# ANDERSON v. KIJAKAZI

> District Court, N.D. Florida · November 24, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10116517

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 24, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10116517

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine reasonableness of factual findings
- finding that the court must also consider evidence detracting from evidence on which the Commissioner relied

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL JEROME ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO. 1:20-cv-121-GRJ

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security1,

Defendant.
/

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff appeals from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”), denying his application for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) benefits for lack of disability under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). ECF No. 1. The Commissioner has
answered, ECF No. 17, and both parties have filed briefs outlining their
respective positions. ECF Nos. 24, 25. For the reasons explained below,
the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

1 In July of 2021, Dr. Kilolo Kijakazi was appointed Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. The Clerk must correct the docket accordingly.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Title XVI application on July 11, 2017, alleging a

disability onset date of January 4, 2016, due to high blood pressure and
heart problems. R. 170-81. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Alisa M. Tapia on February 19, 2019. See R. 12-24. On May 14,
2019, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since July 11, 2017 (the date Plaintiff applied for SSI). R. 17. The
ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: morbid

obesity, history of ischemic heart disease, and hypertension. Id. The ALJ
also found that these impairments, or a combination thereof, do not meet or
medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments. R. 18.

After careful review of the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with some
limitations: He can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; he can
occasionally kneel, crouch, crawl and climb ramps and stairs; and he

should occasionally avoid exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes,
odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. R. 19.
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. R. 22.
Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ

determined, relying upon the testimony from a vocational expert, jobs exist
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform,
such as cafeteria attendant, cleaner housekeeper, and folder. R. 24. In

light of these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been under
a disability, as defined in the Act, since July 11, 2017. R. 25.
The Appeals Council denied review. R. 1-3. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff asserts two related issues for review. First, Plaintiff says that the

ALJ erred by failing to develop the record with opinion evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s RFC. Second, because no opinion evidence as to Plaintiff’s RFC
exists in the record, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not ordering a

consultative examination before making the RFC determination.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). Substantial evidence

is more than a scintilla, i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create
a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the

conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d

580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have

reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds
that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision.
Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358
(11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole,

taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the
decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835,
837 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the court must scrutinize the entire record

to determine reasonableness of factual findings); Parker v. Bowen, 793
F.2d 1177 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that the court must also consider
evidence detracting from evidence on which the Commissioner relied).
However, the district court will reverse the Commissioner’s decision on

plenary review if the decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to
provide the district court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the
Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton v. Dep’t Health & Human

Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that can be expected to result in death, or has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42
U.S.C. §§ 416(I), 423(d)(1) (2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905 (2015).

The impairment must be severe, making Plaintiff unable to do his previous
work, or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national
economy. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511, 416.905–416.911.
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant has the burden of proving the
existence of a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. Carnes v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). First, if a claimant is

working at a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(b),
416.920(b). Second, if a claimant does not have any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limit his physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities, then he does not have a severe

impairment and is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Third, if a
claimant's impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, he is disabled. §§ 404.1520(d),

416.920(d). Fourth, if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from
doing past relevant work, he is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),
416.920(e)-(f). Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments (considering his RFC, age,

education, and past work) prevent him from doing other work that exists in
the national economy, then he is disabled. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
The burden of proof regarding the plaintiff’s inability to perform past

relevant work initially lies with the plaintiff. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996,
1002 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2001). The burden then temporarily shifts to the Commissioner to
demonstrate that “other work” which the claimant can perform currently

exists in the national economy. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2.2

2 In Doughty, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained the burden shifting
process as follows:

In practice, the burden temporarily shifts at step five to the Commissioner.
The Commissioner must produce evidence that there is other work
available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant
has the capacity to perform. In order to be considered disabled, the
claimant must then prove that he is unable to perform the jobs that the
Commissioner lists. The temporary shifting of the burden to the
Commissioner was initiated by the courts, and is not specifically provided
for in the statutes or the regulations.

Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2.
III. SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
Because Plaintiff’s appeal focuses on the ALJ’s treatment of the

evidence pertaining to his RFC, the Court’s discussion focuses on the
records the ALJ considered in making her RFC determination.
A. Medical Evidence

Prior to applying for SSI, Plaintiff presented to the emergency
department (“ER”) at Capital Regional Medical Center (“CRMC”) in
Tallahassee, Florida on three occasions between 2015 to 2016. See R.
271-286, 287-318, 319-339.3 At those visits, Plaintiff was diagnosed with

exacerbation of congestive heart failure, hypertension, and morbid obesity.
R. 273. Notwithstanding these diagnoses, Plaintiff has a history of chronic
noncompliance and continued to smoke 1/3 pack of cigarettes per day, as

he had done for 18 years. R. 296, 300. In August of 2016, an
echocardiogram showed Plaintiff’s heart had an ejection fraction (“EF”) of
20-25%. R. 293. Plaintiff also presented to the ER during this time frame,
complaining of swollen lower legs. R. 291-92. The swelling intensified

such that Plaintiff required hospitalization and surgery to prevent necrosis.
R. 296-98, 307-08.

3 During these visits, Plaintiff primarily complained about an ulcer on his foot and
swelling in his lower legs. See R. 272, 273, 293.
After Plaintiff applied for SSI, Plaintiff returned to the ER six times
from July 2017 to August 2018. Each time, Plaintiff was examined and

released as follows:
In July of 2017, Plaintiff complained of mild abdominal pain and
bilateral lower leg swelling, and he requested a refill for his hypertension

medication. R. 403-12, 405.
On August 30, 2017, Plaintiff complained of mild abdominal pain and
leg swelling. R. 380-89. He reported injuries sustained while doing heavy
lifting at work. R. 380, 382. On examination, Plaintiff’s left testicle was

swollen, and he had edema in his legs. R. 385-86. All other examination
findings were generally normal with no motor or sensory deficits. R. 386.
In February of 2018, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for

treatment for pneumonia and subsequently released. R. 517-23, 529-31,
537.
In April of 2018, Plaintiff complained of shortness of breath. R. 481-
87. Normal cardiovascular findings were noted at the time. R. 485.

In June of 2018, Plaintiff complained of shortness of breath, leg
swelling, and mild pulmonary congestion. R. 444-49, 465-67. An EF of 20-
25 percent was noted. R. 448.
In August of 2018, Plaintiff returned for a pacemaker check. R. 429-
32. During this visit, Plaintiff reported no symptoms related to his

pacemaker, yet he admitted that he continued to smoke cigarettes. R. 429.
On examination, Plaintiff had normal cardiovascular findings and was
diagnosed with mild cardiomegaly with no acute pathology. R. 426, 434 &

441. Plaintiff denied both chest pain and shortness of breath. R. 430.
At the initial review stage, the Agency decisionmaker determined that
there was insufficient evidence to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims, and thus found
that Plaintiff was not disabled. R. 70-76. The decisionmaker noted the

absence of any medical opinion from any medical source in the record and
found no RFC assessments associated with Plaintiff’s claim. R. 75. The
agency also concluded that a consultative examination was not required. R.

73.
Upon reconsideration, Dr. Thomas Lawhorn (“Dr. Lawhorn”), a state
agency physician, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical evidence and concluded the
claim should be closed due to insufficient evidence. R. 79-86. Dr. Lawhorn

did find, however, that Plaintiff’s hypertension and ischemic heart disease
were severe impairments, based on available records at the time. R. 84.
Dr. Lawhorn further noted that no medical opinion from any medical source

was present in the record, nor was there any RFC assessment associated
with Plaintiff’s claims. R. 85. Dr. Lawhorn further noted that attempts to
reach Plaintiff were unsuccessful and that Plaintiff had “failed to cooperate.”

R. 83. Dr. Lawhorn also determined that a consultative examination was
not required in this case. R. 82.
At the hearing level, additional evidence was provided, as

summarized by the ALJ. The new evidence included updated medical
records and Plaintiff’s testimony regarding both his work history and his
present symptoms.
B. Hearing Testimony

At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 48 years old. He was 6’6” tall
and weighed 425 pounds. R. 34. Plaintiff had a college degree in
accounting and lived at his deceased grandmother’s home. R. 36-37, 35.

Plaintiff reported past work as a manager, cashier, security guard and fast-
food worker. R. 37-46. At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by
counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that he had reviewed the record and
that he had no objections or additional submissions. R. 33. During the

hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel did not raise any issue regarding missing
evidence or the need to develop additional evidence. See R. 32-35, 56-59,
68-69.
Plaintiff testified at the hearing as follows: he experiences shortness
of breath and cannot lift twenty pounds, R. 47; his legs go numb while

sitting and he cannot sit for an eight-hour shift, R. 48; everything hurts all
day, R. 50; he can walk twenty to twenty-five feet before he becomes
winded, so he must sit three to five minutes before he can get up again, R.

53; he rides in an electronic cart at Walmart and sits on a stool in the
shower, R. 55-56; he can sit for fifteen to twenty minutes before he needs
to stretch his legs, R. 53; he lies down once or twice a day for an hour or
two to ease the swelling in his legs, R. 57; and that he must elevate his

legs above his heart for at least an hour or two every day, R. 57-58.
Plaintiff also testified that he continues to smoke seven to eight cigarettes
per day. R. 51.

The vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing. R. 59-69.
The VE testified that Plaintiff’s prior jobs were performed at a light
exertional level. R. 60. The VE thus opined that, given Plaintiff’s present
limitations, he still could return to his four prior positions as manager,

cashier, security guard, or fast-food worker. R. 61. The ALJ posited that,
were she to find no prior work, were there other jobs a person could
perform with Plaintiff’s limitations? R. 62. The VE affirmed that other jobs

in the national economy such as cafeteria attendant, cleaner/housekeeper,
and folder would apply. Id. Claimant’s counsel examined the VE as well.
R. 68-69. During that examination, the VE testified that work would be

precluded for an individual who must raise their legs over their waist for up
to two hours per day. R. 68-69.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Fourth Step: ALJ’s Assessment of Claimant’s RFC
At the fourth step, the ALJ must make an assessment of the
claimant’s RFC. Castle v. Colvin, 557 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam) (citing Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.

2004)). The RFC is an assessment, based on all relevant medical and
other evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to work despite his
impairment. Id. (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th

Cir.1997)). The claimant is responsible for providing medical evidence
demonstrating an impairment and how severe the impairment is during the
relevant time-period. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). If a claimant’s
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the Agency will

assess and make a finding about a claimant’s RFC “based on all the
relevant medical evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
A claimant who is seeking to establish a disability based on subjective

testimony of pain and other symptoms “must satisfy two parts of a three-
part test showing: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2)
either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged

pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can
reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Dyer v.

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
At the administrative hearing, the burden rests with the claimant to
prove that he is disabled. See Castle, 557 F. App’x at 853. “The ALJ has a
duty to develop the record where appropriate but is not required to order a

consultative examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence
for the ALJ to make an informed decision.” Id. (quoting Ingram v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In Castle, the district court, relying on Manso-
Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996),
concluded that the ALJ erroneously “played doctor” in assessing Plaintiff’s
RFC when he should have ordered a consultative examination instead.

The district court reached that conclusion because the record was devoid
of any objective medical evidence confirming the severity of Plaintiff’s
alleged knee pain. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. “Contrary to the district

court’s reasoning, the ALJ did not “play doctor” in assessing [Plaintiff’s]
RFC, but instead properly carried out his regulatory role as adjudicator
responsible for assessing [Plaintiff’s] RFC.” Castle, 557 F. App’x at 853

(citing and quoting from 20 C.F.R. § 1545(a)(3)). The Court of Appeals
explained that “the pertinent regulations state that the ALJ has the
responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC.” Castle, 557 F. App’x at

853. The Court also distinguished Castle from Manso-Pizarro, which had
ruled that an ALJ is not qualified to interpret raw data in a medical record.
Castle, 557 F. App’x at 854. The medical records at issue in Manso-
Pizarro were far more complicated than those at issue in the Castle case.

Id. Even the Manso-Pizarro Court noted an exception to its holding:
“’Where the medical evidence shows relatively little physical impairment, an
ALJ permissibly can render a commonsense judgment about functional

capacity even without a physician’s assessment.’” Castle, 557 F. App’x at
854 (quoting Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d at 854).
The Castle Court concluded that the ALJ in that case properly carried
out his regulatory role in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, and that the ALJ’s

RFC finding was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
B. Consultative Examinations & Full and Fair Record
In developing the record, the ALJ must order a consultative
examination or obtain medical evidence or expert testimony where the
record contains insufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed
decision. See Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). An

ALJ, however, is not required to order medical evidence to complete the
record unless the record establishes that supplementation is necessary to
enable the ALJ to render her decision. Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206

(11th Cir. 1988); Kelly v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1540, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985).
Additionally, a consultative examination may be required in situations
where the ALJ needs to resolve some conflict, ambiguity, or other
insufficiency in the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519(a)(2) (“When

we purchase a consultative examination, we will use the report from the
consultative examination to try to resolve a conflict of ambiguity if one
exists. We will also use a consultative examination to secure needed

medical evidence the file does not contain such as clinical findings,
laboratory tests, a diagnosis or prognosis necessary for decision.”),
404.1519a(b) (“A consultative examination may be purchased when the
evidence as a whole, both medical and nonmedical, is not sufficient to

support a decision on your claim.”).
Finally, “there must be a showing of prejudice before it is found that
the claimant’s right to due process has been violated to such a degree that

the case must be remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development
of the record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934–25 (11th Cir. 1995)). Prejudice

has been found when the record “has evidentiary gaps which result in
unfairness or ‘clear prejudice.’” Brown, 44 F.3d at 935 (quoting Ware v.
Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)).

C. ALJ’s RFC Finding Based on Fully and Fairly Developed
Record; No Consultative Examination Was Required

Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ discounted Dr. Lawhorn’s report
as unpersuasive, the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination
regarding Plaintiff’s RFCs. ECF No. 24 at 9-11. Plaintiff further contends
that remand is required because no opinion evidence exists in this record
to support the ALJ’s RFC determination. The Court concludes, however,
that a vast amount of objective medical evidence in the record, spanning
many years, provides substantial support for the ALJ’s RFC determination.

In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ followed the correct two-step
inquiry. First, the ALJ determined whether there was an underlying
medically determinable physical impairment that can be shown by medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s) in accordance with the

requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. In the case at hand, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments of ischemic
heart disease, hypertension and morbid obesity could reasonably be
expected to cause Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. R. 19. Second, the ALJ
evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s

symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit Plaintiff’s functional
capacity. Id. Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms

were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence or other evidence in
the record as discussed below. R. 20.
1. ALJ’s review of the objective medical evidence.
The ALJ reviewed all of Plaintiff’s visits to the ER on a number of

occasions over several years. Imaging of his heart during those visits
revealed only mild to moderate results. R. 20. Also, although an
echocardiogram in August of 2016 showed an EF of 20-25%, only mild

cardiomegaly was noted at the time. Id. Follow-up imaging in November of
2016 revealed no acute chest disease and dilated cardiomyopathy. Id.
Further, a chest x-ray and imaging taken on three occasions in 2018
revealed no acute cardiopulmonary pathology, only mild cardiomegaly. Id.

And, even though Plaintiff also complained, on occasion, of shortness of
breath, he generally denied symptoms such as orthopnea, palpitation,
dizziness, blurred vision, and syncopal attaches. Id.; see R. 465.

Moreover, several references to non-compliance with medication, cigarette-
smoking, and motorcycle riding are found in within the record. R. 21, 405,
429. Finally, Plaintiff’s cardiovascular screenings were generally normal

throughout the record with normal heart sounds, no murmur, and a normal
heart rate and rhythm. Id.
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the objective medical records did

not support Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of his symptoms.
2. ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s hearing testimony.
In looking at Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff

takes prescription medications and over the counter pain medication to
alleviate his symptoms, and that elevating his legs also helps. R. 20. The
ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “mild to moderate results do not correspond well

to the [Plaintiff’s] extensive allegations in this case.” Id. Also, despite
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his substantial exertional limitations, the
objective medical evidence revealed otherwise.4 For example, Plaintiff
reported injuries sustained while performing heavy lifting just one month

after he applied for SSI. See R. 380, 382. As to Plaintiff’s testimony that he
has been unable to work since January 2016, the record shows that

4 The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the medical
evidence in the record, and she further expressed doubt as to its veracity. R. 21.
Plaintiff’s heavy-lifting injury was sustained while he was at work at Mike’s
Bikes in August of 2017. Id. Finally, Plaintiff testified that he had not driven

in years because of his inability to sit for long periods of time. R. 21. Yet,
after the hearing, the ALJ observed Plaintiff “hop onto and drive away in
his- at least 800 pound- cruiser motorcycle.” Id. (emphasis in original).

3. ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Lawhorn’s opinion evidence.
In evaluating Dr. Lawhorn’s opinion evidence, the ALJ properly
applied the new medical regulations as Plaintiff applied for SSI after March
27, 2017. R. 21-22. The ALJ found Dr. Lawhorn’s conclusion that the

evidence in the record was insufficient to determine disability to be
unpersuasive. R. 22. That was because Dr. Lawhorn did not have access
to updated medical records and Plaintiff’s own testimony about his work

history and normal daily activities that were available at the hearing level,
along with the VE testimony. Id. The ALJ did, however, accept Dr.
Lawhorn’s finding that Plaintiff has severe impairments of hypertension and
ischemic heart disease as that finding was consistent with a 2016

echocardiogram and a 2017 chest X-ray. See R. 17.
So, after reviewing the objective medical evidence, the hearing
testimony, and Dr. Lawhorn’s report, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has
the RFC to perform light work subject to enumerated limitations (which is a
very low bar, indeed).

Upon careful review of the record in this case, this Court concludes
that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not pointed to any conflict in the record that

warranted a consultative examination,5 and Plaintiff has not demonstrated
any evidentiary gaps that result in unfairness or prejudice.
In sum, the ALJ had plenty of objective medical records regarding
Plaintiff’s medical conditions to make an informed decision as to his RFC.

See Castle 557 F. App’x at 854 (“Where the medical evidence shows
relatively little physical impairment, an ALJ permissibly can render a
commonsense judgment about functioning capacity even without a

physician’s assessment.”) (quoting Manso-Pizarro 76 F.3d at 17).
V. CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

5 It is worth noting once again that Dr. Lawhorn determined that a consultative
examination was not required in this case.
DONE AND ORDERED on the 24th day of November 2021.
s/Gary R. Jones

GARY R. JONES
United States Magistrate Judge

.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10116517. Public record. Not legal advice.