LLC, 953 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff elects to do so here. See Doc. 53,

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, §102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Amadio v.
Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001).
However, thereafter he does not discuss reasonable accommodation at all or whether he needed it. Rather, Plaintiff
returns to his discussion of disparate treatment. Thus, any claim of failure to accommodate is also underdeveloped
and waived. Williams v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 982 F.3d 495, 511 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied (Jan. 7,
2021) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are
waived[.]”). See also Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting, in the context
of a complaint, “the mere invocation of ADA discrimination and the inclusion of the word ‘accommodation’ in the
cited definition of qualified individual does not provide adequate notice that a plaintiff is alleging a failure to
accommodate claim”).
at 12-13 (citing Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 718 (7th
Cir. 2021)).
In their Motion, Defendants offer four arguments as to why they are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim. Doc. 50, at 28-45. First, Plaintiff has

not established a prima facie case of discrimination in applying the first four prongs of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 30-37. Second, even if Plaintiff has met
his burden, Defendants claim they have presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for his
termination, which Plaintiff has failed to rebut with evidence of pretext. Id. at 38-40. Third, the
undisputed facts do not establish a hostile work environment claim as part of his ADA claim. Id.
at 40-43. Finally, Plaintiff did not request an accommodation until the end of his employment
and received reasonable accommodations that he now claims to have requested. Id. at 44-45.
Plaintiff responds to Defendants’ Motion by loosely following the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Doc. 53, at 12-14. The Court also notes Plaintiff does not address the Defendants’
second, third, or fourth arguments. Therefore, Plaintiff concedes he has not established a hostile

work environment claim as part of his discrimination claim; if he has not met the four prongs of
McDonnell Douglas, then he has no evidence to offer for the burden-shifting portion of the
framework in steps five and six; and he cannot successfully establish a failure-to-accommodate
claim. See C & N Corp. v. Kane, 756 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding a nonmovant’s
failure to make an argument in response to a summary judgment motion amounted to waiver of
that argument); Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the silence
resulting from the non-movant’s failure to file a response brief was deafening and resulted in
waiver). Notably, Plaintiff also did not seek leave to file a sur-reply to respond to Defendants’
waiver arguments.
In considering the evidence as a whole, the singular question that matters in a
discrimination case is: “Whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or
other adverse employment action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).

See McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 367 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding the
plaintiff’s discrimination claim failed under the Ortiz holistic approach and McDonnell Douglas
framework). It is well-settled that a plaintiff may still utilize the McDonnell Douglas “burden-
shifting” framework to meet the holistic standard described in Ortiz. Id.; Johnson v. Advocate
Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2018). Regardless of the approach applied in
proving a discrimination case, at summary judgment Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate
genuine issues exist for trial. Markel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 276 F.3d 906,
910 (7th Cir. 2002). The Parties have chosen to present their positions using the McDonnell
Douglas framework. The Court will do the same.
A. McDonnell Douglas Framework

The McDonnell Douglas framework for employment discrimination claims requires
Plaintiff to show: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting the defendant’s
legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated
employees who were not members of his protected class were treated more favorably.
Marnocha, 986 F.3d at 718. A court need not address the other elements of the framework,
including legitimate business expectations, where the plaintiff failed to satisfy the fourth element
by not providing sufficient evidence regarding a similarly situated individual. McDaniel, 940
F.3d at 368. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.” Carson v. Lake County, Indiana, 865 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir.
2017). If such reason is given, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer’s explanation is “pretextual.” Id. However, as indicated above, Plaintiff failed to
respond to Defendants’ argument regarding steps five and six and therefore conceded he has no

evidence to offer to support pretext or rebut Defendants’ assertions on these issues. To the extent
some arguments for pretext could overlap with arguments raised where Plaintiff addresses his
employer’s legitimate expectations in prong two, the Court has addressed them below.
Regardless, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish each element of his prima facie
case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
For the purposes of summary judgment, Defendants concede that Plaintiff was disabled
as defined by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and was subjected to an adverse employment
action by virtue of his termination or forced resignation. Doc. 50, at 29. However, Defendants
argue Plaintiff cannot show that he was qualified for the job of patrol officer or that he met the
legitimate job expectations and that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably.

Id. at 30-37. In his Response, Plaintiff claims he met “prong two” because he successfully held
law enforcement jobs before and after he worked at the Department, which demonstrate that he
was “capable or at the very minimum, possesse[d] the capability to at some point, perform those
essential functions.” Doc. 53, at 13 (citing Pltfs. SOF ¶ 2). He then recites the partial definition
of “qualified individual” but does not argue whether he needed a “reasonable accommodation” to
be considered as “qualified.” Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff pivots to claim that he was consistently
improving with his training but struggled due to the “disparate treatment” he faced, as shown by
his circumstantial evidence. Id. The Parties blend their discussions of a “qualified individual”
and “meeting an employer’s expectations.” The Court agrees there is some overlap but the
definition of a “qualified individual” also addresses whether the individual can perform the job
“with or without accommodations.” Therefore, the Court does separate the discussions to review
the accommodation aspect of a “qualified individual.”
A “qualified individual” is an individual who “with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). On the issue of whether Plaintiff was
“qualified,” he did not propose any accommodation that would have enabled him to perform this
job. Even so, his history with the position shows that, even with the accommodation of additional
time, he could not perform the job. Plaintiff agrees that understanding Department policies and
how certain people want the officer to perform were essential functions of the job. See SOF ¶¶
63, 66. Becoming proficient in all 11 areas was also essential to successfully complete the FTP
and become an officer. SOF ¶¶ 17, 38. At the same, Plaintiff admits his ADHD substantially
impacts his ability to focus, learn, and comprehend what he reads. SOF ¶ 61. It has also
substantially limited his ability to work as a police officer by impacting his ability to understand

geography, department policies, logs, work performance, and how certain people want things
done. SOF ¶ 62.
It is undisputed that the only things Plaintiff eventually expressed needing (in November
2017) because of his ADHD were additional time and learning in different ways. SOF ¶ 71. Yet,
all of the written tests that recruits took were untimed, he had additional training time, and
recruits were given a variety of ways to learn geography including learning on the street with
FTOs and being given maps and a list of the hundred blocks. SOF ¶¶ 24, 55, 58. Plaintiff does
not challenge the adequacy of training on this subject from FTOs or the written material he
received. Nor does he explain what he should have been allowed to learn instead. Moreover, he
ultimately passed the geography exam. However, geography was only one piece of the 11-
category competency puzzle and the test was one aspect of the evaluation for competency in this
category. After the end of his extended training spanning an additional six weeks to that of a
typical recruit, the FTO in the shadow phase still concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the

performance standards in five areas. SOF ¶ 128. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown he could perform
the job with or without accommodations, which is a prerequisite to his disparate treatment claim.
As persuasively argued by Defendants, Plaintiff admittedly could not meet his
employer’s expectations. To the extent Plaintiff relies on his jobs before and after he worked at
the Department to meet this prong, the expectations of another law enforcement office wholly
fail to address the “Defendant’s expectations” here. The second prong does not ask for the
expectations of police departments or the broad umbrella of “law enforcement” generally, it asks
for those of the named Defendant, the City of Peoria. Moreover, the Court “must examine [his]
performance at the time of the challenged adverse actions,” not at some later date with a different
employer. Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 788 (7th Cir. 2007). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

reference to his employment prior to his position as a Peoria Police Department recruit and his
post-employment positions are not relevant.
Turning to the undisputed facts, Plaintiff was aware during training that he was
performing below standards throughout phases I, II, and III of training as well as the shadow
phase. SOF ¶¶ 90, 98, 101, 115, 122, 125. It is undisputed that Plaintiff knew he had to
successfully complete the FTP as well as the year and a day probationary period. SOF ¶¶ 14, 17.
Plaintiff failed to do so because of his inability to meet the standards in all 11 categories,
therefore he could not have met his employer’s legitimate expectations.
Regarding the FTP, Plaintiff agrees there were 11 areas of competency he had to receive
satisfactory scores in and every recruit who had successfully completed the program and was
hired had satisfactory performance standards in all of these areas by the end of the shadow phase.
SOF ¶ 51. His evaluations were rated consistently below standards with few exceptions. SOF ¶¶

87-90, 94-95, 98-99, 101-102, 104, 107-108, 111-112, 114, 117-120, 122-123, 125, 128. Plaintiff
does not contest the legitimacy or reasonableness of any of these 11 categories of expectations.
He did not dispute the evaluations he received throughout the process as he read, understood,
initialed, and signed each evaluation. SOF ¶¶ 88, 95, 99, 102, 112. Aside from one evaluation, he
never wished to discuss his FTO’s evaluations with the training sergeant. SOF ¶ 112. Thereafter,
Venzon even shadowed him and observed deficiencies like the FTOs had been documenting
throughout his field training process.
Plaintiff also received additional time to complete his training beyond that of a typical
recruit, but he still failed to consistently meet performance standards, which resulted in Venzon’s
recommendation to terminate his probationary period. SOF ¶¶ 129, 132, 134. Even after remedial

training, he continued to score below the standards in electronic communications, geography,
written communication, and field performance. During the shadow phase, Plaintiff also admitted
other specific issues he had: that he missed radio traffic, used poor routes to get to call locations,
drove past target addresses, failed to secure a suspect in a timely manner, and did not interview a
victim before closing a domestic violence call. SOF ¶ 120. He was slow to put out information
on the radio, failed to check a suspect for warrants even when prompted, relied heavily on the
computer system to find locations, made some officer safety errors putting himself and others at
risk several times, and his FTO often corrected his reports. SOF ¶ 122. These concessions are
fatal to Plaintiff’s claims as he has essentially conceded he did not meet the Department’s
expectations. See Buntin v. City of Indianapolis, 500 Fed. Appx. 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2013);
Squibb, 497 F.3d at 788. Based on the Court’s discussion above, it is clear Plaintiff has not
shown he met his employer’s legitimate expectations or that those expectations were illegitimate.
This same evidence regarding the employer’s expectations could be used to rebut any

perceived argument by Plaintiff as to pretext for his termination and Defendants do argue it as
such. See Doc. 50, at 38-40. Defendants argue Plaintiff was terminated because of his poor and
inconsistent performance throughout his training, including the shadow phase, and Chief
Mitchell’s belief that he would not be an effective police officer. Id. at 39-40. “The only concern
in reviewing an employer’s reasons for termination is the honesty of the employer’s beliefs.”
Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Balderston v.
Fairbanks Morse Engine Division, 328 F.3d 309, 323 (7th Cir. 2003)). To show pretext, a
plaintiff must present evidence suggesting the employer’s “proffered reason is a lie” by
identifying “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s
asserted “reasons that a reasonable person could find it unworthy of credence.” Marnocha, 986

F.3d at 721 (quoting Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018); Boumehdi v.
Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In his brief, Plaintiff does not challenge the honesty of Chief Mitchell’s belief that he did
not meet the Department’s standards or his ultimate decision that Plaintiff should be terminated.
See SOF ¶¶ 137-138. Plaintiff also did not dispute Chief Mitchell’s affirmation in his deposition
that ADHD did not impact his decision to terminate Plaintiff. SOF ¶ 139. In his Response,
Plaintiff does not challenge the honesty of the evaluations he received throughout his FTP,
agreeing they were the FTOs opinion; rather, he simply disagrees with them. An inquiry into
pretext evaluates “the honesty of the employer’s explanation, rather than its validity or
reasonableness[.]” Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover, mere
subjective disagreement with evaluations of one’s own performance does not create a genuine
issue of material fact as to an employer’s honest assessment of whether the employee met
legitimate job expectations. Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Comm., Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1114 (7th

Cir. 1998). It is undisputed that at the time of his termination, Venzon, Scally, and Chief Mitchell
did not believe Plaintiff was meeting the Department’s standards and they had exhausted all
reasonable training to help him succeed. See generally SOF ¶¶ 130-139. Additionally, Plaintiff
did not dispute the process that took place regarding the decision to terminate him. In sum,
Plaintiff has failed to rebut the voluminous evidence showing his deficiencies throughout the
FTP and he has not provided evidence that the Department’s reason for termination was
pretextual. See generally SOF ¶¶ 86-120.
Although Plaintiff claims to follow the McDonnell Douglas framework, he fails to
address the fourth prong requiring him to identify someone who was similarly situated to him but
treated more favorably. This failure alone is fatal. See McDaniel, 940 F.3d at 369 (holding a

plaintiff’s prima facie case failed where she failed to identify any similarly situated employees to
allow a factfinder to conduct a “meaningful comparison”) (citing Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Skiba, 884 F.3d at 723. Based on the above, no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff’s ADHD caused him to be terminated.
B. Plaintiff’s Additional Circumstantial Evidence
In the interest of following Ortiz, in addition to the evidence discussed above, the Court
considers the circumstantial evidence Plaintiff offers in further support of his disparate treatment
theory. His circumstantial evidence of discrimination appears to be the vernacular of the U.S.
code governing discrimination, the fact that he was tested multiple times, with different
variations even though Defendants knew he suffered from ADHD, and the fact that unnamed
FTOs made fun of his intelligence.
On the issue of testing, Plaintiff argues he received disparate treatment because he was
given the same test which tested the material in a different order. He claims this was an

intentional act of discrimination. However, his argument is difficult to follow and ultimately
conclusory as he fails to explain in fact or in caselaw, how this administration of the test was
“purposefully detrimental.” Doc. 53, at 15. He does not pinpoint when he took the tests and what
Defendants’ knowledge was regarding his ADHD at the time. Was it just his remark to HR that
he took Adderall for the purposes of a drug test? Was it after his vague remarks to Venzon that he
may need more training and learned differently than others? Or was it after his November 2017
meeting when he finally asked for an ADHD accommodation of more time? Plaintiff does not
allege others who re-took the geography test were presented with the questions in the same order
whereas he was not. Rather, the evidence he cites in his testimony is that he had to take the test
in a different order because, unlike all of the others, he failed to pass the original test. Doc. 50-1,

at 159-161. Defendants’ proffered reason for the change is that the material is the same but it is
presented in a different fashion to prevent test-takers from simply memorizing the answers and it
ensured that Plaintiff was tested on his understanding of the underlying subject matter. Doc. 56,
at 9, 14. Notably, Plaintiff never informed anyone that this presentation caused him an issue
because of his ADHD or that he needed an accommodation. The test was also untimed. Plaintiff
has not challenged the honesty of the employer’s explanation for changing the testing format. See
Hill, 724 F.3d at 968.
Connecting Plaintiff’s argument with the U.S. Code that he cites, he does not explain how
testing the material in a different order was not job-related or was inconsistent with business
necessity. Doc. 53, at 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112). Plaintiff took the test 22 times. It is
reasonable that an employer might be concerned that a test-taker would simply memorize the test
rather than understand the material by repeatedly re-taking the test in the same order. Recall
geography is a critical skill, along with an understanding of Peoria’s 100-block divider system,

so that a police officer can get to where the officer is needed and arrive at a call. SOF ¶¶ 55, 64.
Plaintiff also does not explain which part of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) he intends to use to support
his disparate treatment argument and how the test was not administered in the most effective
manner or what that appropriate manner would have been throughout his 18 attempts to pass.
Plaintiff further states that on top of the academic scrutiny, Plaintiff faced verbal
harassment from others in regard to his intelligence, which directly correlated to his ADHD and
FTO Mitchell specifically heard other FTOs speaking negatively about Plaintiff’s efforts to
progress when it came to geography. Doc. 53, at 15 (citing Pltfs. SOF ¶¶ 57-62). However,
Plaintiff elsewhere waived his argument in support of a hostile work environment claim. Where
relevant to his discrimination claim, it is unclear how all of these comments in Plaintiff’s SOF ¶¶

57-62 “directly correlate[] to his ADHD” and whether they were made by named Defendants in
this case. For example, it is not apparent how being accused of cheating or being told he, as a
recruit, had to eat in a separate car so that the FTOs could meet together, are discriminatory
comments about ADHD. Plaintiff makes no argument to explain such correlations beyond his
conclusory remark. Additionally, many of the statements Plaintiff cites for support are vague in
content and identifying who made the comments about Plaintiff. See e.g., Pltfs. ¶¶ 57-59, 62.
At best, Plaintiff cites to statements that Venzon made multiple times to him during
meetings wherein he asked Plaintiff if he “was stupid, lazy or just doesn’t care.” Pltfs. ¶ 61. Even
if such comments were “arguably discriminatory,” courts are often cautious about relying on
“stray remarks” as evidence of discriminatory animus Bunn, 753 F.3d at 684–85 (citing Teruggi
v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 2013); Merillat v. Metal Spinners,
Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2006)). “[I]solated comments are not probative of
discrimination unless they are ‘contemporaneous with the discharge or causally related to the

discharge decision-making process.’” Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir.
2012) (quoting Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997)). See e.g.,
Hooper, 804 F.3d at 854–55 (holding the defendant’s comment four months before termination
that she had a contentious relationship with her mother-in-law, who was bipolar like plaintiff,
was insufficient to support a discrimination claim); Markel, 276 F.3d at 910 (holding comments
made two months before a termination decision were not contemporaneous to adverse action).
Here, Plaintiff does not identify when these comments were made, and he has not made a causal
connection between them and his termination. Even when considering the evidence Plaintiff
discussed regarding the McDonnel Douglas framework and his circumstantial evidence
described here, the Court still finds that no reasonable juror could find in Plaintiff’s favor that he

was discriminated against because of his ADHD disability. Therefore, summary judgment is
granted on Plaintiff’s claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in Count IX.
II. Section 1983 Disability Discrimination

Regarding Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, Defendants contend the undisputed facts
demonstrate Plaintiff has not stated a claim for disability discrimination under § 1983. Doc. 50,
at 45-47. In his Response, Plaintiff argues the disparate treatment he received was not connected
to a legitimate state interest. Doc. 53, at 16. As cited by Plaintiff, while disabled individuals
receive broader protection under the ADA, the relevant standard of review for an equal
protection claim is rational basis review. Id. at 15-16 (citing U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 202, 302(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182(a). A.H. by Holzmueller
v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 3d 705 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir.
2018); Stevens v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2000)). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that disability is not a “suspect classification” under the Equal Protection Clause,

so a plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation on the basis of their disability has to show
that the state actor’s discrimination was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-68 (2001). The State need not even
articulate its reasoning at the moment the decision is made. Id. at 367. Rather, the challenging
party has the burden to negate “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). A
rational basis “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.” Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, Ill., 588 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
Here, Plaintiff argues because he was tested early-on in his training through multiple tests

which exacerbated his disability, they was not connected to the legitimate state interest of
protecting the public. Doc. 53, at 16. It is unclear whether Plaintiff is referring to all of the tests
on different subjects that he had to take or the times he had to repeatedly take the geography test.
See SOF ¶ 41. Assuming the method of testing was discriminatory, he has not negated every
conceivable rational basis for the difference in treatment. Focusing on the timing of the tests is
hardly enough to meet Plaintiff’s burden to overcome rational basis review. Defendants also
offered various reasons for the early or repeated testing including the City wanting its
probationary officers to learn quickly, complete training without delay, or be able to multi-task
and focus on several things at once during a call. Doc. 50, at 46. All of these reasons appear to be
rationally related to the “legitimate state interest of protecting the public” which Plaintiff argues
to be the interest “of the utmost importance” at issue here. Additionally, Plaintiff repeatedly
struggled with geography throughout the FTP so it is conceivable that his employer may re-test
him on that subject as he previously failed to meet expectations for that category throughout his

training and geography was a critical area that he needed to pass to serve the public as an officer.
Doc. 56, at 17 (citing SOF ¶¶ 86-129). A police officer needs to able to get where the officer is
needed and arrive at a call. SOF ¶¶ 55, 64. These, in turn, relate back to the overall interest of
protecting the public. As such, Plaintiff has not disproved all rational basis, therefore his equal
protection claim in Count I fails, and summary judgment is granted.
III. Section 1983 Procedural Due Process
Plaintiff’s next argument in his Response is that he “did not receive all procedural
protections that were due under the U.S. Constitution.” Doc. 53, at 16. In their Motion,
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff had no property
interest in his probationary employment and even if he did, he received all of the procedural

protections due to him. Doc. 50, at 47-51. Plaintiff’s Response to withstand summary judgment
is brief. He recites the definition of “procedural due process” and its requirements, then admits
he received notice of the termination meeting and was given the opportunity to be heard. Doc.
53, at 17. However, he claims his due process rights were violated because he pays union dues,
therefore, he should have been afforded the opportunity to have the union representative sit in on
the meeting and/or advise him. Plaintiff claims this did not happen because an unnamed union
representative who Plaintiff ran into on his way to the termination meeting informed Plaintiff
that probationary employees were not entitled to union representation. Id. (citing Pltfs. SOF ¶¶
64, 69). There is no evidence cited from the record that indicates Plaintiff paid union dues nor is
it stated in his additional statement of material facts, so the Court disregards that statement.
To state a due process claim, a plaintiff must first establish he had a constitutionally
protected property interest in his employment. Rujawitz v. Martin, 561 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir.

2009); Covell v. Menkis, 595 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a person has a
property interest in his job only where he has a legitimate expectation of continued employment
based on a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff would need to show a legitimate expectation of continued employment by
pointing to an Illinois law, an ordinance, a contract, or some understanding that limited the
Department’s ability to discharge him. Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 296 (7th Cir. 2011) (“It is
well-settled that probationary public employees do not possess a property interested in continued
employment and thus have no right to procedural due process before their employment may be
terminated.”). While Illinois generally does not recognize a property interest in continued
employment for probationary public employees, a municipality may provide greater protection to

these employees through enacting rules and regulations. Id. Such a rule or regulation can only
create a property interest if it is a “clear policy statement” that overcomes the clear statutory
language allowing probationary employees to be fired without cause. Id. at 296-97.
When the Parties briefed this issue at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, Plaintiff claimed
probationary officers in Peoria were given greater due process protection than provided by state
law because Field Training General Order 300.11 created an entitlement to a propriety interest,
which was “strengthened by other agreements, policies, and aspects of the recruit program.”
Doc. 28, at 8 (citing Doc. 23, at 4). The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
due process claim because Plaintiff did assert Defendants were limited in their ability to
discharge recruits. Id. at 9. However, the Court emphasized that “[i]t is questionable whether
FTGO 300.11 or any other provision establishes Umberger had a protected property interest in
his employment because he does not allege recruits could be terminated only for cause.” Id.
Therefore, the Court allowed discovery to proceed with the belief that it would further resolve

the issue. Discovery has concluded and the Court is in better position to opine.
Nothing appears to have changed since the Court’s 12(b)(6) ruling except the standard at
summary judgment is different where the Court does not accept Plaintiff’s bare allegations as
true. Rather, it “is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what
evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Johnson v.
Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). There is no disputed fact that needs
resolved to conclude Plaintiff did not have a property interest in his employment. It is undisputed
that Plaintiff was a probationary employee when he was terminated and General Order 300.11,
which Plaintiff relied on in his Complaint for his procedural due process claims, does not state
that a recruit or probationary officer could only be fired “for cause.” SOF ¶¶ 19, 22. Recruits are

at-will employees during the probationary period, and the Chief of Police does not need cause to
separate a probationary officer from employment. SOF ¶ 18. Plaintiff could not point to a statute,
regulation, rule, general order, or contract that stated that a probationary officer could only be
fired for cause. SOF ¶ 20. In his Response, Plaintiff conceded this issue of a property interest
entirely by failing to demonstrate he has a constitutionally protected property interest, which is
the first requirement for a due process claim. Rujawitz, 561 F.3d at 688 (citing Moss, 473 F.3d at
700; Border v. City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996)). He also failed to respond
to Defendants’ argument on this requirement at all, thus waiving his argument. See C & N Corp.,
756 F.3d at 1026. Based on the undisputed facts, and as laid out in Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 50,
at 47-51), Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of any Illinois law, ordinance, contract, or
some understanding that limited the Department’s ability to discharge him or a “clear policy
statement” that created a property interest in his probationary employment, therefore his due
process claims fail. See Redd, 663 F.3d at 296-97.

To the extent there could be any remaining questions surrounding the union
representative’s role regarding termination meetings for recruits, Plaintiff cites no evidence to
support that he was entitled to representation, that he actually requested it, or that Defendants
prevented a union representative from attending the meeting. More importantly, he fails to
discuss how representation somehow created a property interest. “[P]erfunctory and undeveloped
arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived[.]” Williams,
982 F.3d at 511. This case is at summary judgment, well after discovery has ended wherein
Plaintiff had an opportunity to take discovery on this issue. At this point, his allegations
regarding whether he was entitled to such representation are mere speculation. See Overly, 662
F.3d at 864; Johnson, 325 F.3d at 901. Thus, summary judgment is granted on Count II as

Plaintiff failed to show he had a property interest and there are no disputed facts that require a
trial. See also Doc. 53 (advocating throughout that there are no disputed facts).
IV. Section 1983 Retaliation
In Count VII, Plaintiff’s Complaint also raised a Section 1983 retaliation claim. In ruling
on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court allowed him to proceed on this
theory “by way of a due process violation.” Doc. 28, at 18. It seems Plaintiff has abandoned his
retaliation claim. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2011). He does
not discuss how he was retaliated against in his statement of material facts section or argument
section of his brief even though Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims. He also fails
to respond to Defendants’ arguments in their Motion asking for summary judgment on this claim
and their Reply arguing that Plaintiff waived his claim by failing to demonstrate a triable issue of
fact exists that requires a trial. See Doc. 50, at 51-53; Doc. 56, at 18. Thus, Plaintiff has waived
his arguments to defeat summary judgment. See C & N Corp., 756 F.3d at 1026. Even so,

Plaintiff has conceded he had no property interest, which is a prerequisite to a due process claim.
See Rujawitz, 561 F.3d at 688. Thus, the Court concludes summary judgment is appropriate on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
V. Remaining Arguments: Indemnification and Qualified Immunity
Count VI is a state law indemnification claim against the City or Peoria. Plaintiff
concedes he has not made any substantive allegations against the City of Peoria, rather it is only
being used for indemnification purposes. Doc. 53, at 18. “A local public entity is not liable where
an employee is not liable.” Vill. of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enters., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1100
(Ill. 2001) (citing 745 ILCS 10/2–109). Thus, because Plaintiff no longer has any viable claims
against the individual Defendants, summary judgment is appropriate on Count VI for

indemnification. Additionally, because summary judgment is appropriate on all claims, the Court
need not address the Parties’ arguments regarding qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 50) for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

Signed on this 21st day of January, 2022.
s/ James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136613. Public record. Not legal advice.