# Inspirations Nevada LLC v. Med Pro Billing, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Florida · February 10, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120172

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 10, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-CV-60268-STRAUSS

INSPIRATIONS NEVADA LLC,

Plaintiff,
v.

MED PRO BILLING, INC.,

Defendant.
______________________________/

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon four separate motions for attorneys’ fees [DE
318, 319, 320, 322] (collectively, the “Motions”) filed by Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, Med Pro
Billing, Inc. (“Med Pro”). Each of the Motions pertains to a different law firm that represented
Med Pro during the course of this matter. I have reviewed the Motions, the attachments to the
Motions, and all other pertinent portions of the record. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, Inspirations
Nevada LLC (“Inspirations”), has not filed any response to the Motions (despite receiving proper
notice of the Motions), and the time to do so has passed.1 For the reasons discussed herein, the
Motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Inspirations commenced this action against Med Pro on February 7, 2020. See [DE 1]. On
April 1, 2020, Med Pro filed a 3-count Counterclaim [DE 28] against Inspirations. Inspirations
subsequently filed a 15-count Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [DE 148] against Med Pro

1 Inspirations’ failure to respond to the Motion “may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the
[M]otion[s] by default.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). Nevertheless, I still analyze the issues of
entitlement and reasonableness below. However, the reductions made to hours billed may have
been greater had Inspirations responded to the Motion.
and three other defendants on April 8, 2021. Med Pro was named as a defendant in Counts 1, 2,
4, 8, 12, and 14. On May 26, 2021, the Court entered the Order on Motions to Dismiss [DE 166],
dismissing Counts 2-15 of the SAC with prejudice. Thus, the sole remaining count of the SAC
was Count I, under which Inspirations alleged a claim for breach of contract against Med Pro. The

parties subsequently proceeded to trial on that claim and on the Counterclaim. Med Pro, however,
withdrew Counts II and III of the Counterclaim (which were brought in the alternative) before the
case was submitted to the jury. See [DE 307] at 1 n.2. Thus, the only claims submitted to the jury
were Inspirations’ breach of contract claim against Med Pro (Count I of the SAC) and Med Pro’s
breach of contract claim against Inspirations (Count I of the Counterclaim). On November 9,
2021, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Med Pro on both claims [DE 306], and the Court
entered a Final Judgment [DE 307] in favor of Med Pro in accordance with the jury’s verdict.
ANALYSIS
I. ENTITLEMENT
Med Pro is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Both parties’ breach of

contract claims were premised upon a Billing Agreement [DE 148-1]. Section 15 of the Billing
Agreement provides that:
The prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs
in the event that legal services are used in connection with the collection or
enforcement arising from or related to this Agreement, whether or not suit is
brought and whether incurred at trial, on appeal, in bankruptcy proceedings or
otherwise.

Because Med Pro prevailed on its breach of contract claim against Inspirations and on all of
Inspirations’ claims against Med Pro, Med Pro is clearly the prevailing party on the claims between
Med Pro and Inspirations. Therefore, Med Pro is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees
against Inspirations in accordance with Section 15 of the Billing Agreement. Moreover, as noted
above, Inspirations has failed to file any response to contest entitlement.
II. REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES
A. Legal Standard

When determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, courts begin by multiplying a
reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended. Norman v. Housing Auth. of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983)). The result of that calculation is known as the lodestar, see id. at 1301-02, which is
“strongly presumed to be reasonable.” Martinez v. Hernando Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 579 F. App’x
710, 715 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
The party seeking an award of fees has the burden of documenting the hours incurred and
the applicable hourly rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). Fee
applicants are required to exercise billing judgment and to exclude entries that are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428

(11th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Entries for clerical or administrative tasks
should also be excluded. See Ortega v. Berryhill, No. 16-24697-CIV, 2017 WL 6026701, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2017) (“Purely clerical or secretarial tasks that require no legal skill or training,
such as converting pleadings to PDF, faxing and mailing, updating lists and calendars, and filing
or e-filing documents, should not be billed at a paralegal rate regardless of who performs them.”
(citing Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1999))).
It is axiomatic that hours that are unreasonable to bill to one’s client are unreasonable to
bill to an adversary, “irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168
F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301). If fee applicants fail to exercise billing judgment,
courts must do it for them. Id. A court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider its
own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an
independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Norman, 836 F.2d
at 1303 (citations omitted).

Courts reviewing fee applications “need not, and indeed should not, become green-
eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice,
not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Consequently, “[w]hen
a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court has two choices:
it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-
board cut.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Loranger v.
Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1994)).
B. Discussion
I find that Med Pro reasonably incurred $311,037.30 in attorneys’ fees in this matter. The
following chart contains a summary of the hourly rates and number of hours requested for each

timekeeper,2 the rates and number of hours being awarded as to each timekeeper, and the total fee
award as to each timekeeper. The chart also contains a column indicating the year in which
attorneys were admitted to the Florida Bar (and, for one attorney, the Georgia Bar). That column
is blank for three individuals, as they are paralegals.

2 In addition to the hours reflected in the chart below, Med Pro seeks to recover additional fees
incurred in connection with preparing the Motions. However, I decline to award any such fees.
Inexplicably, each of the four law firms that represented Med Pro during this case seeks to recover
a substantial amount of hours for preparing the same recycled fee motion – 8 hours, 8 hours, 7
hours, and 20 hours, respectively (for an astounding total of 43 hours). As an initial matter, Med
Pro should have filed a single fee motion rather than four separate, repetitive versions of the same
motion. At any rate, without any clear, reliable indication of who actually prepared the form of
motion and the hours that were actually spent preparing the Motions, the Court will not award fees
in connection with the preparation of the Motions.
Timekeeper Admitted Rate Hours Rate Hours Amount
to Bar Requested Requested Awarded Awarded Awarded
Eric Rayman 2006 $300 150.8 $300 135.72 $40,716.00
Leonor 1988 $300 58.8 $300 52.92 $15,876.00
Lagomasino
Pedro 2006 $300 1.2 $300 1.08 $324.00
Hernandez
Mayda 2018 $250 1.8 $250 1.62 $405.00
Mallory
Steven 2003 $350 70.5 $350 63.45 $22,207.50
Gonzalez
Matthew 2005 (GA) $350 162.8 $350 146.52 $51,282.00
Marrone 2009 (FL)
Alexander 2014 $350 26.7 $325 24.03 $7,809.75
Heydemann
Jose De La 2019 $325 28.3 $250 25.47 $6,367.50
Cruz
Kristin $175 43.5 $95 39.15 $3,719.25
Greenslit
Michael $175 2.1 $95 1.89 $179.55
Alvarez
Levi 1995 $400 226 $400 203.4 $81,360.00
Williams
Chad Marcus 2017 $400 299.1 $300 269.19 $80,757.00
Georgette $75 0.5 $75 0.45 $33.75
Douglass
Total $311,037.30

With respect to the number of hours awarded, I applied an across-the-board reduction of
10%. Although Local Rule 7.1 permits the granting of the motion by default, courts still have an
independent obligation to only award reasonable attorneys’ fees, even in a default situation. See
Caplan v. Rehabclinics (PTA) Inc., No. 19-CV-62890, 2020 WL 3977140, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Fla. July
13, 2020); Barrios v. S. & Caribbean Agencies, Inc., No. 18-21550-CV, 2020 WL 7481869, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7481965 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
25, 2020); Barrera v. Officina, Inc., No. 10-21382-CIV, 2012 WL 692212, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
2, 2012). However, I have balanced this obligation with countervailing considerations, including
that Inspirations had the burden of specifically and precisely pointing out unreasonable hours. See
Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (“Those opposing fee applications have obligations, too. In order for
courts to carry out their duties in this area, ‘objections and proof from fee opponents’ concerning
hours that should be excluded must be specific and ‘reasonably precise.’” (quoting Norman, 836
F.2d at 1301)). Because Inspirations failed to discharge its burden, I only applied a modest

reduction of 10%.
I find that the 10% reduction is necessary and appropriate to account for duplication.
During the pendency of this case, Med Pro retained, and was represented by, four different law
firms (at different stages). It is unclear why Med Pro changed law firms so many times during the
course of the litigation. Regardless, it did. Inspirations should not have to pay for the additional
hours that were incurred solely due to these changes in representation. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at
428 (“Courts are not authorized to be generous with the money of others.”).
There are numerous billing entries that include time that would not have been incurred had
Med Pro not changed counsel so frequently. For instance, the very first billing entry by Med Pro’s
third set of attorneys is a 4-hour entry stating “[b]egin review of file to get up to speed on case.”

[DE 319-4] at 20. The very next entry for 5.7 hours also includes time (from a different attorney)
for reviewing the docket and various pleadings and other filings (pleadings and filings that prior
counsel would have also reviewed, or prepared). These examples are only two of several, and the
billing records from Med Pro’s second and fourth sets of attorneys likewise contain multiple
entries for similar work that duplicated work performed by predecessor counsel. Now, none of
this is to say that the work performed was not necessary upon coming into the case. It was.
However, Inspirations should not have to pay for work that was only necessary because Med Pro
decided to change counsel every few months.
With respect to hourly rates, I also find that some reductions are warranted. As the party
seeking an award of fees, Med Pro has the burden of “supplying the court with specific and detailed
evidence from which the court can determine the reasonable hourly rate.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427
(quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303). “A reasonable hourly rate is ‘the prevailing market rate in

the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,
experience, and reputation.’” Id. at 436 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). “The general rule
is that the ‘relevant market’ for purposes of determining the reasonable hourly rate for an attorney’s
services is ‘the place where the case is filed.’” Id. at 437 (citing Cullens v. Georgia Dep’t. of
Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir.1994)).
Based on my own knowledge regarding reasonable hourly rates in this community and my
consideration of applicable law, and taking into account the background, experience, and
qualifications of the different timekeepers (to the extent such information has been provided), I
find that the awarded rates reflected in the chart above are reasonable. First, the requested $300
rate for attorneys Eric Rayman, Leonor Lagomasino, and Pedro Hernandez, the requested $350

rate for attorneys Steven Gonzalez and Matthew Marrone, and the requested $400 rate for attorney
Levi Williams are reasonable. These six attorneys have all been admitted to the Florida Bar (or
Georgia Bar) for at least 15 years (and in Mr. Williams’ case, for over 25 years). Second, the
requested rate of $250 for attorney Mayda Mallory is reasonable. Third, the requested rate of $75
for paralegal Georgette Douglass is reasonable.
However, based on the information (often only limited information) provided as to other
timekeepers, I find that the other requested rates must be reduced to be reasonable. First, I have
reduced attorney Alexander Heydemann’s rate from $350 to $325. Although Mr. Heydemann is
a partner at his firm, during his firm’s involvement in this case, he had only been a member of the
Bar for roughly 6.5 years, and Med Pro does not provide any other information regarding Mr.
Heydemann aside from his areas of practice. Cf. EWC Franchise, LLC v. DOC Dev., LLC, No.
20-CV-60035, 2020 WL 8093447, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, 2021 WL 124415 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2021) (reducing rate of attorney with approximately

nine years of experience from $350 to $325). Second, I have reduced attorney Chad Marcus’s rate
from $400 to $300. Mr. Marcus has only been a member of the Bar for 4 years, and while his
areas of practice are also disclosed, no other information is provided. Cf. Beyond Games Ltd. v.
Yossi Gallo Galimidi, No. 20-23072-CIV, 2021 WL 4443943, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4441407 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2021) (finding $285
to be reasonable rate for attorney with three years of experience). Third, I have reduced attorney
Jose De La Cruz’s rate from $325 to $250. At the time he worked on this case, he had been an
attorney for less than 2 years. Cf. EWC Franchise, 2020 WL 8093447, at *2-3 (reducing rate of
attorney who had only practiced for one year at the time of her work on the case from $325 to
$250). Finally, I have reduced the rates for Kristin Greenslit and Michael Alvarez, both paralegals,

from $175 to $95. While a reasonable rate for a paralegal is often (though not always) greater than
$95, no information is provided regarding Ms. Greenslit and Mr. Alvarez (other than that they are
paralegals). Therefore, I cannot find a greater rate to be reasonable under the circumstances.3
In light of my findings regarding the reasonable hourly rates for all timekeepers and the
number of hours that they reasonably billed, I find the lodestar amount for this matter to be

3 I have similarly reduced paralegal rates in the past to $95 when no information regarding their
experience and qualifications was provided, as have other judges in this district. See Rehabclinics
(PTA), 2020 WL 3977140, at *4; Caplan v. 101 Vapor & Smoke, LLC, No. 18-cv-23049-KMM,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142994, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 18-cv-23049, at DE 39 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019).
$311,037.30. Additionally, I find that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable attorneys’ fee
award here. Therefore, Med Pro will be awarded attorneys’ fees in that amount.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Motions [DE
318, 319, 320, 322] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant/Counter-
Plaintiff, Med Pro Billing, Inc., shall recover from Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, Inspirations
Nevada LLC, attorneys’ fees in the amount of $311,037.30, for which let execution issue.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 10th day of February 2022.

United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10120172. Public record. Not legal advice.