# Watkins v. Sergeant M. Bigwood

> District Court, S.D. Florida · April 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10117643

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10117643

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that it was “undisputed” that sheriff was acting in his discretionary capacity where the complaint alleged that the sheriff was “at all times material . . . duly appointed and acting in his individual capacity as Sheriff of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office”
- explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”
- noting the First Amendment does not protect “true threats,” including acts of “[i]ntimidation” where the speaker intends to place the listener in fear of bodily harm or death

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 18-cv-63035-BLOOM/Valle

ERIC WATKINS,

Plaintiff,
vs.

SERGEANT M. BIGWOOD, et al.,

Defendants.
__________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants’, Sergeant M. Bigwood (“Bigwood”),
Officer T. Yopps (“Yopps”), and Officer Samuel Ramos (“Ramos”) (collectively, “Defendants”),
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [40] (“Motion”). Plaintiff filed his Response, ECF No. [43]
(“Response”), to which Defendants filed their Reply, ECF No. [46] (“Reply”). The Court has
considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied. Plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave, ECF No. [47], to file a sur-reply is denied as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and motion for more definite statement. See ECF No. [30] (“Order”). Specifically, the
Court dismissed the official capacity claims against Defendants without prejudice and required
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint that comports with Rules 8 and 10, Fed. R. Civ. P. See id.
On March 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint, ECF No. [35]
(“Complaint”), in which he brings two counts against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based
on alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations. Unlike the original complaint, ECF No. [1],
the instant Complaint raises claims against Defendants only in their individual capacities. See ECF
No. [35] at ¶¶ 3-5.
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s involuntary detention for a mental health evaluation
after joggers in a public park complained to Defendants about Plaintiff’s alleged behavior—
brandishing a knife and shouting anti-gay slurs—while in the park. See generally ECF No. [35].

Plaintiff alleges that he is homeless and lives out of his car. Id. at ¶ 22. He alleges that on December
15, 2014, he was sitting outside his car in Mullins Park while preparing to make breakfast, and he
was singing an anti-gay reggae song.1 Id. at ¶¶ 10, 21. According to him, this had been his “routine
for more than a year prior.” Id. at ¶ 11. He was situated approximately 60 feet away from the
walkway where patrons walk or exercise. Id. at ¶ 10. He asserts that two joggers, Tanika Beckford
(“Beckford”) and Jermaine Jackson (“Jackson”), were offended by Plaintiff’s singing. Id. at ¶ 12.
He alleges that Jackson believed that Plaintiff was speaking to him, but he ignored Jackson and
continued to sing. Id. at ¶ 14. Jackson, in response, allegedly cursed at him and attempted to
physically attack Plaintiff but was restrained by Beckford, and they walked out of the park while

Plaintiff continued singing. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16, 21. According to Plaintiff, Beckford and Jackson told
him that they were going to call the police and have him arrested for singing the anti-gay song. Id.
at ¶ 17.
Sometime later, Officers Ramos and Manchula2 arrived on the scene. Ramos informed
Plaintiff that the police were called in response to a complaint that he was “in the park disturbing
the peace.” Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that, in a “calm cool and collected manner,” he informed

1 The song’s lyrics included references to shooting homosexuals, and it included derogatory terms
such as “faggot” and “batty boy.” See id. at ¶¶ 21, 26

2 Officer Manchula is not named as a defendant. Plaintiff alleges that he “had a history with”
Officer Manchula. See id. at ¶ 18.
Ramos that he was not creating a disturbance but that he was “merely singing a song Boom Bye
Bye in a faggot boy head and the two patrons got upset and started cursing” at him. Id. at ¶ 19.
Bigwood later arrived, and he informed Plaintiff that Beckford and Jackson had complained that
he had been making anti-gay slurs while waiving a knife in his hand. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff told
Bigwood that he possessed two knives, which he uses to prepare his meals, but he denied having

the knives out while he was singing because he had yet to prepare breakfast. Id. at ¶¶ 22-24. In
response to Bigwood’s question about how Beckford would know that he had a knife, Plaintiff
informed him that everyday he is “in the park with [his] desk outside [his] car and that [he is] either
doing writing or preparing [his] meals.” Id. at ¶ 25.
After Bigwood had listened to Plaintiff sing the song and had spoken with Beckford and
Jackson, Bigwood reportedly informed Plaintiff that he believed Plaintiff needed a mental health
examination based upon the incident at hand and a previous incident eight months earlier in April
2014 at another park. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiff alleges that that previous incident involved “a park
manager wanting to officially trespass [Plaintiff] from the park” and that Officer Manchula had

been involved in that incident. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. He also alleges that that incident did not involve
complaints from patrons that he was shouting anti-gay slurs. Id. at ¶ 43. After speaking with Officer
Manchula, Bigwood allegedly again told Plaintiff that he believed that he needed a mental
evaluation because of his “constant singing of the antigay song in parks” and because he believed
that Plaintiff had waived his knife at Beckford. Id. at ¶ 30. According to Plaintiff, Bigwood asked
him to voluntarily submit himself to a mental health examination, but he refused to go. Id. at ¶¶ 32-
33.
The Complaint asserts that Bigwood, in response, ordered Ramos and Yopps to arrest him,
and he was handcuffed, placed in a police car, had his phone confiscated,3 and was taken to a
“mental facility.” Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. Plaintiff alleges that he was not confrontational with the police,
and Beckford and Jackson’s reports to the police were unreliable and not provided in a sworn
affidavit. Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. According to Plaintiff, Beckford and Jackson made various false
statements to police, such as Plaintiff shouting anti-gay slurs at Jackson, appearing hostile and

preparing to physically engage Jackson, and stabbing the air toward Jackson with a knife. Id. at ¶¶
37, 39-40. He never told Bigwood that he hated homosexuals and never shouted anti-gay slurs. Id.
at ¶ 41.
Plaintiff’s behavior never varied from calm to angry, and he never expressed feelings of
conspiracy that random citizens and police were targeting him without cause, which Bigwood
reported. See id. at ¶ 42. He also never told Bigwood that he was “not Fucking going anywhere.”
Id. at ¶ 44. According to Plaintiff, prior to December 15, 2014, no mental health professional had
certified that he met the criteria for involuntary examination. Id. at ¶ 45. He further alleges that
during his conversation with Bigwood, he expressed that Bigwood’s decision to arrest him under

the Baker Act was a “conspiracy between Bigwood and the other officers, especially Manchula,
and the complainants, but specifically the officers because of Plaintiff’s past and present pending
lawsuits against Lauderhill police officers, especially Manchula who Plaintiff had a pending
lawsuit against,” and that the decision to arrest him was “to retaliate against Plaintiff to cause him
mental anguish and hardship and to disrupt and hinder Plaintiff from timely filing a response in
court in the case against Manchula[.]” Id. at ¶ 46.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of being Baker Acted “coupled with the false statements in

3 Plaintiff alleges that he was video recording the entire incident on his cell phone, but that when
he was released from the medical facility, the video was deleted from his phone, and only Officers
Ramos and Manchula knew that he was recording the incident. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 38.
the arrest records,” he is seen as a “trouble maker and mental problem and case,” and he cannot
get employment. Id. at ¶ 50. The Complaint seeks $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages from
each Defendant and $2,000,000.00 in punitive damages from each Defendant. Id. at ¶¶ 52-53.
Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice based on qualified
immunity. ECF No. [40]. They assert that regarding the Fourth Amendment claim (Count I), the

allegations demonstrate that they were acting within their discretionary authority, there are
insufficient factual allegations against Yopps and Ramos, and that the facts as pled do not show
that Bigwood involuntarily detained Plaintiff without probable cause. Id. at 2. Regarding the First
Amendment claim (Count II), Defendants assert that based on recent Eleventh Circuit precedent
involving Plaintiff in a different lawsuit, it was not clearly established law that it was not
appropriate to apprehend Plaintiff for singing the same anti-gay song at issue in this case. Id. (citing
Watkins v. Central Broward Regional Park, 799 F. App’x 659 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Watkins II”)).4
Plaintiff responds that Watkins I did not indicate whether the dismissal of the complaint
against the Lauderhill Police Department was with or without prejudice, and that Defendants

mischaracterize the Watkins I decision. ECF No. [43]. He further argues that Defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity regarding either count under the factual allegations as pled in the
Complaint. Id. Additionally, he argues that he should be allowed to amend his complaint to assert
additional facts that he believes would further establish liability against Officers Yopps and
Ramos. Id.
In their Reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants acted
within their discretionary authority, and that he fails to carry his burden to establish that qualified

4 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirming in part and reversing in part this Court’s initial sua
sponte dismissal order, see Watkins v. Bigwood, No. 19-10456, 2019 WL 6724401 (11th Cir. Dec.
19, 2019), is referred to as “Watkins I.”
immunity does not apply regarding either count. ECF No [46]. Additionally, Defendants assert
that Plaintiff relies on facts concerning Officers Ramos and Yopps that were not pled in the
Amended Complaint, and that it is improper to request leave to amend in a response to a motion
to dismiss. See id. at 2.
The Motion, accordingly, is ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to dismiss
A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need
detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s
pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor
of the plaintiff. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304
F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F.
Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and
courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “courts may infer from the
factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative explanations,’ which suggest lawful
conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am. Dental
Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).
A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the
complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central

to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); Maxcess,
Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] document outside the four
corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is
undisputed in terms of authenticity.”) (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir.
2002)).
B. Pro se litigants
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998). This leniency, however, does not confer on pro se litigants “a right to receive

special advantages not bestowed on other litigants. [The pro se litigant] must, for example, abide
by local rules governing the proper form of pleadings.” Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1115
(11th Cir. 1985). Further, courts cannot serve as de facto counsel for a party and cannot rewrite a
deficient pleading for the sake of sustaining an action. Jarzynka v. St. Thomas Univ. of Law, 310
F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2004). The Court cannot simply “fill in the blanks” to infer a
claim, Brinson v. Colon, 2012 WL 1028878, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2012), as “it is not the Court’s
duty to search through a plaintiff’s filings to find or construct a pleading that satisfies Rule
8,” Sanders v. United States, 2009 WL 1241636, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2009); see Bivens v.
Roberts, 2009 WL 411527, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2009) (“[J]udges must not raise issues and
arguments on plaintiffs’ behalf, but may only construe pleadings liberally given the linguistic
imprecision that untrained legal minds sometimes employ.” (citing Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d
1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008))). In determining whether a pro se litigant has stated a claim, “the
court ought not penalize the litigant for linguistic imprecision in the more plausible allegations,”
while keeping in mind that “wildly implausible allegations in the complaint should not be taken to

be true.” Miller, 541 F.3d at 1100.
III. DISCUSSION
Determining whether the Complaint should be dismissed raises the overarching issues as
to whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Count I and Count II. The Court
will address each issue in turn.
A. Qualified immunity defense generally
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their
individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d

1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.
2002)); see also Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003). “The
purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties
without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly
incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law,” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872,
877 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The qualified immunity doctrine accordingly represents “a balance between the need for a remedy
to protect citizens’ rights and the need for government officials to perform their duties without the
fear of constant, baseless litigation.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1231 (citation omitted). Accordingly,
“[q]ualified immunity is, as the term implies, qualified. It is not absolute.” Id. at 1233.
“Generally speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional
right.’” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas

Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). To prevail on a motion to dismiss based
on qualified immunity, “the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of
his discretionary authority when the allegedly unconstitutional acts took place.” Storck, 354 F.3d
at 1314 (citing Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)).
“A government official acts within his discretionary authority if his actions were (1)
undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties; and (2) within the scope of his
authority.” Mikko v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 857 F.3d 1136, 1144 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Lenz v.
Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995)). “In applying each prong of this test, [courts] look
to the general nature of the defendant’s action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have

been committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an
unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.” Holloman ex rel.
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). “In other words, ‘a court must ask
whether the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related
to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties.’” Mikko, 857 F.3d at 1144
(quoting Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Once the public
official has established that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity does not apply.” Storck, 354 F.3d
at 1314 (citing Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194).
The United States Supreme Court has outlined a two-part test to determine whether a
plaintiff meets its burden on rebutting a qualified immunity defense: (1) “[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated
a constitutional right?”; and (2) if a constitutional right would have been violated under the
plaintiff’s version of the facts, the court must then determine “whether the right was clearly

established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).
Moreover, courts “may consider these two prongs in either order; an official is entitled
to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish either.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 923
F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Jacoby v. Baldwin Cty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir.
2016)).
“[O]nly Supreme Court cases, Eleventh Circuit caselaw, and [Florida] Supreme Court
caselaw can ‘clearly establish’ law in this circuit.” Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d
950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Hamilton By & Through Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525,
1532 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996)). The essence of this inquiry is the “public official’s objective

reasonableness, regardless of his underlying intent or motivation.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1231-
32 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Lee,
284 F.3d at 1195). “To be clearly established, the contours of an asserted constitutional right ‘must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.’” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). “[I]n the light of pre-existing law, the
unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034.
“Qualified immunity ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ but does not protect ‘the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1231-32
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).
Nonetheless, “[t]he Supreme Court and [the Eleventh Circuit] have stated that a plaintiff
cannot strip a § 1983 defendant of his qualified immunity by citing to general rules or abstract
rights.” Jones, 174 F.3d at 1282 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S. Ct. 3034); see Walker

v. Schwalbe, 112 F.3d 1127, 1132 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiffs may not discharge their burden [of
showing that a right is clearly established] by referring to general rules and abstract rights.”).
“Qualified immunity focuses on the actual, specific details of concrete cases.” Walker, 112 F.3d
at 1132. Indeed, “‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’”
but “must be ‘particularlized’ to the facts of the case” because otherwise “‘[p]laintiffs would be
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply
by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.’” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)
(citations omitted).
Additionally, “[b]ecause § 1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative causal connection

between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation,’ each defendant
is entitled to an independent qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and
omissions.” Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright,
802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). Thus, in conducting a § 1983 analysis, courts
must “evaluate a given defendant’s qualified-immunity claim, considering only the actions and
omissions in which that particular defendant engaged.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will
individually address each Defendant’s actions below.
B. Discretionary authority
As noted, Defendants carry the initial burden to demonstrate that they were acting within
the scope of their discretionary authority when the allegedly unconstitutional acts took place. This
inquiry is two-fold: “[w]e ask whether the government employee was (a) performing a legitimate
job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), and (b) through means that were within
his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265. Here, Defendants’ challenged
actions arise from their investigation of the alleged disturbance in the park stemming from

Plaintiff’s encounter with Beckford and Jackson, and Plaintiff’s subsequent involuntary detention.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were employed at the Lauderhill Police Department and
at “the time of the alleged claim” were “on duty” and acting in their “individual capacity[ies],”
and he came into contact with Defendants because “two patrons had called 911 and complained
that [he] was in the park disturbing the peace.” See ECF No. [35] at ¶¶ 3-5, 18. The Complaint’s
allegations show that Defendants became involved with Plaintiff in response to investigating
citizen complaints while they were on duty. The Complaint, accordingly, presents facts that satisfy
Defendants’ burden. See Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1362 (S.D. Fla.
2016) (finding that it was “undisputed” that sheriff was acting in his discretionary capacity where

the complaint alleged that the sheriff was “at all times material . . . duly appointed and acting in
his individual capacity as Sheriff of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office”); Gonzales v. Israel,
No. 15-CIV-60060, 2015 WL 1143116, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) (finding that the
discretionary authority prong was established where complaint alleged that the defendants were
“acting under color of state law” at all relevant times); Bozeman v. Pollock, No. 14-CIV-60493,
2015 WL 11197743, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2015) (stating that “[i]n this case, Pollock ‘responded
to a call on his police radio, investigated the scene, and made an arrest. Such actions clearly fall
within his discretionary authority as a law-enforcement officer’”). Plaintiff does not dispute that
Defendants acted within their discretionary authority. Therefore, Defendants have carried their
burden, and the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity does not apply.
C. Qualified immunity – Fourth Amendment claim
The gist of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment violation claim in Count I is that he was
involuntarily detained under the Baker Act without probable cause. According to Plaintiff,
Defendants arrested him in “bad faith” because no mental health professional certified that he met

the criteria for involuntary examination, there was “no other valid or viable reasons to believe that
Plaintiff had a mental illness,” and none of the Defendants gave him a “conscientious explanation
and disclosure of the purpose of the examination, and there [was] no reliable evidence to support
that Plaintiff met the criteria for involuntary examination.” ECF No. [35] at ¶ 8.
Regarding this count, the Eleventh Circuit in Watkins I previously analyzed the initial
complaint’s Fourth Amendment claim as follows:
“[T]he existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a
subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest” under both the First and Fourth
Amendments. Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2018).
“Probable cause exists where the facts within the collective knowledge of law
enforcement officials, derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense
has been or is being committed.” Id. at 1298. Even absent actual probable cause, a
claim for false arrest is subject to dismissal if the police officer had “‘arguable’
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Id. “Arguable probable cause exists where
reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge
as the defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id.
(alteration omitted). “Whether an officer possesses probable cause or arguable
probable cause depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact
pattern.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010).

Under Florida’s Baker Act, a person may be subjected involuntarily to a mental
health examination if “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that without care or
treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others
in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior.” Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)(b)(2)
(emphasis added). Police officers “shall take a person who appears to meet the
criteria for involuntary examination into custody and deliver the person” to an
appropriate mental health facility for examination. Id. § 394.463(2)(a)(2).
For Plaintiff to be detained lawfully under the Baker Act, probable cause must have
existed -- evidenced by Plaintiff’s recent behavior -- to believe that a “substantial
likelihood” existed that Plaintiff would cause “serious bodily harm” to himself or
to others in the near future. This standard is a high one: for example, a reasonable
belief about “some likelihood,” “might cause” “some kind of bodily harm,” “at
some point in the future” is not good enough for probable cause to deprive a person
of their freedom.

Under Plaintiff’s version of the facts -- which we now must accept as true and must
construe in Plaintiff’s favor at this early stage of the proceedings -- Plaintiff
remained at all pertinent times near his car, which was more than 60 feet away from
the area where people were walking and jogging. Plaintiff denies flatly that he acted
in an aggressive or hostile manner either toward Beck[ford] and Jackson or toward
Defendant Officers. Plaintiff also denies flatly ever holding or waving a knife on
the pertinent day. To the extent there existed a risk of a physical altercation,
Plaintiff says that Jackson was the aggressor and that Plaintiff simply ignored
Jackson.

Also according to the complaint, the officers saw nothing to the contrary on the day
of the arrest; Plaintiff says the officers claim that they saw him have moments of
anger after they confronted him, but he denies that. On top of that, the event at
another park about 8 months earlier is not referred to as one involving actual
violence -- even IF we accept that an older event that occurred 8 months previously
might be evidence of “recent behavior” for the Baker Act.

Based on the limited record before us on appeal, an objective officer could not have
concluded reasonably that a “substantial likelihood” existed that Plaintiff would
soon “cause serious bodily harm” to himself or to others. Nor can we say that
Plaintiff’s version of the facts is so implausible that he can state no claim for relief.
Because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts from which we may infer, for now at
least, that he was detained under the Baker Act without probable cause or even
arguable probable cause, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim
under the Fourth Amendment.

Watkins I, 797 F. App’x at 442–43. Although the underlying complaint at issue in Watkins I is no
longer operative, the instant Amended Complaint is substantially similar to the one under
consideration by the Eleventh Circuit. That panel vacated this Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants, in which the Court determined that Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity upon the facts alleged in the initial complaint.
i. Officers Yopps and Ramos
Defendants Yopps and Ramos asserts that they are entitled to qualified immunity because
the Amended Complaint lacks specific factual allegations detailing their actions toward Plaintiff
except that they followed Bigwood’s order to arrest him. ECF No. [40] at 5-6. In their view,
Plaintiff provides no reason why these officers should not have followed Bigwood’s orders to

detain Plaintiff. Id. Yopps asserts that “[n]othing on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint gives any
indication that [he] was in anyway involved in the investigation at issue or that [he] knew or should
have known that his conduct may allegedly violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 5
(emphasis in original). Yopps cites to two Eleventh Circuit decisions that affirmed qualified
immunity under a summary judgment setting where no record evidence showed that the officers
acted unreasonably in following their superiors’ orders nor why they should have questioned the
validity of that order. See id. (citing Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995) and Brent
v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001)). Ramos asserts that the “same principle applies
to” him. Id. He acknowledges, however, that the Amended Complaint alleges that he made initial

contact with Plaintiff and handcuffed Plaintiff and transported him to a mental facility at
Bigwood’s direction, but he asserts that there is “once again no indication or allegations that [he]
knew or should have known that Sgt. Bigwood’s orders allegedly may have violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights (which they did not)).” Id.
Plaintiff, in response, concedes that he “could, and arguably should, have provided more
factual details as to Ramos’ and Yopps’ involvement in the incident.”5 ECF No. [43] at 2.

5 In the Response, Plaintiff supplies additional facts that, in his opinion, confirm that Officers
Yopps and Ramos violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See ECF No. [43] at 2-3. The Court will
not consider these newly asserted allegations when ruling on the instant Motion. See, e.g.,
Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); Marabella v. NCL
(Bahamas), Ltd., No. 19-CV-25185, 2020 WL 533987, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2020).
Regardless, he maintains that when the Complaint’s allegations are viewed in a light most
favorable to him, the allegations show that Ramos and Yopps acted unreasonably in following
Bigwood’s order, and that they knew or should have known that arresting him might result in a
constitutional violation. Id. In particular, he argues that all Defendants responded to the park to
investigate the 911 call, they were all present during the investigation, observed his behavior and

demeanor and heard his responses to Bigwood’s questioning, they knew that he disputed
Beckford’s and Jackson’s reports, and knew that he did not qualify for Baker Acting. Id. (citing
ECF No. [35] at ¶¶ 8-10, 18-34).6 Upon review and consideration, and in light of Watkins I, the
Court agrees with Plaintiff that he has stated a sufficient claim against Officers Yopps and Ramos
and that they are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time.
ii. Sgt. Bigwood
Defendant Bigwood asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity regarding the Fourth
Amendment claim because he was authorized to take Plaintiff to an appropriate mental facility
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1). He adds that “[t]o defeat qualified immunity, [Plaintiff’s]

factual allegations must demonstrate that reasonable officers—possessing the same knowledge as
the defendants—could not have believed that [Plaintiff] appeared to meet the criteria for
involuntary examination.” ECF No. [40] at 6 (quoting Bright v. Thomas, 754 F. App’x 783, 786
(11th Cir. 2018)). He notes that police officers are entitled to rely on victim statements and

6 Plaintiff requests in his Response that, “if this [C]ourt finds that the facts are insufficient to sustain
a claim against Yopps and Ramos, he be allowed to amend his Complaint to more clearly state
facts regarding “Yopps and Ramos’ presence and observation of their and Bigwood’s investigation
of the 911 call that was headed by Bigwood[.]” ECF No. [43] at 9. The Court declines Plaintiff’s
invitation for leave to amend because it is procedurally improper. See Cita Tr. Co. AG v. Fifth
Third Bank, 879 F.3d 1151, 1157 (11th Cir. 2018). Further, the Court notes that it previously
explained to Plaintiff that requesting leave in this manner is improper when it rejected an identical
request in response to the previous motion to dismiss. See Watkins v. Bigwood, No. 18-CV-63035,
2020 WL 1166720, at *5 n.6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2020).
eyewitness accounts, and that pursuant to Bright, 754 F. App’x 783, which he characterizes as
instructive, Bigwood’s actions were justifiable. Id. at 7. He further maintains that the Amended
Complaint fails to allege facts reflecting that his reliance on Beckford and Jackson’s reports was
unreasonable, id., Plaintiff in fact possessed two knives even though he denied waiving at knife,
id. at 8, and Plaintiff volunteered his prior trespass history to Bigwood for singing the anti-gay

song at another park. Id. In Bigwood’s view, Plaintiff “offers no sound explanation” for why
Bigwood’s decision to “credit the victims’ reports” “notwithstanding Plaintiff’s denials” was
unreasonable under the circumstances and based upon information known to Bigwood at the time.
ECF No. [46] at 3.
Plaintiff, in response, contends that Bright is materially distinguishable, Beckford’s report
that he was waiving a knife while singing was not corroborated, Bigwood requested Plaintiff to
sing the song for him because he wanted to hear the lyrics, Plaintiff only informed Bigwood about
the April 2014 incident at another park because Bigwood “had his facts wrong” as that incident
did not involve violence, and he only expressed his conspiracy beliefs that his detention was a

retaliatory arrest “after Bigwood decided to arrest him for the purpose of Baker Acting him because
[Bigwood] knows there was no probable cause to arrest or Baker Act him.” ECF No. [43] at 3-6.
In Bright, a pro se plaintiff sued several police officers under § 1983 for involuntarily
committing him for a psychiatric evaluation. 754 F. App’x at 784. According to the complaint,
after plaintiff complained about poor customer service at a restaurant, restaurant employees
assaulted him by throwing hot grease at his face and punching him. Id. He then called the police
to report the attack. Id. Upon arriving at the scene, the police heard different versions of events
from plaintiff and the employees, including the employees’ collective story that plaintiff was the
instigator and had hit two employees, and that the employees were defending themselves. Id.
Sometime thereafter, while the police were present, plaintiff grabbed one of the employees by the
waist, which prompted the officers to restrain plaintiff and take him to a nearby hospital under the
Baker Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.463. Id. Plaintiff, in response, filed his civil rights complaint.
The district court ruled that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity on
plaintiff’s false arrest claim under § 1983. Id. at 785. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel held

that based on the complaint’s factual allegations, the officers had arguable probable cause to detain
and commit plaintiff under the Baker Act. Id. at 786. In this respect, “[w]hether an officer possesses
probable cause or arguable probable cause depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the
operative fact pattern.” Id. As alleged in the complaint, the police were called in response to a
physical altercation, the officers observed plaintiff with blood in his mouth and he “either had just
grabbed, or was still grabbing,” one of the employees. Id. Further, the employees “in concert” told
the officers that plaintiff instigated the altercation by attacking them. Id. Upon this factual
sequence, the panel concluded that the district court’s ruling “was correct” because the officers
were told by “multiple alleged victims or eyewitnesses that [plaintiff] attacked” the employees,

and upon hearing the employees’ version of events and “observing the surrounding
circumstances,” they could have believed that plaintiff met the criteria for involuntary examination
and that he might cause serious bodily harm to himself or others. Id. at 787-87.
The plaintiff, moreover, alleged “no facts that were known to the officers to suggest that it
was objectively unreasonable for them to believe the” employees even though he alleged the
officers “knew” the employees “were lying and that the employees’ version of events was
‘impossible, ridiculous, or even ludicrous.’” Id. at 787. Indeed, the complaint failed to allege “facts
explaining how the officers knew the employees were lying or why the employees’ version of
events was implausible.” Id. Importantly, the panel noted that even if the employees’ statement
and accusations alone were insufficient to provide arguable probable cause, the officers observed
plaintiff in a physical altercation after arriving at the scene. Id. at 788. This fact, coupled with the
consistent version of events told to the officers by the employees, could have led the officers to
have believed that plaintiff met the requirements for involuntary commitment. Id. at 788.
Returning to the instant case, and upon careful review and consideration, the Court agrees

with Plaintiff that Bright is distinguishable. As previously noted in Watkins I, Plaintiff alleges that
he remained at all times near his car; he denies acting aggressively toward Beckford and Jackson
or Defendants; he denies holding or waiving a knife; he alleges that Jackson was the aggressor and
that he ignored him; and according to the Complaint, Defendants saw nothing to the contrary. 797
F. App’x at 442. Unlike Bright, there was no underlying physical altercation, and the officers did
not observe any conflict in progress or have an objective reason to believe that Plaintiff was
violent. The April 2014 incident at another park, moreover, involved the same song but it did not
involve another patron or concerns about Plaintiff engaging in violent conduct. ECF No. [35] at ¶
28. To be sure, Beckford reported that Plaintiff waived a knife. However, Plaintiff explained to

Defendants that he was homeless and living out of his car. He also denied having taken any knives
out as he had not prepared breakfast at the time of the incident. Id. at ¶¶ 22-24. No factual
allegations were presented to demonstrate otherwise, and no facts show that there was a substantial
likelihood that Plaintiff would cause harm to himself or to others. Thus, while Bigwood could
consider Beckford’s reports in his investigation, the allegations in the Complaint, taken as true,
show that the “surrounding circumstances” and information known to Bigwood did not warrant
Baker Acting Plaintiff based on the prior 2014 incident or his “constant singing” of the anti-gay
song.
In light of the factual allegations raised and against the backdrop of Watkins I, the Court
concludes that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that an objective officer could not have
concluded reasonably that Plaintiff met the criteria for involuntary examination under the Baker
Act. Accordingly, Bigwood is not entitled to qualified immunity under Count I.
D. Qualified immunity – First Amendment claim

The crux of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim in Count II is that Defendants violated his
right to free speech by Baker Acting him for his singing and in retaliation for his lawsuits against
Lauderhill police officers. He alleges that there was no “valid, viable or reliable reasons or
evidence to justify involuntary examination and Baker Acting.” ECF No. [35] at ¶ 9.
Regarding this count, the Eleventh Circuit in Watkins I previously analyzed the initial
complaint’s First Amendment claim as follows:
To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show
that (1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) the defendant’s conduct adversely
affected his protected speech; and (3) a causal connection between the adverse
conduct and the protected speech. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2005). “A plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant’s allegedly
retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the
exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 1254.

Under the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s singing clearly constituted
protected speech. The “most basic” principle underlying the First Amendment’s
right to free speech is that the “government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790-91, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011). The
Supreme Court has recognized few exceptions to this broad protection only for
“well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,” including obscenity (i.e.,
sexual content), incitement of violence, and fighting words. Id. at 791, 131 S.Ct.
2729.

The lyrics of the anti-gay song involved in this case -- as distasteful and offensive
as they likely are to many people -- seem to fall within no exception to the First
Amendment’s protection. Although the song included references to violence,
nothing in the assumed facts establishes that Plaintiff was seeking to or was likely
to incite imminent violence toward homosexuals. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 448, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”). Nor did the song – objectively viewed in the context of
Plaintiff’s version of the facts – fit the narrow constitutional exception for “fighting
words”: His merely singing in an out-of-doors, public place, a recognized song that
has been available to the public to hear otherwise in a variety of ways, more than
60 feet away from the pertinent walkway for passersby, and without addressing any
particular person would be protected speech. For background, see Cohen v. Cal.,
403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (describing “fighting words”
as “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen,
are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction”; and concluding that the words “Fuck the Draft” written on a jacket
constituted no “fighting words” in part because the words were “clearly not
‘directed to the person of the hearer.’”).

About the second element, we have no trouble concluding that being taken into
custody for an involuntary mental examination is the kind of conduct that would
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his rights under the First
Amendment. (The practice of treating people who hold unpopular views as
mentally ill is not uncommon in this world and can readily be frightening.) Plaintiff
has also alleged sufficient facts from which a factfinder could infer a causal
connection between Plaintiff’s singing and his detention. Among the reasons
Sergeant Bigwood gave for determining that Plaintiff needed a mental examination
included Plaintiff’s “constant singing of the anti-gay song in parks” and Officer
Manchula’s previous encounter with Plaintiff on 17 April 2014: an incident that
also involved Plaintiff’s singing of an anti-gay song. Plaintiff has thus alleged
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for violation of his clear rights under the
First Amendment.

797 F. App’x at 443–44. Since that opinion was issued, the Eleventh Circuit has revisited
Plaintiff’s singing of the anti-gay song in the context of whether a park manager and park employee
were entitled to qualified immunity for an alleged First Amendment violation. See Watkins II, 799
F. App’x 659. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims in Watkins II arose from two incidents, in May 2013
and April 2014, in which he was removed and subsequently banned from a park after loudly and
repeatedly singing the anti-gay song at issue in the present case. Id. at 662. In analyzing the First
Amendment claims, the court ruled as follows:
We next turn to the grant of summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims
against [park manager] Finch and [park employee] Wishnoff. The district court
concluded both Finch and Wishnoff were entitled to qualified immunity because
they were acting within their discretionary authority and did not violate any clearly
established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have been
aware.
. . .

Here, the district court did not err in concluding that Finch and Wishnoff were
entitled to qualified immunity as to his First Amendment claims. Watkins does not
dispute that both Finch and Wishnoff were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority when they acted to have him removed and banned from the
park. As a result, to overcome qualified immunity, Watkins bears the burden to
demonstrate that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Gaines,
871 F.3d at 1208.

Watkins has failed to meet this burden for two reasons. First, Finch offered an
alternative, lawful basis for the decision to remove and ban Watkins from the park;
one based on Watkins’s conduct rather than the content of the song he chose to
sing. In a sworn declaration, Finch stated he had received complaints from other
park patrons and employees that Watkins had been screaming, yelling, or ranting
at them, and he discussed those complaints with the other employees, including
Wishnoff. Watkins failed to offer contrary evidence creating an issue of material
fact as to this asserted basis for his removal, one that does not implicate his First
Amendment rights, clearly established or otherwise.

Second, even assuming the content of Watkins’s speech—and not his disorderly
conduct—was the basis for his removal, a reasonable official could have believed,
under the circumstances of this case, that Watkins’s speech constituted unprotected
intimidation. The First Amendment does not protect “true threats,” which are
“statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.” See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48, 359–60, 123 S.Ct. 1536,
155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) (noting the First Amendment does not protect “true
threats,” including acts of “[i]ntimidation” where the speaker intends to place the
listener in fear of bodily harm or death).

The lyrics Watkins was singing advocated violence against gay people, and
Watkins admitted that he sang that song to deter gay people from being around him.
Under these specific circumstances, and given the ambiguity as to whether
Watkins’s speech was indeed protected, we cannot say that “every objectively
reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that the
official’s conduct did violate federal law when the official acted.” Vinyard, 311
F.3d at 1351; see also Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282–84 (11th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he preexisting law must give real notice of practical value to
governmental officials, considering the specific circumstances confronting them,
and not just talk of some generalized, abstract intellectual concept.”).
Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment as to Watkins’s
First Amendment claims.

Id. at 665-67 (footnotes omitted).
In light of these two decisions, Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that they
had “real notice of practical value” that detaining Plaintiff based on the anti-gay music would
violate clearly established law. ECF No. [40] at 9. They add that the Amended Complaint’s
allegations show that it “was not clearly established in December 2014 that Plaintiff’s detention
violated the First Amendment nor was it in retaliation for the content of Plaintiff’s speech.” Id. at
10. According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s denial that he had his knife out “is simply not credible,
based on the totality of the allegations.” Id. at 10. They conclude that Plaintiff’s “allegations about
the content of the song [he] was singing, coupled with the claims that the lyrics upset Beckford
and Jackson and their report that Plaintiff was simultaneously waiving a knife, clearly reflect that
a reasonable official could have believed that Plaintiff’s speech constituted unprotected
intimidation.” Id. at 11. Thus, they assert that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this
stage on Count II. Id.
Upon review and consideration, the Court disagrees. In Watkins I, the Eleventh Circuit held
that “[u]nder the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s singing clearly constituted
protected speech,” the lyrics “seem to fall within no exception to the First Amendment’s
protections,” and while the lyrics included violent references, “nothing in the assumed facts

establishes that Plaintiff was seeking to or was likely to incite imminent violence toward
homosexuals.” 797 F. App’x at 443. Indeed, the court noted that “merely singing in an out-of-
doors, public place, a recognized song that has been available to the public to hear . . . more than
60 feet away from the pertinent walkway for passersby, and without addressing any particular
person” did not constitute “fighting words.” Id. The court further explained that the prior
complaint’s allegations alleged sufficient facts for a factfinder to infer a causal connection between
Plaintiff’s singing and his detention. Id. at 444. The court also had “no trouble concluding” that
detaining a person for an involuntary mental examination would deter a person of ordinary fitness
from exercising his First Amendment rights. Id.
In Watkins II, by contrast, which involved a summary judgment posture, the record

established that Plaintiff was removed from the park because of disorderly conduct, including
“screaming, yelling, or ranting” at park patrons and employees, rather than the content of the song.
799 F. App’x at 666. Further, he was not involuntarily detained for a mental examination in that
incident. That court noted, additionally, that even if the content of his speech was the basis for his
removal in that case, under the “specific circumstances” of the case, a reasonable official could
have concluded that Plaintiff’s speech constituted “unprotected intimidation” as Plaintiff admitted
he sang the song to “deter gay people from being around him” and it was “ambig[uous] as to
whether Waktins’s speech was indeed protected[.]” Id. at 667.
Here, the factual record has not been developed. The Court, consequently, will not make

fact findings as to whether Plaintiff intended to engage in “unprotected intimidation” or whether
he waved a knife toward Beckford and Jackson during the incident, which allegations Plaintiff
denies. Plaintiff alleges that he was never violent or aggressive. He also alleges that he ignored
Jackson while he was singing his song, the song “was not directed at anyone” and “no one
complained or felt that it was directed at them.” Plaintiff denies that he told Bigwood that he hated
homosexuals. See ECF No. [35] at ¶¶ 14, 21, 24-25, 28, 32, 40, 41. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations
as true and construed in a light most favorable to him, the Court cannot conclude that qualified
immunity is appropriate.
Case No. 18-cv-63035-BLOOM/Valle

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, itis ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
1. The Motion, ECF No. [40], is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave, ECF No. [47], is DENIED AS MOOT.
3. Defendants shall file their respective Answers to the Amended Complaint no later than
May 12, 2020.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on April 30, 2020.

BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Eric Watkins
7990 Hampton Blvd
Apt. 110
North Lauderdale, FL 33068
Email: kemet121671.ew@ gmail.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10117643. Public record. Not legal advice.