# Restricted Filer - Morgan v. United States

> District Court, S.D. Florida · March 13, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10123123

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 13, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-20946-RAR
(16-CR-20652-RAR)

ROBERT LOUIS MORGAN IV,
as “next friend of”
ROBERT LEWIS MORGAN, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.
__________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS AND
DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a “Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 filed by Petitioner Robert Louis Morgan IV (“Petitioner”) as “next friend”
of his father, Robert Lewis Morgan, Jr. (“Morgan”). Petitioner alleges that the Government
“violated clearly established law when it used the products of several unreasonable seizures” to
secure Morgan’s conviction in Case No. 16-CR-20652. Pet. at 3. Petitioner asks the Court to issue
a writ of error coram nobis and to vacate Morgan’s conviction. See id. at 9. The Court must
dismiss this Petition for three reasons: (1) Petitioner, a non-lawyer, cannot file pleadings on his
father’s behalf; (2) the Petition is an unauthorized successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. §
2255; and (3) this action is a transparent attempt to circumvent the Court’s sanction restricting
Morgan’s access to the courts that rises to the level of contemptuous conduct.
First, Petitioner cannot file pleadings on Morgan’s behalf because he is not a lawyer. Any
person who wants to appear in federal court can either represent themselves pro se or can hire an
attorney to represent him or her. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. “The right to appear pro se, however, is
limited to those parties conducting ‘their own cases’ and does not apply to persons representing
the interests of others.” Franklin v. Garden State Life Ins., 462 F. App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2012)
(citing Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 1997, overruled in part

on other grounds, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)). Petitioner is not a
lawyer, so he has no right to “represent[ ] . . . the interests of others” by filing documents pro se
on a third-party’s behalf. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873 (11th Cir. 2008).
In response to this, Petitioner says that he has standing to bring this action for Morgan as a
“next friend,” since he is “acting in the best interests of Mr. Morgan” and has a “significant
relationship” with Morgan as his son. Pet. at 7–8. The Court concedes that there are “certain
circumstances” a person may have standing as a “next friend” to “proceed on a party’s behalf.”
Centobie v. Campbell, 407 F.3d 1149, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005). However, to establish “next friend”
standing, Petitioner must meet three prerequisites:
First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation—such
as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why
the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to
prosecute the action. Second, the “next friend” must be truly
dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks
to litigate, and [third] it has been further suggested that a “next
friend” must have some significant relationship with the real party
in interest.

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990) (cleaned up).
Petitioner argues that coram nobis relief is “inaccessible” to Morgan because he is “in
custody.” See Pet. at 6–7. Petitioner is correct that coram nobis relief is unavailable to Morgan,
but, as the Court will explain shortly, it is unavailable to Petitioner as well, so there is no “adequate
explanation” as to why Morgan cannot “appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.”
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163; see also Baker v. McDonough, No. 06-CV-423, 2006 WL 3266469, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2006) (“Petitioner states that his reason for pursuing habeas relief on behalf
of his son is the fact that his son is procedurally barred from filing another section 2254 petition.
However, his son’s procedural inability to present his claim is not the type of ‘disability’
contemplated by Whitmore.” (internal citation omitted)).

Second, this Petition must be construed as a § 2255 motion to vacate and dismissed as
successive. A petition for writ of error coram nobis is only available “when there is and was no
other available avenue for relief.” Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2000)
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)). The Eleventh
Circuit has explained that a defendant cannot seek coram nobis relief to attack a judgment he is
currently “in custody” on since relief under § 2255 is available instead. See United States v. Brown,
117 F.3d 471, 474–75 (11th Cir. 1997); see also McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast,
Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that § 2255 “is the exclusive
mechanism for a federal prisoner to seek collateral relief”). Petitioner’s argument that coram nobis
relief is still available to him—since he is not “in custody” like Morgan—is patently frivolous.

The Petition attacks the same judgment that authorizes Morgan’s present confinement, and, so
long as Morgan remains “in custody” on that judgment, it cannot be altered by a petition for writ
of error coram nobis relief no matter who brings it. See Brown, 117 F.3d at 474–75; United States
v. Garcia, 181 F.3d 1274, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1999).
Since coram nobis relief is unavailable, the Petition “must be construed as a § 2255
motion.” Brown, 117 F.3d at 474. As both Petitioner and Morgan are no doubt aware, a criminal
defendant must receive permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion from the “court
of appeals before the district court may reach the merits of the [successive] motion.” Boyd v.
United States, 754 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2014). Morgan has already filed multiple § 2255
motions challenging the legality of his conviction, and he did not receive permission from the
Eleventh Circuit to file the instant Petition. See Order Striking Motion for Leave to File Petition,
United States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2022), ECF No. 166 at 2–3.
“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive [§
2255 motion].” Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).1

Third, the Petition is a flagrant attempt by Morgan to circumvent restrictions this Court put
in place to restrict his frivolous and malicious pro se filings. To briefly summarize the relevant
procedural history, the Court sanctioned Morgan for “his abusive post-judgment motions in both
his underlying criminal case and his original § 2255 case.” Order Denying Notice of Objection,
Morgan v. United States, No. 22-CV-20653 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2022), ECF No. 5 at 3. Since
Morgan insisted on “inundating the Court with his increasingly asinine arguments,” the Court
barred Morgan from filing any motions related to Case No. 16-CR-20652 without first receiving
permission from the Court to do so. See id. The Court explained that it would only grant Morgan
permission to file additional motions if he: (1) certified that “the issues contained in the proposed

filing are not frivolous” and (2) explained why the “non-frivolous issue cannot be resolved in a
separate action.” Id. Despite this restriction—and numerous explanations from the Court that he
could not file successive § 2255 motions without first receiving permission from the Eleventh
Circuit—Morgan continued to file frivolous motions collaterally attacking his conviction and
sentence, all of which were stricken pursuant to the Court’s prior Order. See Order Striking Motion

1 Morgan’s inability to file a successive § 2255 without permission from the Eleventh Circuit does not
impact the Court’s analysis As the Court explained to Morgan less than two months ago, “[t]he mere fact
that § 2255 imposes restrictions on second or successive motions does not mean that this remedy is
‘unavailable’ to [Morgan].” Jan. 30, 2024 Paperless Order, United States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2024), ECF No. 211 (citing Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 480 (2023)). The continuing
“availability” of § 2255 further emphasizes that coram nobis is not a viable alternative method of
challenging Morgan’s conviction. See Brown, 117 F.3d at 474–75.
for Leave to File Petition, United States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2022),
ECF No. 166; Apr. 19, 2023 Paperless Order, United States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 19, 2023), ECF No. 185; May 18, 2023 Paperless Order, United States v. Morgan, No.
16-CR-20652 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2023), ECF No. 190; Aug. 28, 2023 Paperless Order, United

States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2023), ECF No. 198; Jan. 30, 2024
Paperless Order, United States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2024), ECF No.
211.
Morgan has now apparently taken a new and audacious step to evade the Court’s
restrictions on his pleadings: enlisting his son to file motions on his behalf. The Court uses the
word “apparently” because it is not entirely convinced that Petitioner and Morgan are different
people. In addition to inheriting Morgan’s proclivity for advancing frivolous arguments, the Court
cannot help but notice that Petitioner’s handwriting is indistinguishable from his father’s.
Compare Pet., with Motion for Leave to Reopen Case, United States v. Morgan, No. 16-CR-20652
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2024), ECF No. 210. In the Court’s estimation, Morgan intended to frustrate

and ignore this Court’s Orders by either impersonating his son (without his son’s knowledge or
consent) or by enlisting his son to abet this ill-conceived plot. Either way, this Petition represents
extreme and contemptuous conduct that is “designed to harass those in positions of authority or to
grind the wheels of the judicial system to a halt.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th
Cir. 1986) (en banc).
This escalation of bad-faith conduct has shown the Court that it has indulged Morgan long
enough. The Court has the inherent power to “punish for contempts”—even if the contempt
occurred “beyond the court’s confines.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)
(quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873)). A party’s knowing and willful decision to
ignore a court’s orders can be met with “coercive and compensatory sanctions.” Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1991). However, before the Court
considers imposing civil contempt sanctions on Petitioner and/or Morgan it will—indeed it must—
give the parties an opportunity to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. See

Newman v. State of Ala., 683 F.2d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1982). This opportunity to show cause
is especially important here since the Court has reason to believe that Petitioner is an innocent
party who has unwittingly been dragged into this quagmire through his father’s short-sighted and
selfish actions.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, [ECF No. 1], which the Court construes
as a successive motion to vacate under § 2255, is DISMISSED for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Since the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot issue a
certificate of appealability. See Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.
2007).

2. On or before April 22, 2024, both ROBERT LOUIS MORGAN IV and ROBERT
LEWIS MORGAN, JR., shall SHOW CAUSE in writing why they should not be
held in civil contempt for knowingly and willfully violating the Court’s Orders. The
parties’ written responses shall be mailed to the Clerk of the Court for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida and must contain the case numbers
listed above. Failure to show cause by April 22, 2024, may result in additional
sanctions—including monetary fines and/or incarceration.
3. The U.S. Marshal is hereby ORDERED to serve a copy of this Order on both
ROBERT LOUIS MORGAN IV and ROBERT LEWIS MORGAN, JR, at the
addresses listed below.
4. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk of the Court shall
administratively CLOSE the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 13th day of March, 2024.

a A. RUIZ I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: Robert Louis Morgan IV
635 Indiana Street
Orlando, FL 32805
Robert Lewis Morgan, Jr.
13829-104
Coleman Low
Federal Correctional Institution
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. Box 1031
Coleman, FL 33521

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10123123. Public record. Not legal advice.