# Moore v. A-TEAM TRAPPERS, L.L.C.

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122235

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122235

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that claims under the Jones Act were arbitrable because they would not “be viable if [the plaintiff] had not served as an employee on one of Carnival’s cruise ships”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-60441-RAR

ARNOLD MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

A-TEAM TRAPPERS, L.L.C.,
a Florida Limited Liability Company, et al.,

Defendants.
____________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART AND STAYING CASE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint, [ECF No. 34], filed on June 15, 2023.1 Having considered Defendants’
Motion, the record, and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion, [ECF No. 34], is GRANTED IN PART
for the reasons stated herein.
BACKGROUND
This is a case arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). First Am. Compl.
(“FAC”), [ECF No. 29] ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges the two corporate Defendants, A-Team Trappers,
L.L.C. (“A-Team Trappers”) and Lainey Central, L.L.C. (“Lainey Central”) were his joint
employers. FAC ¶ 7. He alleges the two individual Defendants, Cole and Tiba, are the “co-owners
and general managers of the corporate Defendants.” FAC ¶ 10. From approximately August 2020
to April 2022, Plaintiff was employed with Defendants as an “animal trapper.” FAC ¶ 15. The

1 The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Response”), [ECF
No. 36]; Defs.’ Reply to Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”), [ECF No. 37].
parties disagree on whether Plaintiff worked as an employee or independent contractor. Compare
FAC ¶ 25.4, with Mot. ¶ 4. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants was governed
by an Independent Contractor Agreement (“Agreement”), [ECF No. 34-1]. This Agreement was
“between A-Team Trappers, LLC . . . its affiliates, successors and assigns” and Plaintiff.

Agreement at 1. The Agreement contained an arbitration provision, which provides in relevant
part:
This Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and
evidences a transaction involving commerce. Any dispute relating
to this Agreement, or any other disputes or claims relating to the
employment relationship (whether based in common law, contract
or tort, or a federal, state or other statutory claim) will be governed
and decided by binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act and by an impartial independent arbitrator appointed
by the American Arbitration Association. The place of arbitration
shall be Pinellas County, Florida.

Agreement ¶ 19(A). Defendants move to dismiss this case on the ground that Plaintiff’s claims
must be arbitrated pursuant to this provision. See generally Mot.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the entire
dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement. See Babcock v. Neutron Holdings, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
3d 1222, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2020). When adjudicating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, a court may consider matters outside of the pleadings, such as an agreement between
the parties attached to a motion to dismiss. See id.
While federal law establishes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, state law
governs the interpretation of an arbitration provision. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal
Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001). The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)
requires a court to stay or dismiss a lawsuit and compel arbitration where: “(a) the plaintiff entered
into a written arbitration agreement that is enforceable under ordinary state-law contract principles
and (b) the claims before the court fall within the scope of that agreement.” Lambert v. Austin
Ind., 544 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When
determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a claim, courts “should apply ordinary state-law

principles that govern the formation of contracts.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 944 (1995). “[T]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at
issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000).
“Federal law counsels that questions of arbitrability, when in doubt, should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.” Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 251 F.3d at 1322.2
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff’s FLSA Claims are Subject to Arbitration
First, the Court confirms Plaintiff’s FLSA claims fall within the language of the
Agreement. They clearly do. “Contract interpretation principles under Florida law require [courts]
to look first at the words used on the face of the contract to determine whether that contract is

ambiguous. It is well settled that the actual language used in the contract is the best evidence of
the intent of the parties and, thus, the plain meaning of that language controls.” Rose v. M/V “Gulf
Stream Falcon”, 186 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
The Agreement’s arbitration provision is broad and unambiguous, requiring arbitration of
“[a]ny dispute relating to this Agreement, or any other disputes or claims relating to the
employment relationship (whether based in common law, contract or tort, or a federal, state or
other statutory claim).” Agreement ¶ 19(A) (emphasis added). A claim arising under the FLSA

2 Plaintiff’s argument that the Supreme Court has recently eliminated the presumption in favor of arbitration
in Morgan v. Sundance, 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022) is unsupported by that citation, irrelevant to this matter,
and contrary to law. See Resp. at 3.
clearly falls within this unambiguous language because it is a federal statutory claim relating to
the parties’ employment relationship.
While the language of the Agreement clearly includes Plaintiff’s claims, he argues FLSA
claims are not within the FAA’s purview because they are not “a controversy . . . arising out of [a]

contract or transaction.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Resp. at 4–10. But courts frequently compel parties to
arbitrate FLSA claims, so this argument summarily fails. See, e.g., Perera v. H & R Block E.
Enters., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Sammons v. Sonic-North Cadillac, Inc.,
No. 6:07-cv-277-Orl-19DAB, 2007 WL 2298032, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007); Bolamos v.
Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 02-21005, 2002 WL 1839210, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 21, 2002);
cf. Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (“After
examining the FLSA’s text, legislative history, purposes, and . . . Supreme Court decisions, we
discern no ‘contrary congressional command’ that precludes the enforcement of plaintiffs’
Arbitration Agreements[.]”) Montero v. Carnival Corp., 523 F. App’x 623, 627–28 (11th Cir.
2013) (noting that claims under the Jones Act were arbitrable because they would not “be viable

if [the plaintiff] had not served as an employee on one of Carnival’s cruise ships”).3
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are subject to arbitration. The Court now addresses
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments in turn.

3 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s citations to Florida law requiring courts to look to whether there
is a nexus between the dispute and the contract, because those cases typically involve provisions that only
reference claims “relating to” the agreement. See Navarro v. Varela, 345 So. 3d 365, 368 (Fla. 3d DCA
2022); Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 591 (Fla. 2013). The Agreement here is much
broader. Indeed, this case does raise issues directly related to the Agreement. The parties dispute whether
Plaintiff was an employee or independent contractor—a fact that is central to Plaintiff’s FLSA claim.
Because the parties all agree the employment relationship between them was governed by the Agreement,
the Court disagrees that Plaintiff’s claims are somehow unrelated to it. See Gill v. J.G. Wentworth Home
Lending, LLC, No. 19-80591, 2019 WL 13234224, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2019) (“[A]n FLSA violation
regarding Plaintiff’s compensation relates to the Employment Agreement, as the Employment Agreement
sets forth how Plaintiff would be compensated.”)
II. Plaintiff’s Other Arguments are Without Merit
a. Non-Signatories
First, without citing to a single case, Plaintiff argues he cannot be compelled to arbitrate
his claims against Defendants Lainey Central, LLC, Cole, and Tiba because the Agreement is only

between him and A-Team Trappers. Resp. at 2. The Court disagrees.
“Although arbitration is a contractual right that is generally predicated on an express
decision to waive the right to trial in a judicial forum . . . the lack of a written arbitration agreement
is not [always] an impediment to arbitration.” MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942,
947 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009). “[T]here are certain limited exceptions, such as equitable
estoppel, that allow nonsignatories to a contract to compel arbitration.” Id. (citation omitted).
These exceptions recognize that “the arbitration proceedings between the two signatories would
be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted” if the
signatory was not compelled to also arbitrate the dispute brought against a non-signatory. Id.

(alteration accepted) (quoting Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681
(5th Cir. 1976)). “Chapter 1 of the [FAA] permits courts to apply state-law doctrines related to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.” GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v.
Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1643 (2020).
Florida courts can apply equitable estoppel to allow a non-signatory to invoke an arbitration
provision “when the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of
concerted conduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.”
Shetty v. Palm Beach Radiation Oncology Assocs.-Sunderam K. Shetty, M.D., P.A., 915 So. 2d
1233, 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla.
3d DCA 2003)). Courts must look to whether the plaintiff’s claims against the signatory and
non-signatory both arise out of the same factual allegations when determining if equitable estoppel
applies in these circumstances. See Shetty, 915 So. 2d at 1235; Armas, 842 So. 2d at 212.
Applying these principles, Central Lainey—as well as Tiba and Cole—can clearly invoke

the arbitration clause on equitable estoppel grounds. Plaintiff alleges A-Team Trappers and
Central Lainey were his joint employers, and it appears the two entities paid him jointly and all
Defendants are liable for the amount allegedly owed. FAC ¶¶ 7, 28–31. Therefore, Central Lainey
may invoke the arbitration clause. In addition, all the relevant actions that form the basis of
Plaintiff’s claims were seemingly performed by Defendants Tiba and Cole, so the allegations
against them are inherently the same factual allegations that underlie his claim against A-Team
Trappers. See FAC ¶ 11 (stating that Cole and Tiba “hired [Plaintiff], told him what to do day-to-
day, [and] determined how much and whether he would be paid”). To hold otherwise would allow
Plaintiff to effectively render the arbitration proceedings between him and A-Team Trappers
meaningless, because in the event he received an unfavorable decision he could merely relitigate

the exact same issue against the remaining Defendants. See MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 177 F.3d at
947.
Similarly, Florida law recognizes that non-signatories who are agents of a signatory may
invoke an arbitration clause in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Amat v. Rey Pizza Corp., 204 F.
Supp. 3d 1359, 1364–65 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (“The Eleventh Circuit recognizes that non-signatories
can be bound to arbitrate under several theories arising from the common law principles of contract
and agency law.”); see also Bolamos, 2002 WL 1839210, at *2. A non-signatory agent may invoke
an arbitration provision, for example, “when the signatory to the contract containing a[n]
arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by
both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.” Koechli v. BIP Int’l,
Inc., 870 So. 2d 940, 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (quoting Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462,
467 (5th Cir. 2002)).
In addition to the aforementioned equitable estoppel principles, this agency theory clearly

applies to Cole and Tiba. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Cole and Tiba are the “co-owners and
general managers of the corporate Defendants and operate[] them day-to-day.” FAC ¶ 10.
Defendants Cole and Tiba were obviously acting as the agents of A-Team Trappers and Central
Lainey when Plaintiff’s claims arose, because his allegations against Cole and Tiba only relate to
actions they took in their roles as the owners and operators of A-Team Trappers and Central
Lainey. See FAC ¶¶ 10–11. Therefore, these allegations are substantially interdependent on the
allegations against A-Team Trappers and Central Lainey. See Koechli, 870 So. 2d at 944. Indeed,
as noted above, Plaintiff does not single out any Defendant he is pursuing relief from and instead
proceeds against all Defendants jointly in his single count for overtime compensation. FAC
¶¶ 28–31. Defendants Cole and Tiba squarely fall within this agency theory and may compel

arbitration.
Accordingly, the Court finds that all Defendants may properly invoke the arbitration clause
within the Agreement.
b. Plaintiff Was Not Exempt from the FAA
Next, Plaintiff argues he falls within the FAA exception for “seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiff
maintains he falls within this exception because he “handled materials, goods, and merchandise
that was manufactured all throughout the world” and “handled telephone calls and researched
things on the internet.” Decl. Arnold Moore in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, [ECF No. 36-1] ¶ 28.
But this exception is not nearly as broad as Plaintiff argues. This exception exempts “only
contracts with transportation workers, rather than all employees, from the FAA.” Sw. Airlines Co.
v. Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1790 (2022). To qualify as a transportation worker, a plaintiff “must be
actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of . . . goods across borders via the channels of foreign or

interstate commerce.” See id. Nothing in the FAC or Plaintiff’s declaration indicates he is a
“transportation worker” as defined by the Supreme Court. Were his mere interaction with goods
that traveled in interstate commerce enough to exempt Plaintiff from the FAA, this exception
would encompass a great deal of workers clearly not contemplated by the language of the statute.
In sum, this exception does not apply.
c. The Arbitration Provision Did Not Expire
Finally, Plaintiff argues the arbitration provision did not survive the end of his employment.
Resp. at 11. Notably, nothing in the Agreement or the arbitration provision specifically states this
provision survives the termination of the Agreement or the end of the parties’ relationship. See
generally Agreement. The Court, however, finds the Agreement contemplates survival of the right

to arbitrate disputes covered by the Agreement.
The Agreement broadly states the parties shall arbitrate “[a]ny dispute relating to th[e]
Agreement[] or any other disputes or claims relating to the employment relationship,” including
claims based on common law as well as federal, state, or other statutes. Agreement ¶ 19(A).
Courts have construed broad arbitration provisions as surviving the underlying agreement’s
termination. See Bendlis v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
“[B]road language” contained in an arbitration provision suggests the parties “intended for the
arbitration clause to survive expiration.” See id. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly concluded
that broad arbitration clauses can survive the termination of the underlying
agreement—particularly where the language of the clause indicates that claims relating to the
agreement’s termination are subject to arbitration. Martinez v. Carnival Corp., 744 F.3d 1240,
1245–46 (11th Cir. 2014); Montero, 523 F. App’x at 627 (“But that interpretation would allow an
employee to avoid arbitration entirely by either disembarking from the ship ahead of schedule or

waiting until his 10–month contract expires before he brings a claim.”).
The Court finds the provision broad enough to survive the termination of the Agreement.
Just like the provision in Bendlis, the Agreement’s arbitration clause places little limitation on the
claims that are subject to arbitration. See Bendlis, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 1345 (mandating arbitration
of “any and all claims, grievances, and disputes of any kind whatsoever relating to or in any way
connected with the [plaintiff’s] shipboard employment with [the defendant]”). The Court agrees
the broad language of the Agreement, like the language in Bendlis, Martinez, and Montero,
indicates this provision survived termination of the Agreement—particularly because the language
is clearly broad enough to encompass claims relating to the Agreement’s termination. The
arbitration provision of the Agreement remains operative and may still be invoked.4

III. The Court will Stay Proceedings
Defendants only request dismissal of this case but note in their Reply that the Court has the
inherent authority to instead stay the case. See generally Mot.; see also Reply at 3. Section 3 of
the FAA only refers to a “stay.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. But a court may dismiss a case when all claims are
subject to arbitration. See Perera, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. Courts around the country are split as

4 As a final matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s declaration includes a host of representations that do
not appear related to any argument contained in his Response. See generally Decl. Arnold Moore in Opp’n
to Mot. to Dismiss. Because many of these facts do not relate to the arguments in the Response, the Court
does not consider them. To the extent some of these assertions contradict the plain language of the
Agreement, the Court finds them unavailing. And the Court notes this declaration appears to erroneously
claim Plaintiff’s duties included “hostessing at a restaurant.” Id. ¶ 2. This apparent mistake calls into
question the credibility of this declaration.
to whether a stay or dismissal is proper in these circumstances. See Valiente v. Holiday CVS, LLC,
No. 20-20382, 2020 WL 2404701, at *2—-3 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2020) (collecting cases). The
Eleventh Circuit, however, appears to prefer stays. See id. Accordingly, while Defendants did not
request a stay, the Court will only grant the Motion in part and stay the case rather than dismiss it.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Motion, [ECF No. 34], is GRANTED IN PART.
2. Plaintiff is COMPELLED to arbitrate his claims against Defendants pursuant to
the Agreement.
3. This case is STAYED pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.
4. The parties shall provide the Court with joint status reports every sixty (60) days
regarding the status of the arbitration proceedings.
5. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case for administrative purposes only.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 28th day of July, 2023.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10122235. Public record. Not legal advice.