# Concilio Mision Cristiana Fuente de Agua Viva, Inc. v. Ortiz-Hernandez

> District Court, S.D. Florida · January 29, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122940

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 29, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122940

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the various reasons permitting transfer, including improper venue, want of jurisdiction, and convenience under § 1404(a)
- recognizing a court’s authority to transfer an action sua sponte

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

CONCILIO MISION CRISTIANA
FUENTE DE AGUA VIVA, INC.,

Plaintiff,
v. CIV. NO. 22-1206 (RAM)

EDWIN LEMUEL ORTIZ-HERNANDEZ,
MARIA DEL CARMEN ARROYO
PANTOJAS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Edwin Lemuel Ortiz-Hernández’s
(“Defendant” or “Ortiz-Hernández”) Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint and for Change of Venue (“Motion to Dismiss” or
“Motion”). (Docket No. 59). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion. This action shall be
transferred to the Southern District of Florida.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 3, 2022, Plaintiff Concilio Misión Cristiana Fuente
de Agua Viva, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “CMCFAV”) filed its original
Complaint with the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan
Superior Part, against Ortiz-Hernández, his wife Maria del Carmen
Arroyo-Pantojas, and their conjugal partnership.1 (Docket No. 7-

1 Ortiz-Hernández is the only defendant in this case that has been served.
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 2

1). The Complaint alleged that on December 13, 1999, CMCFAV “made
a three-million-dollar written loan” to Defendant, his wife, and
their community property (the “1999 Contract”) and that they still
owed Plaintiff repayment of $1.313 million. Id. at 2-3.
On May 5, 2022, Ortiz-Hernández filed a Notice of Removal,
removing the case to this Court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1332.
(Docket No. 1). He asserted that this Court may exercise diversity
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because: Plaintiff seeks
relief in excess of $75,000; Plaintiff is organized under the laws
of Puerto Rico and has a Puerto Rico address; and Defendant and
his wife are citizens of Florida. (Docket Nos. 1 and 7-1).
On June 22, 2022, Ortiz-Hernández moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), respectively. (Docket No. 11).
In support, he argued he was not a party to the 1999 Contract in
his personal capacity. Id. at 5-7. Alternatively, Ortiz-Hernández
sought change of venue to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. Id. at 7-8. In response, Plaintiff
moved to remand. (Docket No. 13).
The Court denied both motions on January 27, 2023. (Docket
No. 20). Regarding personal jurisdiction, the Court found that
Plaintiff had “met its present burden under the prima facie
standard for showing personal jurisdiction” but warned that the
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 3

Court was not prejudging “whether Ortiz-Hernández is personally
bound by the 1999 agreement.” Id. at 10, 17-18. Regarding venue,
the Court reasoned that Ortiz-Hernández had “not made a case for
transferring this action” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 16.
Following the Court’s ruling, Defendant answered the original
Complaint on March 17, 2023. (Docket No. 29).
On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Docket
No. 42). The instant Motion to Dismiss was filed by Ortiz-Hernández
on August 7, 2023. (Docket No. 59). Ortiz-Hernández contends the
Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction or transfer venue to the Southern District of Florida.
(Docket No. 59 at 5, 22). Plaintiff filed its Opposition on
September 27, 2023. (Docket No. 69). CMCFAV argues this Court has
personal jurisdiction over Defendant both because of a 1999 forum-
selection clause and because there are enough contacts to establish
specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 9-15. Regarding venue,
CMCFAV invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which governs corporations,
even though Defendant is sued in his personal capacity. Id. at 15-
16.
Defendant’s Reply, filed October 16, 2023, reiterates that
the Court lacks personal jurisdiction and contends Plaintiff has
waived opposition to Defendant’s motion to change venue. (Docket
No. 78). Plaintiff filed a Surreply on November 6, 2023, clarifying
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 4

its argument for why venue is proper in Puerto Rico. (Docket No.
84). Most significantly, CMCFAV alleges Defendant and his wife
travelled to Puerto Rico to seek out and receive investment funds
there. Id. at 2, 4.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
From 1999 to 2006, Ortiz-Hernández and his wife, both pastors
living in Florida, did ministry as members of CMCFAV, an
organization based in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 42 at 1-2).
Defendant and his wife also ran an organization called Genesis
Broadcasting Network Co. (“Genesis Broadcasting”). Id. at 2. On
December 13, 1999, “Plaintiff and Genesis Broadcasting Network
Co., represented by its President Edwin Lemuel Ortiz executed a
Purchase and Sale Agreement for the sale to Plaintiff of Radio
Station 90.9 FM.” Id. at 2-3. From 1999 to 2003, CMCFAV made a
series of payments to Defendant, totaling at least a million
dollars. Id. at 2-5.
On July 8, 2006, the board of directors of Genesis
Broadcasting discussed “efforts to seek financing for the
repayment of the Council’s investment.” (Docket No. 42-8 at 1).
The board resolved that its president, Ortiz-Hernández, would

2 The following facts are derived from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and its
corresponding exhibits and are taken as true for purposes of the analysis
herein. (Docket No. 42).
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 5

create a new corporation that could obtain credit to be used in
repaying a certain debt “contracted with the Fuente de Agua Viva
Council of P.R.” (Docket No. 42-10 at 1).
On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff, Defendant, and his wife
signed a letter (the “2010 Letter”) agreeing to a payment plan by
which Defendant and his wife would pay Plaintiff $1,700,000.
(Docket Nos. 42 at 5 and 42-12 at 1-3). Defendant and his wife
made multiple payments to CMCFAV, and the parties continued to
negotiate the amounts. (Docket Nos. 42 at 6-8 and 42-27 at 1).
CMCFAV alleges that “[a]fter October 2019,” Defendant breached his
“written and verbal agreements to repay.” (Docket No. 42 at 9).
Plaintiff seeks payment of $1,313,500. Id.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Transfer Under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code
Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code of the United States
provides that, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought or to any district or division to which all parties have
consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This section codified and
liberalized the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, which
was embraced by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947). In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 6

reasoned that “Congress, by the term ‘for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,’ intended to
permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience” than previously required under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
When determining whether to grant a transfer, the relevant
private-interest factors to be examined by a court are:
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for
the attendance of unwilling and the cost of
obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses;
possibility of view of the premises; if view
would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a
case, easy, expeditious and inexpensive.

Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. at 508-509; see also Aquakem Caribe, Inc.
v. Kemiron Atl., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-202 (D.P.R. 2002).
Public-interest factors also have a bearing on the transfer
determination. Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. at 509. These factors have
included “the trial judge’s familiarity with the applicable state
law, the local interest in adjudicating disputes at home; court
congestion in the two forums, [and] the fairness of placing the
burden of jury duty on the citizens of the state with greater
interest in the dispute.” NPR, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Puerto
Rico, 242 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (D.P.R. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 7

Considering the aforementioned factors, the decision to
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) necessarily requires an
“individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29
(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
B. The Court’s Discretion to Transfer
The decision to transfer is within the Court’s discretion.
See Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737 (1st Cir.
1977). The Court need not determine the best venue but “merely a
proper venue.” Astro–Med v. Nihon Kohden of Am., 591 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2009) (citing Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244
F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Moreover, courts may transfer an action under § 1404(a) on
their own initiative. See Desmond v. Nynex Corp., 37 F.3d 1484
(1st Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled that a court may transfer a
case sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) . . . .”) (citing
Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir.
1987)); Lead Indus. Assoc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979); Mobil Corp. v. S.E.C., 550 F.
Supp. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
C. Forum-selection Clauses
“When the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection
clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 8

the forum specified in that clause.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013). To
determine whether there is a valid forum-selection clause, a court
must first decide whether “the parties entered into a valid
contract of which the forum selection clause was an agreed-to
provision.” Expedition Leather LLC v. FC Org’l Prods. LLC, 2013 WL
160373, at *1 (D.N.H. 2013) (quoting Provanzano v. Parker View
Farm, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 53, 58 (D. Mass. 2011)). The party
asserting enforcement of a forum-selection clause has the burden
of showing the parties agreed to it. See id. (citing Altvater
Gessler–J.A. Baczewski Intern. (USA) Inc. v. Sobieski Destylarnia
S.A., 572 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2009)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Ortiz-Hernández requests the Court dismiss this action for
lack of personal jurisdiction or change its venue to the Southern
District of Florida (“SDFL”). (Docket No. 59). He contends venue
in the District of Puerto Rico (“DPR”) is improper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 13913 and that transfer is therefore mandatory. Id. at 22-23.
However, a separate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), authorizes
courts to transfer cases to a different venue “[f]or the

3 The Court cautions Defendant that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 has been amended
since enactment of the version cited in Defendant’s brief. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b) (2011), with (Docket No. 59 at 22) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)).
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 9

convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of
justice.” As explained below, the Court finds it is in the interest
of justice to transfer the present case to SDFL. See Desmond v.
Nynex Corp., 37 F.3d 1484 (1st Cir. 1994) (recognizing a court’s
authority to transfer an action sua sponte); Gerena v. Korb, 617
F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the various reasons permitting
transfer, including improper venue, want of jurisdiction, and
convenience under § 1404(a)).
The Court begins its analysis by considering again whether
Defendant is bound by a forum-selection clause, since a valid
forum-selection clause would alter the § 1404(a) analysis. Atl.
Marine, 571 U.S. at 62. The Court then considers whether it is in
the interest of justice to transfer this case to SDFL.
A. The Forum-selection Clause in the 1999 Contract Does Not
Govern This Case

Plaintiff maintains this action must be litigated in DPR
because of the forum-selection clause in the 1999 Contract. (Docket
No. 42 at 2). However, CMCFAV has not met its burden of showing
Defendant “entered into a valid contract of which the forum
selection clause was an agreed-to provision.” Expedition Leather,
2013 WL 160373, at *1 (citation omitted). In its Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff admits the 1999 Contract is between CMCFAV and Genesis
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 10

Broadcasting. See, e.g., (Docket Nos. 42 at 2-3 and 69 at 3, 6).4
Indeed, the 1999 Contract itself, which Plaintiff attaches, names
CMCFAV and Genesis Broadcasting as the two contracting parties.
(Docket No. 42-6 at 1). Because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint shows
Defendant was not a party to the 1999 Contract at the time it was
signed, Plaintiff must assert some other reason for why Defendant
is bound by the forum-selection clause.
Plaintiff appears to advance two theories. First, CMCFAV
intimates that Defendant was treated as if he were a party to the
contract, even though Defendant signed on behalf of Genesis
Broadcasting. Plaintiff alleges Defendant “was paid personally”
and that Defendant and his wife treated the radio station “as their
own.” (Docket Nos. 42 at 3 and 69 at 3). However, Plaintiff makes
no legal argument for why these facts lead to the conclusion that
Defendant is bound by the 1999 Contract.
Second, Plaintiff argues the 2010 Letter, which Defendant,
his wife, and Plaintiff signed, is a modification of the 1999
Contract. (Docket No. 42 at 5). CMCFAV seems to suggest that by
signing the 2010 Letter, Defendant became a party to the 1999

4 This is different than what Plaintiff asserted in its original Complaint.
Compare (Docket No. 7), with (Docket No. 42). There, Plaintiff stated that “[o]n
December 13, 1999, in Carolina, Puerto Rico, the plaintiff made a three-million-
dollar written loan to the defendant Edwin Lemuel Ortiz Hernández.” (Docket No.
7-1 ¶ 4). But in its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “the 1999
Purchase and Sale was executed between corporations.” (Docket No. 42 at 3).
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 11

Contract. (Docket No. 69 at 5-7, 9-11). However, Plaintiff’s
argument for how an agreement between CMCFAV and Defendant could
change an agreement between CMCFAV and Genesis Broadcasting is
unsupported and flawed. Plaintiff urges that “the facts of the
case,” such as prior communications between Plaintiff and
Defendant, “modified [the] original agreement.” Id. at 5. But
Plaintiff does not explain how. Plaintiff reiterates that the
monies agreed to in the 1999 Contract were “personally delivered
to Defendants” but fails to identify the relevance of this fact.
Id. at 6. Finally, CMCFAV quotes the Court’s previous holding that
CMCFAV had met its prima facie burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction by virtue of the forum-selection clause. Id. at 10-
11 (quoting (Docket No. 20 at 7-9)). However, Plaintiff disregards
that the Court’s January 27, 2023, Order involved a different legal
question (personal jurisdiction), a different burden (a prima
facie showing), and different allegations (those in the original
Complaint). See (Docket No. 20 at 3, 5-6).
Plaintiff’s various arguments fall short of showing that the
1999 Contract’s forum-selection clause should be enforced against
Defendant. Moreover, after reviewing the exhibits attached to
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court is unable to find any
convincing evidence that the 1999 Contract was modified to include
Defendant as a party. Accordingly, the Court finds that the forum-
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 12

selection clause in the 1999 Contract need not be considered when
determining whether to transfer this case to a different venue.
B. This Action Could Have Been Brought in SDFL
Without consent by the parties, transfer to another district
court under § 1404(a) is permitted only if this case “might have
been brought” there in the first place. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In
the case at bar, this would require the United States District
Court for SDFL to have jurisdiction and for venue to be proper
there. See Colon Perez v. Metan Marine, Inc., 2018 WL 1664697, at
*8 (D.P.R. 2018) (citing Marel Corp. v. Encad Inc., 178 F. Supp.
2d 56, 58 (D.P.R. 2001)).
Both requirements are met. The fact that Defendant and his
wife (a defendant that has not been served) live in SDFL5 would
have permitted venue there. See (Docket No. 42 at 1-2); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(1). The SDFL district court would have had diversity
jurisdiction because Plaintiff is resident of a different state6
than Defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
(Docket No. 42 at 1-2); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Finally, the court
would have had personal jurisdiction since Defendant and his wife
are residents of that district. (Docket Nos. 42 at 1-2 and 29 at

5 SDFL “comprises the counties of Broward, Dade, Highlands, Indian River, Martin,
Monroe, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, and Saint Lucie.” 28 U.S.C. § 89(c).
6 The law treats Puerto Rico as a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 13

1); Colon Perez, 2018 WL 1664697, at *8 (holding that transferee
forum would have had personal jurisdiction over defendant who
resided in that district). See also In re Genentech, Inc., 566
F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“There is no requirement under
§ 1404(a) that a transferee court have jurisdiction over the
plaintiff . . .; there is only a requirement that the transferee
court have jurisdiction over the defendants . . . .” (citing
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960))).
C. Private-interest Factors
1. The convenience of the parties and witnesses
On the one hand, Plaintiff’s choice of venue is accorded a
“strong presumption” in its favor. Cuadrado Concepción v. United
States, 2019 WL 5847216, at *3 (D.P.R. 2019) (citing Coady v.
Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000)). That said,
“[t]he most important factor in deciding whether to transfer an
action is the convenience of the witnesses.” Colon Perez, 2018 WL
1664697, at *9 (quoting Demers, Jr. v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc.,
2010 WL 4683780, at *6 (D.N.H. 2010)).
In this case, most of the operative events took place in SDFL,
which makes it likely most of the relevant witnesses are located
there. See id. at *8. Moreover, courts give less weight to a
plaintiff’s choice of forum when the operative events occurred
elsewhere. Id. SDFL is where Defendant and his wife signed the
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 14

2010 Letter. (Docket No. 42-12). It is the location, proposed by
CMCFAV’s then-Secretary, where Defendant and Plaintiff met in 2018
to negotiate payments. (Docket Nos. 42-14 at 2, 42-25 at 3-4 and
42-27 at 1).
SDFL is also the location of the property that led to the
parties’ dispute: a radio station in Homestead, Florida. (Docket
No. 42 at 2-3). Many of the checks made out by Defendant to CMCFAV
appear to have been written in SDFL. See, e.g., (Docket Nos. 42 at
6 and 42-11 at 3). Also, it was in SDFL where Genesis
Broadcasting’s board of directors met and passed a resolution
discussing a debt “contracted with the Fuente de Agua Viva Council
of P.R.” See (Docket Nos. 42 at 4, 42-8 at 1 and 42-10 at 1).
It is true that the 1999 Contract appears to have been signed
in Puerto Rico and that CMCFAV’s headquarters is located there.
(Docket Nos. 42-6 at 3 and 42 at 1). Additionally, Plaintiff
alleges in its Opposition and Surreply that Defendant travelled to
Puerto Rico to request and receive money. (Docket Nos. 69 at 12
and 84 at 2, 4). None of these facts, however, tips the balance in
favor of venue in DPR. As discussed above, Defendant is not a party
to the 1999 Contract. The location of Plaintiff’s headquarters is
a neutral factor at best since Defendant and his wife reside in
Florida. Finally, because Defendant alternated between acting in
his personal capacity and representing Genesis Broadcasting,
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 15

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant requested and received
money in Puerto Rico fail to show how these events relate to the
dispute in this case, i.e., a claim against Defendant in his
personal capacity.
2. Relative access to sources of proof
While electronic communication diminishes the relevance of
geographic proximity to physical evidence, that “does not render
this factor superfluous.” Cuadrado Concepción, 2019 WL 5847216, at
*3 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th
Cir. 2008)). To the extent proximity aids in ease of access,
evidence regarding the radio station, the decisions of Genesis
Broadcasting, Defendant’s finances, and the signing of the 2010
Letter will be easier to obtain in SDFL than in this district.
Apart from evidence of communications between Plaintiff and
Defendant, most of the support for Plaintiff’s allegations will
likely come from the radio-station dealings, the actions of Genesis
Broadcasting, the 2010 Letter, and the payments from Defendant. As
such, the Court weighs the location of that evidence more than the
location of the 1999 Contract signing, the location of CMCFAV’s
headquarters, and Defendant’s alleged trips to Puerto Rico.
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 16

D. Public-interest Factors
1. Familiarity with the applicable law
“[A] court’s familiarity with the applicable law has . . .
been recognized in this circuit as an appropriate factor in
deciding a motion to transfer.” Cuadrado Concepción, 2019 WL
5847216, at *3 (quoting Scholtens v. Gyrus Acmi, Inc., 2019 WL
2528377 (D. Mass. 2019), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 2565664). Here,
Plaintiff asserts that Puerto Rico law governs its breach-of-
contract claim. (Docket No. 42 at 2, 8-9). However, even if
Plaintiff is correct, that would weigh only slightly against
transfer. The issues in this case appear to be whether a contract
exists between the parties and if so, whether Defendant breached
it. Given the relatively straightforward nature of Puerto Rico law
involved, a federal court in DPR would not be significantly more
competent than a federal court in SDFL at resolving these issues.
See BMJ Foods Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Metromedia Steakhouses Co.,
L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 229, 234 (D.P.R. 2008) (transferring case to
the Northern District of Texas despite claim arising under Puerto
Rico’s Act 75 dealership law).
2. Court congestion
The most recent caseload statistics prepared by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts show that during the 12-
month period ending March 31, 2023, SDFL had roughly 209 cases
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 17

pending per district court judge, compared to DPR’s roughly 230
cases per judge.7 Because the individual caseloads of judges in
either district is roughly comparable, the factor of court
congestion is neutral as to whether the instant case should be
transferred.
3. Local interest and burden of jury duty
Considerations of local interests in adjudicating disputes at
home weigh in favor of transferring this case to SDFL. The claims
in this lawsuit stem from the financing, construction, and
operation of a radio station in Homestead, Florida. (Docket No. 42
at 2-3). At least one Florida bank, Suntrust Bank Miami, was
allegedly involved. Id. at 3. The 2010 Letter, arguably the most
important evidence of Defendant’s alleged debt, was signed before
a Florida notary. (Docket No. 42-12). This means citizens in SDFL
have a stronger interest in deciding this case than do citizens of
Puerto Rico. In turn, that greater interest makes it fairer to
burden citizens in Florida with jury duty for this case than
citizens in Puerto Rico.

7 See Table C-1 -- U.S. District Courts -- Civil Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics (March 31, 2023), U.S. Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics/2023/03/31 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024); Table D Cases -- U.S.
District Courts -- Criminal Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31,
2023), U.S. Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-cases/federal-
judicial-caseload-statistics/2023/03/31 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024).
Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 18

V. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the parties’ submissions regarding
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as the record as a whole,
the Court finds that transferring this case sua sponte is
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff is unable to meet
its burden to enforce the 1999 Contract’s forum-selection clause,
and most of the operative events in this case occurred in SDFL.
After considering both private- and public-interest factors, the
Court concludes it is in the interest of justice to transfer this
case to SDFL.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Ortiz-
Hernández’s Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 59. The Clerk of Court
shall TRANSFER this case to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida. This case is now closed in the
District of Puerto Rico for statistical purposes.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of January 2024.

s/Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122940. Public record. Not legal advice.