# Lenoir v. Love

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 5, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115691

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 5, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115691

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming directed verdict in favor of officers in their official capacities where the municipality was also a named defendant to avoid redundancy and confusing the jury

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

REX D. LENOIR,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Case No. 3:23-cv-1476-HES-JBT
PHILIP V. LOVE, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Plaintiff Rex D. Lenoir, a detainee at the Duval County Jail, initiated
this action on November 18, 20238, by filing a pro se Complaint for Violation of
Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Lenoir names as
Defendants: (1) Philip V. Love; (2) Sheriff Mike Williams; (8) Nicholas A.
Theilacker; (4) Joshua A. Rodriguez; and (5) Otto H. Bottin. Complaint at 2—4.
His allegations appear to arise from a June 14, 2021 arrest, during which he
asserts Defendants used suggestive identification procedures, illegally
searched him, and used excessive force. See id. at 5-6.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.! See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (llth Cir, 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)@) dismissals should
only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims
‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
judges are all too familiar.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1849 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears
that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the
PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

1 Lenoir has neither paid the filing fee nor filed an application to proceed as a
pauper. As such, for purposes of the Court’s required screening, the Court will assume
he intends to proceed as a pauper.

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.8d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.8d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.8d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (lth Cir. 2011) @er curiam); Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under
Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1988 action, a plaintiff must show
“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and □

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306
n.10 (ith Cir. 2007).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
‘contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

"28 gunvive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
644, 570 (2007),

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary|,]”
the complaint should “give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 656 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to
include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 872 F.8d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration
omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions[,]”’which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Lenoir’s pro se
allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

y. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.8d at 709).
Here, Lenoir’s Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim. As to
Defendants Love, Theilacker, and Bottin, his claims are conclusory in nature

and devoid of facts that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference
that they violated his rights. For instance, Lenoir alleges that Theilacker
“surpass[ed] the mandates of Florida’s stop and frisk law by placing his hands
inside of [Lenoir’s] pockets during a ‘pat down’ for weapons,” Complaint at 5,
but he fails to describe the context of the search. As such, Lenoir does not
plausibly establish that the search was unreasonable and amounted to a
constitutional violation. See United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 997 □□□□□
Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“When an officer reasonably believes that a suspect
threatens his safety or the safety of others, he may search the suspect and seize
concealed objects that he reasonably believes may be weapons or other
instruments of assault.”). As to Love and Bottin, he merely asserts that Love
“swlore] falsely to violations of Fla. Stat. Law” and employed a “suggestive”
identification procedure, Complaint at 5, while Bottin “smash[ed] [Lenoir’s]
nose into a Jacksonville Sheriffs Office patrol car,” id, at 6. Lenoir again
provides minimal facts to support his allegations. Without more, his
allegations are conclusory in nature and fail to state a claim for relief.
Lenoir sues the remaining Defendants—Rodriguez and former Sheriff
Williams—in their official capacities only. The purpose of suing a government
official in his or her individual capacity is to impose personal liability for

actions taken under color of state law. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v.
Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.8d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Kentucky v, Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). Suing a government
official in an official capacity, on the other hand, is an alternative way to assert
a claim against the entity he or she represents, which in this case would be the
Sheriff, or more appropriately, the County. Id. Since Lenoir sues Sheriff
Willams in his official capacity, the official-capacity suit against Rodriguez is
duplicative and should be dismissed, See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d
764, 776 (ith Cir. 1991) (affirming directed verdict in favor of officers in their
official capacities where the municipality was also a named defendant to avoid
redundancy and confusing the jury); see also C.P. by and through Perez v.
Collier Cnty,, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1091 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (dismissing similar
claims).3 The Court will consider Sheriff Williams’ official capacity liability in
the context of those cases discussing county and municipal liability under
§ 1988.

3 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
Corp., 371 F.3d 1805, 1810 (11th Cir, 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).

To the extent that Lenoir seeks to hold Duval County through former
Sheriff Williams vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of the employees
responsible for Lenoir’s alleged injuries, Lenoir has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has soundly
rejected the theory of respondeat superior as a basis for liability in § 1983
actions. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead,
a county or municipality may be liable in a § 1983 action “only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex rel.
Estate of Tessier, 402 F.3d at 11165 (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must
establish that an official policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving
force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
693-94. “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or
created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on
behalf of the municipality.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488,
489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to
“distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Grech v. Clayton
Cnty., 335 F.8d 1326, 1329 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quotation omitted),

Indeed, municipal liability arises under § 1983 only where “‘a deliberate choice
to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’ by city
policymakers.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting
Pembaur v, Cincinnati, 475 U.S, 469, 483-84 (1986)). A municipality will
rarely have an officially-adopted policy that permits a particular constitutional
violation, therefore, in order to state a cause of action for damages under
§ 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the municipality has a custom
or practice of permitting the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330; McDowell
v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1288, 1289 (ith Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit has
defined “custom” as “a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes
on the force of law” or a “persistent and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d
at 489,
In some circumstances, “the failure to provide proper training may fairly
be said to represent a policy for which the city may be held liable if it actually
causes injury.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Failure to train can lead to
municipal liability “only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees
in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its
inhabitants [such that the failure to train] can be properly thought of as a city
‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 388-89 (alteration

added). Thus, in order to assert such a claim, a plaintiff must “present some
evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a
particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any
action.” Gold v, City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1850 (11th Cir. 1998), The
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “without notice of a need to train or
supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable as a matter of law
for any failure to train or supervise.” Id. at 1851. Indeed, “the need for such
training must be plainly obvious to [County] decisionmakers,” such as where
there is “evidence of a history of widespread prior abuse.” Wright v. Sheppard,
919 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990) (alteration added); see also Rocker v. City
of Ocala, 355 F. App’x 312, 314 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), Here, Lenoir
alleges that Sheriff Williams was “complicit in all violations committed by his
officers . . . [because he] was responsible for the training and conduct of his
subordinates.” Complaint at 5. His allegations are conclusory at best. He
neither pleads facts suggesting that the alleged constitutional violations
resulted from a failure to train, nor that Sheriff Williams would know of a need
to train or supervise, Therefore, this case will be dismissed without prejudice
to Lenoir’s right to refile his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with factual

10

allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief against a proper defendant if
he elects to do so.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2, The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case
without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this □□□ day of |
April, 2024.

LL. Lb
Jrfited Statés District Judge

Jax-9 3/28
Rex D, Lenoir, #2021012338

11 .

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115691. Public record. Not legal advice.