# Grose v. American Airlines, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 11, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120711

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 11, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 21-cv-81096-MATTHEWMAN

RUTH GROSE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.
______________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DE 23]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant, American Airlines, Inc.’s
(“Defendant” or “American”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) [DE 23] and
Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (“SMF”)
[DE 24]. Plaintiff, Ruth Grose (“Plaintiff” or “Grose”) has filed a response [DE 30] and Statement
of Material Facts in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 31]. Defendant
has filed a reply [DE 35] and Reply Statement of Material Facts [DE 34]. The matter is now ripe
for review, and the Court has carefully considered the filings and attachments thereto, the
arguments of counsel, and the entire docket in this case.
I. THE COMPLAINT [DE 1]
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains four counts against Defendant: violation of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964—discrimination on the basis of race (Count I); violation of the Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992—discrimination on the basis of race (Count II); violation of Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964—discrimination on the basis of gender (Count III); and violation of
1
the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992—discrimination on the basis of gender (Count IV) See
Compl., DE 1.
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the uncontested portions of the record together with
Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) [DE 24], Plaintiff’s Response SMF [DE 31],
and Defendant’s Reply SMF [DE 34].

American is a commercial airline that offers thousands of daily flights to hundreds of
destinations throughout the United States and abroad and has operations at airports throughout the
country, including at Palm Beach International Airport (PBI) in West Palm Beach, Florida. [Def.’s
SMF ¶ 1]. Safety is American’s top priority. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 1]. Grose is a black female and the
Plaintiff in this case. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 1]. Before working for American, Grose worked for several
airlines at various airports. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 3]. Prior to the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger,
Grose worked for U.S. Airways as a Ramp Manager in Philadelphia, a Ramp Manager and
Customer Service Manager (“CSM”) in Chicago, and a CSM in Memphis. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 3].
Around the time of the merger, Grose worked as a Catering Manager in Philadelphia. [Def.’s SMF
¶ 3].

In or around September 2018, Grose transferred to PBI, where she worked as a CSM for
American until her separation in January 2020. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 4]. At PBI, Grose reported to the
General Manager, Ruth Hightower, a black female. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 5]. In turn, Ms. Hightower
reported to Scott Clementi, the Managing Director for American’s eastern region. [Def.’s SMF ¶
5]. Clementi is a white male. [Pl.’s Reply SMF ¶ 44].
Grose’s duties as a CSM at PBI included making sure that the agents above the wing were
servicing the customers, making sure that they were on the aircraft in a timely manner, and also
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managing the team on the ramp simultaneously with that flight to ensure that they were getting the
customers’ bags loaded and everything done on a timely basis and getting out customers out on
time and safely. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 6]. Above all else, Grose shared responsibility for ensuring
safety. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 7]. Safety is American’s top priority, and every employee is responsible for
putting safety first. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 7]. Grose was additionally responsible for training other
employees that safety must always come first. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 7].

On December 28, 2019, Flight 1971 arrived at PBI from Dallas. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 8].
Because the plane arrived late to PBI, Flight 1971 would be considered a “quick turn,” meaning
employees would have to work quickly to get the flight out on time. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 8]. After the
passengers boarded and the plane was ready for departure, Crew Chief Michael O’Brien tried to
push the plane away from the gate, but the pushback would not start. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 9]. A pushback
(sometimes referred to as “pushback tractor” or “pushback tug”) is a vehicle that is used to
physically push an aircraft backwards away from the gate and ramp area so it can depart. [Def.’s
SMF ¶ 9].
O’Brien radioed another Crew Chief at a nearby gate to get a different pushback. [Def.’s
SMF ¶ 10]. In the meantime, O’Brien (who was on the right side of the plane) tried to use a belt

loader to move the pushback tug away from the aircraft, but he was unsuccessful. [Def.’s SMF
¶ 10]. A belt loader is a vehicle with a long conveyor belt that is used to load and unload baggage
onto and off a plane. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 10]. According to O’Brien, the belt loader is not supposed to
touch the aircraft. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 10]. O’Brien told the other Crew Chief to get a second belt loader
so they could use both to try to move the inoperable pushback tug. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 11]. The other
Crew Chief refused to bring over the second belt loader, but Grose agreed to do it instead. [Def.’s
SMF ¶ 11]. Grose admits that she got on a belt loader at a nearby gate, but it is disputed whether
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she drove under the jet bridge. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 12; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 12]. Grose has claimed in the
past that she never drove under the jet bridge but instead drove under the aircraft’s wing in order
to line up with the pushback on the left side of the plane. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 14].
Grose admits that the rubber part of the railing was touching the aircraft. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF
¶ 16]. It is disputed, however, whether part of the belt loader actually “hit” the side of the airplane.
[Def.’s SMF ¶ 16; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 16]. Grose admits that, when used properly, a belt loader

should not make contact with any part of the aircraft. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 17]. She admits that the way
the belt loader touched the aircraft when she used it is different than the way it ordinarily touches
the aircraft. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 17].
After the rubber part of the railing touched the aircraft, Grose backed up, adjusted her angle,
and tried again. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 19; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 19]. With the addition of a second belt loader,
the ramp crew moved the malfunctioning pushback tug away from the aircraft, which made room
for a replacement pushback to connect to it. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 19]. Grose did not get off the belt loader
to inspect the aircraft, but she did look for scratches and dents just as she did when she was ramp
lead. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 21; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 21]. Grose did not tell the captain or first officer of Flight
1971, or tell maintenance, about what had happened since she did not believe it was a reportable

event since it was just a “tap” or a “touch.” [Def.’s SMF ¶ 21; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 21].
Grose admits she is not formally trained in aviation mechanics and is not licensed by the
FAA as an aviation mechanic; however, she worked on the ramp for 16 years and inspected aircraft
regularly as ramp lead. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 23; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 23]. Grose also did not receive formal
training about ramp operations from American, but, after she was hired as a manager, she
“shadowed another manager to see how the operation ran,” and she also had additional knowledge
from her years of industry experience working the ramp for other carriers. [Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 42; Def.’s
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Reply SMF ¶ 42]. Plaintiff also testified that she was required to keep up with various trainings
and that her manager would discuss important information with her, such as changes in policies.
[Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 42; Def.’s Reply SMF ¶ 42].
Grose waited until two days after the incident to finally report it in an email to her
supervisor, Ruth Hightower, because Hightower was out of work dealing with a personal matter.
[Def.’s SMF ¶ 25; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 25]. In that email, Grose stated, “I accept the outcome of what you

say or do. I can only say I apologize to you because your expectation is your leadership will always
practice the safety we preach. And I just breached safety last week to the ramp.” [Def.’s SMF
¶ 25]. The safety managing director told Clementi about the reports, and Clementi was initially in
disbelief that a CSM would do what Grose had done. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 27]. Grose admitted that she
made a poor judgment call and that her “failure was in using a belt loader.” [Def.’s SMF ¶ 29].
She admitted she should have waited to see if Operations would send assistance. [Def.’s SMF
¶ 29].
After completing the investigation, Clementi concluded that Grose had committed
“egregious” violations of safety policies and a complete failure of leadership warranting
termination. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 30]. In addition to violating several policies, Clementi believed that

Grose’s conduct demonstrated a complete failure of leadership because she knowingly and
willingly violated safety policies that she was charged with enforcing and did so in front of her
subordinates, which could encourage them to do the same thing. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 32]. Clementi was
surprised by how brazen Grose was about her violations, which included directing employees to
also violate safety policies. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 32]. It was clear that Grose knew these policies. [Def.’s
SMF ¶ 32]. Indeed, she had taught them to the ramp agents. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 32]. She nevertheless
committed those violations. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 32].
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Clementi’s own notes reflect that O’Brien admitted to directing Grose to bring over a
second belt loader. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 32]. However, Clementi has testified that neither Grose’s
race nor sex had any bearing on Clementi’s decision to terminate her. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 35]. Clementi
also testified that the termination decision was based on the December 28, 2019 incident and the
egregious violation of policies. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 35].
Grose also contends that several of her subordinate employees should have been terminated

for witnessing or participating in Grose’s misconduct and not stopping the plane from departing.
[Def.’s SMF ¶ 36]. These employees include Crew Chief Michael O’Brien, Ramp Agent Frank
Puleo, and Operations Agent Robin Woods. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 36]. Each of these employees had a
different position from Grose, reported to a different supervisor (indeed, they reported to Grose
herself), and was a member of a union. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 36]. Further, Grose admits there is no
evidence that any of these employees drove under the jet bridge or wing of the aircraft or hit the
aircraft with ground equipment. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 36].
Grose believes that, if she was going to be terminated, then Michael Stafford, a white male
who was Customer Service Manager at Tampa International Airport (TPA), should have also been
terminated instead of receiving lesser discipline for engaging in similar conduct. [Def.’s SMF ¶

37]. In December 2019, around the time of Grose’s incident, Stafford was moving a set of air stairs
to the ramp area at TPA. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 38]. Air stairs are stairs placed on the side of the plane to
allow passengers to get on and off. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 38]. Stafford should not have been on the air
stairs. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 38]. Stafford was distracted by the movement of another plane and as a result
accidentally hit the tail of it with the air stairs, causing damage to the plane. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 38].
Stafford immediately reported the incident before the plane departed, consistent with American’s
policies. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 38]. When the investigation into this incident was complete, it was
6
determined that Stafford’s conduct was accidental and the result of him losing situational
awareness. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 39]. Stafford was given a written reprimand and prohibited from driving
ground equipment but was not terminated for the offense. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 39]. Stafford was
supervised by the General Manager of TPA, Frankie Jamison; however, it was Clementi that
allowed Jamison to conduct the investigation and make the determination as to the discipline
issued to Stafford. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 37; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 37].

Anthony Linarducci, the IAM (union) Safety Chairman in West Palm Beach, submitted a
letter in support of Grose explaining that he believed Grose’s intentions to be good. [Pl.’s Resp.
SMF ¶ 48; DE 33-2]. The IAM (union) Shop Steward also submitted a letter of recommendation
asking American to keep Grose employed. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 49]. Hightower submitted the letters
to Clementi along with a request for “the opportunity to speak with [him] (or whomever) before a
decision is rendered.” [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 49]. Additionally, several employees signed a letter of
recommendation. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 49].
Hightower told Clementi that she felt this was “another case of blatant discrimination that
has been geared towards the Leadership Team in PBI.” [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶50]. When Clementi
informed Hightower that he decided to terminate Grose, Hightower remarked that the situation in

Tampa involved a white man. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶50]. In Ms. Hightower’s January 10, 2020 email,
she also described having discussed with Grose the importance of demonstrating appropriate
compliance with safety procedures for the ramp agents, that safety always comes before on-time
departure, and that Grose had learned that even “the slightest bump to the ‘skin of the aircraft’
could cause structural damage.” [Def.’s Reply SMF ¶50].
In August 2019, several employees made a complaint accusing Hightower and Grose of
racism. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶53]. During the investigation, Hightower said that PBI had “a lot of
7
issues having diverse workgroups whether its racial, or gender biased. It’s just a lot of disrespect
at the station[.]” [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶52]. Hightower also said that “the Everyday Bias training was
necessary for the entire station and the agents should have been more open minded to [taking] that
particular class.” [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶52]. Some of the employees at PBI said that “if [flight
attendants] come here with those Black Lives Matters pins, we’re going to wear our Trump pins.”
[Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶53]. Hightower and Grose discussed the racism that existed at the station, but

HR could not substantiate their claims. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶54; Def.’s Reply SMF ¶54]. Hightower
testified that the employees “treated each other as blacks and whites. There’s clearly that separation
there.” [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶55]. Grose told an employee, Joe Vasquez, that he was out of uniform
for wearing a t-shirt with an American logo and a slogan saying, “make American great again.”
[Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶56]. In response, the employee made a “harassment” complaint against Grose.
[Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶56].
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states in relevant part that “[a] party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on
which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of
demonstrating to the court by reference to the record that there are no genuine issues of material
fact that need to be decided at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
When a moving party has discharged its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “go
beyond the pleadings,” and, by its own affidavits or by “depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file,” identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex,
8
477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
When deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must view the
evidence and all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations and

quotations omitted). Any doubts regarding whether a trial is necessary must be resolved against
the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
So long as the non-moving party has had an ample opportunity to conduct discovery, the
non-movant must come forward with affirmative evidence to support its claim. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing
party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could
reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). If the
evidence advanced by the nonmoving party “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
then summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 249–50.

IV. MOTION, RESPONSE, AND REPLY
In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination and
cannot establish a prima facie showing of race or sex discrimination through even circumstantial
evidence. [DE 23 at 6–9]. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff “cannot show that she was treated
differently than similarly situated employees outside her protected class.” Id. at 7. Defendant
contends that none of the individuals who Plaintiff claims were not terminated (but perhaps should
have been) are similarly situated to Plaintiff. Id. Defendant also argues that it has “articulated a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging Grose—her flagrant violations of safety
9
policies and leadership failures.” Id. at 9. Defendant points out that Plaintiff agreed at her
deposition that her violations “constituted a terminable offense, even if she personally did not
agree with that.” Id. at 12. Further, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff “has no evidence that . . .
American’s reasons are false nor does she have any evidence that they concocted to cover up a
discriminatory reason.” Id.
In response, Plaintiff first “concedes that Mr. O’Brien, Mr. Puleo, and Ms. Woods are not

similarly situated comparators for purposes of the burden shifting framework outlined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” [DE 30 at 6 n.1]. Next, she argues that,
while she and Mr. Stafford did report to different direct supervisors, “that is not the full picture,”
since “Mr. Clementi made the decision about who decided the discipline to be issued to Ms. Grose
and Mr. Stafford.” [DE 30 at 6]. Plaintiff contends that “Ms. Grose and Mr. Stafford were, in a
word, extraordinarily similarly situated. Ms. Grose and Mr. Stafford were both Customer Service
Managers who engaged in similar conduct only one day apart at different airports. American
conducted simultaneous investigations into the conduct of both individuals, but those
investigations followed markedly different paths leading to drastically different outcomes . . . .”
Id. at 7.

Plaintiff additionally argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the credibility
of Defendant’s purported legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s
employment. [DE 30 at 7]. According to Plaintiff, Defendant ignored the relevant evidence and
“treated Ms. Grose as ‘guilty’ from the start.” Id. at 8. Finally, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s
purported business reason for terminating Plaintiff is undermined by the general atmosphere of
discrimination. Id. Plaintiff contends that “Ms. Hightower complained about racism at PBI station
to both Mr. Clementi and representatives from human resources who were investigating a
10
complaint that Ms. Hightower and Ms. Grose were racist against white people. Mr. Clementi
promised to contact human resources, but no investigation was ever done.” Id. at 9–10.
Accordingly, Defendant’s “failure to correct the ‘racism’ at PBI – which exists to this day –
undermines and calls into question the legitimacy of American’s reason for terminating Ms.
Grose’s employment.” Id. at 10.
In Defendant’s reply, it first argues that “American’s decision to terminate Grose—like its

motion for summary judgment—was based on Grose’s own admissions and her version of events.
American did not have to make credibility determinations in its investigation because Grose
conceded all the relevant facts during the investigation, and has conceded them again in this
lawsuit.” [DE 35 at 1]. Defendant contends that, based on these undisputed facts, Defendant had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment. Id. at 2. According
to Defendant, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of sex and race discrimination and “has
failed to produce evidence showing that American’s legitimate business reasons for her
termination are untrue and are merely pretext for discrimination.” Id. Defendant maintains that
Plaintiff has not identified any legitimate factual disputes. Id. at 3. Defendant distinguishes
Stafford’s incident on the basis that Stafford’s accident was “caused by the loss of situational

awareness,” whereas “each of Grose’s violations was an intentional decision she made.” Id. at 5.
Defendant also asserts that Stafford and Grose are not similarly situated because different decision
makers are involved. Id. at 5–6.
V. RELEVANT LAW
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Florida Civil Rights Act of
1992 (“FCRA”) make it unlawful to discharge an employee because of the employee’s race or sex,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The FCRA is patterned after Title VII, and
11
claims for race and sex discrimination are analyzed under the same framework. Dandridge v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 844 F. App’x. 214, 215 (11th Cir. 2021).
In the absence of direct evidence, a circumstantial case is analyzed using the burden
shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under
that framework, a plaintiff must first prove that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she
was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) the employer treated similarly situated,

employees who were not members of the plaintiff’s class more favorably and (4) she was qualified
to do the job or to the benefit at issue. Cooper v. Jefferson Cnty. Coroner and Med. Exam’r Off.,
861 F. App’x 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Nealy v. SunTrust Bank, No. 21-11358, 2021 WL
5112819, at *2 (11th Cir. 2021).
In Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019), the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the comparator leg of this analysis (assessment of “similarly situated”
employees) is necessarily conducted at the prima facie stage of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Id. at 1217. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that
she and her proffered comparators were ‘similarly situated in all material respects.’” Id. at 1218.
“This determination is one of ‘substantive likeness,’ an inherently fact-sensitive inquiry which

must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Thompson v. McDonald, No. 16-80811-CIV, 2019 WL
11314995, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Thompson v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
Veterans Affs., 801 F. App'x 688 (11th Cir. 2020). Furthermore, “[e]xamples of ‘similarly situated
comparators’ would ordinarily include persons who engaged in the same basic conduct (or
misconduct) of the plaintiff; persons who were subjected to the same employment policy,
guideline, or rule as plaintiff; persons who ordinarily, but not invariably, were under the
jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff, and persons who share the plaintiff’s
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employment or disciplinary history.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Stimson v. Stryker
Sales Corp., 835 F. App'x 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Ordinarily, a similarly situated comparator
will have engaged in the same basic misconduct as the plaintiff, been under the same supervisor,
shared the plaintiff's disciplinary and employment history, and been subject to the same
employment policy.”).
Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a

legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 506 (1993). “The employer’s burden [here] . . . is ‘exceedingly light’ and merely requires that
the employer proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.” Bradley v. Pfizer, Inc., 440 F. App’x
805, 807 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Once the defendant offers such a reason, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the proffered reason is mere pretext for illegal discrimination.
Menefee v. Sanders Lead Co., 786 F. App’x 963, 966 (11th Cir. 2019). To do so, “plaintiff must
disprove all legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the employer.” Bradley, 440 F.
App’x at 807. Even proof of discriminatory animus is not enough to prove pretext unless plaintiff
also proves that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is false. See id. Instead, the plaintiff must
“show both that the employer’s explanation was false, and that discrimination was the real reason

for his decision.” Margolis v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cty., 89 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1351
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2015).
Courts “do not sit as a ‘super personnel department,’ and must take care not to second-
guess the employer’s business judgment.” Ostrow v. GlobeCast Am. Inc., 489 F. App’x 433, 436
(11th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted). The court’s assessment is not concerned with
whether the employer’s decision was prudent or fair; it is only concerned with whether it was
discriminatory. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (“[I]t is not our role to second-guess the wisdom of an
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employer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom of them is irrelevant—as long as those
decisions were not made with a discriminatory motive.”) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d
1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff’s “failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom [her] case.” Smith
v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). “Instead, she may establish a
‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional

discrimination by the decisionmaker by pointing to evidence such as (1) suspicious timing,
ambiguous statements, or other information from which discriminatory intent may be inferred, (2)
systematically better treatment of similarly-situated employees, and (3) pretext.” Daneshpajouh v.
Sage Dental Grp. of Fla., PLLC, No. 19-CIV-62700-RAR, 2021 WL 3674655, at *12 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 18, 2021) (citing Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185). “When undertaking a convincing mosaic analysis,
the Court first considers whether [Defendant’s] cited reasons for firing [Plaintiff] are merely a
pretext for discrimination.” Key v. Cent. Ga. Kidney Specialists, P.C., No. 19-00253, 2020 WL
7053293, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 2020). The pretext inquiry requires Plaintiff to “demonstrate[]
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them

unworthy of credence.” Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir.
2005). Critically, though, “a reason is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Springer v. Convergys
Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007).

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VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
Defendant’s argument that there is no direct evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims is
unrebutted. Plaintiff has made no argument whatsoever in her response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment that there is, in fact, sufficient direct evidence to support her claims in this
case.1 Therefore, the Court finds that no direct evidence exists to support Plaintiff’s claims.

As this is a circumstantial evidence case, the Court must utilize the burden shifting
framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Defendant does
not dispute that Plaintiff is a Black female and is thus a member of a protected class. [DE 23 at 6].
Defendant also does not dispute that Plaintiff was terminated or that she was “generally qualified
for the position.” Id. at 6–7. Defendant simply argues that Plaintiff “cannot establish that American
treated similarly situated, non-black or non-female employees better than she.” Id. at 7.
In response, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Stafford is a valid comparator. [DE 30 at 6]. First,
Defendant tries to distinguish Michael Stafford on the basis that “Stafford’s incident was an
accident caused by the loss of situational awareness” and “each of Grose’s violations was an
intentional decision she made.” [DE 35 at 5]. The facts surrounding the Stafford incident are

described in Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts at paragraphs 38 and 39.
38. In December 2019, Stafford was moving a set of air stairs to the ramp area at
TPA. (Clementi Dep. at 9:4–13, ECF No. 22-4.) Air stairs are stairs placed on the
side of the plane to allow passengers to get on and off. (Pl. Dep. Vol. 2 at 117:5–9,
ECF No. 22-2.) Stafford should not have been on the air stairs. (Id. at 114:3–116:1.)
Stafford was distracted by the movement of another plane and as a result
accidentally hit the tail of it with the air stairs, causing damage to the plane. (Id.;

1 The Court also notes that the undisputed material facts at Def.’s SMF ¶ 35 states, “[n]either Grose’s race nor sex
had any bearing on Clementi’s decision to terminate her. (Clementi Dep. 31:21–32:2, ECF No. 22-4.) The decision
was based on the December 28, 2019, incident and the egregious violation of policies. (Id. at 18:1019:21.).” Thus,
there is not only a clear lack of direct evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims, but there is also undisputed evidence
that contradict Plaintiff’s claims.
15
see also Clementi Dep. 25:25–26:12, ECF No. 22-4.) Stafford immediately
reported the incident before the plane departed, consistent with American’s
policies. (Pl. Dep. Vol. 2 at 114:20–22; 117:16–118:6, ECF No. 22-2.)

39. When the investigation into this incident was complete, it was determined that
Stafford’s conduct was accidental and the result of him losing situational
awareness. (Clementi Dep. at 25:22–26:5, ECF No. 22-4.) Stafford was given a
written reprimand and prohibited from driving ground equipment but was not
terminated for the offense. (Id. at 10:15–19; see also Pl. Dep. Vol. 2 at 115:1–6,
ECF No. 22-2.)

Plaintiff does not dispute these facts.
The Court notes that, while Plaintiff’s and Stafford’s conduct was somewhat similar, it is
undisputed that Stafford did immediately report the incident, whereas Plaintiff did not. Plaintiff
contends that her supervisor had been out for a serious medical issue at the time of the incident
and that she did not need to report the incident pursuant to American’s policies because she merely
“tapped” the aircraft. [DE 30 at 6]. Plaintiff’s conduct raises safety concerns as Plaintiff did not
immediately notify anyone of the incident so the area of contact on the airplane could be inspected
before the airplane departed. In this regard, the Court does find that Plaintiff’s failure to report the
incident immediately and prior to the plane’s departure distinguishes her from Stafford and weighs
against Stafford being a proper comparator. However, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that
Stafford is not a proper comparator because Stafford’s conduct was accidental while Plaintiff’s
was not. Such argument is not supported by the record.
Second, Defendant argues that different decision makers determined the appropriate
disciplinary action to take against Plaintiff and Stafford. [DE 35 at 6]. Clementi was the individual
who made the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. [Def.’s SMF ¶ 30]. Frankie Jamison
was Stafford’s supervisor; however, according to Plaintiff, Clementi permitted Jamison to conduct
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the investigation and make the determination as to how to discipline Stafford. [Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶
37]. Plaintiff argues that
Mr. Stafford reported to Mr. Frankie Jamison while Ms. Grose reported to Ms. Ruth
Hightower. Both Mr. Jamison and Ms. Hightower reported to Mr. Clementi. Mr.
Clementi made the decision about who decided the discipline to be issued to Ms.
Grose and Mr. Stafford. Mr. Clementi allowed Mr. Jamison to decide the discipline
to be issued to Mr. Stafford but excluded Ms. Hightower until he had already made
the decision to terminate Ms. Grose, despite Ms. Hightower’s repeated requests to
provide input. Ultimately, the decision rested with Mr. Clementi.

[DE 30 at 6]. Defendant replies that
Contrary to the general rule, Grose suggests that the fact that different decision-
makers reached different decisions about employees engaged in different conduct
is somehow indicative of discrimination because Clementi could have stepped in
and taken additional action with respect to Stafford if he had wanted. (Resp. Br. at
6.) That argument makes no sense and does not tend to show that similar people
were treated differently. And Clementi’s involvement in Grose’s case came about
because Grose failed to timely report the incident, which meant that Clementi
learned about it from company safety officers instead of through Grose’s direct
reporting line.

[DE 35 at 6]. The Court agrees that different decision-makers were involved with Stafford and
Plaintiff and that this weighs against Stafford’s appropriateness as a comparator. Further, as noted
above, the fact that Stafford immediately reported the incident prior to the plane’s departure,
whereas Stafford did not report the incident for two days, well after the plane’s departure, further
weighs against Stafford’s appropriateness as a comparator. Safety reasons clearly support that any
such incident be reported prior to the plane’s departure.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently established a
proper comparator and thus has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination on the
basis of race and gender. However, in an abundance of caution, and to provide added clarity, the
Court will continue with its analysis as if a proper comparator and a prima facie case of
discrimination on the basis of race and gender has been established by Plaintiff. That is, for the
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purpose of the following analysis, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has established a prima facie
case of discrimination on the basis of race and gender.
Defendant’s Legitimate Reason for the Adverse Employment Action
Plaintiff argues in her response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that
Defendant basically has treated her as guilty from the start of the investigation into the relevant
incident and even ignored the exculpatory testimony given by Mr. O’Brien. [DE 30 at 8]. In its

reply, Defendant explains, “Grose argues that summary judgment is improper because she insists
that the credibility of American’s legitimate business reasons should be assessed by a factfinder at
trial. (Resp. Br. at 7.) That is not the proper standard.” [DE 35 at 6].
It appears to the Court that Plaintiff has impliedly conceded in her response that Defendant
gave a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, and, rather, Plaintiff appears more
focused on her argument that there was a pretext for illegal discrimination. It appears that, in her
response, Grose has somewhat conflated her legitimate reason argument with her pretext
argument. Regardless, it is clear to the Court that Defendant has met its “exceedingly light” burden
and has proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. Bradley, 440 F.
App’x at 807. Plaintiff did something that was unsafe. Plaintiff got on a belt loader and operated

it in a manner that caused it to tap or touch the plane, and then failed to immediately report it before
the plane departed despite the fact that one of Defendant’s primary goals is to ensure safety. The
facts of this case show that Plaintiff even conceded in an email that she had “just breached safety
last week to the ramp.” [Def.’s SMF ¶ 25].
Whether There Was a Pretext for Illegal Discrimination
Defendant contends that “[e]ven if Grose did provide evidence that American’s reasons
were false, she has not provided any evidence that the real reason for her termination was hidden
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discrimination.” [DE 35 at 7]. The Court agrees. In Plaintiff’s response, she argues that the
evidence shows that Mr. O’Brien directed another employee to drive the belt loader from a
different gate and also shows that Plaintiff simply tapped the aircraft. [DE 30 at 8]. It seems that
Plaintiff is really asserting in her response that the investigation into the incident by Defendant
was inherently flawed and biased toward Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden
of proving that the proffered reason for termination is a mere pretext for illegal discrimination. She

has not disproven all legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the employer or that
discrimination was the real reason for Clementi’s decision. Instead, she has made vague allegations
that the investigation was insufficient or unfair. However, this Court’s assessment is not concerned
with whether the employer’s decision was prudent or fair; it is only concerned with whether it was
discriminatory.
Plaintiff’s Convincing Mosaic Argument
Finally, Plaintiff makes a “convincing mosaic” argument in her papers. She contends that,
“Ms. Hightower complained about racism at PBI station to both Mr. Clementi and representatives
from human resources who were investigating a complaint that Ms. Hightower and Ms. Grose
were racist against white people. Mr. Clementi promised to contact human resources, but no

investigation was ever done.” [DE 30 at 9–10]. According to Plaintiff, “[e]ven when Ms.
Hightower complained directly to human resources that there was a problem at PBI station – a
problem at every level – American did not take any action. American’s failure to correct the
‘racism’ at PBI – which exists to this day – undermines and calls into question the legitimacy of
American’s reason for terminating Ms. Grose’s employment.” Id. at 10.
In reply, Defendant asserts that “Grose’s manager’s complaints about her supervisees do
not provide evidence of pretext. Grose has not presented any evidence that her supervisors were
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racist (other than that which asserts that Hightower and Grose themselves were discriminatory).”
[DE 35 at 8]. Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff “has not presented any evidence satisfying
her burden to show that American’s decision was a ruse for discrimination. Even assuming there
was any ‘general atmosphere of discrimination,’ the only evidence Grose has presented suggests
that she and Hightower were the ones responsible for it.” /d.
In order to establish a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence, the Court must first
consider whether Defendant’s claimed reasons for firing Plaintiff were merely a pretext for
discrimination. Key, 2020 WL 7053293, at *6. In other words, Plaintiff is required to demonstrate
weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in Defendant’s proffered legitimate reasons for
terminating Plaintiff that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence. Jackson,
405 F.3d 1276 at 1289. Plaintiff has completely failed to make the requisite showing. Thus, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 23] is GRANTED. Summary judgment is hereby entered in
favor of Defendant as to Counts IJ, II, II], and IV of the Complaint. Final judgment shall be entered
separately.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida,
this 11th day of July, 2022.

United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120711. Public record. Not legal advice.