# Garcia v. Abbate

> District Court, S.D. Florida · February 9, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10123007

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 9, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10123007

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a state may voluntarily commit a person if they are “both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous”

## Opinion text

SOUTHERN DISTR ICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 23-CV-14419-RAR

JOSE GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

ENZA ABBATE,

Respondent.
______________________________/

ORDER DENYING 28 U.S.C. § 2254 HABEAS PETITION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,1 in which Petitioner challenges his civil commitment in the
custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) after he was found not guilty
by reason of insanity by the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for St. Lucie County, Florida,
in Case No. 2007-CF-000576. See Petition [ECF No. 1] (“Pet.”). Respondent filed a Response to
the Petition. See Response to Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 11] (“Resp.”).
Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, and for the reasons set forth
below, the Court DENIES the Petition in its entirety.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 26, 2007, Petitioner was charged by Information with battery evidencing
prejudice based on the victim’s mental or physical disability (Count 1) and with elderly or disabled

1 The Court initially determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not § 2254, applied to this action since it appeared
“that the state court found [Petitioner] incompetent to stand trial and that he was committed with the hope
of being restored to competency.” Order Requiring Filing Fee, [ECF No. 4], at 1 n.1. With the benefit of
the full state-court record, the Court is now aware that Petitioner was civilly committed after the state court
adjudicated him not guilty by reason of insanity in the underlying criminal case. Accordingly, the Court
modifies its original finding and agrees with both parties that this Petition was properly brought under §
2254. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus review may be available
[under § 2254] to challenge the legality of a state court order of civil commitment or a state court order of
civil contempt.”); Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 232–33 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying § 2254 to
Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a “Motion for Examination of Defendant” pursuant to FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.210, arguing that she had “reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant is incompetent to
proceed.” Motion for Examination, [ECF No. 12-1], at 4. The trial court granted the motion,
appointed an expert, and ultimately committed Petitioner to DCF after two experts concluded that
Petitioner was incompetent to proceed. See Order Appointing Expert, [ECF No. 12-1], at 6–8;

Order Adjudging Defendant Incompetent to Proceed, [ECF No. 12-1], at 10–12. On March 11,
2008, the state court released Petitioner from DCF custody after he agreed to comply with certain
conditions upon release. See Order Allowing Defendant to be Released ROR With Mental Health
Court Conditions, [ECF No. 12-1], at 16–17.
On March 25, 2008, the state trial court adjudicated Petitioner not guilty by reason of
insanity. See Order Adjudging Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, [ECF No. 12-1], at
19. Although the court found that Petitioner had been restored to competence on December 10,
2007, it adopted the written reports of two experts who concluded that Petitioner was “insane at
the time of the alleged offense.” Id. The court further explained that Petitioner “does not meet the

criteria for commitment to a treatment facility of [DCF] as provided in section 916.15(1), Fla. Stat.
(2007), but is in need of mental health treatment and community placement.” Id. at 20.
Accordingly, the court placed Petitioner on “conditional release” under Fla. Stat. § 916.17, and
required Petitioner to “take any psychotropic medications prescribed by his treating physician”
and “participate in the St. Lucie County Mental Health Court and appear for all Court hearings as
noticed.” Id.
On May 20, 2008, the state trial court issued a bench warrant for Petitioner’s arrest after
he failed to appear in court as directed. See Bench Warrant, [ECF No. 12-1], at 23. Defense
counsel quickly moved for the appointment of a mental health expert, stating that Petitioner
Petitioner might “meet[ ] the criteria for involuntary treatment.” Motion to Appoint Mental Health
Expert, [ECF No. 12-1], at 25. The trial court granted the motion, revoked Petitioner’s conditional
release, and ordered Petitioner to be committed to DCF custody. See Order of Revocation of
Conditional Release, [ECF No. 12-1], at 29–31. On March 10, 2010, the trial court concluded that
Petitioner “continues to meet [the] criteria for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Florida

Statute 916.13(1) [and] [FLA. R. CRIM. P.] 3.212” and ordered Petitioner to remain in the custody
of the DCF until further order of the court. Order of Involuntary Recommitment, [ECF No. 12-1],
at 41. Petitioner has remained in DCF custody since then, with the state trial court most recently
reaffirming that Petitioner should remain civilly committed on August 8, 2023. See Order of
Involuntary Recommitment, [ECF No. 12-1], at 43.2 The instant Petition was filed on December
19, 2023. See Pet. at 15.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)],
28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a

writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181
(2011). Some of the more restrictive limits are found in § 2254(d). Under that provision, a federal
court may grant habeas relief from a state court judgment only if the state court’s decision on the
merits was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable

2 A review of Petitioner’s state court docket confirms that Petitioner’s competence has been reviewed every
year since 2010, and the state trial court has consistently found that Petitioner still meets the statutory
criteria for involuntary commitment. See State Court Docket, [ECF No. 12-1], at 33–39.

3 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered
to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). “Absent
evidence to the contrary, [courts] assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date
that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014).
U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, § 2254(d) constructs a “highly deferential standard for evaluating
state-court rulings” because, after all, this standard “demands that state-court decisions be given
the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ federal law if the ‘state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts.’” Consalvo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000)) (brackets omitted). A state court’s decision
qualifies as “an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413) (cleaned up).
“‘If this standard [seems] difficult to meet’—and it is—‘that is because it was meant to be.’” Burt
v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).
By its own plain terms, § 2254(d)’s deferential standard applies only when a claim “was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen, 563
U.S. at 181 (“If an application includes a claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings, § 2254(d), an additional restriction applies.”); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472
(2009) (“Because the Tennessee courts did not reach the merits of Cone’s Brady claim, federal
habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies under AEDPA.”). The
summary denial of a claim with no articulated reasons presumptively serves as an adjudication on
the merits subjecting the claim to § 2254(d)’s additional restrictions. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100
(“This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons
before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’”). This is because
claim has been presented to a state court and denied in that forum. See, e.g., id. at 99 (“When a
federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be
presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication
or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”).
At the same time, “federal court[s] should ‘look through’ [an] unexplained decision to the

last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” if one exists. See Wilson v.
Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (emphasis added). From there, federal courts “presume that
the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. “[T]he State may rebut [that]
presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were
briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.” Id.
In addition to the standard of review imposed by AEDPA, the petitioner must also show
that any constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict to
be entitled to habeas relief. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The Supreme Court

has explained that, while the passage of AEDPA “announced certain new conditions to [habeas]
relief,” it did not supersede or replace the harmless error standard announced in Brecht. Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 134 (2022). In other words, a habeas petitioner must also satisfy Brecht,
even if AEDPA applies. See id. (“[A] federal court must deny relief to a state habeas petitioner
who fails to satisfy either [Brecht] or AEDPA. But to grant relief, a court must find that the
petition has cleared both tests.”) (emphasis in original); see also Mansfield v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
679 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A] habeas petition cannot be successful unless it satisfies
both [AEDPA] and Brecht.”).
Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in his Petition: (1) the “original psyche evaluation
in 2008 did not cite a mental illness but I was committed for 15 years on a charge that if proven
would only carry 5 years,” Pet. at 5; (2) the crimes Petitioner was arrested for “seemed to be a
misdemeanor” since they were originally labeled misdemeanors on the arrest affidavit, id. at 7; (3)
Petitioner “no longer meet[s] the criteria for commitment,” id. at 9; and (4) an unidentified judge

“wouldn’t discuss [the] case” and left the case open “in perpetuity” without providing “termination
objections,” id. at 10. In addition to arguing that all four grounds for relief fail on their merits,
Respondent contends that Grounds 1 and 2 are untimely and that all four grounds for relief are
both “not cognizable because they raise only state law issues” and unexhausted because “Petitioner
never presented the State courts with a federal aspect to his claims.” Resp. at 11–12. Although
Respondent’s procedural arguments are compelling and most likely correct, the Court instead
elects to reach the merits of the Petition since each of Petitioner’s claims can easily be denied,
even under a de novo standard of review. See Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th Cir.
2020) (“[A] federal court may skip over the procedural default analysis if a claim would fail on

the merits in any event.”).
A. Ground One
The Court finds that Ground One is made up of two separate subclaims. First, Petitioner
seems to allege that Chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes does not apply to him because “the original
psyche evaluation in 2008 did not cite a mental illness[.]” Pet. at 5. Second, Petitioner challenges
the length of his civil commitment, arguing that he was “committed for 15 years on a charge that
if proven would only carry 5 years.” Id. Respondent counters that Petitioner has received
“multiple diagnoses and treatment” since 2007 and that Petitioner “can remain involuntarily
14.
Under Florida law, a criminal defendant can be found not guilty by reason of insanity if,
“at the time of the crime, the defendant was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong
as a result of a mental disease or defect.” Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 938 (Fla. 2002).
However, any “defendant who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty

by reason of insanity may be involuntarily committed” if he or she “meet[s] the criteria for
involuntary commitment and [is] treated in accordance with the provisions of this section and the
applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Fla. Stat. §§ 916.15(2), (3)(a). For a defendant
to be involuntarily committed in a way that comports with both Florida law and due process, the
state court must specifically find that “the defendant has a mental illness and, because of the illness,
is manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others.” Id. § 916.15(2); see also Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (holding that a state may voluntarily commit a person if they are
“both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous”).
Contrary to Petitioner’s argument that “the original psyche evaluation in 2008 did not cite

a mental illness,” the state court plainly complied with § 916.15 by adopting specific findings that
Petitioner was afflicted with a mental illness and that this illness caused him to be dangerous to
others before committing him to DCF. Prior to being placed on conditional release on March 11,
2008, an expert psychologist diagnosed Petitioner with schizophrenia but was able to restore
Petitioner to competency with a regimen of pharmaceuticals. See September 15, 2023 Report,
[ECF No. 14-1], at 4. Since then, several experts have consistently opined that—if Petitioner does
not take his medication—he demonstrates symptoms of psychosis and is a threat to others. See id.
at 4–6. While on conditional release, Petitioner “refuse[d] to take [the] psychotropic medication
as prescribed by his treating physician” and did not attend court proceedings as required. Motion
Petitioner’s conditional release and committed Petitioner to the custody of DCF on June 17, 2008,
it adopted the previous psychological reports which found that: (1) Petitioner had a mental illness
(schizophrenia), and (2) because Petitioner was refusing to take his medication, he was a threat to
others. See Order of Revocation of Conditional Release, [ECF No. 12-1], at 29–31. Since the trial
court relied on written reports establishing that Petitioner “is mentally ill, and is a danger to himself

or others[,]” it complied with Florida law and due process requirements when it committed
Petitioner to DCF custody in 2008. Tavares v. State, 871 So. 2d 974, 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
(citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 429).
Petitioner’s second subclaim fares no better. Petitioner alleges that his 15-year involuntary
commitment is presumptively illegal because he was originally charged with two third-degree
felonies—battery evidencing prejudice and elderly or disabled adult abuse4—that each carry a
maximum sentence of five years in prison. See Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(d) (2007) (“For felony of
the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.”). In short, Petitioner says that
it is illegal for his involuntary commitment to last longer than the maximum prison sentence he

could have received had he been adjudicated guilty. Unfortunately for Petitioner, this precise
argument has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court. In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354 (1983), the Court held that the purpose of involuntary commitment “is to treat the individual’s
mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The committed
acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.” Id. at
368 (emphasis added). Criminal sentences, on the other hand, are based on “different

4 See Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(b) (2007) (“[A] person who commits battery commits a misdemeanor of the
first degree[.]”); Fla. Stat. § 775.085(1)(a) (2007) (explaining that, when “the commission of a [first-degree
misdemeanor] evidences prejudice” based on a protected class, then it is “reclassified to a felony of the
third degree”); Fla. Stat. § 825.102(1) (2007) (“A person who knowingly or willfully abuses an elderly
person or disabled adult without causing great bodily harm . . . commits a felony of the third degree[.]”).
necessary correlation between [the] severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery[,] [t]he length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal sentence . . . is irrelevant to the
purposes of confinement.” Id.; see also Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1439 (11th Cir. 1984)
(“[A]n acquittee may be automatically committed for an indefinite period of time after he has
proved at his criminal trial by a preponderance of the evidence that mental illness caused his

criminal act.” (emphasis added)).
The record is clear that Petitioner has a mental illness and presents a danger to others. The
state court did not violate the Constitution by ordering Petitioner to be committed to DCF until he
is no longer a danger, even if that commitment lasts longer than a hypothetical statutory maximum
sentence. The Court thus DENIES Ground One.
B. Ground Two
In Ground Two of his Petition, Petitioner asserts that the crimes he was originally arrested
for were “marked misdemeanor” on his arrest affidavit and were improperly enhanced to felonies
when the Information was filed. Pet. at 7; see also Arrest Affidavit, [ECF No. 12-1], at 83.

Petitioner also repeats a similar refrain from Ground One by arguing that a misdemeanor “doesn’t
qualify for 15 years forensic commitment under [Fla. Stat. § 916.15].” Pet. at 7. These arguments
are meritless. An arrest affidavit is not a charging document, so the state attorney’s normally
unfettered discretion in charging a criminal defendant is not constrained by an initial determination
made by a (non-lawyer) police officer. See Tucker v. State, 987 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA
2008) (“Ordinarily, ‘arrest’ and ‘prosecution’ refer to different stages in the criminal justice
process. ‘Prosecution’ generally refers to the formal pressing of criminal charges by a prosecuting
authority. In Florida, the prosecuting authority is the state attorney, who has the complete
discretion to initiate, continue or terminate a ‘prosecution.’” (citing State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2,
explained when it denied Ground One), the “severity of the offense . . . is irrelevant to the purposes
of confinement.” 463 U.S. at 369. Petitioner can remain involuntarily committed for an indefinite
period of time so long as there is evidence that he has a mental illness and that his mental illness
makes him a danger to the community. See id. at 368; Wallace, 734 F.2d at 1439. Ground Two
is thus DENIED.

C. Ground Three
Petitioner argues in Ground Three that he “no longer meet[s] [the] criteria for
commitment.” Pet. at 9. The record does not support this. The state court most recently found
that Petitioner “continues to meet [the] criteria for involuntary hospitalization” on August 8, 2023.
See Order of Involuntary Recommitment, [ECF No. 12-1], at 41. The court relied on two forensic
evaluations: a February 14, 2023 Report authored by Dr. Elizabeth Hooper, which recommended
that Petitioner remain committed, see February 14, 2023 Report, [ECF No. 14-3], at 1–12; and a
April 19, 2023 Report authored by Dr. Theodore Williams, which found that Petitioner no longer
met “the legal criteria for continued involuntary commitment,” April 19, 2023 Report, [ECF No.

14-2], at 5. After weighing the competing expert reports, the state court adopted the February 14,
2023 Report and extended Petitioner’s commitment for another year. See Order of Involuntary
Recommitment, [ECF No. 12-1], at 41.
Whether a defendant meets the involuntary commitment standard under Fla. Stat. § 916.15
is a finding of fact. See Mannarelli v. State, 767 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Thus,
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Three unless he can rebut the “presumption of
correctness” a federal court applies to state court factual findings with “clear and convincing
evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025,
1035 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“[A] state court’s factual determinations are presumed to be
(internal quotations omitted)). Petitioner provides no evidence—let alone clear and convincing
evidence—that the state court wrongly found that he qualified for involuntary commitment under
§ 916.15. See generally Pet. On the contrary, Petitioner’s most recent evaluation still concluded
that Petitioner “continues to meet criteria for involuntary hospitalization,” even if it recommended
that he be placed in a “less restrictive setting, such as a civil hospital.” September 15, 2023 Report,

[ECF No. 14-1], at 11. Since there is overwhelming evidence that Petitioner still meets the criteria
for involuntary commitment—and given that Petitioner has not even attempted to rebut this
evidence—Ground Three is thus DENIED.5
D. Ground Four
Ground Four is the most cryptic claim. Here is what Petitioner alleges in Ground Four in
its entirety:
In one appeal the Judge said he wanted me to get well but no reason
cited. Wouldn’t discuss case. Case open in perpetuity under FS 916
with no termination objectives given under the statute.

Pet. at 10. Petitioner is obliged to “state the facts supporting each ground” for relief in his § 2254
petition, and the Court can dismiss a claim that does not meet these “heightened pleading
requirements.” Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011). The Court will do its best to
decipher “this vague and conclusory claim,” but it will not “bend over backwards to figure out
every possible argument” Petitioner could be making here. Catoggio v. United States, No. 23-CV-

5 The Court also rejects any argument that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner meets
the statutory criteria for involuntary civil commitment. To show that there is insufficient evidence to sustain
an involuntary civil commitment, Petitioner must satisfy the test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979), which requires Petitioner to show that “no rational trier of fact would have found proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Freeze v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Child. & Fam., No. 08-CV-2045, 2011 WL 3156714, at *5
(M.D. Fla. July 26, 2011). There is ample evidence, including dozens of expert reports dating back to 2007,
showing Petitioner has a serious mental illness and that his refusal to take his medication makes him a
danger to others. See September 15, 2023 Report, [ECF No. 14-1], at 4–6. That is more than enough to
meet Jackson’s sufficiency of the evidence standard.
Petitioner is making three distinct arguments in Ground Four: (1) the state court gave “no reason”
for committing him; (2) the presiding judge “wouldn’t discuss” Petitioner’s case; and (3) his
involuntary commitment is continuing “in perpetuity” without being given “termination
objectives.” All of these claims are meritless.
First, although the state court’s most recent “Order of Involuntary Commitment” did not

contain any detailed factual findings, the court considered and expressly adopted the February 14,
2023 Report and the April 19, 2023 Report—both of which exhaustively discussed Petitioner’s
mental health history, his present dangerousness, and his treatment—into its analysis. See Order
of Involuntary Recommitment, [ECF No. 12-1], at 41. As this Court has repeated several times
now, there is ample evidence in the record showing that Petitioner meets the criteria for involuntary
civil commitment under Fla. Stat. § 916.15.
Second, there is no evidence that the state trial court refused to “discuss” Petitioner’s case.
On the contrary, the record of Petitioner’s most recent hearing in state court shows that Petitioner
appeared by video conference and that he was represented by an attorney who made arguments on

his behalf. See id. at 41 (stating that the trial court considered the “argument of counsel”); Court
Minutes, [ECF No. 12-1], at 85 (reflecting Petitioner and defense counsel’s appearances at the
hearing).
Third, Petitioner is not being held “in perpetuity.” While mentally ill persons who are a
danger to themselves or others may be involuntarily committed, the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution still requires the state to periodically “consider the propriety of ongoing commitment”
and to release a detainee “if the criteria for commitment are no longer met.” J.R. v. Hansen, 803
F.3d 1315, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2015). The state court here has dutifully reviewed the propriety of
Petitioner’s commitment every year for the past fifteen years. See State Court Docket, [ECF No.
to Petitioner’s dangerousness—mainly stemming from Petitioner’s refusal to take medication that
would suppress the symptoms of his psychosis. See September 15, 2023 Report, [ECF No. 14-1],
at 4–6.6 Petitioner’s commitment is reviewed every year “by someone with the duty to consider
and the authority to order release when appropriate” and that is all the Constitution requires.
Hansen, 803 F.3d at 1326. Until the state court has reason to believe that Petitioner “has recovered

his sanity or is no longer dangerous,” he can remain involuntarily committed in the custody of
DCF. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
Since Petitioner fails to identify any constitutional errors, the Court will DENY Ground
Four.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
No evidentiary hearing is warranted in this matter. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 474 (2007) (“[I]f the [state court] record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or
otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”).
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

After careful consideration of the record in this case, the Court declines to issue a certificate
of appealability (“COA”). A habeas petitioner has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district
court’s final order denying his habeas petition. Rather, to pursue an appeal, a petitioner must
obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).
Issuance of a COA is appropriate only if a litigant makes “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do so, litigants must show that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable

6 The Court notes that Petitioner’s most recent forensic report has recommended that Petitioner be placed
in a civilian hospital and expresses optimism that additional progress will be made towards his release if he
“maintain[s] compliance with his current medication regimen[.]” Id. at 11.
or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). And “[w]here a district court has
disposed of claims . . . on procedural grounds, a COA will be granted only if the court concludes
that ‘jurists of reason’ would find it debatable both ‘whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right’ and ‘whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”
Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Franklin vy. Hightower, 215 F.3d
1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Here, reasonable jurists would not debate the Court’s decision to deny the Petition on its
merits. Accordingly, a COA will NOT ISSUE.
CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, it 1s hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. Any request
for a certificate of appealability is DENIED, and an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. All deadlines
are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to
CLOSE the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 9th day of February, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10123007. Public record. Not legal advice.