# Canyes v. Carnival Corporation

> District Court, S.D. Florida · November 1, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122646

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 1, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-20858-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

CHARLENE CANYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
doing business as
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,

Defendant.
________________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESSES’ TESTIMONY
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Carnival Corporation, doing business
as Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment,1 ECF No. [100]
(“Summary Judgment Motion”), and Daubert Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert Witnesses,2 ECF
No. [101] (“Daubert Motion”). Regarding the Summary Judgment Motion, Plaintiff Charlene
Canyes (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response in opposition, ECF No. [106],3 and Defendant filed a Reply,4
ECF No. [121]. Regarding the Daubert Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition, ECF No.
[110], and Defendant filed a Reply,5 ECF No. [117]. The Court has reviewed the Motions, the

1 Defendant also filed a Statement of Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. [99] (“SMF”), to which Defendant attached Exhibits A through J of the motion, ECF
Nos. [99-1] – [99-10].
2 Defendant also filed Exhibits A through AD in support of the Daubert Motion. ECF Nos. [104-1]
– [104-31]. Exhibit AD appears to be a duplicate filing. ECF Nos. [104-30] – [104-31].
3 Plaintiff filed a counterstatement of material facts (“CSMF”), disputing certain facts in
Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts, a memorandum of law in opposition to the Summary Judgment
Motion, and Exhibits A through H of the Response, in a single eighty-three-page document. ECF No. [106].
4 Defendant filed two Replies, ECF Nos. [119] and [121]. The later-filed Reply, ECF No. [121],
contains three footnotes that do not appear in the earlier-filed Reply, ECF No. [119]. The Court reviews the
later-filed Reply.
5 Defendant filed an exhibit with the Reply.
supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons
that follow, the Summary Judgment Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the Daubert
Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This action stems from Plaintiff’s injury on January 15, 2019, while a passenger on

Defendant’s cruise ship, Carnival Horizon. 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16, ECF No. [32-1]. According
to the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff bent down to retrieve a bottle that had fallen out of a
refrigerator on the floor of Plaintiff’s cabin and adjacent to a cabin wall. Id. ¶ 16. As Plaintiff stood
up, she forcefully struck her head on a metal latch protruding from a berth immediately above her
and was injured. Id.6 The metal latch secures the upper berth to the cabin ceiling. Id. The Third
Amended Complaint asserts three claims: Count I – Negligent Maintenance of the Passenger
Cabin, Count II – Negligent Design and Construction, and Count III – Negligent Failure to Warn.
Id. ¶¶ 15-47.
A. Summary Judgment Motion
Defendant seeks summary judgment on all Counts, raising four principal arguments. First,
Defendant contends that it was not on notice of a dangerous condition. ECF No. [100] at 5-10.7

Second, as to Count I, there is no evidence that Defendant did not maintain Plaintiff’s cabin in a
safe condition. Id. at 10-12. Third, Count II fails because no evidence demonstrates that Defendant
participated in the design or construction of the Carnival Horizon. Id. at 12-14. Fourth, as to Count
III, the alleged dangerous condition in Plaintiff’s cabin was open and obvious and there was no

6 A berth is a place to sit or sleep on a ship. Berth, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/berth (last visited Oct. 3, 2023).
7 The Court generally cites to the page of a filing indicated by the pagination generated by the
electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers of all court filings. However, when citing to
deposition transcript, the Court uses the page number that is indicated on the transcript.
duty to warn.
Plaintiff responds that she need not prove that Defendant was on notice because Defendant
created the dangerous condition that caused her injuries by designing Plaintiff’s cabin. ECF No.
[106] at 5-8. Alternatively, Plaintiff maintains Defendant was on notice by virtue of the occurrence

of a similar incident seven months prior to her injuries. Id. at 8-10.
B. Daubert Motion
Alternatively, Defendant seeks to exclude all of Plaintiff’s experts from testifying at trial.
Those experts include (1) Dr. Melissa Ortiz-Becher, Psy.D., LMHC (“Ortiz-Becher”), Plaintiff’s
treating clinical psychologist; (2) Tamar Fleischer, R.N. (“Fleischer”), who prepared Plaintiff’s
Life Care Plan; (3) Amanda Marie Sizemore, M.S. (“Sizemore”), who prepared a
Vocational/Disability Evaluation Report; (4) Dr. Kenneth Eugene Lehrer (“Lehrer”), an economist
who prepared a report on Plaintiff’s economic damages; (5) Dr. Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D.
(“Goldhaber”), an expert on organizational communication who submitted a report on Defendant’s
purported failure to warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition; (6) Roy J. Scott (“Scott”), a former
U.S. Coast Guard Marine Inspector and Investigator who prepared a report on vessel

accommodation design standards; (7) Dr. Jose Pizarro, M.D. (“Pizarro”), Plaintiff’s treating
radiologist; (8) Dr. Nicholas D. A. Suite, M.D. (“Suite”), Plaintiff’s treating neurologist; and (9)
Dr. Cheri Surloff Ph.D., Psy.D. (“Surloff”), Plaintiff’s treating neuropsychologist. Defendant
contends their opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and their applied methodologies fail to meet the standard for expert testimony
set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). ECF No.
[101] at 3-20. Moreover, Defendant asserts that Surloff, Fleischer, Sizemore, Scott, and Goldhaber
are not qualified to offer expert opinions. See generally id.
Plaintiff generally responds that Defendant’s disagreements with her experts’ opinions go
to the weight of their testimony, not to the admissibility of that testimony. ECF No. [110] at 2-4.
Plaintiff also responds that Fleischer, Ortiz-Becher, Sizemore, Scott and Goldhaber are qualified
to opine in this case. Id. at 4-6. Finally, Plaintiff maintains Scott and Goldhaber’s methodologies
are sufficiently reliable under Daubert. Id. at 6-8.

C. Material Facts
The following material facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
i. The Plaintiff’s Cabin
Plaintiff boarded the Carnival Horizon on January 12, 2019. Def.’s SMF ¶ 2, ECF No.
[99]; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 2, ECF No. [106]. On January 15, 2019, Plaintiff reached for a water bottle
that had fallen out of a small room refrigerator that was located on the floor of her cabin aboard
the Carnival Horizon that was adjacent to a wall. Def.’s SMF ¶ 1; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 1. As she stood
up, Plaintiff struck her head on a sharp metal latch protruding from the upper berth in her cabin.
Def.’s SMF ¶ 1; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 1. The metal latch secures the upper berth to the ceiling when the
upper berth is not in use. Def.’s SMF ¶ 1; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 1.

i. The Metal Latch
The record contains a photograph of the section of the cabin where the upper berth and
metal latch are located, which is reproduced below.
Case No. 22-cv-20858-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
OW

Borcegue Decl. § 14 fig. The record also contains a close-up view of the metal latch.

_

ECF No. [104-24].
Plaintiff testified that the metal latch was visible from several vantage points. The metal
latch is visible when entering the cabin, but one “[has] to be looking for it to see it.” Mar. 10, 2023
Dep. of Charlene Canyes (““Mar. 10, 2023 Canyes Dep.”) at 510:8-20, ECF No. [100-8]. The metal
latch is also visible to an observer sitting directly under the upper berth. /d. at 510:25-511:2. The

latch is also visible to an observer who is “standing facing the wall” and the upper berth. Apr. 5,
2023 Dep. of Charlene Canyes (“Apr. 5, 2023 Canyes Dep.”) at 30:3-10, ECF No. [100-6]. The
metal latch is also visible when observing an individual in the cabin who is “on the bed[.]” Id. at
54:21-55:16.

ii. Notice of June 21, 2018 Incident Involving Another Passenger
The parties dispute whether there were any reported prior incidents involving a passenger
striking his/her head on a metal latch in cabins similarly configured in the Carnival fleet. Def.’s
SMF ¶¶ 3, 4, ECF No. [99]; Pl.’s CSMF ¶¶ 3, 4, ECF No. [106] at 1. Specifically, Defendant’s
Guest Claims Manager and Corporate Representative, Monica Borcegue (“Borcegue”), states that
there have been no such incidents. Decl. of Monica Borcegue (“Borcegue Decl.”) ¶ 15, ECF No.
[100-1]. Likewise, Borcegue testified that there were no reports or complaints about safety hazards
in cabins in vessels within the Vista class relating to latches protruding from the bottom on
bunkbeds. Tr. of May 12, 2023 Dep. of Carnival Corp. Corporate Representative Monica Borcegue
(“May 12, 2023 Borcegue Dep.”) at 161:7-19, ECF No. [99-3]. However, Borcegue testified that

an incident occurred on June 21, 2018 in which a guest, Millie Schild (“Schild”), was in her cabin
aboard the Carnival Horizon, the same vessel on which Plaintiff was injured, and “hit her head on
the metal part of [the] bunkbed.” Id. at 31:22-32:5. Schild provided a witness statement and
received medical attention. Id. at 33:16-17. Schild had a cut and “was given staples to close her
wound.” Id. at 33:8-9. Borcegue testified that “they describe it as the latch bolt, but it was a similar
latch bolt or a metal piece, as it was in this case.” Id. at 32:8-11.
iii. Defendant’s Service of Cabins
Flavius C. Dragan (“Dragan”), Defendant’s Housekeeping Manager, testified that, in
January 2019, Defendant had a “policy and procedure” in which Defendant’s stewards would ask
guests who are passengers aboard a Defendant’s ship for their preference concerning the frequency
of cabin service, such as “morning service, evening service, or both.” Mar. 3, 2023 Dep. of Flavius
C. Dragan (“Dragan Dep.”) at 18:6-25, ECF No. [100-3]. Servicing in this context means cleaning.
See ECF No. [100-7] at 2 (“[Guest] has requested to not have SR cleaned for entire week, as well

as no linen to be changed . . . .”). Stewards would open the upper berth upon embarkation and
leave the upper berth in the open position for duration of the voyage. Id. at 19:1-20. Dragan further
testified that Plaintiff asked for the room not to be cleaned during the week “because [of] different
reasons.” Id. at 26:19-21.
iv. Design of Carnival Horizon
Borcegue testified that all the cabins in the Carnival Horizon are “configured similarly.”
Id. at 41:17-42:16. Defendant has an employee who is the director of the New Builds Department,
a department of Carnival Corporation. Id. at 135:12-20. The director communicates with
manufacturers about the placement of the bunkbed, the fridge, and “other configurations” in the
cabins. Id. at 135:24-136:3. When presented with a design for a cabin, the New Builds Department

“look[s] at everything just to make sure that everything is functional and that everything is working
as it should. At [that] point in time, [the New Builds Department] would go ahead and . . . go
forward with the design.” Tr. of Supp. Dep. of Borcegue (“June 26, 2023 Borcegue Dep.”) at
12:14-13:16. Defendant chooses the layout of the cabin and the location of the furnishings in the
cabin; however, “the cabin itself” is “up to the [manufacturer].” May 12, 2023 Borcegue Dep. at
136:12-20.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citations to materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A factual
dispute is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and
‘genuine’ if a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party.” Miccosukee

Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
A court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, draws “all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and may not weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations[.]’” Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019); see
also Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e accept [the non-moving
party’s] version of the facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to him as the non-movant.” (citation omitted)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which
a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “If more than

one inference could be construed from the facts by a reasonable fact finder, and that inference
introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the district court should not grant summary
judgment.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted).
B. Daubert Standard
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. When a party
proffers the testimony of an expert under Rule 702, the party offering the expert testimony bears
the burden of laying the proper foundation, and that party must demonstrate admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir.
2005); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999). To determine
whether expert testimony or any report prepared by an expert may be admitted, the Court engages
in a three-part inquiry, which includes whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently
regarding the matters the expert intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert
reaches his or her conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact,

through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562
(11th Cir. 1998) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
refers to each of these requirements as the “qualifications,” “reliability,” and “helpfulness” prongs.
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). While some overlap exists among
these requirements, the court must individually analyze each concept. See id.
Under Daubert, a district court must take on the role of gatekeeper, but this role “is not
intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-
Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Consistent with this function, the district court must “ensure that speculative, unreliable expert

testimony does not reach the jury.” McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256
(11th Cir. 2002). “[I]t is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to the
persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.” Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the district court cannot exclude an expert based on a belief that the expert
lacks personal credibility. Rink, 400 F.3d at 1293 n.7. On the contrary, “vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Quiet Tech.,
326 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596). “Thus, ‘[o]n cross-examination, the opposing
counsel is given the opportunity to ferret out the opinion’s weaknesses to ensure the jury properly
evaluates the testimony’s weight and credibility.’” Vision I Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Aspen
Specialty Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator
Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988)). Ultimately, “a district court enjoys ‘considerable leeway’
in making” evidentiary determinations such as these. Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of

Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
i. Maritime Law Principles
As an initial matter, the parties agree this case is governed by maritime law. “Maritime law
governs actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters.”
Guevara v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (citing Keefe v. Bah. Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d
1318, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 1989)). “In analyzing a maritime tort case, [courts] rely on general
principles of negligence law.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980)). “To prevail on a
negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff

from a particular injury, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach actually and
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.’” Guevara,
920 F.3d at 720 (quoting Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1336). “Each element is essential to Plaintiff’s
negligence claim and Plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations of her complaint in making a sufficient
showing on each element for the purposes of defeating summary judgment.” Isbell v. Carnival
Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236-37 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
“A cruise-ship operator ‘is not liable to passengers as an insurer, but only for its
negligence.’ The mere fact of an accident causing injury is insufficient to establish that a dangerous
condition existed.” D’Antonio v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Ltd., 785 F. App’x 794, 796-97
(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322); see also Looney v. Metro. R.R. Co., 200 U.S.
480, 486 (1906) (“A defect cannot be inferred from the mere fact of an injury. There must be some
proof of the negligence.”); Miller v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., No. 15-cv-22254, 2016 WL 4809347, at *4
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2016) (“Generally, ship owners and operators do not owe a heightened or special

duty of care to their passengers.” (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358
U.S. 625, 630 (1959))), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 981 (11th Cir. 2017). Rather, “[u]nder maritime law,
the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes passengers a duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances.” Sorrels v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015).
The duty of reasonable care requires, “as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier
have had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.” Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322. “In
other words, a cruise ship operator’s duty is to shield passengers from known dangers (and from
dangers that should be known), whether by eliminating the risk or warning of it.” Tesoriero v.
Carnival Corp., 965 F.3d 1170, 1178 (11th Cir. 2020). However, with respect to warning
passengers of dangers that are known or should be known, the cruise ship operator’s duty does not

extend to warning of open and obvious dangers. See Carroll v. Carnival Corp., 955 F.3d 1260,
1264 (11th Cir. 2020) (“An operator of a cruise ship has a duty to warn only of known dangers
that are not open and obvious.” (citing Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 n.5)). Thus, a cruise-ship
operator’s liability often “hinges on whether it knew or should have known about the dangerous
condition.” Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720; see also D’Antonio, 785 F. App’x at 797. “The mere fact
that an accident occurs does not give rise to a presumption that the setting of the accident
constituted a dangerous condition.” Miller, 2016 WL 4809347, at *4. Moreover, a plaintiff cannot
establish a breach of its duty of care unless the plaintiff shows
(1) a dangerous condition existed; [and] (2) the vessel’s operator had actual notice
of the dangerous condition; or (3) if there was no actual notice, that [d]efendant had
constructive notice of the dangerous condition for an interval of time sufficient to
allow the vessel’s operator to implement corrective measures.
Stewart v. Carnival Corp., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (quoting Reinhardt v.
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 1:12-cv-22105, 2013 WL 11261341, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2,
2013) (citing Adams v. Carnival Corp., 2009 A.M.C. 2588, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Keefe,
867 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1989)))) (alterations in Stewart).
Defendant disputes whether it owed a duty to protect Plaintiff from, or warn Plaintiff of,
the injury that Plaintiff suffered on January 15, 2019. See ECF No. [100] at 3 (asserting that a
vessel owner owes a duty of reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not
members of the crew and that a plaintiff must show inter alia that a defendant had a duty to protect

plaintiff from a particular injury); id. at 14-15. Defendant does not squarely dispute whether the
metal latch posed a dangerous condition but contends that Defendant was not on notice of the
hazard posed by the metal latch and that in any event the hazard was open and obvious. Id. 5-10.
Plaintiff argues there is a dispute whether Defendant was on notice and cites to the record to show
that Defendant participated in the design of Carnival Horizon. See generally ECF No. [106]. The
Court address the parties’ arguments in the order of the Counts in the Third Amended Complaint.
ii. Count I
Defendant seeks summary judgment on Count I, Negligent Maintenance of the Passenger
Cabin. Defendant argues there is no evidence that Defendant breached its duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances because there is no evidence that Defendant did not maintain Plaintiff’s
cabin in a safe condition. ECF No. [100] at 10-12.8

Plaintiff does not substantively respond to Defendant’s argument. Plaintiff’s theory of

8 In making this argument, Defendant assumes arguendo that it was on notice of the dangerous
condition posed by the metal latch. Id. at 10. It is Defendant’s contention that it had no actual or constructive
notice. Id. at 5-10.
liability regarding Count I is that Defendant breached its duty of reasonable care by creating a
dangerous condition in her cabin, specifically by leaving the upper berth in the down or open
position, which created the risk that Plaintiff would strike her head whenever she would attempt
to stand up from near the open refrigerator. 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that it was

Defendant’s practice to have its stewards lower and raise the upper berth each day, and that a
steward who would service Plaintiff’s cabin would have seen the metal latch in the down position
during the exercise of his or her duties during Plaintiff’s cruise. Id. ¶ 20.
However, the record shows no such a practice exists. The evidence reflects that
Defendants’ housekeeping staff would leave the upper bunk in the down position upon
embarkation and for the duration of the voyage. Dragan Dep. at 18:6-19:20. Dagan’s testimony
indicates that Plaintiff asked for “the room not to be cleaned during the week because [of] different
reasons.” Id. at 26:19-21. Plaintiff concedes that the upper berth stayed in the same position
throughout the excursion. ECF No. [106] at 3. Thus, there is no evidence that Defendant had a
practice requiring that the upper berths on its vessel cabins be raised daily by a certain time during

a voyage. Crucially, there is no evidence on the record or argument by Plaintiff that indicates the
implementation of such a practice was necessary for Defendant to meet its standard of reasonable
care. As such, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant’s duty of reasonable care to passengers
encompasses an obligation to raise the upper berth in Plaintiff’s cabin daily to prevent injuries.
See Sorrels, 796 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Under maritime law, the owner of a ship in
navigable waters owes passengers a ‘duty of reasonable care’ under the circumstances.”)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted as to Count I.
iii. Count II
a. Notice
Defendant contends that Count II must be dismissed because it did not breach its duty of
reasonable care since it lacked notice of the dangerous condition posed by the metal latch. ECF

No. [100] at 6. Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence that Defendant had actual
notice of the cabin’s dangerous condition, or that substantially similar incidents occurred on
Carnival vessels providing constructive notice, either of which would be necessary to give rise to
Defendant’s duty of reasonable care. ECF No. [100] at 4-6. Defendant cites the Declaration of its
corporate representative to affirmatively show there is no evidence of substantially similar events
for the three years prior to Plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 6. The record reflects that Defendant disclosed
to Plaintiff one incident where a Carnival Horizon passenger was injured, but who was not
“involve[d] with a situation where a passenger struck his or her head due to proximity to [a] cabin
refrigerator.” Defendant argues that incident is not substantially similar to Plaintiff’s incident
because the other passenger “herself caused her incident by standing too quickly and not paying

attention.” Def.’s 2d Am. Resps. to Pl.’s Initial Interrogs. to Def. Dated Feb. 10, 2022, No. 23,
ECF No. [100-5] at 3.
Plaintiff responds that the incident that involved the other passenger is a substantially
similar incident that placed Defendant on constructive notice of the dangerous condition in
Plaintiff’s cabin. ECF No. [106] at 9-10. In Plaintiff’s view, Defendant was aware of that incident
but “did nothing and allowed Plaintiff to encounter the same dangerous condition.” Id. at 9.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a plaintiff can establish constructive notice by
showing “conditions substantially similar to the occurrence in question must have caused the prior
accident.” Jones, 861 F.2d at 661-62; Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 (citing Jones, 861 F.2d at 661-
62). In Jones, a plaintiff sought recovery for injuries sustained due to an elevator that
malfunctioned, hitting the floor of an elevator shaft. Jones, 861 F.2d at 657-58. At issue was
whether prior incidents described in maintenance reports for the elevator were substantially similar
to the plaintiff’s incident. Id. at 661. The maintenance reports indicated the elevator’s “normal

stopping device” malfunctioned in both a prior incident and the plaintiff’s incident, meaning that
both incidents were substantially similar. See id. at 662.
Here, Defendant’s corporate representative testified about the incident with a cruise
passenger that occurred on the Carnival Horizon on June 21, 2018. See Borcegue Dep. at 30:10-
32:5. Borcegue described how the passenger hit her head on the metal part of the bunk bed in her
cabin after placing her luggage underneath that bed. Id. Borcegue testified that “it was the – they
describe it as the latch bolt, but it was a similar latch bolt or a metal piece, as it was in this case.”
Id. at 32:8-11 The passenger, Schild, provided a witness statement and she received medical
attention. Id. at 32:12-19 Similar to the Plaintiff here, Schild was injured due to her head striking
a metal latch on the upper berth in her cabin. The Court finds that the conditions in Schild’s cabin

were substantially similar to plaintiff’s incident. Both Schild and Plaintiff’s injuries were due to
hitting their heads on metal components of bunk beds in cabins on the same vessel within a seven-
month period, so the two incidents are substantially similar. Although the incident with Schild
involved her setting down luggage while Plaintiff’s incident involved her picking up a fallen water
bottle, that is not a substantial difference.
Moreover, the injuries in the June 21, 2018 incident support the conclusion that the
condition in Plaintiff’s cabin was dangerous. That circumstance distinguishes the instant case from
the one on which Defendant relies for the proposition that the condition here is not dangerous. See
ECF No. [100] at 5 (citing Malley v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 713 F. App’x 905, 909) (11th
Cir. 2017)). In Malley, the court stated that the defendant “did not know that the [condition] was
dangerously high” since there was “no evidence that a passenger had ever been injured, or even
complained, before.” Malley, 713 F. App’x at 909. Here, Borcegue’s testimony established the
passenger was injured and received medical attention. See Borcegue Dep. at 33:4-11 (testifying

that the passenger “was given staples to close her wound”).
Thus, to the extent evidence of the prior incident is admissible, constructive notice may be
established and summary judgment is not warranted as to Count II.
b. Negligent Design of the Cabin
Defendant submits that Plaintiff’s negligent design claim, Count II, fails because “there is
no evidence to support Plaintiff’s allegations to establish Carnival was involved in the design or
construction of the subject cabin or upper bunk.” ECF No. [100] at 12. In other words, Defendant
argues there is no dispute that Defendant did not breach its duty of reasonable care because it is
not responsible for the design of the cabin. Mendel v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 2012 WL
2367853, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2012) (“A cruise line is not liable for any alleged improper

design if the plaintiff does not establish that the ship-owner or operator was responsible for the
alleged improper design.”). In support, Defendant relies on Groves v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 463 F. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2012), in which the Eleventh Circuit stated that a plaintiff cannot
sustain a negligent design claim on a motion for summary judgment absent evidence that a
defendant-cruise line “actually created, participated in, or approved the alleged negligent design
of these areas . . . where [the plaintiff] was injured.” Groves v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 463
F. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff responds that there is evidence Defendant chooses the design of its cabins,
including the placement of the refrigerator relative to the bunk bed. ECF No. [106] at 2. Moreover,
Defendant’s New Builds Department has the ultimate say and approval over the design and layout
of the cabins and evidence exists that Defendant at least participated in or approved the negligence
design of Plaintiff’s cabin area. Id.
As this Court has previously explained, liability based on negligent design would require

that Carnival “actually created, participated in, or approved the alleged negligent design” of the
staircase. Johnson v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-CV-23167, 2021 WL 1341526, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
9, 2021) (citing Groves, 463 F. App’x at 837). The question is thus whether there is a dispute of
fact as to whether Defendant created, participated in, or approved a negligent design.
Borcegue testified to the following. All Carnival Horizon cabins are configured similarly.
May 12, 2023 Borcegue Dep. at 42:10-43:1. The director of Defendant’s New Builds Department
is “involved” with the vessel manufacturers’ decisions about the placement of the bunkbed, the
fridge, and other “configurations” in a cabin. Id. at 135:24-136:8. When a manufacturer presents
a certain design to the New Builds Department, the department “look[s] at everything just to make
sure that everything is functional and that everything is working as it should. At [that] point in

time, they would go ahead and . . . go forward with the design.” June 26, 2023 Borcegue Dep. at
12:14-13:16. The director chooses the layout of the cabin and all the furnishings that would go
into the cabin, and all the dimensions of the furnishings. May 12, 2023 Borcegue Dep. at 136:12-
20. In the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all inferences in her favor, that testimony
supports that Defendant participates in and approves the layout of the cabin in the Carnival
Horizon. That testimony distinguishes this case from the one in Groves where there was no
evidence of the cruise line’s participation in the design of an area on a vessel. Accordingly,
summary judgment is denied as to Count II.
iv. Count III
Defendant seeks summary judgment on Count III, Negligent Failure to Warn, on the
ground that the purported dangerous condition in Plaintiff’s cabin was open and obvious, obviating
the need for a warning. Id. at 14-20.9 In other words, Defendant argues its duty of reasonable care

does not extend to warning Plaintiff of the dangerous condition posed by the upper berth, assuming
it owed any duty to Plaintiff at all. Carroll, 955 F.3d at 1265 (holding defendant had no duty to
warn where danger associated with walkway was open and obvious). Plaintiff does not
substantively respond to this argument.
“A dangerous condition is one that is not apparent and obvious to a passenger[.]” Stewart,
365 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. “A cruise line does not need to warn passengers or make special
arrangements for open-and-obvious risks. . . . In determining whether a risk is open and obvious,
we focus on what an objectively reasonable person would observe and do not take into account the
plaintiff’s subjective perceptions.” Horne v. Carnival Corp., 741 F. App’x 607, 609 (11th Cir.
2018). This Court has previously considered whether a danger is open and obvious in Price v.

Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 20-CV-20621, 2022 WL 2713727 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2022). In that
case, the plaintiff testified that she “could have” and “should have” seen a round metal clamp in
the walkway of Deck 4 of the vessel M/S Carnival Valor that caused her fall, and that the clamp
was “shiny[.]” Price v. Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 20-cv-20621, 2022 WL 2713727, at *1, *7
(S.D. Fla. July 13, 2022). Based on that testimony, the Court determined “any reasonably prudent
person through the exercise of common sense and the ordinary use of his/her eyesight could have
noticed the clamp and any danger it could have posed.” Id. at *8.

9 Notably, Defendant does not argue that the alleged hazard’s open and obvious character requires
that the Court enter summary judgment on Count II. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the open and
obvious nature of a danger is relevant to a cruise ship operator’s duty to warn. Carroll, 955 F.3d at 1264.
Here, Plaintiff testified that the metal latch was visible from various viewpoints in the
cabin. Plaintiff testified that the metal latch is visible to an observer when entering the cabin, Mar.
10, 2023 Canyes Dep. at 510:8-20, when sitting directly underneath the upper berth, id. at 510:25-
511:2, when standing and “facing the wall” while also facing the upper berth, Apr. 5, 2023 Canyes

Dep. at 30:3-10, and when observing an individual in the cabin who is “on the bed” underneath
the upper berth, Mar. 10, 2023 Canyes Dep. at 54:21-55:16. Because Plaintiff concedes that the
metal latch is visible from multiple vantage points inside the cabin, any reasonably prudent person
would have noticed the metal latch and any danger it could have posed. As such, the hazard posed
by the metal latch was open an obvious, so Defendant had no duty to warn. Accordingly, Plaintiff
cannot show Defendant breached a duty of reasonable care owed to Plaintiff by failing to warn.
Summary judgment is thus warranted on Count III.
v. Request for Hearing
Plaintiff requests a hearing on the Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion pursuant to
Local Rule 7.1(b)(2). However, the Court determines that oral argument is unnecessary given the

foregoing discussion.
B. Daubert Motion
i. Nicholas D.A. Suite
Defendant seeks to exclude the testimony of Suite. The Daubert Motion identifies Suite’s
expert report as Exhibit A. ECF No. [101] at 3. However, Exhibit A is a “Follow-Up Evaluation”
dated January 10, 2023, ECF No. [104-1]. Defendant attaches Exhibit B, the July 7, 2023
deposition of Suite, ECF No. [104-2]; and Exhibit C, the July 28, 2023 deposition of Suite, ECF
No. [104-3]. The July 7, 2023 deposition refers to an “October 2019 Report,” ECF No. [104-2] at
4,10 and the July 28, 2023 deposition refers to a “January 2020 Addendum Report” and a “January
2023 Report,” ECF No. [104-3] at 4. The July 7, 2023 deposition makes further reference to
“Independent Medical Examination” being the title of the October 2019 Report. ECF No. [104-2]
at 32:10-17.

The foregoing shows Defendant’s Exhibit A is not Suite’s report, and the Court’s review
of the record confirms Suite’s report has not been filed with the Court.11 Since Suite’s expert report
is not part of the record, it cannot at this point fulfill its gatekeeping function under Daubert with
respect to Suite’s proffered testimony. Accordingly, the Daubert Motion is denied as to Suite.
ii. Cheri Surloff
Surloff prepared a neuropsychological report dated January 2, 2023 after being referred to
assess Plaintiff’s “cognitive and emotional status.” Ex. E, Neuropsychological Rep. dated Jan. 2,
2020 (“Surloff Report”), ECF No. [104-5]. The Surloff Report sets forth Plaintiff’s relevant
medical history, notes Surloff’s observations of Plaintiff, and lists the tests that Surloff
administered during the referral, along with the test results. Surloff Rep. at 2-9. The Surloff Report

states that Plaintiff suffers from a mild neurocognitive disorder due to TBI and depression. Id. at
15.
Defendant argues that Surloff’s testimony should be excluded as unreliable for lack of a
sufficient factual basis and because Surloff incorrectly applied an appropriate methodology. ECF

10 The deposition transcript contains a reporter’s note that “Defendant’s Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4
were retained by Mr. Perez and are not attached to the deposition transcript.” ECF No. 104-2 at 3.
11 In making this determination, the Court reviewed to no avail the docket sheet in this case, the
exhibits to Defendant’s Daubert Motion, ECF Nos. [104-1] – [104-31], the exhibits to Defendant’s
Statement of Material Facts, ECF Nos. [99-1] – [99-10], the exhibits to Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Motion, ECF Nos. [100-1] – [100-8], the exhibits to Defendant’s Motions in Limine, ECF Nos. [103-1] –
[103-15], and the exhibits to Defendant’s Reply in support of its Summary Judgment Motion, ECF Nos.
[199-1] – [119-5], [121-1] – [121-5], and the exhibits to Defendant’s other Replies, see ECF Nos. [117],
[118], [120].
No. [101] at 9. Defendant points to Surloff’s deposition testimony to show that Surloff does not
know the extent of Plaintiff’s past injuries, such as Plaintiff’s head injury that predates the incident,
and Surloff admitted she did not have available Plaintiff’s medical records when writing her report.
Id. Defendant maintains Surloff is unaware of Plaintiff’s family history, unaware that Plaintiff took

the Florida broker’s exam after her alleged incident, and did not consider factors such as Plaintiff’s
financial problems or family issues. Id. Moreover, Defendant points out that Surloff admitted she
is not qualified to opine on Plaintiff’s Diffusion Tensor Imaging (“DTI”) evaluation and
improperly attempts to bolster Suite’s testimony, the credibility of Plaintiff, and that of her family.
Id. at 10. Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant’s arguments.
Apart from Defendant’s general citation to the standards set forth in Rule 702 and Daubert,
Defendant’s attacks on Surloff’s methodology and qualifications are legally unsupported.
Although Defendant cites extensively to Surloff’s deposition testimony to point to Surloff’s lack
of consideration for Plaintiff’s medical history prior to the incident in this case, Defendant has not
shown that the purported deficiencies in Surloff’s opinion bar its admissibility. See Ward v.

Carnival Corp., No. 17-24628-CV, 2019 WL 1228063, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2019) (finding
that contentions regarding expert’s failure to rule out certain pre-existing medical conditions prior
to reaching his conclusions more appropriate for cross examination than for excluding expert’s
testimony (citing Jones, 861 F.2d at 663 (“On cross-examination, the opposing counsel is given
the opportunity to ferret out the opinion’s weaknesses to ensure the jury properly evaluates the
testimony’s weight and credibility.”))). The Court is therefore unpersuaded that Surloff’s
testimony should be excluded at trial. See Melford v. Kahane & Assocs., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1116,
1126 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“Generally, a litigant who fails to press a point by supporting it with
pertinent authority, or by showing why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the
face of contrary authority, forfeits the point. The court will not do his research for him.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). As for whether Surloff is qualified to opine on the DTI evaluation,
Defendant points out that Surloff’s statement during her deposition makes plain she is unqualified
to opine on DTI evaluations. ECF No. [104-9] at 113:10-12 (stating that Surloff could not comment

on Passero’s analysis of Plaintiff’s “frontal lobe difficulty” using DTI because she is not a
neuroradiologist). However, that testimony does not necessarily mean that Surloff cannot rely on
Passero’s analysis in forming her opinions, and the Court does not find exclusion of Surloff’s
testimony on the DTI evaluation is warranted.
Defendant correctly notes that “[t]he burden of laying the proper foundation for the
admission of expert testimony is on the party offering the expert, and the admissibility must be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence.” ECF No. [117] at 2 (citing Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc.,
613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256)). Certainly, Plaintiff
ultimately bears the burden to demonstrate her expert’s testimony is admissible at trial, and the
Court may exclude such testimony where Plaintiff fails to address Defendants’ arguments. Lewis,

2021 WL 4991102, at *4. Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendant’s
challenges to this and Plaintiff’s other experts, that circumstance does not warrant excluding the
testimony where the Court has determined Defendant as the movant has failed to carry its burden.
Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he onus is upon the
parties to formulate arguments.”). Because Defendant has not demonstrated that Surloff’s
testimony is inadmissible, the exclusion of Surloff’s testimony is not warranted.
iii. Melissa Ortiz-Becher
Ortiz-Becher submitted an expert report dated April 20, 2023. Ex. H, Confidential Progress
Rep. (“Ortiz-Becher Report”), ECF No. [104-8]; see also ECF No. [104-9] at 51 (identifying
Confidential Progress Report as expert report). Ortiz-Becher identifies herself as a licensed clinical
psychologist and opines that Plaintiff “has been experiencing and having problems with balance,
depth perception, visual perception deficits, vertigo, debilitating complex migraines, sensitivity to
light, memory . . . problems, loss of sense of smell and taste, and electric shocks in her tongue.”

ECF No. [104-8] at 2. Ortiz-Becher notes that the most recent neuropsychological evaluation
performed by Dr. Jorge A. Herrera indicated “significant cognitive deficits” and Plaintiff received
a diagnosis of “Mild Neurocognitive Disorder Due to Brain Traumatic Injury.” Id. Ortiz-Becher
opines that Plaintiff suffers from “Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Moderate, Generalized
Anxiety Disorder,” and TBI. Id. Ortiz-Becher opines that Plaintiff’s “current emotional issues are
a direct and proximate result of the accident that she experienced on the cruise ship” and that,
“[b]ut for the injuries that she suffered as a result of the incident on the cruise ship, she would not
be suffering from depression and anxiety, and [Plaintiff] would not be in need of psychotherapy.”
Id.
Defendant challenges Ortiz-Becher’s testimony on the grounds that she is unqualified

because she is neither a medical doctor nor an expert on TBI but notes that she has treated “a
handful of patients with TBI over the course of her career.” ECF No. [101] at 10-11. Moreover,
Defendant argues in part that Ortiz-Becher’s opinions are based on an unreliable methodology.
Defendant particularly contends that Ortiz-Becher may not testify as to the cause of Plaintiff’s
emotional issues because her testimony is premised on the “temporal proximity” between the
incident and those issues; since she was required to perform a differential diagnosis to proffer such
testimony, Ortiz-Becher’s opinion must be excluded. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff responds that Ortiz-Becher is qualified because she has treated patients with the
same injury. ECF No. [110] at 5. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s criticisms are not properly
attacks on her methodology, are more appropriately raised through cross examination, and do not
justify the exclusion of Ortiz-Becher’s opinions. Id. at 3.
The Court agrees with Defendant that Ortiz-Becher’s opinion is unreliable. Ortiz-Becher’s
proffered testimony suffers from “a classic ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’ fallacy which ‘assumes

causation from temporal sequence.’” See Cooper v. Marten Transp., Ltd., 539 F. App’x 963 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1336). As the Ortiz-Becher Report demonstrates, Ortiz-
Becher impermissibly connects Plaintiff’s current emotional issues and the incident only by her
say so. See Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”). Absent
from the Ortiz-Becher Report is any indication that Ortiz-Becher sought to eliminate other
potential causes of Plaintiff’s Major Depressive Disorder or Generalized Anxiety Disorder. The
deposition of Ortiz-Becher confirms that she based her opinion on the severity and temporal
proximity of Plaintiff’s emotional issues and the incident, but she did not seek to rule out other

causes:
Q. Okay. Second paragraph, you wrote, “It is my opinion that Ms. Canyes’s current
emotional issues are a direct and proximate result of the accident that she
experienced on the cruise ship.” Why can’t it be something else, Doctor?
A. Because the situations that happen in life, it could be a temporary situation and
not necessarily have to effect [sic] your functioning in terms of your brain
functions, in term of your cognitive abilities. And when you have a specific event
that changes something and then you have to link the two of them as the cause of
it. . . . So when you have a major event in your life, especially you have a situation
where you hit your head and, after that, you cannot function the way that you think
that you function before, it was a correlation right there. . . .
Q. So it’s based on temporality?
A. What do you mean?
Q. She says she has an accident January 15, 2019, she starts making complaints,
you're linking the two things just based on a time relationship?
A. A time --
MR. MILLER: Object to form.
You can answer.
THE WITNESS: -- and severity.
ECF No. [104-10] at 169-70. Given Ortiz-Becher’s reliance on the temporal proximity between
her symptoms and the incident, her testimony would be unreliable and must be excluded on that
basis. See Cooper, 539 F. App’x at 967 (excluding experts’ opinion where their methodology
“amounted to simple reliance on a temporal relationship”).
iv. Tamar Fleischer
Fleischer submitted a report that purports to “outline those services that [Plaintiff] requires
to promote independent function, maximize quality of life, and provide for her physical and
emotional well-being, specific to the January 2019 accident.” ECF No. [104-11] at 4 (“Fleischer

Report”). The Fleischer Report notes that the life expectancy for a sixty-year-old female is 24.9
years. Id. (citing Nat’l Vital Statistics Rep., 2019 United States Life Tables, Vol. 70:19 (Mar.
2022)). In a section titled Medical History, the Fleischer Report recounts Plaintiff’s medical history
starting from the date of the incident. Id. at 5-8. The Fleischer Report summarizes the total cost for
Plaintiff’s needs in a table that lists in separate columns Plaintiff’s One-Time Costs and Annual
Cost for Medical Surveillance and Medications / Equipment. Id. at 9 tbl. The table multiplies the
Total Annual Cost for the annual costs by Plaintiff’s life expectancy, 24.9 years. Id.
Defendant seeks the exclusion of Fleischer’s testimony on the grounds that she is
unqualified to prepare a life care plan, she did not speak to physicians except for Suite prior to
formulating Plaintiff’s life care plan and failed to account for Plaintiff’s medical history prior to

the incident. ECF No. [101] at 12. Moreover, Defendant asserts Fleischer is unqualified to testify
on the life care plan because she lacks specialized knowledge for doing so and conducted no
differential diagnosis analysis. Id.
Plaintiff responds that Fleischer is qualified to testify given her experience as a litigation
consultant who authors life care plans for other individuals who have TBI. ECF No. [110] at 4-5.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that the Fleischer Report is based on Fleischer’s review of at least twenty
different records relating to Plaintiff’s medical history and consulted five sources for her cost
estimates. Id.

Defendant replies that Fleischer’s experience does not qualify her to testify on a life care
plan because it is not clear how her experience leads to her opinion, why her experience is a
sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. ECF No.
[117] at 4. Defendant further replies that Fleischer cannot opine on Plaintiff’s life care plan, even
though she has authored life care plans for TBI patients, because Fleischer has never treated TBI
patients herself. Id. at 5.
The Fleischer Report relies on treating psychologist Neil Applebaum, Psy.D’s diagnosis,
that Plaintiff sustained a mild traumatic brain injury when she hit her head on January 15, 2019.
Fleischer Rep. at 4, 6. The Fleischer Report also details the complications that Dr.Surloff
diagnosed as stemming from Plaintiff’s mild TBI. Id. at 6. Based on a review of several medical

documents that describe those complications, Fleischer further opines that Plaintiff’s mild TBI
“has impacted many aspects of [Plaintiff’s] life, including vocational and recreational
opportunities, interpersonal relationships, comfort, and independence.” Id. at 8, 14. On that basis,
the Fleischer Report estimated the total cost for Plaintiff’s medical needs, setting forth an
explanation of the costs of Plaintiff’s life care plan, including counseling and cognitive therapy for
her mild TBI. Id. at 9, 11.
Moreover, at her deposition, Fleischer testified that she authored “many life care plans for
individuals who have had traumatic brain injury” as a life care planner. ECF No. [104-12] at 52.
In addition, she attended a rehabilitating nursing conference in November 2021 that concerned
costing for life care plans titled “Collaboration and Goal Setting with Chronic Complications of
TBI.” Id. at 23:6-13. That testimony shows that Fleischer has experience in providing life care
plans for patients with TBI—meaning that Fleischer’s experience is germane to Plaintiff’s care to
the extent Plaintiff suffers from mild TBI—and supports that Fleischer, who is trained on costing

life care plans for those with chronic TBI complications, reliably applied her experience to the
facts of this case. Fleischer is thus qualified to testify on Plaintiff’s life care plan based on her
experience. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note
(2000 amends.) (“The Committee Note to the 2000 Amendments of Rule 702 . . . explains that
‘[n]othing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone . . . may not provide a
sufficient foundation for expert testimony.’”)). Although Fleischer may not be qualified to treat
mild traumatic brain injury, see id. at 53:9-16, Defendant fails to explain how her lack of
experience disqualifies her from preparing a life care plan for the care that a mild TBI patient
requires.
Moreover, because Defendant does not dispute the validity of life care planning as a

damages methodology, or the calculations on which Fleischer’s costs are based, the Court’s review
of the Fleischer Report leads to its conclusion that Fleischer’s proffered opinion represents the
reliable application of life care planning. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (“[i]f the witness is relying
solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the
conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that
experience is reliably applied to the facts.’” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note
(2000 amends.) (emphasis in Frazier)). Further, because Fleischer’s calculations are helpful to the
jury in determining damages, that opinion is admissible.
Defendant relies on Collett v. Scott Fisher & Robert Bearden Inc. to argue Fleischer’s
methodology is unreliable, but that reliance is misplaced. Defendant cites Collette for the
proposition that Fleischer’s opinion is based on insufficient facts or data, but the court in that case
excluded the expert’s opinion in that case on that basis because the sought to offer a causation
opinion based on insufficient facts. Collett v. Fisher, No. 3:19-CV-1468-HES-MCR, 2022 WL

710249, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2022). But Fleischer is not offering a causation opinion, so Collett
provides this Court with little guidance on Fleischer’s opinion. Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s
assertion, Collett does not require Fleischer to have done a differential diagnosis before developing
a life care plan. To the extent Fleischer’s failure to perform a differential diagnosis undermines the
calculations in Plaintiff’s life care plan, Defendant has not shown that that deficiency is grounds
for the exclusion of her testimony, rather than a basis to undermine that testimony through cross
examination. Collett thus does not support Defendant’s argument. Accordingly, Fleischer’s
opinion is not due to be excluded.
v. Amanda M. Sizemore
Defendant seeks to exclude testimony by Sizemore concerning her opinion that Plaintiff’s

“pre-injury earning power ranged from $50,250.00 to $60,740.00 for full-time work as a General
Sales Representative or Real Estate Sales Agent, respectively.” ECF No. [101] at 13-14 (quoting
ECF No. [104-13] at 4 (“Sizemore Report”)). Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s tax records that
are included in Sizemore’s Report and Plaintiff’s actual earning history do not support Sizemore’s
assumptions about Plaintiff’s pre-incident potential income. Id. Moreover, Defendant submits that
Sizemore failed to thoroughly review Plaintiff’s medical background and is not qualified to opine
on medical issues. Id. at 14. Plaintiff argues Sizemore is qualified to opine on Plaintiff’s medical
issues because those issues relate to Plaintiff’s ability to perform work in the future. ECF No. [110]
at 5. However, Plaintiff does not substantively respond Defendant’s attacks on Sizemore’s
methodology.
As with Defendant’s attacks on Surloff’s testimony, Defendant’s arguments to exclude
Sizemore’s testimony are unsupported by citations to legal authorities. As such, the exclusion of
Sizemore’s testimony is not warranted.

vi. Kenneth Eugene Lehrer
Defendant seeks to exclude Lehrer’s opinion, an economic expert, on the grounds that the
opinion relies solely on the Fleischer Report and Sizemore Report. ECF No. [101] at 14. Defendant
does not attack Lehrer’s qualifications or the reliability of his methodology, as applied. Thus, to
the extent that Lehrer’s opinions are based on either the Fleischer Report or on Sizemore’s
opinions, Lehrer may testify.
vii. Jose Pizarro
Pizarro submitted a report in which he opines that Plaintiff’s brain shows indications of a
post-traumatic axonal shearing injury based in part on an analysis of diffusion tensor imaging
(DTI). According to the Radiological Society of North America, MRI diffusion tensor imaging is

an advanced neuroimaging technique. ECF No. [104-18] at 2. ECF No. [104-16] at 10 (“Pizarro
Report”). That testimony would be relevant to whether the January 15, 2019 incident caused the
axonal shearing injury. See id. at 9 (opining that report’s findings “may represent the sequela of
injury to the head on January 15, 2019”). The Pizarro Report states in part that in Plaintiff’s “left
frontal lobe, there is a gray-matter interface T2 hyperintense lesion” that has increased in size and
is consistent with “progression of the structural changes related to shearing injury in this case” and
not with multiple sclerosis. ECF No. [104-16] at 10. The Pizzaro Report further states that there
are three “punctuate lesions” in the left frontal lobe gray-white matter interface that are consistent
with “micropetechial hemorrhage” from shearing injury. Id. Moreover, the Pizarro Report states
that the grey-white matter interface is “a common location for post-traumatic axonal shearing
injury.” Id. The Pizarro Report asserts that “[w]hole brain analysis” demonstrates “visible
reductions in fractional anisotropy,” which is seen in groups of patients that are diagnosed with
white matter injury. The Pizarro Report concludes that its findings are consistent with post-

traumatic axonal shearing injury, which is a correlate for post-concussion syndrome. Id.
Defendant seeks to exclude Pizarro’s testimony on the ground that DTI is unreliable under
the Daubert standard. Defendant contends there are doubts in medical publications and law review
literature on whether DTI has a known rate of error, whether it is generally accepted by the
scientific community when used to prove a patient suffers from mild TBI, and at least one New
York state court has excluded testimony based on DTI. ECF No. [101] at 15. Nevertheless,
Defendant acknowledges that at least one court in this district, among others, have admitted DTI
evidence. Id. at 16-17. Moreover, Defendant contends that Pizarro’s admission that he could not
determine when her brain injury occurred without a prior MRI of Plaintiff’s brain, and Pizarro’s
failure to review Plaintiff’s medical records in formulating his opinion, render his testimony

unreliable. Id. at 17. As with Defendant’s attacks on the Plaintiff’s other experts’ opinions, Plaintiff
does not substantively respond to those arguments.
As Defendant points out, at least one court in this district has determined that DTI is a
reliable method, especially when used in conjunction with other medical tests and assessments.
Marsh v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-21097-UU, 2017 WL 6987718, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 15, 2017). The Court finds Marsh to be persuasive on its own terms. Marsh considered DTI
under the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part test to determine whether expert testimony should be
admitted under Daubert. Specifically, Marsh found that DTI is a generally accepted method for
analyzing and diagnosing TBI, has been peer-reviewed extensively, and has a documented rate of
error. Marsh, 2017 WL 6987718, at *3-4.
Moreover, Defendant’s other arguments against Pizarro’s testimony are unpersuasive. The
Pizarro Report is careful to note that the DTI scan of Plaintiff’s brain is consistent with TBI, not
that Pizzaro’s DTI analysis conclusively establishes that Plaintiff suffers from TBI. Pizarro’s

testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact in conjunction with other medical testimony in
considering whether Plaintiff is suffering from TBI as a result of the incident. Id. at *4. The fact
that Pizarro did not compare his DTI findings with a pre-injury MRI of Plaintiff goes to the weight
of the expert’s opinion and does not warrant excluding Pizzaro’s opinion. As such, the Daubert
Motion is denied as to Pizarro’s testimony.
viii. Gerald Martin Goldhaber and Roy Scott
Defendant seeks to exclude the testimony of Goldhaber and Scott. Goldhaber seeks to
testify on whether Defendant provided adequate warning to Plaintiff on the hazard presented by
the metal latch. ECF No. [104-26] at 21. However, because the Court has determined that summary
judgment is warranted on Plaintiff’s negligent failure to warn claim, the Court proceeds only to

consider the Scott Report, ECF No. [104-23], and the Scott Supplemental Report, ECF No. [104-
23]. Those reports show that Scott seeks to testify that Plaintiff’s cabin does not comply with the
standards promulgated by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the International Labor
Organization (ILO). ECF No. [104-23] at 3. Specifically, the Scott Supplemental Report states that
there is a nine-inch minimum gap between a bed and the vessel bulkhead due to the presence of a
nightstand. ECF No. [104-24] at 3. Moreover, the Scott Supplemental Report states that “the entire
bottom of the frame for the support of the upper [berth] is approximately 50 3/8”,” which is less
than the ILO’s Title 3 requirement that headroom for all passageways be 80.8 inches clear of any
obstructions. ECF No. [104-23] at 4. Further, Scott seeks to testify that there is a seven-inch
overhead obstruction where the metal latch is located given how the length of the upper berth
extends seven inches beyond the length of the lower bed. Id. at 7-8.
Defendant first argues that Scott relied on a photograph taken of a cabin in a Disney Cruise
Line vessel and that Scott should not be allowed to testify based on that photograph. ECF No.

[101] at 17-18 (citing Ex. AC, ECF No. [104-29]). Plaintiff does not contest that the “Disney”
photograph is irrelevant. As such, Scott’s testimony is precluded to the extent it relies on that
photograph.
Defendant argues the ABS and ILO standards are irrelevant to the instant case because
those standards are for crew members and not passengers. Id. at 18. However, a defendant cruise
line’s purported failure to follow industry standards is probative of the standard of care. Cf.
Carroll, 955 F.3d at 1269-70 (holding that expert’s testimony that cruise line’s maintenance of a
walkway did not adhere to industry standards was relevant to standard of care). To the extent there
is evidence that the standard of care is lower for passengers than for crew members, that evidence
undermines the weight of Scott’s testimony, but not its admissibility. Moreover, to the extent the

standard of care is higher, the ABS and ILO standards would be a fortiori probative of the standard
of care in this case.
Defendant faults Scott for failure to perform “any kind of scientific testing or analysis
during his vessel inspection,” but as Plaintiff correctly observes, not all expert testimony requires
“scientific testing or analysis.” As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, expertise may be based on
non-scientific experience. Cf. Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 669 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding expert
testimony that was based on personal experience admissible to establish “the passport-stamping
practices of Mexican immigration officials” even in the absence of any “verifiable testing or
studies”). Defendant asserts that Scott’s opinion is a legal conclusion that is not helpful to the trier
of fact. ECF No. [101] at 20 (citing Jordan v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 1:17-20773-CIV, 2018
WL 3584702, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2018)). However, Defendant’s reliance on Jordan is
misplaced. The expert in Jordan sought to testify that the plaintiff “did nothing to contribute to her
accident and subsequent injuries.” Jordan, 2018 WL 3584702, at *9. Jordan reasoned that opinion

was an impermissible legal conclusion because it amounted to a determination that the plaintiff
was not at fault, an assertion amounting to an instruction to the jury of “what result to reach”, but
Jordan explained that the Court, not the expert, “must be the jury’s only source of law” in reaching
a verdict. See id. (citations omitted). As the foregoing shows, Scott seeks to testify on the cabin’s
non-compliance with certain industry standards; Scott is not testifying that Defendant negligently
designed Plaintiff’s cabin. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, such testimony is relevant to the
issue of the applicable standard of care and helpful to the trier of fact. Nor is it determinative that
“Mr. Scott does not have a naval architecture degree.” ECF No. [101] at 20. Defendant has
presented no authority supporting that Scott needs such a degree to offer his testimony. To the
extent that Plaintiff can lay a foundation for Scott’s qualifications, Scott’s testimony on industry

standards is admissible, and there is a basis to conclude that Scott is qualified. See ECF No. [104-
23] at 4 (identifying self as “ABYC Standard Accredited”). Accordingly, the Motion is denied as
to Scott’s testimony.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [100], is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is granted as to Counts I
and III but denied as to Count II.
2. Defendant’s Daubert Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert Witnesses, ECF No.
[101], is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Case No. 22-cv-20858-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

a. The Daubert Motion is granted as to the testimony of Dr. Melissa Ortiz-
Becher, Psy.D., LMHC;
b. The Daubert Motion is denied as to the testimony of Amanda Marie
Sizemore, M.S., Dr. Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D., Dr. Jose Pizarro, M.D.,
Dr. Nicholas D. A. Suite, M.D., and Dr. Cheri Surloff Ph.D., Psy.D., and
Tamar Fleischer, R.N.; and
c. The Daubert Motion is granted in part and denied in part as to the testimony
of Dr. Kenneth Eugene Lehrer, Roy J. Scott.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 31, 2023.

BETHBLOOM i ists
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122646. Public record. Not legal advice.