# Murdock v. American Maritime Officers Union National Executive Board

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120730

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120730

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that section 301 preempts claims brought by union members alleging breach of a union constitution
- holding that courts must look to whether the state-law claims “arise from the same facts, or involve similar occurrences, witnesses or evidence”
- holding that an apprenticeship committee was not a labor organization under the LMRDA as it had “a legal identity separate from any union” and was “a managing committee appointed in equal numbers by management and labor”

## Opinion text

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida

Charles Murdock, Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Civil Action No. 19-62687-Civ-Scola
American Maritime Officers Union )
National Executive Board and Paul )
Doell, Defendants. )
Order
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant American Maritime
Officers Union National Executive Board’s motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 69.) Murdock filed
a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 77), and the Board filed a reply
in support (ECF No. 81). After careful consideration of the briefing, the record,
and the applicable legal authorities, the Court grants in part and denies in
part the Board’s motion. (ECF No. 69.)
1. Background
As the parties are familiar with the background of this case, the Court
will only discuss the relevant context. In this suit, Murdock, the former
National Secretary-Treasurer of the American Maritime Officers Union (the
“AMO”), sues Paul Doell (the National President of the AMO) and the AMO’s
Board. The AMO Constitution created the Board and provides that the Board
will consist of a National President, National Secretary-Treasurer, National
Executive Vice President, and four National Vice Presidents. (ECF No. 19-2
at 12 (art. 6, sec. 4(a).) The Board’s authority is vast—it may “discuss and
prepare reports and recommendations on any part of th[e] Union’s activities,
policies and plan,” and through a majority vote of the Board, any
recommendation may be adopted as binding AMO policy. (Id. (art. 6, sec. 4(c).)
In addition to creating the leadership structure of the AMO, the AMO
Constitution also generally sets out rules and requirements for the union’s
membership. This includes setting dues rates, membership qualifications, and
setting out rules for elections and impeachment proceedings. (Id. at 11, 12, 14,
19 (arts. 4, 5, 11, 23).)
In the instant motion, the Board moves to dismiss itself as a party to this
case, arguing that the Board cannot be sued under the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”) or the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”) and that the relief that Murdock seeks cannot be provided by the
Board. In support of these arguments, rather than fully briefing the issues in
one motion, the Board decided to “rel[y] upon and incorporate[] by reference”
arguments made in two separate briefs previously filed with the Court. (ECF
No. 69 at 1 (referring to ECF Nos. 61, 65).) The Court disapproves of this tactic.
See Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 377 F.3d
1164, 1167 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the practice of incorporating
documents by reference forces courts “to skip over repetitive material, to
recognize and disregard any arguments that are now irrelevant, and to
harmonize the arguments [the party] has made at various stages of litigation”
and noting that such a practice “makes a mockery of [court] rules governing
page limitations and length”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
However, given that the Board’s motion is two pages, and the seemingly
relevant portions of the two briefs “incorporated by reference” amount to five
pages, the Court will consider the motion, as it appears to fit within the page
limitations set by the Local Rules.1
Murdock primarily counters that the Board’s motion is untimely, that the
Board should be estopping from now asserting that it is not amenable to suit,
and that the motion is duplicative of the Defendants’ pending motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 77.) Moreover, while Murdock did not expressly
“incorporate by reference” additional arguments made in other briefings, the
Court will also consider arguments that Murdock made in response to the
briefing that the Board incorporated.
2. Legal Standard
The Board moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, in the
alternative, moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). However,
the Court believes that the question of whether the Board is liable under the
LMRDA and LMRA is more appropriately a question of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
In general, subject-matter jurisdiction refers to “prescriptions delineating
the classes of cases a court may entertain.” Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis, 139
S.Ct. 1843, 1848 (2019). Because of the “[h]arsh consequences” that attend the
branding of a dispute as jurisdictional (i.e., challenges to subject-matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time and may not be waived), the Supreme
Court has warned of “profligate use of the term.” See id. at 1848–49 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, in general, “when Congress does
not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should

1 Seemingly in defense of this “incorporation by reference” tactic, the Board states that it only
“filed the instant motion [because] it appears the Court requires a stand-alone motion to
consider dismissal of the [Board].” (ECF No. 81 at 3.) The Court does not “require” anything.
However, the Federal Rules provide that “[a] request for a court order must be made by
motion.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). Therefore, to the extent that the Board wants a court order
dismissing it from this case, the Federal Rules require a motion.
treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
Here, the LMRDA and the LMRA limit who may be sued: labor
organizations and officers. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412; 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), (c).
While not all statutory restrictions on an appropriate defendant will be deemed
jurisdictional, the Supreme Court has held that congressional restrictions of
jurisdiction “for claims against particular defendants” constitute restrictions of
a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 n.11.
Therefore, multiple lower courts have recently treated the scope of the LMRDA
as concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. See Imagine This Future v. Spence,
No. 1:21-cv-00453, 2021 WL 1946500, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2021)
(holding that the defendant was not a “labor organization” under the LMRDA
and dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Medford v. Civil Serv.
Emps. Ass’n, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 174, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that the
defendant was “not a ‘labor organization’ under the LMRDA and [was] not
subject to the LMRDA” and dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that questions concerning the scope of
the LMRA also constitute issues of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Wooddell v.
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 71, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991). Therefore, the Court
will treat the Board’s motion as one brought under Rule 12(b)(1).2
Attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction come in two forms: “facial attacks”
and “factual attacks.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir.
1990). Facial challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction are based solely on the
allegations in the complaint. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs.,
Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, courts will “look at the face
of the complaint and determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient
basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Scelta v. Delicatssen Support Servs., Inc.,
No. 98-2578-CIV-T-17B, 1999 WL 1053121, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 1999)
(citations omitted). Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge “the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings,” and courts
will consider “matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits.”
See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2 As the motion is properly one attacking the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the Board
may raise it at any time and cannot waive it. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. Nonetheless, even
if the Court considered the Board’s motion as one under Rule 12(c), the Court holds that the
Board is not estopped from arguing that it is not liable to suit and that the motion is timely
under Rule 12(c).
3. Analysis
Questions of the “scope of liability under a statute (i.e., who may be
sued),” are questions of statutory interpretation. See Shotz v. City of Plantation,
Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1166–67 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Court
must start where all cases of statutory interpretation start: “the language of the
statute itself.” See Med. Transp. Mgmt. Corp. v. Comm’r of I.R.S., 506 F.3d 1364,
1367 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281
(11th Cir. 1999)). Courts must decide whether the statutory language has a
“plain and unambiguous meaning . . . determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole.” See id. at 1367–68 (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997)). If the language is unambiguous, the
inquiry ends. See id. However, if the statutory language is ambiguous—or
“susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”—courts may use
traditional “interpretative tools,” such as “an examination of the act’s purpose
and of its legislative history.” See id. at 1368 (citing Atl. States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 1990)); United States
v. Pringle, 350 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Shotz, 344 F.3d
at 1167 (“If ‘the statutory language is not entirely transparent,’ we employ
traditional canons of construction before ‘reverting to legislative history to
assist us in determining the meaning of a particular statutory provision by
focusing on the broader, statutory context.’”) (cleaned up) (quoting CBS Inc. v.
PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Therefore, the Court will examine the text of both the LMRDA and the
LMRA to determine whether Congress provided the Court with subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims brought against the Board under either statutory
scheme.
A. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act Claims
First, the Court looks to the text of Title I of the LMRDA. Murdock brings
claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(4) and (a)(5), which protect union members’
rights to institute actions against the union and its officers as well as members’
rights to due process in disciplinary proceedings, respectively. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(4) (providing that “[n]o labor organization shall limit the right of any
member thereof to institute an action in any court”); 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)
(stating that “[n]o member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such
organization or by any officer thereof unless” certain rights are provided). As
courts have widely held, the LMRDA provides a cause of action against labor
unions and officers of such unions. See generally Urichuck v. Clark, 689 F.2d
40, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1982); Adamszemski v. Loc. Lodge 1487, Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 496 F.2d 777, 780–81 (7th Cir.
1974) (noting that union members have a “right to bring a suit against a union
and its officers” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 411 et seq.).
If plaintiffs can sue labor unions and officers under the LMRDA, whether
a union’s executive board can be sued depends on how broadly those terms are
defined. The Act defines “officer” to include “any member of [a labor
organization’s] executive board or similar governing body.” See 29 U.S.C.
§ 402(n). Labor union, or “labor organization,” is defined as an organization
“engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . . in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning . . . terms or conditions of employment[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 402(i).
Reviewing these definitions, the Act makes clear that suits against individual
members of an executive board are cognizable, but it does not address whether
suits against such a governing body itself may be brought or whether a union’s
executive board may fall within the definition of labor organization. Therefore,
as the text of the statute does not resolve this question, the statute is
ambiguous.
Next, the Court will look to the purpose of the statute. The LMRDA was
passed to “eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor
organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and
representatives” and to provide “enlarged protection for members of unions
paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.” See 29
U.S.C. § 401(c); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 352
(1989). Cognizant of this remedial scheme, and given the expansive language
used, courts construe the LMRDA to apply “broadly to include all labor
organizations of any kind other than those clearly shown to be outside the
scope of the Act.” See Roddy v. United Transp. Union, 479 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D.
Ala. 1979) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 451.2). In other words, the LMRDA’s purpose is
expansive.
Next, the Court will look to the appropriate context, namely, the
structure of the AMO. It is axiomatic that a union acts through its officers. See
generally Williams v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 200 F.2d 302, 305 (3d
Cir. 1952) (“In exercising its powers to bargain collectively for its members[,] as
in all its other activities on their behalf[,] a labor union acts, through its
authorized officers, as agent of the entire membership within the authorities
conferred by its constitution and bylaws.”). And in the AMO, the national
officers may act through the Board. (See ECF No. 19-2 at 12 (art. 6, sec. 4(c).)
The Board formulates policy (id.), accepts members (id. at 19 (art. 22, sec. 9)),
designates a trial committee to hear impeachment proceedings (id. at 19
(art. 23, sec. 2), and hears appeals of and approves or rejects the outcome of
such disciplinary proceedings (id. at 20 (art. 23, sec. 6)).
Considering the remedial purpose of the LMRDA, the broad construction
given to its scope, and the structure and authority of the Board, the Court
finds that suits against the Board are cognizable under the LMRDA. As the
LMRDA states, it is intended to “eliminate or prevent improper practices on the
part of labor organizations . . . and their officers and representatives.” See 29
U.S.C. § 401(c). The rights protected in the LMRDA would be meaningless if a
union or a group of officers could act unlawfully through an executive board
yet potentially avoid liability. Therefore, the Court holds that suits against
internal executive boards composed solely of union officials fall within the
scope of the LMRDA.
The cases that the Board cites do not compel a different result. (ECF
No. 61 at 11.) First, in Maurer, the District Court for the Southern District of
California held that the plaintiff had failed to “allege[] or establish[]” that a
“joint apprentice committee under a collective bargaining agreement” was a
labor organization under the LMRDA. See Maurer v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Loc. 569, AFL-CIO, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1054, 1059 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
However, this result was based on the deficiencies of the plaintiff’s pleading;
the court noted that it was provided with no legal authorities that conclusively
showed that such committees were “not labor organizations as a matter of law.”
See id. at 1058. Therefore, Maurer’s holding is of little value here.
The Board also cites to Mayhew, which held that a union’s joint seniority
board was not a labor organization under the LMRDA. See Mayhew v. ILA Loc.
1771 (Clerks & Checkers), No. C.A.2-05-01558-PMD, 2005 WL 3055597, at *5
(D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2005). There, the joint seniority board, which was created via a
collective bargaining agreement, was composed of union and employer
representatives to address the hiring and firing of employees. See id. at *5. The
court held that the joint seniority board could not constitute a labor
organization under the LMRDA as it was “not merely a board of employees
subordinate” to a union but rather a board “made up of members of two
separate entities,” including an employer association. See id. Therefore,
Mayhew at most stands for the proposition that a board or committee that
consists of both union members and employer representatives cannot be sued
under the LMRDA. See id.; see also Bass v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 630 F.2d
1058, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an apprenticeship committee was not
a labor organization under the LMRDA as it had “a legal identity separate from
any union” and was “a managing committee appointed in equal numbers by
management and labor”).
As the Board is merely an internal governing body subordinate to the
AMO and is only composed of union officers, the Court holds that LMRDA
claims extend to the Board. Therefore, the Court denies the Board’s motion to
dismiss Murdock’s LMRDA claims.
B. Labor Management Relations Act Claims
Second, the Board argues that it is not amenable to suit under the
LMRA. Murdock brings two claims for breach of contract, arguing that the
Defendants breached the AMO Constitution by “stripping Mr. Murdock of his
constitutionally defined duties” and by creating a modified process through
which the AMO membership ratified Murdock’s impeachment. (ECF No. 47-1 at
¶¶ 114, 137.) While the operative complaint does not specify whether these
claims are brought under state or federal law, Murdock has previously
represented that they are brought pursuant to the LMRA. (See ECF No. 30 at 5;
ECF No. 53 at 6.) Murdock now argues that these claims are cognizable under
the LMRA, but in the alternative Murdock asks the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction to the extent that these claims arise under state law.
1. LMRA Jurisdiction
Most claims regarding the breach of a labor agreement must arise under
section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-
CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 857–58 (1987) (“[Q]uestions relating to what the
parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were
intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by
reference to uniform federal law[.]”) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 211 (1985)). Therefore, section 301 preempts any state-law claims
where the court “must consult and interpret the contract at issue to resolve the
issues before it.” See Int’l Union, Security, Police and Fire Pros. of Am. v. United
Gov’t, No. Civ.A.04-2242-KHV, 2004 WL 3019430, at *6 (D. Kan. Dec. 30,
2004) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988));
see also Pruitt v. Carpenters’ Loc. Union No. 225 of United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners of Am., 893 F.2d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that
section 301 preempts claims brought by union members alleging breach of a
union constitution).
However, such claims are only preempted if the contract at issue falls
within those governed by section 301. See Madsen v. Am. Fed’n. of Musicians of
the U.S. and Canada, AFL-CIO, Loc. 24, 13 F. Supp. 3d 820, 824 (N.D. Ohio
2014). Therefore, regardless of the legal source of Murdock’s contract claims,
the Court must first determine whether the AMO Constitution is a “contract[]
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations,”
such that section 301 applies. See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).
Typically, section 301 suits are between a local union and an
international union, but in what has been deemed a “creative use of the federal
labor laws,” union members may sue a union—as a third-party beneficiary—for
breach “to enforce promises made to [the union] allegedly for the [member’s]
benefit.” See Hechler v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 834 F.2d 942, 943–
44 (11th Cir. 1987). Because union constitutions are “an important form of
contract,” these third-party beneficiary suits may allege breach of a union
constitution. See Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 101, 103; see also Lydon v. Loc. 103,
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 770 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[Union] members
can sue to enforce the contract/constitution as third-party beneficiaries.”)
(citing Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 100–01). However, union members may only bring
a section 301 claim against a local union if they allege breach of a constitution
between an international union and a local union. See Korzen v. Loc. Union
705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “an
international’s constitution is a contract between the international and its
locals” under section 301); cf. James E. Pfander, Federal Jurisdiction Over
Union Constitutions After Wooddell, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 443, 450 (1992) (arguing
that section 301 claims should only extend to “those claims that implicate the
parent-local relationship”). Union members may not bring a section 301 claim
for an alleged breach of a local union’s constitution, as such a constitution is
merely a “contract between the union and its members.” See Korzen, 75 F.3d
at 288 (“A suit on a [local constitution] between a labor organization and a
member is not within the scope of section 301.”).
Murdock argues that the AMO Constitution is between a local union (the
AMO) and an international union (the Seafarers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO (“SIUNA”)). (ECF No. 75 at 7.) The AMO Constitution
contains limited references of an “affiliation” with the SIUNA, which Murdock
argues are “clearly indicative of a contractual arrangement” between the two
unions. (See id.; ECF No. 19-2 at 11, 20.) But regardless of what contractual
arrangement exists between the AMO and the SIUNA, Murdock asserts breach
of the AMO Constitution, which governs the relationship between the AMO and
its members. The AMO Constitution sets out membership requirements,
membership dues rates, and election and impeachment proceedings, among
other things. (Id. at 11, 12, 14, 19 (arts. 4, 5, 11, 23).) As the AMO Constitution
is a contract between the AMO and its members, and not between the AMO
and an employer or international union, any claim concerning the AMO
Constitution is not cognizable under section 301. See Kitmann v. Loc. 619-M
Graphic Commc’ns Conf. of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 F. App’x 714, 719–20
(6th Cir. 2011) (holding that only international union constitutions and an
affiliation agreement between unions fell within section 301); Korzen, 75 F.3d
at 288.
Therefore, as Murdock’s Counts 3 and 9 do not satisfy the LMRA’s
conferral of federal jurisdiction, the Court dismisses these claims.
2. Supplemental Jurisdiction
To the extent that Murdock argues—and is not estopped from arguing—
that these claims were brought under state law, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Where a court has federal-
question jurisdiction over some claims, state-law claims fall within a court’s
supplemental jurisdiction if those claims “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact.” See Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997)); see
also Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 455 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that courts must look to whether the state-law claims “arise from the same
facts, or involve similar occurrences, witnesses or evidence”). But courts may
decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if: (1) those claims raise
a “novel or complex issue of State law”; (2) those claims “substantially
predominate[]” over any federal claims; (3) the court dismissed all federal
claims; or (4) in “exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Murdock’s Count 3 alleges that the Defendants breached the AMO
Constitution by allegedly removing certain duties from Murdock’s purview in
2018 to “undermine” Murdock’s 2018 election. (ECF No. 47-1 at ¶¶ 15–18.)
However, the only other claims that remain in this matter largely concern the
Defendants’ alleged retaliation campaign in 2019 and the later impeachment
proceedings against Murdock. (See ECF No. 54.) As Count 3 involves factual
allegations that are no longer at issue in the remaining counts, there is no
supplemental jurisdiction over Count 3. See Hudson, 90 F.3d at 455.
Murdock’s Count 9 alleges that the Defendants failed to abide by the
impeachment ratification provisions of the AMO Constitution when Murdock’s
impeachment was ratified by a vote of the membership. (ECF No. 47-1 at
¶ 137.) Such claims involving “internal union disputes” between a local union,
its constitution, and its members “lie within the traditional competence of state
courts.” See Pfander, Federal Jurisdiction Over Union Constitutions After
Wooddell, 37 Vill. L. Rev. at 450; cf. Wirtz v. Loc. 153, Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1968) (noting a “long-standing policy against
unnecessary [federal] intrusion into internal union affairs”). Therefore, as
Count 9 primarily implicates state interests in the internal operation of the
AMO vis-à-vis its members, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
Therefore, Murdock cannot bring his breach-of-contract claims under the
LMRA, and to the extent these claims are brought under state law, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
4. Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the Court grants in part and denies in
part the Board’s motion. (ECF No. 69.) Murdock’s claims against the Board
under the LMRDA may proceed, but the Court dismisses Murdock’s claims
brought under the LMRA for lack of jurisdiction.

Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida, on July 12, 2022.
[= N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120730. Public record. Not legal advice.