# Williams v. Florida Department of Corrections

> District Court, S.D. Florida · January 20, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121447

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 20, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121447

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that district court could take judicial notice of online state court dockets
- recognizing that vague, conclusory, or unsupported allegations cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and do not warrant an evidentiary hearing

## Opinion text

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida

Christopher Donnell Williams, )
Petitioner )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-14142-Scola
)
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
Respondent.

Order
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Christopher Donnell William’s petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). The petition alleges four grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel. (See generally id.). Respondent filed a response
(ECF No. 7), with an index to appendix (ECF No. 8) including attached exhibits
1–43 (ECF No. 8-1) and a notice of filing transcripts (ECF No. 9) with the trial
and sentencing transcripts attached (ECF No. 9-1). Williams thereafter filed a
reply (ECF No. 14). The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ written
submissions, the record, and applicable law. For the reasons explained below,
the petition is denied.
1. Background
Following a series of controlled drug buys, the State charged Williams with
six counts of sale or delivery of heroin (Counts 1-6), six counts of possession of
heroin (Counts 7-12), six counts of unlawful use of a two-way communications
device (Counts 13, 15-19), and one count of driving without a valid driver's
license (Count 14). (See ECF No. 8-1 at 4–7). The State alleged the offenses
occurred on six different dates. (See id.). All the offenses were tried before a single
jury in one trial. The jury found Williams guilty on Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, 14, and
15, and not guilty on the remaining counts. (See id. at 23–26).
Williams was sentenced to 180 months on Counts 1 and 2, 60 months on
Counts 7, 8, 13, and 15, and 60 days on Count 14. (See id. at 29–43). All
sentences were ordered to run concurrently. (See id.). Following his direct appeal
and litigation of multiple motions for postconviction relief, Williams docketed the
instant petition on April 19, 2022.
2. Legal Standard
Deference Under § 2254
A court’s review of a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition is
governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See
Abdul–Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007). AEDPA “imposes a highly
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings . . . , and demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt[.]” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.
766, 773 (2010). “The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief
functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems, and not as a means of error correction.” Ledford v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). This
standard is “difficult to meet.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014).
According to AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petitioner
relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state
court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); see also Rimmer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1039, 1053 (11th
Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
A state court decision is “contrary to” established Supreme Court
precedent when it (1) applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth
by the Supreme Court; or (2) confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable
from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-
06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at 410. Consequently,
“[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). If the last state
court to decide a prisoner’s federal claim provides an explanation for its merits-
based decision in a reasoned opinion, “a federal habeas court simply reviews the
specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are
reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Even summary rejection of a claim, without explanation, qualifies as an
adjudication on the merits, warranting deference. See Meders v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019). If the state court’s
merits determination is unaccompanied by an explanation, federal courts should
“‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision
that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained
decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Furthermore,
a decision is still an adjudication on the merits when it “addresses some but not
all of a defendant’s claims.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298 (2013).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel during criminal
proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). When
assessing counsel’s performance under Strickland, the Court employs a strong
presumption that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at
690. “[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it
promises only the right to effective assistance[.]” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20
(2013). “Where the highly deferential standards mandated by Strickland and
AEDPA both apply, they combine to produce a doubly deferential form of review
that asks only ‘whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland’s deferential standard.’” Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311,
1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
demonstrate both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a
reasonable probability that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104.
To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that,
considering all circumstances, “counsel’s conduct fell ‘outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.’” Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588
F.3d 1331, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic
choices made after thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-
91. The court’s review of counsel’s performance should focus on “not what is
possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only [on] what is constitutionally
compelled.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). Counsel is not ineffective for
failing to raise non-meritorious issues, see Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917
(11th Cir. 2001); nor is counsel required to present every non-frivolous
argument, see Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013).
Regarding the prejudice component, “[t]he defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id. A court need not address both prongs of Strickland if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. See id. at 697;
Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
3. Discussion
a. Timeliness
Respondent asserts that the petition should be dismissed as untimely.
(See ECF No. 7 at 13–17). In his reply, Williams correctly notes that Respondent
fails to address the tolling effect of his Motion for Mitigation of Sentence under
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c) (“Rule 3.800(c) Motion”) that was filed on August 9, 2018
and denied by the postconviction court on November 20, 2020.1 (See ECF No. 14
at 2–3). The Court agrees that Respondent’s calculations are therefore incorrect
as the Supreme Court has decided that a Rule 3.800(c) motion qualifies as one
for collateral review, thus tolling the one-year statute of limitations on petitions
for federal habeas relief. See Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 547–48 (2011)
(abrogating Alexander v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 523 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir.
2008).
Rather than redoing the cumbersome timeliness calculations, the Court
will skip over this step as the petition is due to be denied on the merits. See
Loggins v.Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When relief is due to
be denied even if claims are not procedurally barred, we can skip over the
procedural bar issues, and we have done so in the past.”).
b. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
Respondent asserts that Ground Three is unexhausted and concedes
exhaustion on all other grounds. (See ECF No. 7 at 18–21). The Court will skip
over the exhaustion/procedural default analysis and instead deny all grounds
on the merits. See Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]
federal court may skip over the procedural default analysis if a claim would fail
on the merits in any event.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for
a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure
of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).
c. The Merits
Ground One
Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion for severance of charges where charges were similar but happened on
different dates.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). He states that “[h]ad counsel enlightened him

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the online state court docket available at:
https://courtcasesearch.stlucieclerk.gov/BenchmarkWebExternal/CourtCase.aspx/Det
ails/2339038?digest=k%2BvasbWof9Ue65dPjgELdw. See Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that district court could take judicial
notice of online state court dockets). The online docket confirms that Williams docketed
his Rule 3.800(c) Motion on August 9, 2018, and the motion was not denied by the state
court until November 20, 2020.
that he had [the] right to separate his six sales of delivery, there may have been
a different outcome of the trial.” (Id.). This claim was raised in William’s amended
postconviction motion. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 125, 145–46). The trial court denied
the claim, adopting “the State’s reasoning in finding no prejudice where
[Williams] was acquitted on four drug sale dates.” (Id. at 625). On appeal, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal (hereinafter “Fourth District”) agreed, finding in
its substituted written opinion that:
[T]he circuit court's factual findings, as adopted from the
state's response discussing the jury's verdict as compared
to the evidence, are supported by competent, substantial
evidence in the record. We also agree with the circuit court's
legal conclusion that even if the defendant's trial counsel
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by not
moving to sever the offenses for separate trials before
different juries, the defendant was not prejudiced. The jury
convicted the defendant only for the drug-related offenses
in which he was directly recorded participating in the
transaction. The jury does not appear to have been
influenced by the non-recorded alleged transactions, even
where the confidential informant and detectives testified
that he participated in those alleged transactions, because
the jury acquitted him of those alleged offenses. Thus, the
defendant has not shown a reasonable probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome that, but for the
failure to sever the offenses, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.

Williams v. State, 311 So. 3d 30, 32–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020). Having
carefully reviewed the record in full, the Court finds nothing unreasonable with
the state court’s rejection of this claim. Because the state court’s decision was
neither an unreasonable determination of the facts nor contrary to clearly
established federal law, Williams is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Court further notes that William’s assertion that severance may have
led to a different outcome is too speculative and conclusory to warrant federal
habeas relief. See Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing that vague, conclusory, or unsupported allegations cannot support
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and do not warrant an evidentiary
hearing). Williams fails to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different had his counsel moved to sever the
charges. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As such, Ground One is denied under
the prejudice prong of Strickland. See id. at 697.
Ground Two
Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
improper testimony of [Detective] Stubley that bolstered the State’s evidence” in
violation of his 14th and 6th Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Williams refers
to the detective’s testimony that “from his experience defendants usually put cell
phones in fake names, to avoid the police.” (Id.). In his amended postconviction
motion, Williams asserted that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
such bolstering and that he was prejudiced by the testimony. (See ECF No. 8-1
at 124, 138–40). The trial court denied the claim, finding that he suffered “no
prejudice where there is evidence that [Williams] used the cell phone number
during the drug offenses.” (Id. at 624). On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed
the denial of the claim. (See id. at 1129).
The record amply supports the state court’s rejection of this claim. At trial,
Detective Stubley testified as follows:
So I'm following Mr. Williams, he's driving the rental car. I
can see him, I'm driving literally right next to him in an
undercover car. My goal was to not only make some more
observations on Mr. Williams, maybe identify another
source and supply, but to really put that phone in his hand.
And I did that by calling him when he was next to me, in the
lane next to me. And as soon as I called the number I saw
him look down, reach up, get his phone, look at it -- not
clearly not recognize the number that was calling. He
answered it on speaker phone, but he was kinda talking
with a little bit of space between his actual -- between his
face and the phone. He asked hello a couple times, who is
this. At that point I could see it was the phone that I was
intending to put in his hand, the one he had been using,
and I hung up, I terminated the call at that point[.]
(ECF No. 9-1 at 284:23–25, 285:1–13). Moreover, as noted by Respondent, text
messages arranging the drug sales used the same number, the confidential
informant identified Williams in court and testified to purchasing heroin from
him on August 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, and identified his voice offering to sell
heroin on August 12. (See ECF No. 7 at 37). Given the weight of the evidence
against him, Williams fails to show that the result of the proceeding would have
been different had his counsel objected to the detective’s testimony. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, Ground Two is denied under the prejudice
prong of Strickland. See id. at 697.
Ground Three
Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and
file a motion to suppress the audio visual recording of unknown suspect’s voice.”
(ECF No. 1 at 11). He refers to a video recording of one of the drug sales. (See id.
at 11–12). William’s face was not visible on the video, but the confidential
informant identified his voice and testified to him making the sale. (See id.).
Williams asserts that “the voice that was heard by the jury in this case could be
anybody’s voice which is so prejudicial and harmful[.]” (Id. at 12).
William’s argument, however, cuts the other way. His counsel’s strategic
decision to focus on the lack of evidence tying him to the video was reasonable.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91 (“Strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of the law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable.”). Moreover, the recording was properly authenticated as the
confidential informant was a participant, listened to the recording, and confirmed
that the recording memorialized what occurred during the sale. (See ECF No. 9-
1 at 296:17–25, 297:1–12). As such, counsel was not ineffective for failing to
make a meritless objection. See Chandler, 240 F.3d at 917. Williams thus fails
to establish deficient performance.
Williams also cannot demonstrate how the outcome of his trial would have
been different had counsel made the meritless objection or suppression motion.
The trial court in denying this claim specifically found there was “no prejudice
where any objection would have been denied.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 625); see also
Hayes v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 2019 WL 6249274, at *2 (11th Cir. June 6, 2019)
(concluding that the defendant could not make the requisite showing of deficient
performance and prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
counsel’s failure to move to suppress a statement and photo lineup where the
record showed no basis for suppression). Ground Three is thus denied under the
performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.
Ground Four
Williams alleges his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to do a proffer
of the entire jury panel, or ask for a new trial or mistrial or a new jury once the
judge Mr. Levins mentioned that there may have been someone talking or
attempting to talk to the jury.” (ECF No. 1 at 14). Williams raised this claim in
Ground Twelve of his amended postconviction motion. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 147–
49). The state court denied the claim, adopting the State’s reasoning in finding
the claim “conclusory and merely speculative.” (Id. at 625). On appeal, the Fourth
District affirmed the denial. See Williams v. State, 311 So. 3d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2020) (“We affirm without discussion the circuit court's denial of amended
ground[ ] . . . twelve.”).
Williams speculates and presumes that illegal communication occurred
between an outsider and the jury; however, his claim is refuted by the record.
The trial judge stated that “I have no indication that this juror -- these jurors
were talked to at all, none.” (ECF No. 9-1 at 160:8–10). Nevertheless, in an
abundance of caution, the trial judge questioned the jury as follows:
[S]ince this trial began yesterday, you were brought in here
and I -- we need to know, the bailiffs need to know if anyone
outside of court has tried to say anything to you about the
case or ask if you’re on the jury or anything like that, that
needs to be told to the bailiffs and let them know. Okay,
everybody understand that? That’s what the Rule requires.
And if anyone does say anything to you at all in any setting
outside of this courtroom about the case or even asking
what jury you’re on or anything like that, that has to be
immediately reported to the bailiffs, as it is in every criminal
case, just to let you know, okay. Everybody understand
that?

THE JURY: Yes.

THE COURT: Has that -- has that -- (indiscernible), has
anybody tried to contact anybody or anything? Anybody
have any contact or anything?

THE JURY: No.

(ECF No. 9-1 at 176:6–25, 177:1) (emphasis added). Because this claim is
meritless, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise it. See Chandler, 240
F.3d at 917. Williams thus fails to establish deficient performance. He also fails
to show prejudice with his wholly conclusory and speculative claim. See Tejada,
941 F.2d at 1559. Ground Four is thus denied under the performance and
prejudice prongs of Strickland.
c. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish
the need for an evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647
F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual
allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required
to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007);
see also Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir.
2016). Here, the record refutes William’s factual allegations and precludes
habeas relief. See id. Because the Court can “adequately assess [William’s]
claim[s] without further factual development[,]” he is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
d. Certificate of Appealability
A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying his or
her petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal;
rather, in order to do so, he must obtain a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). This
Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if Williams makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the district court rejects a petitioner’s constitutional
claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
“would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Williams does not
satisfy this burden, so the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
4. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, William’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) is denied. A certificate of appealability is
also denied. Because there are no issues with arguable merit, an appeal would
not be taken in good faith, and thus, Williams is not entitled to appeal in forma
pauperis. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on i 2023.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
Copies, via U.S. Mail, to
Christopher Donnell Williams
K84073
Jackson Correctional Institution
Inmate Mail/Parcels
9563 10th Street
Malone, FL 32445
PRO SE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121447. Public record. Not legal advice.