# Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. v. Circuitronix, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Florida · November 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122751

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida

Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit )
Co., Ltd., Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 21-60125-Civ-Scola
)
)
Circuitronix, LLC, Defendant.

Order Denying Both Benlida’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Circuitronix’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
The dispute in this case centers around tens of millions of dollars’ worth
of printed circuit boards, manufactured by Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant
Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. (“Benlida”) which it sold and
distributed to Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Circuitronix, LLC. Benlida
complains that Circuitronix owes it over $13 million for unpaid invoices for
printed circuit boards which Benlida delivered. (3rd Am. Compl. (“Compl.” or
the “complaint”), ECF No. 26.) Circuitronix, however, in its counterclaim,
maintains, to the contrary, that it overpaid Benlida, by over $10 million, and
seeks to recover that overpayment. (Ans. and Countercl., ECF No. 34.) The
Court granted summary judgment in Circuitronix’s favor with respect to the
entirety of Benlida’s complaint (SJ Order, ECF No. 221) and thereafter held a
six-day jury trial on Circuitronix’s claims against Benlida. After deliberating,
the jury unanimously found that Benlida had breached the parties’ contract,
awarding $7,585,847 in damages to Circuitronix. (Verdict, ECF No. 273.) Five
days into the trial, Benlida moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order
granting summary judgment. (Benlida’s Mot., ECF No. 267.) At the close of all
the evidence, Circuitronix moved orally for partial judgment as a matter of law,
also filing a written motion (Circuitronix’s Mot., ECF No. 269), which the Court
reserved ruling on. Both motions have now been fully briefed and are ripe for
the Court’s determination (Circuitronix’s Resp., ECF No. 288; Benlida’s Reply,
ECF No. 291; Benlida’s Resp., ECF No. 290; Circuitronix’s Reply, ECF No. 292.)
After a careful review of the record, the briefing, and the relevant legal
authorities, the Court denies Benlida’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No.
267) and denies in part and denies as moot in part Circuitronix’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 269).
1. Benlida fails to establish that reconsideration is warranted.
“[I]n the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources,
reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy that is employed
sparingly.” Gipson v. Mattox, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (S.D. Ala. 2007). A
motion to reconsider is “appropriate where, for example, the Court has patently
misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues
presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning
but of apprehension.” Z.K. Marine Inc. v. M/V Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561,
1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (Hoeveler, J.) (citation omitted). “Simply put, a party may
move for reconsideration only when one of the following has occurred: an
intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Longcrier v. HL-A Co.,
595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1247 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (quoting Vidinliev v. Carey Int’l,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 107CV762-TWT, 2008 WL 5459335, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 15,
2008)). However, “[s]uch problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider
should be equally rare.” Z.K. Marine Inc., 808 F. Supp. at 1563. Certainly, if
any of these situations arise, a court has broad discretion to reconsider a
previously issued order. Absent any of these conditions, as here, however, a
motion to reconsider is not ordinarily warranted.
Benlida submits that reconsideration is warranted in order “to correct a
clear error and thereby prevent a manifest injustice.” (Benlida’s Mot. at 2.)
According to Benlida, the Court’s clear error manifested in several ways: (1) by
the Court’s failure to apprehend that Benlida’s complaint put Circuitronix on
notice that Benlida sought recovery from Circuitronix for circuit boards ordered
by another company, Circuitronix (Hong Kong) Ltd. (“CTX-HK”) (id. at 2–3); (2)
by the Court’s improperly requiring Benlida to plead its agency theory (id. at 3–
8); (3) by the Court’s not affording Benlida an opportunity to cure its violation
of Local Rule 56.1(b)(1)(B) (id. at 8–9); (4) by the Court’s disregarding the
declaration of one of Benlida’s witnesses (id. at 9–10); and (5) by the Court’s
improperly focusing on Benlida’s allegation that Circuitronix “expressly agreed
to pay the amounts specified in the invoices” (id. at 12–13). While Benlida has
made its disagreement with the Court’s order granting Circuitronix’s motion for
summary judgment abundantly clear, it has nonetheless failed to satisfy its
heavy burden of establishing that reconsideration is warranted.
As an initial matter, Benlida’s grievances either rehash arguments that
have already been raised and addressed or present new arguments or facts
that could have been presented in response to the motion for summary
judgment but weren’t. Neither avenue paves a path towards reconsideration.
See Z.K. Marine, 808 F. Supp. at 1563 (“A motion for reconsideration should
not be used as a vehicle to present authorities available at the time of the first
decision or to reiterate arguments previously made.”).
Furthermore, Benlida’s arguments all fail on their merits as well. First,
Benlida appears to misapprehend the distinction between presenting “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” on the one hand,
and a merely “wholly conclusory statement of claim,” on the other. Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561, 570 (2007). Thus, Benlida’s reliance on
Circuitronix’s principal’s deposition testimony indicating his awareness that
Benlida sought to recoup payment from Circuitronix for orders placed by CTX-
HK misses the point. Simply setting forth “the mere possibility of loss
causation,” does not come even close to providing a defendant with “fair notice
of the grounds for entitlement to relief.” Id. at 557, 561 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Circuitronix’s awareness that Benlida was suing it for orders
placed by CTX-HK does nothing to remedy Benlida’s pleading deficiency.
Second, and relatedly, Benlida’s repeated insistence that the Court
improperly required Benlida to plead a specific theory is misplaced. That is a
mischaracterization of the Court’s order. As the Court explained, Benlida’s
complaint is deficient because it “supplies neither any notice nor factual
allegations that could be construed as advancing its vicarious liability
theories.” (SJ Order at 9.) This is not a hyper-technical application of the law or
the imposition of a heightened pleading standard, as Benlida protests. Rather,
it is a straightforward and unremarkable application of basic federal pleading
standards: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009) (emphasis added).1
Next, Benlida complains about the Court’s assessment of an affidavit
submitted by one of its auditors. First, Benlida takes issue with the Court’s
“excessively formalistic” (Benlida’s Mot. at 9) insistence that Benlida comply
with the Court’s local rule requiring parties to supply “specific, pinpoint
references to particular parts of record material,” L. R. 56.1(b)(1)(B)), when
disputing an opposing party’s statement of fact. Second, Benlida complains the
Court improperly made a credibility determination when it disregarded the
affidavit. The Court is not persuaded as to either point. To begin with, Benlida
cites no legal authority, and the Court is aware of none, that allows for an
exception to Rule 56.1 where “there is no mystery as to where in the docket the
. . . declaration was.” (Benlida’s Mot. at 8.) Nor does Benlida cite to any
authority supporting its theory that a Court is required to afford a

1 Perhaps muddying the waters here, Benlida’s complaint not only lacks factual allegations, but
it also fails to even include any conclusory allegations regarding the vicarious-liability theories
it advanced in response to Circuitronix’s motion for summary judgment.
noncompliant party the opportunity to cure its defective statement of material
facts. Further, the Court did not make a credibility determination as to the
declaration. Instead, it disregarded the auditor’s statement to the extent his
statement encompassed a legal conclusion—that Circuitronix was responsible
for CTX-HK’s debt. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“The evidence presented [in opposing a motion for summary judgment] cannot
consist of conclusory allegations or legal conclusions.”).
Finally, Benlida’s position that it was clear error for the Court to focus on
Benlida’s allegation that Circuitronix “expressly agreed” to pay the amounts
specified in the invoices is meritless. To begin with, Benlida itself highlighted
that allegation in its response to Circuitronix’s motion. (ECF No. 188, 11.)
Further, Benlida highlighted that allegation in an effort to support its newly
advanced theory of vicarious liability. The Court’s analysis merely pointed out
that Benlida’s own reliance on an alleged express agreement actually undercut
its contention that Circuitronix was responsible for CTX-HK’s debts based on
principles of vicarious liability.
In short, Benlida’s arguments on reconsideration are improperly raised
and, in any event, fail on their merits.
2. Aside from those aspects of Circuitronix’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law that were mooted by the verdict, Circuitronix fails to
carry its heavy burden as to the remainder.
As acknowledged by the parties, the only aspect of Circuitronix’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law that was not mooted is Circuitronix’s position
that it should be awarded $317,539 in damages for improper premium
charges, in addition to the verdict amount. In support, Circuitronix points to
“substantial evidence,” not disproved by Benlida, that Circuitronix submitted
payment for these premiums that it was not required to pay. While this may be
true, the Court finds this is not enough to warrant judgment as a matter of
law.
Ordinarily, “[a] motion for judgment as a matter of law is . . . made
against the party asserting a claim on the basis that the party failed to meet its
burden of proof to establish its claim.” Handley v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 655
F. Supp. 3d 1348 (M.D. Ga. 2023), aff’d, 23-10587, 2023 WL 6628921 (11th
Cir. Oct. 11, 2023). In such a case, courts should grant judgment as a matter
of law only “if the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party
that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Middlebrooks v.
Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, however, the
proponent of the claim, bearing the burden of proof, seeks the judgment as a
matter of law. In that case, “granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of a
party bearing the burden of proof,” is considered “an extreme step which can
be done only when the evidence favoring the claimant is so one-sided as to be
of overwhelming effect.” Handley v. Werner Enterprises Inc., 23-10587, 2023
WL 6628921, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023). Courts consider this a more
exacting standard, requiring a showing that the movant “has established his
case by evidence that the jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve.” Weese v.
Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). “As a result of this
heavy burden, courts rarely grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the
party having the burden of proof.” OneSource Facility Services, Inc. v. Mosbach,
205CV525FTM34DNF, 2008 WL 11430040, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2008)
(cleaned up). Circuitronix fails to convince the Court it has met this demanding
standard—indeed it does not even direct any argument towards it.
Instead, Circuitronix paints its argument with broad strokes, contending
in mostly summary fashion that it “put forth substantial evidence” in support
of its claim, pointing to its principal’s testimony, by way of an “example,” as
well as “undisputed documents.” (Circuitronix’s Mot. at 3-4.) Without more, the
Court finds this is not enough to support taking the “extreme step” of granting
judgment as a matter of law in Circuitronix’s favor, especially where the
testimony relied on issues from Circuitronix’s own principal. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (“[T]he court
should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that
evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and
unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from
disinterested witnesses.”).
3. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Benlida’s motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 267) and denies in part and denies as moot in part
Circuitronix’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 269). Because
a jury verdict has been rendered and it appears no further issues remain for
resolution, the Court directs the Clerk to close this case. A separate judgment
will follow. Any pending motions are denied as moot.
Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on November 30, 2023.
[se N. fd Jr.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122751. Public record. Not legal advice.