# Dada v. Campbell

> District Court, S.D. Florida · August 1, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122241

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 1, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122241

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

## Opinion text

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida

Olufolayinka Dada, Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-22736-Civ-Scola
)
Jeff Campbell, and American )
Express Company, Defendants. )

Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file
fourth amended complaint. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 10.) After careful consideration of the
motion, the proposed amended complaint, the record, and the relevant legal
authorities, the Court denies the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the proposed
amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.)
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a party seeking
to amend its complaint may do so only with the opposing party's written consent
or the court's leave. According to the rule, leave should be freely given when
justice so requires. Rule 15(a) reflects a policy of “liberally permitting
amendments” and absent a “substantial reason to deny leave to amend” a
plaintiff's request should be granted. Espey v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 748, 750
(11th Cir. 1984). “Although leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so
requires, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as undue
delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.”
Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Universities of Florida Dep't of Educ. ex rel.
Univ. of S. Florida, 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).
“[L]eave to amend should not be denied on the ground of futility unless the
proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” Montes v. M &
M Mgmt. Co., No. 15-80142-CIV, 2015 WL 11254703, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 12,
2015) (Marra, J.) (citing Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.
1980)). In order to deny leave to amend, the Court must identify a “justifying
reason.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The Plaintiff originally brought this action seeking a breach of fiduciary
duty claim against Defendant Jeff Campbell, and unstated claims against
Defendant American Express Company, relating to three credit cards the Plaintiff
alleged he holds with American Express. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Because the
Plaintiff also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court reviewed the
complaint to determine whether it was frivolous or failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Finding the complaint failed to state claim for relief,
the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Campbell with
prejudice, and against Defendant American Express without prejudice and with
leave to amend, due to the Plaintiff’s pro se status. (Order at 1-2, ECF No. 6.) The
Court required the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint against Defendant
American Express, if the Plaintiff desired to, no later than August 7, 2023.
Instead, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to amend, including
in the motion his proposed amended complaint purporting to plead a claim for
breach of contract against Defendant Campbell and a claim for fraud against
Defendant American Express. Because the Court finds each of the claims are
clearly insufficient on their faces and are therefore futile, the Court must deny the
motion for leave to amend. See Montes, 2015 WL 11254703, at *1.
First, the Plaintiff fails to plead the existence of a contract between himself
and Defendant Campbell that would support his claim for breach of contract.
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (“For a breach of
contract claim, Florida law requires the plaintiff to plead and establish: (1) the
existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3) damages
resulting from the breach.”). The only possible support for the existence of a
contract that the Plaintiff offers in the proposed amended complaint is that he
“opened 3 credit cards with American Express.” (Mot. ¶ 1). Even if this would
even suffice to plead the existence of a contract, which it does not, the allegation
says nothing of any potential contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant
Campbell. Vega, 564 F.3d at 1272.1 Indeed, it seems that this claim is instead an
attempt to restate the breach of fiduciary duty claim that the Court dismissed
with prejudice, as it alleges that “American Express and Jeff Campbell (CFO of
American Express in his fiduciary role) will be in breach of contract for not
accepting tender of payment.” (Mot. ¶ 8.) The Court has already observed that the
Plaintiff cannot legally sustain a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendant
Campbell. (Order at 1-2.)
Second, the Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support a claim for
fraud against Defendant American Express under Florida law. “The requirements
for a claim of fraud or fraudulent inducement are: (1) a false statement regarding
a material fact; (2) the statement maker’s knowledge that the representation is
false; (3) intent that the representation induces another’s reliance; and (4)
consequent injury to the party acting in reliance.” Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Recs.,
Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007). And, while the Court must extend the
Plaintiff some leeway because he is proceeding pro se, the Plaintiff still required to
abide by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure’s requirements that the circumstances of
alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances

1 “To prove the existence of a contract, a plaintiff must plead: (1) offer; (2) acceptance; (3)
consideration; and (4) sufficient specification of the essential terms.” Id.
constituting fraud or mistake.”). The “leniency applied to pro se complaints does
not give the court license to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
sustain an action.” Carvel v. Godley, No. 08-61831-CIV, 2009 WL 10697626, at
*4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2009) (Brown, Mag. J.), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 08-61831-CIV, 2010 WL 11595293 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2010), aff’d, 404 F.
App’x 359 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).
The Plaintiff fails to allege any false statement made by American Express,
any knowledge of falsity by American Express, or any intent to induce reliance by
the Plaintiff. (Mot. ¶¶ 13-19.) In fact, the Court has difficulty determining what
the Plaintiff means to allege in this count at all. At best the Court can determine,
it appears that the Plaintiff is taking issue with the Federal Reserve System and
alleging that American Express, as an agent of the Federal Reserve Board, is
refusing to honor the Plaintiff’s “applications.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Exactly how American
Express could be an “agent” of the Federal Reserve Board, the Plaintiff never
alleges; neither does he detail what constitutes his “applications” or why it would
be fraudulent for American Express to refuse them. (Id. ¶¶ 1-19.)
In sum, the Plaintiff fails to plead any claims upon which relief could be
granted in his proposed amended complaint. In fact, the claims for relief he
purports to plead in the proposed amended complaint are also frivolous. Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (observing that “a complaint, containing as
it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”). Because the Court previously granted
the Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint against Defendant American Express,
the Court will not dismiss the entire matter as frivolous at this juncture. But the
Court cautions the Plaintiff to review the standard for frivolity,2 the Court’s order
dismissing his original complaint (ECF No. 6), and the Court’s order providing
instructions to pro se litigants (ECF No. 8) before filing an amended complaint,
should he choose to do so.
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Because the Court has
previously dismissed the Plaintiff’s original complaint and granted the Plaintiff
leave to amend his claims against Defendant American Express Company, the
Court reminds the Plaintiff that he must file an amended complaint—not move to

2 See, e.g., Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28 (observing that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 grants courts “not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”). Claims that are based on meritless legal theories
include, for example, “claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit,
. . . and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Id. Claims that are
based on baseless factual allegations include, for example, “claims describing fantastic or
delusional scenarios.” Id. at 328.
file, but actually file—an amended complaint no later than August 7, 2023, or
the Court will dismiss this case. The Court directs the Plaintiff to review the
Court’s order dismissing the original complaint (ECF No. 6), the Court’s order
providing instructions to pro se litigants (ECF No. 8), the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and any other applicable law, should the Plaintiff choose to file an
amended complaint by the stated deadline.
Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on August 1, 2023.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge

Copy via U.S. Mail to:
Olufolayinka Dada
490 NE 102nd Street
Miami Shores, Fl 33138

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122241. Public record. Not legal advice.
