# Monroe v. Berryhill

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · March 1, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136210

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 1, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136210

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the ALJ’s failure to explicitly address the claimant’s wife’s testimony did not amount to a fatal failure to consider an entire line of evidence where the ALJ explicitly addressed the claimant’s testimony and the wife’s testimony was “essentially redundant”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLES M., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 19-cv-1178-JES-JEH
)
COMM’R OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 11) for Summary
Judgment and Memorandum (Doc. 12) in Support; Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 15) for Summary
Affirmance and Memorandum (Doc. 15-1) in Support; the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 17); and Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 18) thereto. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 17);
Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 11) is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 15) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been sufficiently detailed in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 17), which the Court now adopts. The Court thus recounts the facts here
in summary fashion.1 Additional facts will be incorporated as necessary in the discussion section.
On June 21, 2015, Charles M. filed an application for disability insurance benefits (DIB)
alleging disability beginning on June 28, 2014. AR 25. His claim was denied initially on
February 18, 2016 and upon reconsideration on May 11, 2016. Id. Charles filed a request for
hearing concerning his application for DIB, which was held before the Honorable Susan F. Zapf

1 Consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 17), references to the pages with the
Administrative Record (Docs. 7, 8) will be identified by “AR [page number].”
(ALJ) on January 17, 2018. Id. At the hearing, Charles was represented by an attorney. Charles,
his wife, and a vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing. Id. ALJ Zapf issued an
unfavorable decision on May 7, 2018, finding that Plaintiff had not been under a disability within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 35.

In the ALJ’s May 2018 decision, she determined Charles had the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease; carpel tunnel; hypothyroidism; hypertension; affective
disorder; and anxiety disorder. AR 27. However, the record was not consistent with a complete
inability to work and a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform based on his age, education, work experience, and his residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). AR 35. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to do the following:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except he could stand
and walk no more than two hours total in an eight-hour day. He had to be able to
stand at his workstation for up to two minutes every 30 minutes to stretch and adjust
position. He could work foot controls occasionally with the right lower extremity.
He could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, and could not climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. He could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel or crouch. He could not work
with concentrated exposure to temperature extremes and hazards. He was limited
to frequent but not constant fingering with the right, dominant hand and frequent
but not constant reaching forward and overhead with the right upper extremity. He
was limited to unskilled work tasks that could be easily resumed if he had
momentary deficits in concentration and attention. He could not do tandem tasks
and needed work with no more than occasional changes in work processes and
procedures. He could tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers, the public and
supervisors.

AR 28-29. On April 4, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Charles’s request for review, making
the ALJ’s May 2018 ruling the Commissioner’s final decision. AR 1. Charles filed the instant
civil action on May 31, 2019 seeking review of the ALJ’s Decision. Doc. 1. On May 14, 2020,
the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation proposing Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance be granted.
Doc. 17, at 21. Plaintiff timely filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s findings. Doc. 18.
LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a decision to deny benefits, the Court “will uphold the Commissioner’s
decision if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and supported his decision with substantial
evidence.” Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial

evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). The Court does not
displace the ALJ’s judgment for its own judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making
credibility determinations. Id.; Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013). A decision
denying benefits does not have to discuss every piece of evidence, but if an ALJ failed to support
her conclusions adequately, then remand is appropriate. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811. If reasonable
minds could differ as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision
to deny benefits. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
In his Objection, which disagrees with nearly all of the Magistrate Judge’s findings,

Plaintiff asks this Court to “decline to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
and reverse the decision of the ALJ and remand this matter for an award of benefits, or, in the
alternative, reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for additional proceedings consistent with the
arguments set forth above.” Doc. 18, at 19. In support Plaintiff raises three principal arguments:
(1) the ALJ did not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s physical RFC or his mental RFC; (2) the ALJ
did not adequately assess opinion evidence; and (3) the ALJ’s symptom evaluation is not
supported by substantial evidence. The Court will address each argument in turn.
1. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Physical RFC and Mental RFC

Overall, Plaintiff takes issue with several of the ALJ’s factual determinations. A
reviewing court must determine, based on the administrative record, whether substantial
evidence supports an agency’s factual determinations. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. The
evidentiary threshold for “substantial evidence” is not high. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has
described it as ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Although Plaintiff may have understandably appreciated more detail in
some areas of the ALJ’s opinion, it was not required to the degree Plaintiff requests. The ALJ
needed to “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford v.
Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000). As the Magistrate Judge
noted, the ALJ must “sufficiently articulate his assessment of the evidence to assure us that the
ALJ considered the important evidence . . . and to enable us to trace the path of the ALJ’s
reasoning.” Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, the Court, like the
Magistrate Judge, can trace the ALJ’s reasoning as to the RFC determinations.

An RFC is a measure of “the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities
on a regular and continuing basis despite limitations from her impairments.” Moore v. Colvin,
743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014). When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must
consider all medically determinable physical and mental impairments, both severe and
nonsevere. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2008). An ALJ’s RFC assessment
must consider both the medical and nonmedical evidence in the record. Dixon v. Massanari, 270
F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not capable of performing his past
relevant work. AR 34. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to do the following:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except he could stand
and walk no more than two hours total in an eight-hour day. He had to be able to
stand at his workstation for up to two minutes every 30 minutes to stretch and adjust
position. . . He was limited to frequent but not constant fingering with the right,
dominant hand and frequent but not constant reaching forward and overhead with
the right upper extremity. He was limited to unskilled work tasks that could be
easily resumed if he had momentary deficits in concentration and attention. He
could not do tandem tasks and needed work with no more than occasional changes
in work processes and procedures. He could tolerate occasional interaction with
coworkers, the public and supervisors.

AR 28-29. As such, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary work with additional limitations.
As to his physical RFC, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to “analyze why the evidence
supported. . . the specific changes in position, fingering, and reaching limitations ascribed to him
by the ALJ.” Doc. 18, at 2. Therefore, the ALJ committed a reversible error based on SSR 96-8p
and Seventh Circuit precedent. Id. Plaintiff’s objection seems to take issue with the phrase
“narrative discussion” from SSR 96-8p. Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s determinations
regarding Plaintiff’s concentration and social limitations accounted for in the mental RFC.
Overall, Plaintiff’s demands for more detailed explanations overlook the standard of articulation
for ALJ decisions. The ALJ need not draft a novel to explain her reasoning. She must minimally
articulate it, such that a reviewing court can trace her reasoning and her decision can be
subjected to meaningful review. Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005)).
a. Sit/Stand Option
Plaintiff asserts the Magistrate Judge did not address his central argument that the ALJ
erred because she did not explain why it was sufficient for Plaintiff to have a sit/stand option
every 30 minutes for up to two minutes at a time as opposed to sit/stand option every 15 minutes.
Doc. 18, at 4. However, this objection ignores the Magistrate Judge’s precise explanation, “the
ALJ did not have to discuss every piece of evidence, [so] she did not have to explicitly explain
why she did not provide for a sit/stand option of a different frequency and duration.” Doc. 17, at
12 (citing Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n ALJ need not mention
every piece of evidence, so long he builds a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”)
(emphasis added)).
In further support of his argument, Plaintiff cites to Lanigan v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 558,

563 (7th Cir. 2017), which the Court finds unpersuasive. Contrary to Plaintiff’s interpretation of
Lanigan, the court did not reverse the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ failed to explain why he
determined “claimant would be off-task 10% of the time as opposed to 5% or 15%.” Doc. 18, at
4. The court reversed the decision because the ALJ did not support her 10% determination with
substantial evidence to build a logical connection between the evidence and the ALJ’s
conclusion. Lanigan, 865 F.3d at 563. In this case, the ALJ’s focus on a sit/stand option every 30
minutes was not a completely arbitrary figure chosen by the ALJ like Plaintiff suggests.
Furthermore, the percentage to which a person can concentrate may be more difficult to quantify
than determining how long a person can sit.
Here, the ALJ supported his sit/stand conclusion with substantial evidence the Court can

readily trace. The ALJ concluded due to his pain, fatigue, and drowsiness, Plaintiff needed to be
able to stand and walk no more than two hours in an 8-hour workday and be able to stand up
from his workstation every 30 minutes for up to 2 minutes. AR 30. Furthermore, ALJ decisions
are read as a whole. Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004). In her decision, the
ALJ also stated that in January 2018, Dr. Smith opined that Plaintiff could sit about 30 minutes at
one time. AR 33. Although the ALJ did not find all of Dr. Smith’s opinions were consistent with
the record and objective evidence, she did give weight to his opinions to the extent they are
consistent with the adopted RFC. Id. Dr. Smith’s 30-minute sitting determination is consistent
with the RFC. In another section of the opinion, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s daily activities at
home then again mentioned he should be able to perform sedentary work with a sit/stand option.
See AR 31. Thus, the Court can trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning between the evidence and
her conclusion regarding the sit/stand option. None of Plaintiff’s citations to the record in his
Objection regarding the stand/sit option change the Court’s opinion.

The Court further notes although Plaintiff provides a laundry-list of case citations, here
and throughout his brief, it is not immediately clear how many of these cases support his
arguments.2 Inundating the Court with inapplicable caselaw citations is not an effective route to
winning one’s argument. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges
are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).
b. Obesity
Next, Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded the ALJ’s failure to
mention Plaintiff’s obesity was a harmless error. Doc. 18, at 5. In his Recommendation and
Report, the Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiff’s argument that if the ALJ had assessed his
obesity and lumbar pain, then the ALJ would have found Plaintiff needed to stand more

frequently to alleviate pain because ‘lumbar pain can be worse when seated, and obesity can
itself exacerbate musculoskeletal conditions.’ Doc. 17, at 13 (citing Doc. 12, at 9). The
Magistrate concluded this argument was “mere speculation” because Plaintiff did not cite any
record evidence to support his contention. Id. (citing Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th
Cir. 2004) (holding remand for explicit consideration of claimant’s obesity would not affect the

2 See e.g., Plaintiff’s citations to Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 2016); Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677,
680 (7th Cir. 2014); Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009); Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir.
2013); Hayes v. Colvin, 2017 WL 5195878 *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2017); Hickey v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5001417 *4
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2017) for the proposition that ALJs may not “play doctor.” Doc. 18, at 3. Based on the discussion
above, the ALJ did not impermissibly “play doctor” in rendering her sit/stand option conclusion without any basis in
the record or medical opinions and Plaintiff’s argument instead focuses on the ALJ’s failure to discuss why she did
not find a different frequency and duration for the sit/stand option. See also the Court’s discussion infra of Plaintiff’s
caselaw citations throughout this opinion.
outcome of the case and claimant did not “specify how his obesity further impaired his ability to
work, but merely speculate[d] that his weight ma[de] it more difficult to stand and walk”).
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that any error in expressly discussing
Plaintiff’s obesity was a harmless error. In his Objection, Plaintiff concedes “that the evidence

does not unequivocally lead to the conclusion that his obesity rendered the sit/stand option
included in the RFC assessment unsupported by substantial evidence.” Doc. 18, at 6. Yet,
Plaintiff urges the Court to find err in the ALJ’s failure to consider Plaintiff’s obesity because it
was “highly relevant” to determining whether the sit/stand option would adequately
accommodate Plaintiff. Id. “But a failure to explicitly consider the effects of obesity may be
harmless error.” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff offered no
evidence to demonstrate how his obesity further impaired his ability to work, other than asserting
it was highly relevant to the sit/stand option. The Seventh Circuit has held, “[a]n ALJ’s failure to
explicitly consider an applicant’s obesity is harmless if the applicant did not explain how her
obesity hampers her ability to work.” Rennaker v. Saul, 820 F. App’x 474, 481 (7th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th
Cir. 2005) does not stand for the categorical rule that it is automatically a reversible error if an
ALJ fails “to assess the impact of a claimant’s obesity on disc and joint disease.” Doc. 18, at 6.
In Gentle, the ALJ had found the claimant was capable of previous work that required standing
much or most of the time, which was not sedentary work. Id. at 867. The court questioned how
the ALJ could have found someone whose disability mainly stemmed from spinal disk disease
which was exacerbated by obesity could have been found capable to perform non-sedentary
work. Id. at 869. Likewise, Barrett also involved light as opposed to sedentary work and it does
not stand for the categorical rule that Plaintiff posits. Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1068
(7th Cir.), on reh’g, 368 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Even if Barrett’s arthritis [in her knees] was
not particularly serious in itself, it would interact with her obesity to make standing for two hours
at a time more painful than it would be for a person who was either as obese as she or as arthritic

as she but not both.”). Unlike those cases, Plaintiff did not explain how obesity would have
impacted his highly restrictive RFC of sedentary work that had additional limitations.
The Court can also infer that the ALJ considered obesity. In the ALJ’s decision, she
discussed Plaintiff’s hypothyroidism and hypertension and cited to B18F/27, a note from Dr.
Singh. See AR 929. That note focuses on hypothyroidism but also mentions Plaintiff’s obesity. In
that same paragraph, the ALJ also discussed a note from Dr. Meridian which stated that
Plaintiff’s conditions were being “treated with aggressive diet, weight loss and caloric
medication and exercise.” AR 31. While the ALJ did not explicitly use the word obesity, it is
clear she considered it.
c. Reaching and Fingering Limitations

Plaintiff also disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that “the Court can
trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning between the record evidence and her conclusion that
Charles’ right hand and right upper extremity limitations were accommodated by a limitation to
frequent fingering and reaching forward and overhead.” See Doc. 17, at 13. Plaintiff’s objection
ultimately asks the court to re-weigh the evidence by arguing the ALJ should have further
restricted Plaintiff’s reaching and fingering limitations. The Court declines to do so.
In reviewing his carpal tunnel, the ALJ considered medical evidence, Plaintiff’s
description of the use of his hands and arms, and his daily activities. This analysis is consistent
with the applicable standard in assessing a claimant’s RFC. An ALJ must consider medical and
non-medical evidence in the record. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1178. The ALJ highlighted that despite
the evidence of carpal tunnel, Plaintiff chose not to undergo surgery, which suggested that the
pain was tolerable. AR 30. Citing to exhibit B10F, the ALJ further noted that Dr. Taiwo reported
positive Tinel’s and Phalen’s tests with 4/5 grip strength in the right hand and Plaintiff had full

grip strength in his left hand. AR 31. In that same exhibit, Dr. Taiwo noted that Plaintiff had
normal grasp and object manipulation ability to fully extend his hands, make fists, and appose
fingers. His range of motion in the shoulders, elbows, and wrists was not limited. In another area
of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ also noted Dr. Smith’s clinical findings of muscle weakness in the
forearm and reduced grip strength, but the ALJ ultimately did not give weight to the opinion of
Dr. Smith to extent he found Plaintiff could not perform sedentary work.
Regarding Plaintiff’s reported symptoms, the ALJ noted they were consistent with an
inability to perform no more than sedentary work. Although not specific to the carpal tunnel
discussion, in discussing activities that supported Plaintiff’s ability to work, the ALJ highlighted
his ability to drive a car, ride a four-wheeler, drive a riding mower, and perform household

chores. The ALJ also pointed out that there had been no hospital or emergency rooms visits for
hand pain since the alleged onset date.
To the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not mention “enough” evidence, the ALJ did
not ignore an entire line of evidence and “an ALJ’s adequate discussion of the issues need not
contain ‘a complete written evaluation of every piece of evidence.’” See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 362
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted). As such, the ALJ applied the appropriate
standard in her consideration of Plaintiff’s reaching and fingering limitations and supported her
conclusions with substantial evidence.
d. Concentration Difficulties and Accommodation
Many of Plaintiff’s objections are premised on his declaration that the ALJ did not
provide a “narrative discussion.” This particular objection is no different. However, Plaintiff’s
interpretation of the words “narrative discussion” throughout his briefs seems to ignore the well-

settled “substantial evidence” standard which requires minimal articulation. See Knox v. Astrue,
327 F. App’x 652, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The ALJ need not provide a written evaluation of
every piece of evidence, but need only “minimally articulate” his reasoning so as to connect the
evidence to his conclusions.”). The Magistrate Judge already reiterated a similar point to Plaintiff
—“Charles loses sight of the fact that the ALJ’s Decision need only be supported by ‘more than a
mere scintilla’ of evidence.” Doc. 17, at 15 (quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154). Plaintiff
acknowledges this remark in his brief but proceeds to ignore it and continue to persist that the
ALJ did not provide a sufficient “narrative discussion.” In disagreeing with the Magistrate’s
Judge’s conclusion, Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not provide substantial evidence for the RFC
determination and the evidence supported a more restrictive RFC. Doc. 18, at 9-11.

In her decision, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff “was limited to unskilled work tasks that
could be easily resumed if he had momentary deficits in concentration and attention. He could
not do tandem tasks and needed work with no more than occasional changes in work processes
and procedures.” AR 29. According to Plaintiff, this determination violates Seventh Circuit
precedent. The Court again disagrees with Plaintiff’s interpretation of caselaw and its
applicability to this case. This case is distinguishable from cases where the Seventh Circuit has
found fault in an RFC assuming that work with simple, routine, and repetitive tasks appropriately
accounted for concentration issues. Nor is there a categorical rule “that an ALJ may never
accommodate ‘moderate’ limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace with only a
restriction to simple instructions and tasks.” Lothridge v. Saul, No. 20-1269, 2021 WL 37503, at
*6 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021). Here, the ALJ added three more restrictions: he is limited to tasks
which “could be easily resumed if he had momentary deficits in concentration and attention;” he
is restricted from tandem tasks; and he can have “no more than occasional changes in work

processes and procedures.” AR 29. In this vein, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s ability to perform
all or substantially all of the requirements of sedentary work was further “impeded by additional
limitations.” AR 35. Therefore, the ALJ confirmed that the VE testified to jobs in the national
economy for a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity. Id. Additionally, “the ALJ explained further limitations were not
established by the record, specifically citing Charles’ reported ability to pay bills, handle
finances, make change, and his observed intact memory and concentration.” Doc. 17, at 15.
At its core, Plaintiff’s objection nitpicks the phrase “unskilled work” in the RFC but
ignores the ALJ’s detailed discussions on AR 32-33 regarding Plaintiff’s mental conditions and
abilities. In addition to Plaintiff’s moderate restrictions in the ability to concentrate, the ALJ also

discussed his mild restrictions in the ability to understand, remember, or apply information, and
his moderate limitations in the ability to adapt or manage oneself. These discussions further
support the ALJ’s mental RFC determination. For example, the ALJ observed that “his work
history evidenced no difficulties working with or sustaining basic tasks,” “the record fail[ed] to
establish evidence of any significant deterioration in cognitive functioning since the claimant
stopped working,” and “Dr. NieKamp concluded that the claimant’s ‘cognitive functions
appeared to be operating within expected developmental limits.’” AR 32.
It is unclear as to how Plaintiff’s citations to AR 32-33, 55, 76, 78, 171-75, 190-97, 354-
56, 378-79, 674, support his argument that he experienced more than “fleeting” concentration
lapses. Aside from his failure to articulate the significance of these pages, only AR 674 appears
to potentially support his argument. This a report from Dr. NieKamp on 12/18/2015, in which
Charles reports “poor focus and concentration,” without further explanation, so it is unclear how
that contradicts the RFC. Even so, AR 674 is inconsistent with other pages Plaintiff cites, AR

354 and 378, which appear to be self-reports authored by Plaintiff on 11/24/2015 and 4/24/2016,
respectively. Notably, in the section titled “check any of the following items that your illnesses,
injuries, and conditions affect,” Plaintiff did not check the boxes “memory,” “concentration,”
“understanding,” and “following instructions.” AR 354; 378. Based on the dates of these reports,
they were authored before and after Dr. NieKamp’s report. Based on these considerations, the
Court does not understand why Plaintiff cited these pages or how they strengthen his argument.
Regardless, an “ALJ is not required to discuss every snippet of information from the medical
records that might be inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence.” Pepper, 712
F.3d at 363. If Plaintiff’s argument rests on his subjective complaints located elsewhere in his
testimony, the Court will not scour the record to find them. Thus, Plaintiff has not identified any

grounds for remand based on the ALJ’s mental RFC determination.
e. Social Interactions
In the ALJ’s decision, she concluded Plaintiff has moderate restrictions in his ability to
socialize, so the RFC limited him to occasional interaction with coworkers, the public and
supervisors. AR 28-29. Plaintiff’s brief objection here is another disagreement with the
“substantial evidence” standard and a demand for the ALJ to explain why she did not find a
greater limitation regarding Plaintiff’s social interactions. In disagreeing with the ALJ’s
conclusion, Plaintiff points to his “temper, easy irritation, mood swings, and isolation” as well as
the state agency doctors’ opinions’ that he “had moderate limitations in accepting instructions
and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors.” Doc. 18, at 13. However, the
Magistrate Judge already precisely addressed these concerns Plaintiff raised.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate’s Judge analysis regarding social interactions.

[Plaintiff] seemingly chooses to ignore what the ALJ explicitly stated in her
Decision. She cited Charles’ own report in August 2017 that he was able to control
his irritability so that it did not affect his relationships; his doctor thought his mood
“decent;” his report to Dr. Smith in October 2015 that Paxil helped considerably
with his anger issues; his record did not include evidence of evictions, altercations,
or severe social isolation; claims representatives described him as cooperative and
appropriate; and his reports that he interacted regularly with family, although he
said he tended to limit his social contacts with them. Reading the ALJ’s Decision
as a whole and with commonsense, she most certainly determined Charles could
occasionally interact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors in light of such
evidence. See Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is proper
to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole . . . .”); Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 564
(7th Cir. 1999) (“we give the opinion a commonsensical reading rather than
nitpicking at it”).

Doc. 17, at 16-17. Plaintiff’s continued objection that the ALJ erred by failing to explain why she
did not find greater limitations in the RFC is unavailing. Plaintiff does not articulate what those
greater limitations should have been. Instead, he simply states the ALJ’s error was outcome-
determinative because “SSR 85-15 states that the inability to perform the basic mental demands
of unskilled work . . . significantly erodes the occupational base.” Doc. 18, at 13. However, none
of Plaintiff’s citations to the record are illuminating. See id. (citing AR 76-77, 175-77, 195-97,
354-56, 378-79, 516-17, 674). These citations do not contradict the moderate limitations in the
RFC. For example, on AR 197, a state agency physician wrote “client has the ability to relate and
communicate with other and tolerate work pressures. The client[’]s adaptive and interpersonal
and cognitive resources are capable of doing one and two step unskilled tasks to the extent of his
physical limitations.” As such, Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence demonstrating he cannot
“perform basic mental demands of unskilled work.” Moreover, pointing to evidence the ALJ did
not discuss does not necessarily mean the ALJ did not support her conclusion with substantial
evidence. Like the Magistrate Judge, this Court can trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning and
finds the ALJ logically supported her conclusion with substantial evidence. The Court will not
re-weigh the evidence even though Plaintiff disagreed with the outcome of the ALJ’s decision.
2. The ALJ Adequately Assessed Opinion Evidence

In his Objection, Plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” for not fully
crediting Dr. Smith’s opinion that Plaintiff could not perform sedentary work. Doc. 18, at 14.
Plaintiff’s argument does not add much more than a recitation of the applicable standard and the
Magistrate Judge’s previous findings on this issue.
Plaintiff does not claim abnormal evidence compelled a finding of disability but he
asserts the evidence and Plaintiff’s symptoms show the ALJ did not give “good [enough]
reasons” for discrediting parts of Dr. Smith’s opinion. Id. Yet, at the end this argument, Plaintiff
asks the Court to award benefits because “Dr. Smith’s work-preclusive opinion is well supported
by clinical and diagnostic findings.” Id. at 16. An award of benefits is only appropriate when “all
factual issues involved in the entitlement determination have been resolved and the resulting

record supports only one conclusion—that the applicant qualifies for disability benefits.” Allord
v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2011). This case does not qualify for such extraordinary
relief. As discussed below, the ALJ applied the appropriate standard in reviewing Dr. Smith’s
opinions and “minimally articulate[d] her reasons for rejecting evidence of disability in the form
of Dr. Smith’s opinions.” See Doc. 17, at 18 (citing Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872).
Pursuant to the “treating physician rule,” an opinion from a treating physician regarding
the nature and severity of an impairment is given controlling weight if it “is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2)
(applicable to claims filed before March 27, 2017); Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added).
“An ALJ must offer good reasons for discounting the opinion of a treating physician.” Israel v.
Colvin, 840 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2016). When an ALJ does not give controlling weight to the
opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must weigh the opinion in accordance with the factors in

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Scrogham, 765
F.3d at 697-98; Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2006). Those factors include 1)
examining relationship; 2) treatment relationship, including the length of the treatment
relationship and the frequency of examination, and the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship; 3) supportability; 4) consistency; 5) specialization; and 6) other factors brought to
the Social Security Administration’s attention. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2). “[O]nce well-
supported contradicting evidence is introduced, the treating physician’s evidence is no longer
entitled to controlling weight[,]” then “the treating physician’s evidence is just one more piece of
evidence for the administrative law judge to weigh.” Bauer, 532 F.3d at 608 (quoting Hofslien v.
Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the ALJ described the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Smith,
including his December 2016, January 2017, and January 2018 opinions. AR 33. Thereafter, the
ALJ described the weight she gave to Dr. Smith’s opinions. The ALJ did not give them weight
“[t]o the extent Dr. Smith stated the claimant could not sustain a limited range of sedentary work,
his opinions are out of proportion to the objective evidence and were given no weight.” AR 33.
Thus, the ALJ gave Dr. Smith’s opinions weight to the extent they are consistent with the
adopted RFC, which is highly restrictive. Id.
As the Magistrate Judge reminded Plaintiff, the ultimate RFC decision is reserved for the
Commissioner. Here, Plaintiff asserts “Dr. Smith was in the best position to opine on [Plaintiff]’s
limitations as a result of his impairments, and the ALJ did not rely on any other specific medical
opinion in the record.” Doc. 18, at 14. However, this assertion ignores the ALJ’s discussion of
other physicians and reports throughout the ALJ’s opinion. An ALJ considers the evidence as a
whole including medical and non-medical. Even if Dr. Smith was the best to opine of Plaintiff’s

impairment, the ALJ was not bound by his opinion. It would run affront to the SSA benefits
process and the 404.1527(c)(2), which allows an ALJ to give controlling weight to a treating
physician where appropriate or give it less weight depending on the (c)(2) factors. Presumably,
Dr. Smith is not an impartial vocational expert like the one who testified at this hearing.
Plaintiff’s argument also assumes that Dr. Smith considered all of evidence that an ALJ would
and did here when Dr. Smith remarked that Plaintiff could not sustain sedentary work. SSA
benefits determinations are not reserved to the sole opinion of a physician. Physicians are, of
course, often integral to the process of determining whether an individual is disabled within the
meaning of the SSA, but they are not the final arbiter on this issue. Otherwise, this system and
process would be entirely different.

Even if the Court does not agree with the weight afforded to a treating physician’s
opinions, the Court’s review is “limited to whether the ALJ sufficiently accounted for the factors
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527” and “built an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ between the evidence and
his conclusion.” Schreiber v. Colvin, 519 F. App’x 951, 959 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming the denial
of benefits where the ALJ did not explicitly weigh each factor in discussing a treating physician’s
opinion, but his decision clearly showed that he was aware of the factors and considered many of
them, including the treatment relationship, the supportability of the opinion, and the consistency
of the physician’s opinion with the record as a whole) (quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,
415–16 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Like the Magistrate Judge concluded, “the ALJ clearly considered the supportability and
consistency of Dr. Smith’s opinions. That conclusion is supported by substantial evidence given
the ALJ’s consideration of Charles’ daily activities, his reported symptoms, the efficacy of his
medications, and physical consultative examination results.” Doc. 17, at 19. Furthermore, despite

Plaintiff’s insinuation, an ALJ interpreting a claimant’s daily activities or subjective symptoms,
is not the same as an ALJ interpreting an MRI. See Doc. 18, at 14 (citing Kaminski v. Berryhill,
894 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 2018)). The ALJ also recognized Dr. Smith was a treating source
with a long-term treatment history, which is a 404.1527(c)(2) factor. However, she also found
inconsistent or contrary evidence in that “the diagnostic and clinical findings of record [were] not
as severe as Dr. Smith indicate[d].” AR 34. In sum, the ALJ clearly was aware of and considered
many of the (c)(2) factors and built a bridge between the evidence and her conclusions regarding
the weight she gave to Dr. Smith’s opinions, which disagreed with his ultimate conclusion that
Plaintiff could not sustain sedentary work.
3. Plaintiff’s Remaining Objections

Using a vague heading and short, convoluted remarks, in Plaintiff’s last section of
objections, he argues the ALJ did not support her “symptom evaluation” with substantial
evidence. Doc. 18, at 16-18. The Court will only address Plaintiff’s specific and articulated
arguments in this section because “perfunctory and undeveloped” arguments are deemed waived.
Horr v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 16, 20 (7th Cir. 2018). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ
erred by (1) failing to address his medication side effects; (2) failing to explain why the activities
the ALJ cited were inconsistent with his alleged symptoms; and (3) failing to explicitly discuss
Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony. The Court finds all of these objections unavailing.
a. Medication Side Effects
Throughout his brief, Plaintiff raises the ALJ’s consideration of the side effects of
Plaintiff’s medications and ultimately asserts “the ALJ’s failure to address his medication side
effects was erroneous.” Doc. 18, at 17. ALJ decisions are read as a whole, and here the ALJ

discussed the side effects throughout her opinion. For example, she discussed “due to back pain,
fatigue, and drowsiness from medications, he could only stand and walk no more than two hours
total in an eight-hour day.” AR 30. In another instance, the ALJ acknowledged, “claimant is
taking strong pain medications. . . and says his medication makes him tired, but he drives his
child to school.” AR 31. The ALJ noted Plaintiff admitted the medications reduced his pain
levels and relieved mental symptoms. Id. The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s “drowsiness from
medications distract him to the extent he was limited to unskilled work tasks that could be easily
resumed if he momentary deficits in concentration and attention.” AR 33. Thus, the Court
disagrees that the ALJ failed to address the side effects of his medications.3
Plaintiff further alleges the ALJ failed by not investigating whether Plaintiff timed his

medications so that he could drive his son to school. This objection goes to the fullness of the
record, which can be good cause for remanding a case. Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th
Cir. 2009). An ALJ has a duty to develop a full and fair record but if a claimant is represented by
counsel, then counsel is presumed to have made his best case before the ALJ. Skinner v. Astrue,
478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007). Even a claimant that appeared without counsel at the social
security hearing must identify a “significant omission” in order to justify remand, such as
medical evidence the ALJ did not consider. Nelms, 553 F.3d at 1098. “Mere conjecture or
speculation that additional evidence might have been obtained in the case is insufficient to

3 By submitting this brief, counsel certified that the factual contentions will have evidentiary support. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b)(3). This one clearly did not.
warrant a remand.” Id. (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). Here, other counsel
represented Plaintiff at the proceeding, so the ALJ did not have a heightened duty to develop the
record that may or may not have included probing into the timing of medications. Even so,
Plaintiff’s argument is mere speculation because it only posits a hypothetical that Plaintiff may

have timed his medications. See Doc. 18, at 17 n.3.
Additionally, the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s point that the Seventh Circuit has
remarked that “taking ‘heavy doses of strong drugs’ indicates that the claimant’s complaints of
pain are likely credible.” See Scrogham, 765 F.3d at 701 (citing Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d
751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004) (criticizing the ALJ for inferring the claimant was a good actress fooling
“a host of doctors and emergency-room personnel into thinking she suffers extreme pain” and
inferring medical workers prescribed drugs and other treatment even though they thought she
was faking her symptoms). However, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not disregard
Plaintiff’s pain and concentration difficulties as mild and discrete. Due to pain, the ALJ
concluded he could not perform physically demanding work but rather, only sedentary work with

a sit/stand option. AR 31. The ALJ also concluded he had moderate restrictions in his ability to
concentrate due physical and mental symptoms, which required further limitations. AR 33. Just
as a diagnosis does not equate to a disability under SSA, taking medicine does not automatically
compel a finding of disability. It is relevant to an ALJ’s inquiry but taking medicine, on its own,
it not outcome determinative. Furthermore, the ALJ did not solely rely on his medications in
concluding that Plaintiff’s statements were not fully consistent with a complete inability to work.
b. Daily Activities and Subjective Symptoms
Plaintiff further claims the ALJ failed to explain why Plaintiff’s daily activities “were
inconsistent with his alleged problems with repetitive standing and walking, manipulative
activities, and concentration limitations.” Doc. 18, at 17. Plaintiff further claims the ALJ violated
Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) because she drew an “explicit link”
between Plaintiff’s daily activities and his ability to work. Id. But “[m]isreading the record and
misreading the ALJ’s opinion are not the routes to securing a remand.” Migdalia M v. Saul, 414

F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (internal citations omitted). The Court disagrees with
Plaintiff’s application of Bjornson and attempt to equate different activities.
Unlike Bjornson, “the ALJ made clear that Charles’ ‘choice of elective activities’
undermined the extent to which he alleged his pain interfered with his ability to work as she
stated ‘the undersigned cannot conclude that he is entirely precluded from all work activities due
to problems with pain.’” Doc. 17, at 21-22. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s activities in the context
of her evaluation as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms.
Further, it is clear the ALJ’s determination did not rest simply on the fact that Plaintiff drove an
ATV or rode a lawn mower. Nor did Plaintiff describe these as events which led him to seek
medical care. As to Plaintiff’s comment that he was able to ride an ATV with the option of

breaks, regardless of how many breaks one took riding an ATV, there are still vibrations one
would feel and other potential pain complications. Plaintiff admitted as much in his testimony
that he cites. See AR 76. It was not impermissible for the ALJ to mention Plaintiff’s elective
activities. To the extent Plaintiff argues he could re-adjust at his own choosing during these
activities, the ALJ added a limitation to sedentary work that would allow him to stand and re-
adjust his position every 30 minutes.
As to Plaintiff’s comment that the ALJ did not “properly address [his] qualifications”
about riding an ATV, the ALJ clearly considered those qualifications as they were embedded in
Plaintiff’s testimony and the ALJ highlighted Plaintiff “said he pays for his activities.” AR 29.
The Court does not see how Plaintiff’s citation to AR 76 encompassing testimony from the social
security hearing supports his position. On that page of testimony, the following exchange occurs:
Q: All right. You’ve described some activities that you do and then you mentioned
paying for it afterwards, but give us some more detail about what do you mean by
paying for it afterwards?
A: Like if we go for a four-wheeler ride and just – I’ve got a nice four-wheeler. It’s
independent suspension and stuff, so it absorbs a lot of that but you still feel some
of that when you’re riding. So if we go for, you know, an hour ride, or whatever,
and come back I’ll spend the rest of the day in – in the bathtub soaking, take a pain
pill and I’ll go lay down for the rest of the night and sometimes into the next day.

Id. (emphasis added). Even if Plaintiff “paid for it later” after riding an ATV, he still chose to
continually engage in that activity at least up to an hour based on this testimony. Considering the
highly restrictive RFC, it is unlikely that Plaintiff would be engaging in full-time work akin to
the physical nature of riding an ATV and its after-effects specific to Plaintiff. It is not
unreasonable that the ALJ included this fact when discussing the severity and persistence of his
symptoms. Again, the ALJ’s opinion does not hinge on Plaintiff’s four-wheeler activity as she
only mentioned it briefly. Thus, the ALJ did not impermissible equate an ill-advised activity to
the ability to work full-time as Plaintiff suggests.
To the extent Plaintiff again objects to the ALJ’s analysis of his subjective allegations, an
ALJ’s analysis of a claimant’s allegations does not have to be perfect. Migdalia, 414 F. Supp. 3d
at 1135 (citing Shideler, 688 F.3d at 312). It is still permissible for an ALJ to examine a
claimant’s daily activities in assessing whether ‘testimony about the effects of his impairments
was credible or exaggerated.’ Id. (quoting Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007)).
“[A]lthough an ALJ may not ignore a claimant’s subjective reports of pain simply because they
are not fully supported by objective medical evidence, discrepancies between objective evidence
and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration.” Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th
Cir. 2008).
The Court finds the ALJ properly considered the SSR 16-3P factors. As the Magistrate
Judge highlighted, “SSR 16-3p directs the ALJ to focus on the ‘intensity and persistence of the
applicant’s symptoms.’” Doc. 17, at 19 (quoting Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir.
2016)). Pursuant to SSR 16-3p, all evidence, “including objective medical evidence, is to be

considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s
symptoms.” Id. at 20. Additionally, the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) are to be
considered. Id. These factors include: “claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors;
medications and their side effects; non-medication treatments; any other measures used to relieve
pain or other symptoms; and any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations
and restrictions due to pain and other symptoms.” Id. (citing SSR 16-3p, at *7-8).
As to objective medical evidence, the ALJ highlighted “medical evidence pertaining to
Charles’ back, wrist, neck, and hands. She pointed out that Charles testified his pain averaged 3-
4/10 with medication and that he reported in February 2017 that he was able to control his pain

somewhat with his current treatment regimen.” Doc. 17, at 20 (citing AR 31). She acknowledged
Plaintiff’s “multiple treatment modalities,” but then discussed the absence of objective severe
pain signs. She also pointed out there were no hospital or emergency room visits for back or
hand pain after the alleged onset date and he did not require an assistive device. She described
how “he took strong medications which he said made him tired yet he drove his son to school,
his pain medications reduced his pain level, and his daily activities included riding a four-
wheeler with his son, driving a riding mower, folding clothes, vacuuming, cooking, taking out
the trash, and helped his son with his homework.” Id. In the aggregate, these were appropriate
considerations. In doing so, the ALJ also discussed perceived inconsistences between Plaintiff’s
daily activities and the medical evidence. Thus, the ALJ properly assessed the extent to which
Plaintiff’s subjective allegations were consistent with and supported by other record evidence.
c. Plaintiff’s Wife’s Testimony
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ did not err by

failing to explicitly discuss the testimony of Plaintiff’s wife because it was essentially redundant.
In the beginning of the ALJ’s decision, she noted that Plaintiff’s wife testified but did not further
discuss the testimony or its credibility. This case is different than Garcia, which Plaintiff cites,
where an ALJ gave a claimant’s fiancé’s testimony only “some weight, recognizing the potential
for bias.” Garcia, 741 F.3d at 761. The Seventh Circuit criticized the ALJ’s reliance on assumed
bias to discount the fiancé’s testimony but did not expressly find reversible error on this point.
Regardless, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s basis for rejecting this objection:
Though Charles assigns error to the ALJ’s failure to explicitly consider his wife’s
testimony, the portions of her testimony he highlights are essentially redundant of
Charles’ own statements and testimony. Therefore, because the ALJ sufficiently
considered Charles’ statements and testimony, the ALJ did not err in failing to
explicitly discuss his wife’s testimony. See Carlson, 999 F.2d at 181 (explaining
that the ALJ’s failure to explicitly address the claimant’s wife’s testimony did not
amount to a fatal failure to consider an entire line of evidence where the ALJ
explicitly addressed the claimant’s testimony and the wife’s testimony was
“essentially redundant”).

Thus, the Court finds no reversible error based on the failure to include this testimony.
In conclusion, on this record, the Court finds Plaintiff’s assertions of error unconvincing.
The Court concludes the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and supported her decisions
with substantial evidence. As the Seventh Circuit succinctly stated in Schreiber, “the ALJ’s
decision was not perfect. But it was supported by substantial evidence, and [the Court] must
nevertheless affirm the denial of benefits even if ‘reasonable minds could differ concerning
whether [Plaintiff] is disabled.’” 519 F. App’x at 962 (quoting Elder, 529 F.3d at 413).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 17). Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 11) for Summary Judgment is DENIED,
and Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 15) for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s

decision to deny benefits is AFFIRMED.
The Clerk is directed to close the case.
Signed on this 1st day of March, 2021.
s/James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10136210. Public record. Not legal advice.