# Byrd v. Valles

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 24, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122250

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 24, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122250

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “supervisory liability” is a misnomer

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE No. 23-cv-61362-BLOOM

JERRY LEE BYRD,

Plaintiff,
v.

DANIEL B. VALLES, et. al.,

Defendants.
_______________________________________/

ORDER REQUIRING AMENDED COMPLAINT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff, Jerry Lee Byrd’s Complaint Under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”), ECF No. [1], entered on the docket on July 18, 2023. Plaintiff is
ordered to amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial state prisoner who files suit against the Broward County Sheriff, seven
Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BSO”) officers, a storage facility, and an insurance company
alleging that his arrest — and the resulting search of his storage unit — was in violation of his
constitutional rights. See generally id. All Defendants are sued in their individual and official
capacities. See id. at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that he “was arrested and detained by several BSO officers in [an] illegal
traffic stop at the entrance of Extra Space Storage . . . that turned into a fishing expedition[.]” ECF
No. [1] at 4. Following the stop, Plaintiff alleges that both he and his vehicle were unlawfully
searched and “Defendant Detective Daniel B. Valles . . . knowingly and willfully stole the
Plaintiff[’s] “Extra Space Storage” business card that [displayed] the gate code, storage unit
number, and the [PIN] to enter the side door, but did not display the code of the combination lock
affixed to the storage unit[.]” Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the resulting search warrant of his
storage unit was unlawfully obtained and executed. See id. at 7–9. Plaintiff seeks $100,000.00 in
compensatory damages, $150,000.00 in punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief. See id. at 13–14.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and is therefore
subject to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d
1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003). Under § 1915(e)(2), a case is subject to dismissal if the action is: (1)
“frivolous or malicious,” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or (3) “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(iii).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a
federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d
1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint

must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x
692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam). Although a pro se pleading is liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some
factual support for a claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the allegations in a complaint require
more than mere labels and legal conclusions. See Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v.
State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019). However, a district court is not
required to “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Rodriguez v.
Scott, 775 F. App’x 599, 603 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 2014).
In addition, shotgun pleadings are not allowed — even from pro se plaintiffs. There are
four types of shotgun pleadings that violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 10(b), or both:

The most common type — by a long shot — is a complaint containing multiple
counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing
each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type . . . is a complaint
that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty
of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun
pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each
cause of action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin
of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which
of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the
defendants the claim is brought against.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015). The
“unifying characteristic” of shotgun pleadings is they “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Shotgun Pleading
The Complaint falls under the third category of shotgun pleadings because it contains a
rambling, nine-page “statement of the claim” that fails to identify any claim or claims for relief.
See ECF No. [1] at 4–12. It is altogether unclear what claim or claims are being alleged, nor which
of the named Defendants is liable and for what each Defendant is responsible. In other words, the
Complaint is a shotgun pleading that “fail[s] . . . to give the [D]efendants adequate notice of the
claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
Moreover, Defendant Valles and Defendant Tony are the only law enforcement defendants
mentioned in the “statement of the claim.” See ECF No. [1] at 4–12. Defendants Diaz, Miller,
Gomez, Okun, Thompson, and Russell are not mentioned and so no “factual allegations” exist that
would “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the
alleged misconduct.” Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303. In fact, for all Defendants, Plaintiff fails to plead
sufficient “factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the alleged misconduct.” Id. Plaintiff shall have one
opportunity to amend.
B. Official Capacity Claims
As discussed, Plaintiff seeks to sue all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Regarding the official capacity claims, a suit against a state officer, employee, or agent in his or
her official capacity is in actuality “an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U.S 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“Official-capacity suits ... ‘generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ”); see also Faulkner
v. Monroe Cnty Sheriff's Dept., 523 F. App'x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A suit against a person

in their official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity.”). Because these Defendants are
employed by the BSO, the official capacity claims are the equivalent of claims against Broward
County.1
“To impose § 1983 liability on [Broward County], a plaintiff must show: (1) that his
constitutional rights were violated; (2) that [Broward County] had a custom or policy that
constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom
caused the violation.” Garcia v. Leavins, 2021 WL 3476623, at *4 (N.D. Fla. June 25, 2021),

1 The claims are against Broward County because under Florida law, “sheriff’s offices lack the legal
capacity to be sued.” Wilk v. St. Lucie Cnty. Fla. Sheriff Off., 740 F. App’x 658, 662 (11th Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted).
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2021 WL 3472797 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2021) (alterations
adopted; citing McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A government entity,
such as Broward County, may be liable in a section 1983 action “only where the [government
entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex. rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff

of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1116 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, in an official capacity suit,
plaintiff must establish that an official policy or custom of the government entity was the “moving
force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 693–94 (1978); Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“[I]n an official capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy
or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.”). Plaintiff shall have one
opportunity to amend.
C. Individual Capacity Claims: Defendant Warden Tony
For a supervisor to be liable for the misconduct of his subordinates, he must be causally
connected to the constitutional violation, such as by implementing an unlawful policy or
disregarding multiple prior reports of misconduct. See, e.g., Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312,

1321 (11th Cir. 2020); Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019); Fulwood
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 568 F. App’x 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Plaintiff fails to
allege any causal connection between Defendant Warden Tony and the alleged constitutional
violations. His status as a supervisor is not enough. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)
(noting that “supervisory liability” is a misnomer). In other words, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient
facts to establish that Defendant Warden Tony was personally involved in the alleged
constitutional violations. See id. Plaintiff shall have one opportunity to amend.
D. Conspiracy: Private Party Defendants
Defendant Extra Space Management and Defendant Beecher Carlson Insurance Services
are private parties. To sue a private party under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the private
party conspired with state actors to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Bendiburg v.

Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990). “To establish a prima facie case of section 1983
conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendants reached an
understanding to violate [his] rights. Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th
Cir. 2002). Plaintiff shall have one opportunity to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. On or before August 24, 2023, Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint that cures the
abovementioned deficiencies. The Amended Complaint must be signed under the penalty of
perjury and must provide a short and plain statement of all claims for relief, a basis for federal
jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.

2. Plaintiff shall file the Amended Complaint on this District’s form for section 1983
actions, which he must fill out completely. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with this
District’s form for section 1983 actions alongside this Order.
3. The Amended Complaint shall be the sole operative pleading considered in this case;
only the claims alleged therein will be addressed by the Court. Therefore, the Amended Complaint
must not refer to the original complaint or incorporate by reference claims raised or arguments
made therein. Similarly, the Amended Complaint must not incorporate by reference arguments or
text from any other documents, including any exhibits.
Case No. 23-cv-61362-BLOOM

4. The Amended Complaint must contain a separate paragraph as to each defendant
explaining what the defendant did and the supporting facts to show why that person is being sued.
5. The Amended Complaint must be labeled “Amended Complaint” and must show 23-
cv-61362-BLOOM so that it will be filed in this case.
6. Plaintiff must not expand the scope of the case by alleging new unrelated claims, or
adding new unrelated defendants, in the Amended Complaint. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,
607 (7th Cir. 2007).
7. The Plaintiff is warned that failure to file the Amended Complaint on time and in
compliance with this Order will result in dismissal of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on July 24, 2023.

BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Jerry Lee Byrd
Paul Rein Detention Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
2421 NW 16 Street
Pompano Beach, FL 33069
PRO SE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122250. Public record. Not legal advice.