# Glanton v. United States

> District Court, S.D. Florida · September 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121065

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NOS. 22-22942-CIV-ALTMAN
19-20063-CR-ALTMAN-2

KEON TRAVY GLANTON,

Movant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.
____________________________________/

ORDER
Keon Travy Glanton is a federal prisoner serving a 400-month sentence in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons. See Amended Judgment, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 17, 2021), ECF No. 207 at 2. Claiming that his conviction and sentence are unconstitutional,
Glanton has filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Motion to Vacate (“Motion”) [ECF
No. 1]; Memorandum of Law (“Memo”) [ECF No. 1-1].
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases authorizes a district court to summarily
deny a § 2255 motion, even “[w]ithout an answer or other pleading from the” United States, “if it
plainly appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the
case that the movant is not entitled to relief.” Broadwater v. United States, 292 F.3d 1302, 1303 (11th Cir.
2002) (cleaned up). And that’s what we have here: a facially meritless 2255 whose claims are
conclusively refuted by the record. The Motion is DENIED.
THE CHARGE AND THE PLEA
The Grand Jury charged Glanton and two codefendants in a twelve-count Indictment. See
Indictment, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2019), ECF No. 1.
The Indictment alleged that Glanton (1) conspired to commit Hobbs Act robberies (Count 1); (2)
committed a Hobbs Act robbery (Count 4); brandished a firearm in furtherance of that Hobbs Act
robbery (Count 5); committed a second Hobbs Act robbery (Count 6); kidnapped the victim during
this second robbery in a way that resulted in the victim’s death (Count 7); carjacked the victim in the
second robbery in a way that resulted in the victim’s death (Count 8); discharged a firearm in
furtherance of the second robbery (Count 9); caused the death of a person while committing the
second robbery (Count 10); and arson (Count 12). Id. at 20–21.

Glanton ultimately pled guilty to Counts 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10 of the Indictment. See Plea
Agreement, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 161
at 1. As part of his plea agreement, Glanton agreed to waive his “right to appeal the sentence imposed
in this case” and promised never to claim that “the admitted conduct does not fall within the scope
of the statutes of conviction.” Id. at 6–7. Glanton also admitted that, at trial, the Government would
have proven the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt:
On July 11, 2018, [codefendant Jamal Lamar] Head and Glanton drove to
[codefendant] Christopher Grant Proby’s residence in Riviera Beach, Florida. Head
and Glanton picked up Proby and a 15-year-old female (“Minor 1”). One of the men
directed Minor 1 to call the nationwide plumbing company “Roto-Rooter” to request
a plumber to complete a call for service at a designated address. . . . The men discussed
that they were going to rob the plumber when he arrived at the service call and take
valuable plumbing equipment. During this time, Head was holding a black semi-
automatic pistol.

Victim D.S., a plumber employed by Roto-Rooter, arrived at the abandoned residence.
. . . Head then attacked D.S. with the black semi-automatic pistol, striking him in the
head and holding him at gunpoint. . . . While holding D.S. at gunpoint, Head took
D.S.’s Roto-Rooter van keys, cell phone, and wallet. . . . Head provided D.S.’s work
van keys to Proby and Glanton, who then removed valuable plumbing equipment
from D.S.’s work van. In total, Proby and Glanton took over $10,000 worth of
plumbing equipment[.]

[ . . . ]

On the afternoon of July 12, 2018, Glanton and Head planned to complete another
robbery of a plumber. Using Glanton’s cell phone, Head called multiple plumbers in
order to set up another robbery in Miami Lakes. At Head’s request, plumber “R.O.”
ultimately agreed to send another plumber, victim “L.S.H.” to an address located [in
Miami Lakes].
[ . . . ]

Shortly after 7:00 p.m., victim L.S.H. arrived at the Miami Lakes address . . . . Glanton
and Head took L.S.H.’s van keys and cell phone and Head forced L.S.H. into the rear
seat of the rental Volkswagen at gunpoint. Glanton then began driving away in L.S.H.’s
white work van, and Head began driving away in the recent Volkswagen while holding
L.S.H. at gunpoint with a .40-caliber semi-automatic pistol.

Shortly after leaving the scene of the carjacking, victim L.S.H. struggled with Head.
Head then shot L.S.H. once in the chest and twice in the abdomen and crashed the
rental Volkswagen into a tree, rendering it inoperable. Head then fled the scene of the
murder. During this time, Head called Glanton by cell phone and directed Glanton
back to a school where Head was hiding. . . . Glanton then arrived in L.S.H.’s white
work van and picked up Head.

Head and Glanton drove to Opa Locka, where they obtained a second car. Head and
Glanton then drove separately to the Northside District of Miami, where they used
gasoline to light L.S.H.’s work van on fire.

Factual Proffer, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No.
161 at 1–5.
After a lengthy plea colloquy, we adjudicated Glanton guilty of Counts 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10 of the
Indictment, and the Government dismissed the remaining counts. See Amended Judgment, United
States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2021), ECF No. 207 at 1. For these
crimes, we sentenced Glanton to 400 months in prison—a sentence that consisted of “196 months as
to counts 1, 8, 10, all term[s] to run concurrent, 84 months as to count 5 to run consecutive with
counts 1, 8, 10 and 120 months as to count 9 to run consecutive with count 5.” Id. at 2.
THE LAW
A. Standard of Review
Because collateral review isn’t a substitute for a direct appeal, a movant can proceed under §
2255 only in extremely limited circumstances. As relevant here, a prisoner is entitled to relief under
§ 2255 if (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,”
(2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,” (3) “the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law,” or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” §
2255(a); accord McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). In other words, “relief
under § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of
other injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a
complete miscarriage of justice.” Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988) (cleaned
up); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (“[W]e have long and consistently affirmed

that a collateral challenge will not do service for an appeal.”). If a court grants a § 2255 claim, the
court “shall vacate and set aside the judgment and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” § 2255(b). The movant bears
the burden of proving his § 2255 claim. See Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir.
2017) (“We rest our conclusion that a § 2255 movant must prove his [claim] on a long line of
authority holding that a § 2255 movant bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255 motion.”
(cleaned up)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to “the Assistance of Counsel
for his defen[s]e.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 686 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas litigant must
demonstrate “that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,’ and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). This same standard
applies to alleged errors made by both trial and appellate counsel. See Farina v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
536 F. App’x 966, 979 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is
evaluated under the same standard as for trial counsel.”).
To establish the first prong (deficiency), “a petitioner must [show] that no competent counsel
would have taken the action that his counsel did take[.]” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (emphasis added). So, if “some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have
acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial,” counsel could not have performed

deficiently. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d
1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992)).
As for the second prong (prejudice), “a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient
performance if ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To succeed on this prong, a defendant must
show that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.” Id. at 687. If the defendant pleads guilty, the prejudice prong is modified so that the
defendant must instead show “that there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59
(1985).

ANALYSIS
Although Glanton appears to advance only one claim—that defense counsel was ineffective
under United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), because he “failed to inform petitioner of case law
that could have challenged the validity of the petitioner’s multiple 924(c) counts”—a closer review of
his Motion reveals that he’s actually asserting several grounds for relief, all centered around his belief
that counsel should’ve negotiated a better deal with the Government. See Memo at 2. In addition to
the Davis claim, Glanton also complains that counsel (1) “never suggested or even contemplated to
negotiate a plea that was consistent with the facts of this case,” ibid.; and (2) failed to inform Glanton
that he “had a cognizable defense to [carjacking,]” id. at 3. We reject all three claims.
A. The Claim
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)’s “residual clause” was “unconstitutionally
vague.” 139 S. Ct. at 2336. After Davis, then, a defendant cannot be convicted of a § 924(c) offense

that’s predicated solely on a residual-clause “crime of violence.” Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069,
1075 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Davis, as we have mentioned, struck down the residual clause as
unconstitutionally vague. For that reason, the survival of Brown’s § 924(c) conviction depends entirely
on whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the
elements clause.” (cleaned up)). Glanton blames his lawyer for allowing him to plead guilty to the §
924(c) offense in Count 5, even though the only predicate for that offense was the conspiracy to
commit Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count 1—an offense that (we can all agree) is no longer a
“crime of violence” under Davis. See Memo at 2 (“[C]ounsel had every opportunity to preserve the
issue of [Hobbs] Act conspiracies not meeting the definition of crime of violence. . . . Yet Defense
Counsel Mark Lowry failed to analyze Mr. Glanton’s plea offer to adequate[ly] advise the petitioner
whether the plea agreement was consistent with applicable caselaw[.]”); see also Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075
(“[W]e conclude that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a ‘crime of

violence,’ as defined by [§ 924(c)’s elements clause.]”).
In saying so, however, Glanton simply misreads the Indictment—which unambiguously
predicated Count 5, not on Count 1 (as Glanton suggests), but on “Count 4 of the Indictment[.]” See
Indictment, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2019), ECF No. 1 at
4 (“[Glanton] did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and
did knowingly possess a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, . . . that is, a violation of [18
U.S.C. § 1951(a)], as charged in Count 4 of the Indictment[.]”). And Count 4 alleged that Glanton had
committed a substantive Hobbs Act robbery on July 11, 2018. Id. at 3–4. For what it’s worth, the Plea
Agreement confirms that Count 5 was predicated on the Hobbs Act robbery charge (Count 4)—not
the Hobbs Act conspiracy charged in Count 1. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-
20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 161 at 1 (“Count 5 charges the Defendant with
brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, that is, the robbery of victim D.S.”). Of

course, substantive Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence.” Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075 (“It’s worth
emphasizing that Brown pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, not substantive Hobbs
Act robbery, a crime we have previously held constitutes a crime of violence under the elements
clause.” (emphasis in original)).
And it’s of no moment that Glanton didn’t plead guilty to Count 4, because he admitted in
the factual proffer both that he committed the substantive robbery on July 11, 2018, and that the
Government would have established his involvement in that robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Factual Proffer, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No.
161 at 2 (“While holding D.S. at gunpoint, Head took D.S.’s Roto-Rooter van keys, cell phone, and
wallet. . . . Head provided D.S.’s work van keys to Proby and Glanton, who then removed valuable
plumbing equipment from D.S.’s work van. In total, Proby and Glanton took over $10,000 worth of
plumbing equipment from D.S.’s work van, all of which was manufactured outside of the State of

Florida, and all of which was owned by Roto-Rooter, a company engaged in interstate commerce and
based outside of Florida.”).
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar situation in United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123 (11th
Cir. 2005). The defendant there likewise argued that his § 924(c) conviction should be vacated
“because he was not convicted of the predicate [offense] for Count Five or charged with the predicate
[offense] for Count Six.” Id. at 1127. Rejecting this contention, the Eleventh Circuit held that “section
924 does not require that defendant be convicted of, or even charged with, the predicate offense to be
found guilty of using or carrying a firearm in relation to the predicate offense. Section 924(c) requires
only that the [predicate offense] be one that ‘may be prosecuted.’” Ibid. (emphasis added).
By agreeing in the factual proffer that the Government would’ve proven his involvement in
the robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, Glanton has conceded that the robbery is a crime that “may
be prosecuted.” United States v. Kitchen, 2018 WL 11422081, at *2 (11th Cir. May 7, 2018) (“Section

924(c) only requires a showing that the predicate offense is one the government could have
prosecuted, meaning a showing that the defendant used or carried a firearm during and in relation to
a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. As part of his plea agreement, Kinchen signed a factual
proffer admitting that, on April 21, 2015 and on May 17, 2015, he entered a store and ordered those
inside to give him money and property ‘at gunpoint.’ This was sufficient to establish the substantive
Hobbs Act robbery counts as the predicates for Kinchen’s § 924(c) convictions.” (cleaned up)); Pena
v. United States, 2017 WL 11518831, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2017) (White, Mag. J.) (“Here the charging
document and the statement of facts presented at the plea colloquy establish that the movant carried
a firearm during a robbery. Thus even though the movant did not plead guilty to the substantive
Hobbs Act robbery, the facts support a conviction under § 924(c) for carrying a firearm in furtherance
of the robbery[.]”), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10666967 (S.D. Fla Jan. 30, 2018) (Zloch,
J.).1

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to advance a meritless Davis claim. See Freeman v. Att’y
Gen., 536 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A lawyer cannot be deficient for failing to raise a meritless
claim.”). So, we DENY Glanton’s first claim for relief.

1 Glanton’s plea agreement ostensibly acknowledges this: In it, after all, he waived any claims that “the
admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the statutes of conviction.” Plea Agreement, United
States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 161 at 7.
B. The Sufficiency of the Plea Bargain
Glanton’s second argument is that counsel was ineffective because he “never suggested or
even contemplated to negotiate a plea that was consistent with the facts of this case.” Memo at 2.
Here, Glanton cites a case from the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Dean, 810 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2015),
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017),2 for his view that he should’ve gotten a more favorable deal because he
was “clearly the follower” and “lacked the requisite criminal history of violence necessary to trigger

an enhanced penalty.” Ibid. Glanton claims that counsel’s inadequate negotiating skills compelled him
to accept a “draconian plea agreement,” even though a better deal was on the table. Ibid.
Three problems with this. First, Glanton did receive a better deal than his codefendants—
precisely because his lawyer was able to persuade the Court (and the Government) that Glanton had
played a lesser role in the conspiracy. Although a 400-month sentence is certainly substantial, his
codefendant, Jamar Head—who pistol-whipped D.S. and killed L.S.H.—received a sentence of 720
months, despite pleading to the very same counts Glanton admitted to. See Judgment, United States v.
Head, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2021), ECF No. 205 at 1–2. This substantial
disparity between Glanton’s sentence and Head’s strongly suggests that Glanton’s lawyer did very well
by his client.
Second, Glanton was no “minor” participant in these crimes. As the factual proffer confirms,
Glanton was an active participant in every aspect of these offenses—except for the murder of L.S.H.

2 We aren’t quite sure why Glanton has cited to Dean. For one thing, the Eighth Circuit was
unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court, so its opinion lacks any precedential or persuasive
authority. See Dean, 137 S. Ct. at 1178. For another, Dean involved sentences that were imposed after
a trial and has nothing to do with the facts of this case, where the parties agreed to a sentencing range
pursuant to a plea agreement. See Dean, 810 F.3d at 526; see also Plea Agreement, United States v. Glanton,
No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 161 at 5 (“The Defendant agrees that he
will recommend a sentence of no less than 360 months in prison; and the United States agrees it will
recommend a sentence of not more than 420 months in prison.”).
See Factual Proffer, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF
No. 161 at 3–4.
Glanton is also wrong when he claims that he doesn’t have a violent criminal history. Before
his arrest in this case, Glanton had been adjudicated guilty of committing an armed robbery with a
weapon in Miami-Dade County on February 7, 2016. See Presentence Investigation Report, United
States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 183 at 19–20. And he’d

been arrested several times for—among other things—battery, armed robbery, and aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon. See id. at 20–22.
Third, Glanton doesn’t even try to show that the Government would have been willing to offer
him a better deal than the one he got. See Vargas v. United States, 2013 WL 12358164, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 12, 2013) (King, Mag. J.) (“Movant’s assertion that counsel made no effort
to negotiate a better deal fails because Movant presents nothing to suggest that a better deal may have
been available or agreed to by the government.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1237850
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2016) (Duffey, J.); see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987) (denying an
ineffective-assistance claim that counsel failed to successfully negotiate a plea agreement where “[t]he
notion that the prosecutor would have been receptive to a plea bargain is completely unsupported in
the record”).
Glanton’s second claim is thus likewise DENIED.

C. The Carjacking Claim
In his final claim, Glanton blames his lawyer for failing to tell him that the Government
couldn’t prove his involvement in the carjacking. See Memo at 3 (“The facts confirm that petitioner
did not have any involvement whatsoever in luring the plumber to the location of the crime, nor did
he participate in the robbery”). In Glanton’s view, “had counsel informed petitioner of the actual
elements of the crime for which he was charged, the petitioner would have known that he had a
cognizable defense to that particular charge and he would have instead elected to go to trial on that
charge.” Ibid.
“To obtain a conviction for carjacking . . . the ‘government must prove that the defendant (1)
with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm (2) took a motor vehicle (3) that had been
transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce (4) from the person or presence
of another (5) by force and violence or intimidation.’” United States v. Harbin, 715 F. App’x 873, 874

(11th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1096 (11th Cir. 2001)). Glanton contends
that he never “took the vehicle by using force or violence,” never acted “in an intimating manner,”
never “brandished any weapon or firearm during the commission of the” offense, and never caused
the victim to suffer a “serious bodily injury or death[.]” Memo at 2–3.
This final claim fails for two reasons. First, Glanton played a major role in planning and
executing the carjacking of L.S.H. The factual proffer—which Glanton signed and whose accuracy
Glanton confirmed under oath in open court—confirms that Glanton: (1) conspired with Head to
“complete another robbery of a plumber” on July 12, 2018; (2) traveled with Head to rent a
Volkswagen Jetta in Miami—the same vehicle the two of them later drove to the carjacking location;
(3) allowed Head to use his cellphone to “[call] L.S.H. to urge him to hurry to the job site”; and (4)
helped Head take “L.S.H.’s van keys and cell phone” after Head held L.S.H. at gunpoint. Factual
Proffer, United States v. Glanton, No. 19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 161 at 2–

3. This proffer—which (again) Glanton signed and, in open court, swore was true and accurate—is
more than enough to show that Glanton personally participated in the robbery.
Second, the mere fact that Glanton didn’t personally kill L.S.H. (or even use a firearm) doesn’t
absolve him of responsibility for the carjacking. Federal law recognizes that “a person who furthers—
more specifically, who ‘aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures’—the commission of a
federal offense ‘is punishable as a principal.’” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 70 (2014) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 2). A defendant “aids and abets” another in committing an offense when “(1) the
substantive offense was committed by someone; (2) the defendant committed an act which
contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission.”
United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000). As we’ve said, Glanton was an essential
participant in the carjacking scheme: He helped Head plan the robbery; he gave Head his phone to
lure L.H.S. to the carjacking location; he was with Head when Head held L.S.H. at gunpoint; he helped

Head take “L.S.H.’s van keys and cell phone” after Head held L.S.H. at gunpoint; and he drove
L.S.H.’s van away from the scene at Head’s direction. See Factual Proffer, United States v. Glanton, No.
19-20063-CR-RKA-2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 161 at 2–3. So, while Glanton may not have
intended to kill or harm L.S.H., the Government only had to prove that Glanton “willfully participated
in the carjacking ‘with the full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense.’”
United States v. Hinton, 730 F. App’x 719, 723 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 77). Since
the factual proffer establishes that the Government proved precisely that, his lawyer cannot be faulted
for failing to argue otherwise. See Freeman, 536 F.3d at 1233 (“A lawyer cannot be deficient for failing
to raise a meritless claim.”).
Glanton’s third claim is DENIED.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Because the record directly and conclusively refutes Glanton’s claims, we see no need to hold

an evidentiary hearing in this case. See Shriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (“[I]f the record
refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not
required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”).
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A COA is appropriate only where the movant makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To deserve a COA, therefore, the movant must show
that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because no “jurists of reason” would find our
resolution of Glanton’s claims “debatable” or wrong, Glanton hasn’t shown that he’s entitled to a
COA.
hoeK
Having carefully reviewed the record and the governing law, the Court hereby ORDERS
AND ADJUDGES that the Motion [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. A COA is DENTED. Any pending
motions, including any requests for an evidentiary hearing, ace DENIED. All deadlines are
TERMINATED. ‘The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 21st day of September 2022.

ROYK.ALTMAN ———s
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CC: Keon Travy Glanton, pro se

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10121065. Public record. Not legal advice.