# Calderon v. SIXT RENT A CAR, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Florida · September 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121066

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

SOUTHERN DISTR ICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 19-62408-CIV-SINGHAL

PHILIPPE CALDERON, ANCIZAR MARIN,
and KELLI BOREL RIEDMILLER, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SIXT RENT A CAR, LLC,

Defendant.
________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed on July 18, 2022 (the “Motion”) (DE [206]). Defendant filed an accompanying
Statement of Material Facts (“DSOF”) (DE [207]). Plaintiffs filed a Response (DE [220])
and accompanying Statement of Material Facts (“PSOF”) (DE [222]) on August 17, 2022.
Defendant filed a Reply and Reply Statement of Material Facts (“RDSOF”) on September
7, 2022. The Motion is now ripe for this Court’s consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring the instant action against Defendant SIXT Rent A Car, LLC
for its alleged unfair, deceptive, and unlawful conduct of imposing unauthorized
repair charges on rental car customers in breach of its rental contracts with
customers and in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. (“FDUTPA”). See Second Am. Compl., at 1 (DE
[151]). Plaintiffs allege Defendant organized a company-wide scheme to profit by
systematically charging unfair, deceptive, and unauthorized Estimated Repair
Costs and other sham fees not permitted by the Rental Agreement. Id.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s Rental Agreements with Plaintiffs are
comprised of a (i) Face Page Contract and (2) Rental Jacket. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs
further assert Defendant incorporated by reference the Rental Jacket into the
Face Page Contract through the following language:
. . . By signing below, you agree to the Terms and Conditions
printed on the Rental Jacket and to the terms found on this Face
Page, which together constitute this Agreement . . .

Id. at 3. Plaintiffs allege the Rental Jacket lists several fees and charges that
Defendant can impose on customers for damage caused to the rental vehicle. Id.
at 4. Moreover, the Rental Agreement indicates customers are “responsible for the cost
of repair,” “Loss of Use,” “Diminished Value,” and “administrative expenses incurred
processing [a] claim.” Id. However, Plaintiffs allege, Defendant breached these provisions
and violated FDUTPA by charging customers for repairs that never took place and
otherwise improperly inflating fees charged to customers. See generally Second. Am.
Compl. (DE [151]).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment “is
appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.
650, 656–57 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a));1 see also Alabama v.

1 The 2010 Amendment to Rule 56(a) substituted the phrase “genuine dispute” for the former “‘genuine
issue’ of any material fact.”
North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010). “By its very terms, this standard provides that
the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247–48 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record
evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light of his burden of
proof. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is “material”
if, “under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson

Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the
material facts are undisputed and do not support a reasonable inference in favor of the
non-movant, summary judgment may properly be granted as a matter of law.” DA Realty
Holdings, LLC v. Tenn. Land Consultants, 631 Fed. Appx. 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. SEC v. Monterosso, 756
F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment,
“the nonmoving party must offer more than a mere scintilla of evidence for its position;
indeed, the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient to permit the jury to

reasonably find on its behalf.” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th
Cir. 2015). “[T]his, however, does not mean that we are constrained to accept all the
nonmovant’s factual characterizations and legal arguments.” Beal v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks summary judgment on several grounds. First, Defendant
argues summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs’ contract claims because
the Terms and Conditions sued upon were not incorporated by reference into
Plaintiffs’ rental agreements as a matter of law based upon the undisputed facts.
Second, Defendant argues summary judgment is proper on Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA
claims because the undisputed facts show Plaintiffs did not suffer actual
damages as a result of unfair or deceptive conduct. Third, Defendants seek
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ injunctive and declaratory relief claims because
Plaintiffs lack standing to obtain either form of relief under both their contract
claims and FDUTPA claims.

A. Breach of Contract Claims
Plaintiff Calderon rented his vehicle in Florida, Plaintiff Marin rented in
Arizona, and Plaintiff Borel rented in Colorado. See DSOF ¶¶ 12, 45, 64; PSOF
¶¶ 12, 45, 64. Because the State of Florida follows the doctrine of lexi loci
contractus, the law of the state in which each Plaintiff rented their vehicle from
Defendant determines the interpretation and enforceability of the rental contracts.
See Fioretti v. Mass. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 1995). The
Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant breached provisions of the
Terms and Conditions Rental Jacket concerning Fees. See Second. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 102–112. It is undisputed by the parties that Defendant’s routine rental
procedure at the time of Plaintiffs’ rentals provided the renter an opportunity to
review paper copies of the Face Page and Terms and Conditions before the
renter used an electronic signature pad to sign the Face Page, which
incorporated the Terms and Conditions by reference. See DSOF ¶¶ 1–12; PSOF
¶¶ 1–12. Here, however, it is mostly undisputed that Plaintiffs were not shown or
told how to access the Terms and Conditions before they signed the signature
pad. See DSOF ¶¶ 12–19, 21, 22, 44–52, 54, 63–69, 71–74; PSOF ¶¶ 12–19, 21,
22, 44–52, 54, 63–69. The only disputed points concern testimony where Plaintiffs
could not recall whether they were shown the Terms and Conditions prior to signing. See
PSOF ¶¶ 20, 53, 70. Plaintiffs cite no record evidence that could support the inference
that Plaintiffs were shown the Terms and Conditions before signing. Therefore, it is
undisputed that Defendant Sixt departed from its routine procedure with regard to
Plaintiffs’ rentals because it failed to show Plaintiffs the Terms and Conditions or tell
Plaintiffs how to access them before signing. Based on this undisputed factual record, the

Court must determine whether the Terms and Conditions are part of each Plaintiff’s rental
contract.
1. Calderon
Under Florida law, to incorporate by reference a collateral document into an
agreement, the agreement must (1) specifically provide that it is subject to the
incorporated document and (2) sufficiently describe or refer to the collateral document so
that the intent of both parties is ascertained. Spicer v. Tenet Fla. Physician Servs., LLC,
149 So. 3d 163, 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). This Court previously held that Calderon’s Face
Page did not sufficiently describe the Terms and Conditions. See (DE [30], at 11–12).

Moreover, this Court continued that the Terms and Conditions could thus only be
incorporated by reference into the Face Page if Calderon “receive[d] [the Terms and
Conditions], or else [was] given clear direction on how to access it” before signing. Id. at
12.
The undisputed factual record reveals there is no evidence Calderon received or
was shown the Terms and Conditions before signing. See DSOF ¶ 20; PSOF ¶ 20.
Calderon testified he did not recall being shown or given “any paperwork” before he
signed the rental contract. Id. And there is no other record evidence that could support
the inference Calderon received the Terms and Conditions or was given clear direction
how to access them before signing. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs cannot prove the
Terms and Conditions were incorporated by reference into the Face Page as a matter of
Florida law.
2. Marin
Under Arizona law, an agreement incorporates by reference a collateral document
if (1) the reference is “clear and unequivocal,” (2) it is “called to the attention of the other

party [who] consents thereto,” and (3) “the terms of the incorporated document [are]
known or easily available to the contracting parties.” United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 681 P.2d 390, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (cleaned up). Arizona law does not require
a contracting party “see the incorporated document if the document is easily available.”
Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, 2018 WL 637382, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2018) (citing
Weatherguard Roofing Co. v. D.R. Ward Constr. Co., 152 P.3d 1227, 1230 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2007)). But an incorporated document, even if readily available, will not be incorporated
if not called to the attention of the contracting party. See Cottonwood Ctrs. Inc. v.
Klearman, 2018 WL 5084657, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2018).

The undisputed factual record indicates Plaintiff Marin testified that when he signed
the signature pad, “an electronic black box,” he had “no idea” what he was signing
because it “was never explained.” DSOF ¶¶ 49–52; PSOF ¶¶ 49–52. Marin further
testified he was not shown or handed any papers before signing. DSOF ¶ 51; PSOF ¶
51. No record evidence supports the inference he was shown a copy of the Face Page
or Terms and Conditions before signing. In fact, Marin testified he only thought his signing
the signature pad indicated his acceptance of the credit card charges for the rental. See
DSOF ¶ 49; PSOF ¶ 49. Even if we assume the language in the signature box clearly and
unequivocally referenced the Terms and Conditions and called them to Marin’s attention,
there is still no evidence in the factual record to support an inference that the Terms and
Conditions were either known or available to Marin. Accordingly, the Court finds the
Terms and Conditions were not incorporated by reference into Marin’s rental contract
under Arizona law.
3. Borel
Under Colorado law, an agreement incorporates by reference a collateral

document if (1) it is “clear that the parties to the agreement had knowledge of
and assented to the incorporated terms,” and (2) the incorporated terms are
“clearly and expressly identified.” French v. Centura Health Corp., 509 P.3d 443,
449 (Colo. 2022). “General or oblique references to a document to be
incorporated . . . are usually insufficient to support a finding that the document
was incorporated by reference.” Id. at 450.
Here, Plaintiff Borel does not recall whether she received a copy of or was
told how to access the Terms and Conditions prior to signing the signature pad.
See DSOF ¶¶ 70–71; PSOF ¶¶ 70–71. Borel testified that she recalled receiving

the receipt, which contained the Terms and Conditions, for the first time when
she received the keys to her rental vehicle. Id. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot prove Borel
had knowledge of, let alone assented to, the Terms and Conditions because there
is simply no record evidence that could support an inference that she received or
had access to the Terms and Conditions before signing. The only record
evidence—Borel’s testimony—tends to prove she did not receive the Terms and
Conditions until after signing. And even if we assume she did receive or have
access to the Terms and Conditions before signing, the signature pad’s “[g]eneral
[and] oblique reference[]” to the Terms and Conditions is likely “insufficient to
support a finding that the document was incorporated by reference.” See French,
509 P.3d at 450. Accordingly, the Court finds the Terms and Conditions were not
incorporated into Borel’s rental contract under Colorado law.
4. Estoppel Arguments
Having found the Terms and Conditions are not incorporated into any of the
Plaintiffs’ rental contracts, the Court next addresses other arguments in support of

incorporation. Plaintiffs first argue Defendant Sixt is contractually estopped from claiming
the terms and conditions are unenforceable because contracting parties are generally
estopped from denying a specific term, fact, or performance arising from that contract.
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue the Face Page shows Defendant intended to be bound by the
Terms and Conditions because they included reference to it in the Face Page. This intent
to be bound, Plaintiffs argue, is evidenced by the fact Defendant sought to enforce the
Terms and Conditions against Plaintiffs. Second, Plaintiffs separately argue Defendant is
estopped from claiming Plaintiffs did not assent to the Terms and Conditions because
they previously argued the opposite position in the course of this action.

a. Contractual Estoppel
Plaintiffs cite a patent law treatise and Federal Circuit case for the
proposition that a party that has entered into a contract is estopped from denying
a term, fact, or performance arising from the contract. See Response, at 7–8.
Plaintiffs cite no authority from Florida, Arizona, or Colorado for this proposition.
Under traditional principles of contract law, denying a term, fact, or performance
arising from a contract could be construed as breach of contract, entitling the
non-breaching party to numerous breach of contract remedies, including specific
performance. However, the Court does not see how Plaintiffs’ argument applies
here. Having found the Terms and Conditions to not be incorporated, they are
not part of the contract. Accordingly, denying a term, fact, or performance arising
under the Terms and Conditions is of no consequence. Moreover, Defendant’s
intent to be bound by the Terms and Conditions is of no consequence where the
other requirements of incorporation by reference are not met as discussed supra
section III.A.

b. Judicial Estoppel
“Judicial estoppel is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn
positions.” Am. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d
1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). And “[b]ecause this is a diversity
case, the application of . . . judicial estoppel is governed by state law.” Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 925, 930 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). “Under Florida law, judicial estoppel applies only
when a party maintains inconsistent positions in separate proceedings.” Searcy
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1358 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing

Fintak v. Fintak, 120 So. 3d 177, 186–87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)). Thus, “judicial
estoppel does not apply to inconsistent positions taken in the course of a single
trial.” Searcy, 902 F.3d at 1358 n.7.
Here, there is no separate proceeding where Defendant took an
inconsistent position to the one it asserts here. Rather, Defendant previously took
an inconsistent position at the beginning of this action based upon the information
available to Defendant at that time. Following the course of discovery in this
action, the parties learned that Sixt did not in fact follow its routine rental
procedure with regard to the individual Plaintiffs as Defendant had initially
believed. At this point, the parties have now turned the chess board around and
argue opposite positions on enforceability of the Terms and Conditions to what
they argued at the case’s onset. Defendant’s position at this phase is not truly
inconsistent with its position at the case’s inception. Rather, Defendant’s position
at the beginning of the case was based on assumptions that turned out to be
incorrect as revealed during discovery. Thus, Defendant has merely changed its

position in light of new facts uncovered during discovery that have disproven the
initial assumptions Defendant formed at the case’s inception. That is exactly what
a Motion for Summary Judgment requires. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does
not forbid this.
B. FDUTPA Claims
Fla. Stat. § 501.211 creates a private right of action for consumers “who
[have] suffered a loss as a result of a violation of [the statute].” Fla. Stat. §
501.211(2). Under this provision, individuals “may recover actual damages, plus
attorney’s fees and court costs as provided in s. 501.2105.” Id. To bring a consumer

claim for damages under the FDUTPA, a plaintiff must prove (1) a deceptive or unfair
practice, (2) causation, and (3) actual damages. Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860,
869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citations omitted). A “plaintiff may recover only actual damages
incurred as a consequence of a violation of the statute” and may not recover “nominal
damages, speculative losses, or compensation for subjective feelings of disappointment.”
City First Mortg. Corp. v. Barton, 988 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (cleaned up).
And critically, “[t]here can be no monetary recovery under the FDUTPA where the plaintiff
has suffered no out-of-pocket losses.” Jones v. TT of Longwood, Inc., 2007 WL 2298020,
at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007) (citing Himes v. Brown & Co. Secs. Corp., 518 So. 2d 937,
938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)). If a plaintiff subjectively believes he paid for a good or service
(that allegedly violates FDUTPA), but has not actually paid or otherwise incurred an out-
of-pocket loss, there can be no finding of actual damages because “whether [a plaintiff]
thought he had [paid] at the time of the transaction is irrelevant.” Haun v. Don Mealy
Imports, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
Here, all Plaintiffs admit they did not personally pay out-of-pocket any of the fees

at issue. See DSOF ¶¶ 27, 58–61, 77–78; PSOF ¶¶ 27, 58–60, 61 (confirming Marin’s
own company paid fees in connection with the invoice sent to Marin personally), 77–78.
Calderon testified he never paid any of the charges invoiced by Sixt for damage to his
rental vehicle. See DSOF ¶ 27; PSOF ¶ 27. For Plaintiffs Marin and Borel, each of their
companies paid the charges invoiced by Sixt to the Plaintiffs. See DSOF ¶¶ 58–61; PSOF
¶¶ 58–61. Thus, from this undisputed factual record, there is no basis to conclude any of
the Plaintiffs incurred an out-of-pocket loss.
Plaintiffs cite several Supreme Court cases to argue that standing is not defeated
when third parties pay charges invoiced to plaintiffs where the third parties stand in the

shoes of Plaintiffs. See Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554
U.S. 269, 286 (2008); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 166 U.S. 468, 473–74 (1897).
Yet both of these cases deal with the injury-in-fact element of Article III standing. The
injury element here is that in the context of FDUTPA, not Article III standing. Plaintiffs very
well could have suffered injury-in-fact under Article III while failing to have suffered actual
damages under FDUTPA. Therefore, these Supreme Court decisions are inapplicable.
Plaintiffs additionally argue Calderon suffered actual damages through his
purchase of a partial damage waiver. As stated above, under FDUTPA, a “plaintiff may
recover only actual damages incurred as a consequence of a violation of the statute.”
Barton, 988 So. 2d at 86. Plaintiff purchased the partial damage waiver to waive
responsibility for $500 of damage to the rental vehicle. See DSOF ¶¶ 15–17; PSOF ¶¶
15–17. And he received the benefit of the bargain when Defendant in fact applied the
$500 waiver to his assessed damage charges, see DSOF ¶ 25; PSOF ¶ 25, which he
ultimately did not pay, see DSOF ¶ 27; PSOF ¶ 27. Accordingly, the Court finds no nexus

between any alleged violation of FDUTPA and payment of the waiver because the Plaintiff
received the benefit of the bargain for the waiver payment.
C. Declaratory or Injunctive Relief under FDUTPA
Under Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1), “anyone aggrieved by a violation of
[FDUTPA] may bring an action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or
practice violates this part and to enjoin a person who has violated, is violating,
or is otherwise likely to violate [FDUTPA].” Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1). Plaintiffs seek
(i) declaratory judgment that Defendant’s Fees are unfair and deceptive, and (ii)
an injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing to engage in the alleged

unlawful conduct, eliminating the amounts allegedly owed, and barring Defendant
from asserting or assigning the right to collect charges. See Second Am. Compl.
¶¶ 100, 121, 132. “Although the FDUTPA allows a plaintiff to pursue injunctive
relief even where the individual plaintiff will not benefit from an injunction . . . it
cannot supplant Constitutional standing requirements. Article III of the
Constitution requires that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief allege a threat of
future harm.” Dapeer v. Neutrogena Corp., 95 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla.
2015) (citations omitted). “[T]o seek prospective or injunctive relief, plaintiffs
(including individually named plaintiffs representing a class) must be able to
demonstrate more than mere injury from past wrongs.” Id. (citations omitted).
To obtain injunctive relief, a party must prove “irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (cleaned
up). “The injury must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.”
Id. (cleaned up). “An injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through

monetary remedies.” Id. (cleaned up). To obtain declaratory relief, a party must
show “a substantial continuing controversy between the parties” that is not
“conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent,” but must be “real and immediate.”
Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985) (cleaned up). “The remote
possibility that a future injury may happen is not sufficient to satisfy the actual
controversy requirement for declaratory judgments.”
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs impliedly concede that Plaintiffs Borel and
Marin lack standing to seek equitable relief because Sixt’s claims against them
were paid off by third parties. See Response, at 16–18. Thus, there is no

possibility of future collection attempts and thus no basis for equitable relief for
these Plaintiffs.
With regard to Calderon, Plaintiff’s PSOF states Defendant cancelled its
entire claim against him and reduced the balance of his account to zero in its
internal computer system in January 2018, over a year before the instant action
was filed. See (DE [1]); PSOF ¶ 34. The parties only dispute whether a
cancellation notice or phone call was made to Calderon. See DSOF ¶¶ 35–38;
PSOF ¶¶ 35–38. Even assuming no cancellation notice was sent to Calderon, the
Court finds there is simply no record evidence that could support a finding of
actual or imminent threat of collection attempts or assignments by Defendant.
Rather, the record evidence tends to prove the opposite—the threat of collection
attempts or assignments is remote and speculative because Defendant’s internal
system reveals the account was closed long before the instant action was filed.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo there was an actual or imminent threat of
future collection, this would not rise to the level of irreparable harm because it

could almost certainly be undone through monetary remedies. Second, for these
same reasons, no record evidence could support a finding of a continuing
controversy between the parties that is real and immediate. Instead, the
possibility of future collection attempts or assignments is highly remote given that
Defendant cancelled the claim and eliminated the balance over a year before the
present action was even filed. Plaintiffs assert there is “no factual guarantee by
Sixt” that collection attempts will not occur in the future. See, Response, at 17.
However, “no factual guarantee against injury” is not the standard to obtain
declaratory or injunctive relief.

D. Declaratory or Injunctive Relief under Breach of Contract Claim
For the reasons discussed supra section III.A., Plaintiffs do not have
standing to seek equitable relief concerning the cited portions of the Terms and
Conditions because the Terms and Conditions were not incorporated by
reference into any of their contracts. And Plaintiffs cannot have “representative”
standing to pursue equitable relief on behalf of a putative class when they
personally lack standing. See Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Ga.,
247 F.3d 1262, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (“just as a plaintiff cannot pursue an
individual claim unless he proves standing, a plaintiff cannot represent a class
unless he has standing to raise the claims of the class he seeks to represent.”).

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(DE [206]) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case and DENY
AS MOOT any pending motions. Final judgment will be entered separately pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. Defendant shall submit a Proposed Final Judgment in Word format to
Chambers email by September 28, 2022.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 20th day of
September 2022. \

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to counsel via CM/ECF

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121066. Public record. Not legal advice.