# Blazejowski v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (St. Johns County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 27, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115676

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 27, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115676

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’
- holding that the state court has the inherent power “to revoke an order of probation, the term of which has not yet commenced, should the court determine that the defendant probationer has been guilty of misconduct occurring subsequent to the entry of the order of probation”
- stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made’

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TAWNY BLAZEJOWSKI,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:20-cev-1386-HES-JBT
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Tawny Blazejowski, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).! Blazejowski proceeds on an Amended Petition
(Doc. 5). In the Amended Petition, Blazejowski challenges a 2014 state court
(St. Johns County, Florida) judgment of conviction for three counts of threats

or extortion, four counts of aggravated stalking, and one count of false report
of child abuse, abandonment or neglect. See Amended Petition at 1.
Blazejowski raises ten grounds for relief. Id. at 5-55. Respondents submitted a

1 For all pleadings and exhibits filed in this case, the Court cites to the
document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.

Response to the Amended Petition (Response; Doc. 13). They also submitted
exhibits. See Docs. 13-1 through 13-4. Blazejowski filed a brief in reply (Reply;
Doc. 14) with exhibits (Docs. 14-1 through 14-3). This action is ripe for review.

II. Factual and Procedural History
The following facts are taken from Blazejowski’s initial motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule
3.850 Motion):
September 2012
This case began when [Blazejowski] and her ex-
fiancé, Mr. Joseph Good, ended their relationship on
September 24th, 2012. ([Blazejowski] then
immediately began firing off a series of harassing
emails. The initial blast of emails contained photos of
them together as a couple. The emails were first sent
from her account (fl.law.ratb@gmail.com) to his email
account at home (joe.good1265@comcast.net) and at
work (cjmxg@allstate.com). But then, [Blazejowski]
hijacked Mr. Good’s account with Yahoo
(joe.good1265@yahoo.com), changed the password,
and sent out over a dozen pornographic emails to
company executives at his work.
She also emailed Mr. Good photos that were
secretly taken inside his residence, photos of him
undressed, a photo from Probation Plus, and a photo
of a shovel stuck in the ground. She then returned to
his Yahoo account, forwarded photos of him undressed
to company executives at his work, removed her phone
and email information, and then completed the late
night crusade by sending out arrest photos of his ex-
wife, Ms. Beth Love.
The next morning, Tuesday the 25th of
September, began with a barrage of emails from an
account created in the likeness of his hijacked Yahoo

account. The fake account was created with Mr. Good’s
name and a nearly identical address
(joegood1265@yahoo.com). At first the emails were
passive aggressive and_ sarcastic (“HAVE A
WONDERFUL DAY”). They then quickly turned to
“sex and porn at work.”
By September 28th, [Blazejowski] had
researched and outline[d] a plan for revenge with a
goal of getting Mr. Good fired from his job at All State.
A search of [Blazejowski’s] computer, which was seized
during the search warrant, revealed a guide on “HOW
TO GET SOMEONE FIRED” and how to “GET
REVENGE ON YOUR EX.”
October 2012
[Blazejowski] then began harassing Mr. Good’s
neighbor and co-worker at All State, Mrs. Jennifer
Robor. On Monday the 15th of October, Mrs. Robor
received mail hand addressed to her husband with no
return information. The envelope contained a typed
letter that alleged she was having an affair with Mr.
Good while they were at work. Having never met or
spoken to [Blazejowski], Mrs. Robor still suspected
that the letter came from [Blazejowski]. [Blazejowski]
denied sending the letter when she was questioned by
Deputy Bagby. She also claimed that she didn’t know
Mrs. Robor or where she lived, and “if Joe though[t]
she was harassing him to prove it.”
By Thursday the 18th of October, [Blazejowski]
also began harassing Mr. Good’s supervisor at All
State, Mr. Scott Thomas. She sent him an email at
8:52 am under the disguise that it was from Mr. Good's
ex-wife: “Beth Love” at owjamcab@yahoo.com. The
subject was “JOE GOOD” and it warned:
YOU BETTER PUT A STOP TO JOE GOOD
FUCKING MY WIFE AT WORK!!! IF YOU
DON’T DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT I WILL
COME IN THERE PERSONALLY AND TAKE
CARE OF IT MYSELF! IF MY WIFE DOES
NOT SUE ALLSTATE FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT THEN I WILL AND THEN I

WILL DIVORCE HER AND [TAKE]
EVERYTHING FROM HER.
The message appears as though it came from Mr.
Matthew Robor, but evidence reveals that the account
owjamcab@yahoo.com was created early that morning
from an IP address registered to [Blazejowski]
(208.96.177.239 -- from: 10/06/12 to 10/20/12).
[Blazejowski’s] harassment then escalated when
she had Mr. Good falsely arrested for domestic battery
on the night of October 18th. Late that night, with a
bloody shirt and face on, [Blazejowski] drove to the
Sheriffs Office from her house (1307 Fireside Court,
St. Augustine) and reported that Mr. Good hit her in
the face. She painted a story for Deputy Galentine that
she was the victim of a jealous and abusive ex-
boyfriend. She included the claim that he “seems to be
having an affair at work and he blames me for her
spouse finding out when I don’t know her.” Due to the
physical evidence, Mr. Good was arrested at home that
night by Deputy Romer. He later posted bond after
First Appearance at the St. John’s County Jail.
Later that night, Friday the 19th of October at
11:35 pm, [Blazejowski] sent another email to Mr.
Thomas under the disguise of “Beth Love” at
owjamcab@yahoo.com. The email warned “JOE GOOD
ARRESTED” with a booking photo and message:
“NOT AS INNOCENT AS HE WANTS YOU TO
BELIEVE OR AS HE TELLS.”
Five days after the initial arrest, on Wednesday
the 24th of October, [Blazejowski] returned to the
Sheriffs Office and reported that Mr. Good violated
the no contact order in the domestic battery case. She
claimed that he called her at 12:48 pm from a blocked
number and said: “if you don’t drop the charges you
will regret it and your next beating will be worth it.”
[Blazejowski] signed a sworn affidavit and warrant
affidavit, but a second arrest was not made.
On the following day, October the 25th,
[Blazejowski] petitioned for and was granted a
temporary injunction against Mr. Good in St. Johns
County Case No. 2012-1712DR. [Blazejowski] used the

arrest for domestic battery and the alleged violation of
no contact as grounds for the injunction.
November 2012
Within a month after their breakup,
[Blazejowski] had obtained an injunction against Mr.
Good, placed his job in jeopardy, and had him falsely
arrested. She then returned to the Sheriffs Office on
the 1st of November to report that Mr. Good was now
violating the no contact order in both the domestic
battery case and the injunction case. In a sworn
affidavit, she claimed that Mr. Good left two
threatening notes on her cars in the middle of the
night. The first note read:
I CAN’T BELIEVE YOU’RE DOING THIS TO
US. YOU ONLY HAVE A COUPLE MORE
DAYS TO CHANGE YOUR MIND BEFORE I
DO IT FOR YOU WITH MY DICK IN YOUR
MOUTH AND MY HANDS AROUND YOUR
NECK!!! The second note read: “STOP YOUR
MOTHER BEFORE I STOP HER AND YOU
DON'T HAVE ONE!!!
[Blazejowski] further alleged that she looked outside
when her dogs started barking and she saw a Jeep
similar to his leaving the scene. No arrest was made.
On the 26th of November, [Blazejowski] sent an
email to local football coaches and the FHSAA
advising them of Mr. Good’s arrest for domestic
battery. The email was nearly identical to the one that
[Blazejowski] sent to Mr. Thomas in October.
[Blazejowski] then began directing threats to
Mr. Good’s daughter, Ms. Caroline Good. The
Gainesville Police Department reported that they
received a tip from Crime Stoppers on November 28th
that Ms. Good was selling illegal drugs out of her dorm
room on the University of Florida campus. A search
revealed no drugs or contraband. Writings in a
notebook later seized from [Blazejowski] show that she
was likely the source of the tip.

December 2012
Since the reports in St. Johns County were not
resulting in arrests, [Blazejowski] then began making
reports in Duval County. On Friday the 14th of
December, [Blazejowski] went to the Avenues Mall in
Jacksonville and reported to Deputy Bialkoski that
she received a call from a female who said: “Stupid
bitch, Joe still has a handgun, he showed it to me, and
he wants you to know that he plans on using it on you
if you continue to ask for the injunction.” [Blazejowski]
alleged the call could have come from Mr. Good's
friend, Mrs. Chantal Allain. According to the report,
patrol efforts were suspended due to lack of suspect
information.
Early the next morning, Saturday the 15th, Mr.
Good received an email that a subscription for
“Maxim” magazine was ordered for Miss Joe Good at
Blackhawk Drive. The address belonged to Mrs.
Allain. On Monday the 17th of December, a
subscription to “Black Men” and “Penthouse”
magazines were ordered for Miss Joe Good at Bartram
Village Drive. That address belonged to Ms. Love.
After attorneys for Mr. Good filed an alibi
defense in the domestic battery case, the State
Attorney’s Office [fliled an Announcement of No
Information on Tuesday the 18th in St. Johns County
Case No. 2012-02461MM.
Following a contested hearing on Wednesday
the 19th, [Blazejowski] was granted an injunction for
one year against Mr. Good in Case No. 2012-1712DR.
On Thursday the 27th of December, Ms.
Caroline Good reported to the Jacksonville Sheriffs
Office that someone mysteriously placed a container
with drugs and paraphernalia in her vehicle while she
was at the Avenues Mall. Writings in notebooks seized
from [Blazejowski] indicate that she was planning a
very similar set up.
On Monday the 31st of December, [Blazejowski]
returned to Duval County in another attempt to get
Mr. Good arrested for a violation of injunction. This
time she reported that she was at Dicks Sporting

Goods and returned to find a card with a photo from
Mr. Good. Mr. Good was questioned at work and
coworkers confirmed his alibi. Mr. Good reported that
he had resorted to getting a new phone that could
track his movements through GPS. [Blazejowski] was
later advised about making a false report, and in
response she reported that she has gotten nowhere
filing charges with St. Johns County but maybe she
will get somewhere with Duval County.
January 2013
On January the 11th, the Jacksonville Aviation
Authority received a Crime Stoppers tip that Mr. Good
was trafficking illegal drugs from Washington DC to
Florida. The tip included a photo and indicated that he
would have a travel companion. Two days later, as
they returned from their trip, Mr. Good and Ms.
Mariela Murphy were detained in the airport. A
search revealed no illegal drugs. Mr. Good advised
that he received a message from Yahoo while he was
out of town that someone was attempting to recover
his account password and that [Blazejowski] may have
discovered that he was in DC because the two
previously shared an Expedia account. Text messages
on [Blazejowski’s] phone indicate that she had been
following Mr. Good around this time and that she
knew he was at the airport on the 10th with a female
companion.
On Wednesday the 16th of January, the Florida
Division of Insurance Fraud received an anonymous
report that Mr. Good was committing insurance fraud
with his ex-wife, Ms. Love. The “anonymous” report
came from [Blazejowski’s] email at
tlblaze6@hotmail.com.
A week later, on Wednesday the 23rd, Ms. Allain
reported to Deputy Romer that a red rose was sent to
her house with a card that read: “Jt was so good to hear
your voice again. I love you, Joe.” Mr. Good denied
sending the rose and card.

February 2013
[Blazejowski] then began harassing Mr. Good’s
new girlfriend, Ms. Mariela Murphy. On the 27th of
February, [Blazejowski] sent a harassing letter to Ms.
Murphy’s parents in California. The envelope had her
old address and it contained a photo of an undressed
lady with a letter proclaiming “MARIELA VERONICA
KAPLAN MURPHY GOOD A HO!!! Also on the 27th,
[Blazejowski] sent a harassing letter to Ms. Murphy’s
landlords. The handwritten envelope[] to Mr. and Mrs.
Duggan contained a typed letter warning:
The Turnberry neighborhood is _ seriously
concerned about your property at 280 Edge of
Woods Rd. This is a nice community and your
tenant is ruining tt and upsetting many families.
There have been countless complaints about the
late night teen parties thrown by her daughter
while she is out of town. These parties always
involve drugs and alcohol out in the open for
children to see. The most upsetting and what you
should be most concerned about is that she
constantly has her boyfriend Joseph Good who is
acriminal, recently arrested in St. Johns County
spend days at a time at the house. We also believe
that your property is in danger. Prior to living
with Mariela Murphy, Joseph Good dated a
women [sic] who was the victim of his jealous ex-
wife, Beth Ann Love who vandalized her home by
spray painting profanity all over [ ] her house
and then went to Turnberry and did the same to
his house on Paradise Pond Rd. Please verify this
though [sic] the neighborhood security company.
It won't be long before your property is targeted
and you both also become victims.
Writings in a notebook seized from [Blazejowski]
indicate that she authored the letters (“2/27/13 ...
mailed letter to her landlords faked handwriting on
envelope and did not handle anything with hands
uncovered’).
[Blazejowski] then turned to using crime
stoppers as a medium for harassment and threats. On

the 27th of February, she called Crime Stoppers of
Northeast Florida to report that Mr. Good was
sexually molesting certain minor children. The
anonymous report mentioned Mrs. Allain and claimed
that abuse had been ongoing since September 2012.
The report was updated on March 1st to include that
“the suspect got a new phone, so the pictures might be
on the old phone or on his computer.” [Blazejowski]
documented in a red notebook that on “02/27/13:
Reported Joe... by calling crime stoppers.”
March 2013
[Blazejowski] began March with a blitz of more
false reports made anonymously through crime
stoppers. On March Ist, [Blazejowski] made an
anonymous report to First Coast Crime Stoppers that
Mr. Good and Mr. Thomas were storing child
pornography on their work computers and using
women to obtain access to children. The tip also
implicated Ms. Murphy, Mrs. Allain, Mrs. Robor, and
Ms. Good. An investigation by All State and the
Jacksonville Sheriffs Office revealed that the tip was
unfounded.
Also on the lst of March, [Blazejowski] made
widespread accusations to the National Center for
Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) about child
molestation and pornography. She named six children
as victims, and falsely implicated Mr. Good, Mr.
Thomas, Mrs. Robor, H.G. (a minor), Ms. Good, and
Ms. Murphy as suspects. The narrative of the NCMEC
tip is identical to the First Coast Crime Stoppers tip
also sent that day. Records reveal that the NCMEC tip
was made from an IP address (208.96.17795)
registered to [Blazejowski].
On March the 2nd, [Blazejowski] anonymously
made an additional crime stopper report that Mr. Good
was molesting a minor child that was also threatening
suicide. The tip implicated Ms. Murphy.
On March the 4th, Deputy Kelly responded to
the St. Augustine Outlet Mall regarding a threat to
kill [Blazejowski] allegedly made by “Mariela.”

[Blazejowski’s] coworker at the Disney Store, Ms. Rose
Carey, reported that she received a call from “Mariela”
warning that her and Joe were coming down there to
kill [Blazejowski]. Ironically, [Blazejowski] arrived
five minutes later. Per [Blazejowski], the Sheriffs
Office responded to her house earlier that day in
reference to a report made by Ms. Murphy. Both Mr.
Good and Ms. Murphy denied any involvement. No
arrests were made but affidavits were obtained with
Mr. Good’s new number and Ms. Murphy’s number
listed. Writings from the red notebook indicate this
was another fabrication by [Blazejowski].
Now armed with their new contact information,
[Blazejowski] engaged in a campaign of fabricated
violations of injunctions by repeatedly spoofing her cell
phone. On Monday the 11th, [Blazejowski] met with
SJSO Deputy Banks at McDonalds on State Road 16
to report that Ms. Murphy and Mr. Good were
harassing her. [Blazejowski] alleged that she received
four calls from around 8:20 pm. She alleged that on the
third call a woman said “don’t fall asleep tonight” and
on the fourth call a man said “coming for you.”
[Blazejowski] claimed that she recognized Mr. Good’s
voice on the fourth call. She additionally provided an
email from “Mariela Murphy” at
marielaymurphy@gmail.com with the subject “Watch
your back” and message:
Working tonight? LOL You're all so stupid.
ESPECIALLY THE COPS!! They will never
figure out what we did but you will take the fall.
Cops and gates won't protect you. We know where
you are at all times and if we don’t get you at
work Joe knows how to get into your house. Joe
wants me to be Mrs. Good but he says we cant
move on until you arc dead. Therefore, when you
least expect it we will get you and no one will ever
find your body. Kiss your kids goodbye!!!
No arrests were made. Records’ show that
marielaymurphy@gmail.com was_ created that
morning from an IP address (173.8.61.53) registered to
the Bartram Trail Library.
10

Three days later, on the 13th of March,
[Blazejowski] reported to Deputy Kelly that she
received 13 calls from 315-2997 and on the final call at
11:20 pm, Mr. Good left a voicemail stating, “J will call
you later.” Deputy Kelly arrested Mr. Good that night
for a violation of injunction because the number
depicted on ([Blazejowski’s] phone matched the
number on Mr. Good’s affidavit from March the 4th.
By 1:56 am on the morning of the 14th, Mr. Good was
booked into the St. Johns County Jail for a second
time.
Within an hour of second false arrest,
[Blazejowski] registered a group of people for the
Florida Victim Information and Notification Everyday
(VINE) service so that they would be notified of Mr.
Good’s arrest and release. Included on the list was Mr.
Good (via cjmxg@allstate.com), Ms. Good, Ms.
Murphy, Mr. Duggan, Mr. Thomas _ (via
cdc5b@allstate.com), president@allstate.com, and
various St. Johns County school administrators or
coaches. Evidence seized from [Blazejowski] includes
a checklist of the people that were subscribed for the
service.
After Mr. Good posted bond, [Blazejowski] called
the Sheriffs Office on the evening of the 14th of March
to report another violation of injunction. This time
Deputy Wright responded to [Blazejowski’s] house
around 9:34 pm and collected a sworn affidavit from
her stating that:
At approximately 16:26 tonight I received a
phone call from (904) 315-2997. I did not answer
the call but a voice mail was left by a voice I
recognize as my ex-fiancé Joseph Good saying
"You will die for making me go to jail.”
[Blazejowski] added that she received notice from the
jail that Mr. Good had been released prior to the
threatening message. Mr. Good was not arrested due
to an ongoing investigation in this case by the Sheriff's
Office.
[Blazejowski] then went to Duval County the
following day and reported the same alleged violation
11

of injunction. On Friday the 15th, [Blazejowski]
advised Deputy Bennick that she listened to a call at
11:30 am while in Duval County at an appointment.
She elaborated that she received the call on the 14th
at 16:27 hours while she was in Duval County, and
further that it was made by Mr. Good while he was at
work in Duval County. The alleged voicemail stated:
“You will die for making me stay the night in jail.” JSO
did not make an arrest that day.
Phone records reveal that [Blazejowski]
fabricated the alleged violations of injunction by
spoofing her cell phone on the 11th, 18th, and 14th.
Records from Sprint for [Blazejowski] show that: (a)
five calls were received on the 11th from Ms. Murphy’s
phone between 19:58 hours and 20:23 hours; (b) a total
of 18 calls were received on the 13th from Mr. Good’s
phone between 21:40 hours to 23:20 hours, and (c) one
call was received on the 14th from Mr. Good’s phone at
16:26 hours. Records from AT&T however prove that
in fact no calls were made by Ms. Murphy to
[Blazejowski] on the 11th and no calls were made by
Mr. Good to [Blazejowski] on either the 13th or 14th.
On the 17th of March, [Blazejowski] wrote a
letter to SJSO Commander Art May and Sheriff David
Shoar commending Deputy Galentine, Deputy Kelly,
Sergeant Tarbert, and Deputy Wright for their work.
In the letter she portrays herself as “a scared victim.”
On Wednesday the 20th of March, [Blazejowski]
reported another violation of injunction in Duval
County. [Blazejowski] reported to JSO Deputy Snead
that she received to [sic] voicemail messages from Mr.
Good stating that[] “You fucking cunt, I still have a
gun” and “I should have killed you when I had the
chance. Good thing it’s never too late.” [Blazejowski]
alleged that the calls came from his work phone (904-
223-2704) at 11:40 am and 11:43 am while she was in
Duval County. An arrest warrant was then issued at
the request of the State Attorney’s Office in Duval
County. On the following day, while he was at work in
Jacksonville, Mr. Good was falsely arrested for a third
time.
12

Records from Sprint for [Blazejowski] (392-
8423) show that two calls were made from Mr. Good’s
work phone (223-2704) on the 20th at 11:39 am and
11:42 am. Records from All State reflect that no calls
were made but records from AT&T reflect that four
calls were made. Notwithstanding the discrepancy in
the records, the recorded messages were clearly
computer generated and clearly not recognizable as
Mr. Good’s voice. The same messages were also
written in a red notebook used by [Blazejowski] to
organize and plan her attacks. Moreover, the notes
confirm that [Blazejowski] discovered a way to spoof
calls from his work phone “to get Joe fired.”
On Thursday the 28th, [Blazejowski] called in
an anonymous report to the Florida Department of
Children and Families regarding child neglect and
abuse by Mr. Good and his ex-wife, Ms. Love. Caller
ID displayed [Blazejowski’s] phone number (392-
8423). An investigation by DCF proved that the tip
was unfounded. At the direction of Detectives with the
Sheriffs Office, DCF confirmed through a controlled
call that [Blazejowski] made the “anonymous” report.
On the 31st of March, [Blazejowski] registered
Mr. Good for multiple adult dating websites online.
[Blazejowski] also created a fake Facebook account for
Mr. Good. Records from Facebook reveal that
[Blazejowski] used her cell phone (892-8423) to verify
the account and accessed the account from an IP
address (208.96.177.95) registered to her house.
During this time, Mrs. Robor received a message from
the account with a “profile” of Mr. Good that contained
a copy of his All State business card, booking photos
from his false arrests, a phot[o] of him undressed, and
the slogan “you are in good hands when you get fucked
Joe Good.” A search of [Blazejowski’s] computer
exposed how she created the “profile” that she later
posted online and mailed to various persons.
April 2013
On April the 2nd, [Blazejowski] made two more
unjustifiable complaints to Crime Stoppers of
13

Northeast Florida. The first tip (#W326-3262), made
at 12:52 am[] [w]las very similar to the one made a
month earlier in March because it again alleged that a
certain child was threatening suicide because she was
being sexually abused. The tip implicated both Mr.
Good and Ms. Murphy. The second tip (W326-3263),
made at 1:02 am, alleged that Mr. Good and Mrs.
Robor were engaged in pornographic photography of
children. Writings seized from [Blazejowski] reveal
that she made both of these false accusations.
Also on April the 2nd, [Blazejowski] circulated a
vulgar letter to Ms. Murphy, Ms. Allain, and Mr.
Good’s mother. The mailing had the same “profile”
that was sent to Mrs. Robor via Facebook along witha
list of adult websites that it could be found on.
Also on the 2nd, [Blazejowski] sent Ms. Murphy
a peculiar letter warning:
“HI BITCH STOP MESSING W/ Beth She
actually wants to make peace w you! LOL Your
beef is with me Not her Leave her alone OR
DEAL WITH ME. You R SO STUPID! Do U
Really think that he will stay w you? Only For
the sex ... Stay away from my friend. Or else
“Your Friend” NOT!’
Two days later, on the 4th of April, [Blazejowski]
continued the harassment with a malicious letter to
Ms. Murphy’s ex-husband at his work. The letter was
filled with accusations of incest, child abuse, child
pornography, and child suicide. Later that evening,
[Blazejowski] registered Mrs. Robor for multiple adult
websites and adult store catalogs.
The terror caused by [Blazejowski] escalated on
Friday the 5th of April when she sent a second round
of threatening letters. The Defendant sent a letter to
both of Ms. Murphy’s parents in California with a
photo of a decomposing corpse and threat that:
“THIS IS WHAT [REDACTED] WILL LOOK
LIKE THE NEXT TIME MARIELA SEE’S HER
IF SHE SEE’S OR EVENT TALKS TO JOE
GOOD ONE MORE TIME!”

14

[Blazejowski] additionally sent a frightening letter to
Ms. Murphy’s landlord, Mr. Duggan, with the threat
that:
IF MARIELA MURPHY IS NOT OUT OF'
YOUR RENTAL PROPERTY WITHIN 80 DAYS
280 EDGE OF WOODS RD AND 229
PINEHURST POINT ST. AUGUSTINE, FL
382092 WILL BOTH BURN TO THE
GROUND!!!
[Blazejowski] also sent a letter to the corporate office
of All State warning that:
“SOME PEOPLE JUST SHOULDN'T LEAVE
THEIR EMAIL UP ON THEIR SCREEN AND
WALK AWAY FROM THEIR DESK. MAYBE
NOW YOU WILL SEE WHAT MANY HAVE
BEEN TRYING TO TELL YOU FOR SO LONG
ABOUT JENNY ROBOR AND JOE GOOD!!!
That day also included a fax sent by [Blazejowski] at
Office Depot to All State under the disguise that it was
“from Mariela Murphy to Jenny Robor.” Attached to
the fax was a string of fake emails that appear as if
they were secretly sent between Mr. Good and Mrs.
Robor.
Twelve days later, on the 17th of April,
[Blazejowski] was apprehended by the St. Johns
County Sheriffs Office as they executed a search
warrant at her home. Deputies seized an
overwhelming amount of evidence detailing
[Blazejowski’s] course of conduct in this case.
In [Blazejowski’s] house, Deputies located a red
college ruled “1 subject” notebook and a yellow “memo
book.” Among other things, the red notebook contained
a chronology of the fraudulent reports that she made
and the threatening letters that she sent from
February to April. The yellow memo book included
notes that prove [Blazejowski] created the death
threat letter that was sent to Ms. Murphy’s parents a
few days earlier (“send letter to Mariela’s step mother”
and “get picture of decomposed corpse’).
In [Blazejowski’s] car, Deputies discovered the
original fax she sent to All State two days earlier from
15

Office Depot. They also found a multicolored notebook
which verified that [Blazejowski] was trying to
engineer an aggravated stalking case against Mr.
Good (“space actions a month apart to show a pattern
of aggravated stalking’). The multicolored notebook
further verified that [Blazejowski] was attempting to
create “provable violations” that would get Mr. Good
arrested and fired from his job (“after all this make
sure to get a Duval judge change 1 yr. injunction to
permanent’).
In the end, [Blazejowski’s] actions caused Mr.
Good to be falsely arrested three times and then
wrongfully terminated from his job at All State after
more than 20 years there.
See Doc. 13-1 at 108-238.
On August 15, 2013, the State of Florida (State) charged Blazejowski by
amended information with three counts of threats or extortion (counts 1-3),
four counts of aggravated stalking (counts 4-7), and one count of false report of
child abuse, abandonment or neglect (count 8). See Doc. 13-1 at 6-7. On August
14, 2014, Blazejowski entered an open plea of no-contest to all eight counts.
See id. at 9-15. On October 10, 2014, the trial court sentenced Blazejowski to
nine years imprisonment followed by two years of community control and then
four years of probation on counts 1 through 3; five years imprisonment on count
4; and five years of probation on each of the remaining counts (counts 5-8). Id.
at 50-58. The trial court also entered an Order of Community
Control/Probation the same day, which set forth all of the conditions of

16

Blazejowski’s community control and probation. Id. at 58-66. Blazejowski did
not pursue a direct appeal.
On February 18, 2016, Blazejowski filed a motion for postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Id.
at 106-33. In the Rule 3.850 Motion, Blazejowski argued her trial counsel was
ineffective when he advised her to forego the State’s alleged plea offer of two
to three years imprisonment and instead enter an open no-contest plea. Id.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief on
July 21, 2017. Id. at 183-92. The Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) per
curiam affirmed the denial of relief on June 26, 2018, and issued the mandate

on July 20, 2018. Id. at 4838, 435.
In May 2018, while serving her prison sentence, Blazejowski was
charged with violating a special condition of the community control/probation
order that prohibited her from contacting the victims. Id. at 60-61, 475-77.
After conducting a violation of probation (VOP) hearing, the trial court revoked
Blazejowski’s community control/probation on counts 1 through 3 and
resentenced her to “serve fifteen (15) years in prison, concurrent on those
counts,” with the probationary sentences on counts 5 through 8 to “remain
unchanged.” Id. at 606-08, 611. Blazejowski appealed, see Doc. 13-2 at 164-211,
and on February 4, 2020, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed Blazejowski’s

17

judgment and sentence upon violation of probation, id. at 252. The Fifth DCA
issued the mandate on April 27, 2020. Id. at 285.
Blazejowski subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking
to disqualify the state court judge who presided over the VOP proceeding. See
Doc. 18-2 at 294-306. The Fifth DCA denied the petition on May 19, 2020. Id.
at 315.
On July 8, 2020, Blazejowski filed a successive Rule 3.850 motion
(Successive Rule 3.850 Motion) in which she raised three claims: (1) newly
discovered evidence; (2) sentence manipulation; and (8) use of false testimony
by the State. See Doc. 13-3 at 257-304. The postconviction court denied relief

on May 25, 2021. See Doc. 13-4 at 499-521. The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed
the denial of relief on September 21, 2021, id. at 523, and issued the mandate

on October 15, 2021, id. at 525.
While her Successive Rule 3.850 Motion was pending, Blazejowski filed

a petition for writ of certiorari, which she later amended. See Doc. 13-2 at 329-
61. On December 17, 2020, the Fifth DCA dismissed the amended petition after
Blazejowski failed to comply with the court’s order directing her to submit an
appendix in accordance with the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.220. Id. at 3638, 365.
Blazejowski filed the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December
2, 2020. See Doc. 1.
18

III. One-Year Limitations Period
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus.
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to
an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to
filing an application created by State
action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if
the applicant was prevented from filing by
such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional
right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate
of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

19

pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). As Blazejowski’s convictions and sentence became final
after the effective date of AEDPA, this habeas action is subject to the one-year
limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Respondents argue that this action is untimely as to the five grounds
raised in the Amended Petition that challenge the original 2014 judgment and
sentence. See Response at 10-11. As to those five grounds, Respondents
contend the one-year limitations period began to run from the date the original
2014 judgment and sentence became final. Id. Blazejowski disagrees, arguing
that all grounds raised in the Amended Petition are timely because she filed
this action within one year of the date her 2018 judgment after revocation of
probation became final. See Reply at 5.
“AEDPA’s statute of limitations runs from the date the judgment
pursuant to which the petitioner is in custody becomes final, which is the date
both the conviction and sentence the petitioner is serving become final.”
Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he
judgment that forms the basis of the habeas petition is the one that places the
petitioner in custody.” Id. at 1292; Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849
F.3d 1321, 1825 (11th Cir. 2017) (‘The judgment that matters for purposes of
section 2244 is the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.”)

20

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the Court looks to the
judgment that places Blazejowski in custody. Here, that judgment is the 2018
violation of probation judgment. Though that judgment stems from the 2014
original judgment and sentence, the sentence that authorizes Blazejowski’s
current detention is the sentence imposed in 2018 for violation of probation.
See Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292 (stating that “the judgment to which AEDPA
refers is the underlying conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes
the petitioner’s current detention”); see also Reilly v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 21-13668, 2023 WL 7179321, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) (The “judgment
[for § 2244 purposes] is the 2015 violation of probation judgment. Though that
2015 judgment stems in part from the 2009 judgment, the sentence that
authorized [the petitioner’s] current detention is the sentence imposed in 2015
for his violation of probation.”); Hernandez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:12-cv-
377-BJD-PDB, 2015 WL 224654, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2015) (finding the
petitioner’s “conviction and sentence became final [for AEDPA purposes] after
revocation of the probation and the imposition of the new judgment and
sentence”).2 Accordingly, the August 21, 2018 order of revocation and

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
ou

imposition of a new judgment and sentence constitutes the “judgment” that
determines the timeliness of Blazejowski’s claims under § 2244(d)(1)(A).3
Respondents concede that “the entire § 2254 petition is timely” if the one-year
limitations period began to run when Blazejowski’s August 21, 2018 judgment
and sentence from the violation of probation became final. See Response at 11.
The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the 2018 judgment on February 4,
2020, and issued the mandate on April 27, 2020. See Doc. 13-2 at 257, 285.
Because Florida law does not permit the Florida Supreme Court to review an
affirmance without an opinion, see Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(a)(2), Blazejowski’s judgment and sentence became final when the time
for filing a petition for certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court
expired. See Chamblee v. Florida, 905 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2018). The
time for Blazejowski to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired on Monday,
May 4, 2020 (ninety days after February 4, 2020). See Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (affording the 90-day grace
period to a Florida petitioner whose conviction was affirmed by a court of
appeal in an unelaborated per curiam decision). Accordingly, Blazejowski had
until May 4, 2021, to file a federal habeas petition. Because she filed this

3 Blazejowski does not allege, nor does it appear from the pleadings or the
record, that the statutory triggers set forth in §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) apply in this case.
22

habeas action on December 2, 2020,4 the Court concludes that her Amended
Petition is timely filed.
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to
establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a
hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,
which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the
applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.
The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the
Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Blazejowski’s] claim|[s]
without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

4 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).
23

V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t
of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023). “The purpose of AEDPA is to

ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error
correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As such,
federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “greatly circumscribed’
and ‘highly deferential.” Id. Gnternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hill
v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y.
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.8d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need
not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed:
24

[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It
should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be
rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most lkely
relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such

as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher
court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98.
The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to
§ 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 120S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000),
§ 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a
“contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application”
clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only
‘if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of
25

law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 4138, 120 8. Ct. at 1523
(plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application”
clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous § factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield v.
Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 185 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “a _ state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance.” Titlow, 571 U.S. at --
-, 1348. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,
301, 1380 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 13823, 1837 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made’).
26

Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for
prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2018). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a
state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in
existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree.” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter,
562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were
adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §
2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,
either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
ai

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
““opnportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 1380 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,”
the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state

28

procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[®] supra, at 747—
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes, [®] supra, at 84-85, 97 S.
Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural
rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal
review of the claims if, among other requisites, the
state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate
to support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 1381S. Ct. 1120, 1127-—
1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558
U.S. --, --, 180 S. Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417
(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted
claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A
prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted
claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice
from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S.,
at 750, 1118S. Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may
be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has
been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a
state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from
the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause,
the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that prevented
[him] from raising the claim and which cannot be
fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v.
Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[7]
Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show

5 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
6 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
7 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
29

that “the errors at trial actually and substantially
disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied
fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’
of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not

30

presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,
allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 5138
U.S. at 324.
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One
As Ground One, Blazejowski argues the State manufactured evidence
against her in order to prevent her from testifying in an unrelated murder that
she alleges was committed by a St. Johns County Sheriffs Office deputy. See
Amended Petition at 6-17. Initially, the Court finds that Blazejowski fails to
present an identifiable constitutional claim in Ground One for which federal
habeas relief would lie. Instead, Blazejowski appears to raise only issues of
state law which are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (stating that “federal habeas corpus relief
does not lie for errors of state law”).
Even assuming Blazejowski presents a federal constitutional challenge
in Ground One, the claim is procedurally barred because she did not fairly
present the federal nature of her claim to the state court. The record reflects
that Blazejowski raised this claim as a newly discovered evidence claim in her
Successive Rule 3.850 Motion. See Doc. 13-3 at 257-64. Her argument,
however, consisted solely of a factual narrative regarding the murder and the
31

alleged manufacturing of evidence against her. Id. Blazejowski did not present
any federal constitutional grounds in support of her claim. Therefore, to the
extent Blazejowski now raises a federal claim, the Court finds she failed to
alert the state court to the federal nature of her claim, and in failing to do so,
deprived the state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See
Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see Kelley v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1345
(11th Cir. 2004) (a petitioner cannot “scatter some makeshift needles in the
haystack of the state court record. The ground relied upon must be presented
face-up and squarely; the federal question must be plainly defined. Oblique
references which hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not
turn the trick.”).
Further, Blazejowski is also procedurally barred from seeking federal
habeas relief on this claim because the postconviction court relied on an
independent and adequate state procedural ground when it found the claim
untimely under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b). See Doc. 13-4 at
509-13. The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test to determine
when a state court’s procedural ruling relies on an independent and adequate
state ground. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). “First, (1)
the last state court rendering judgment must clearly and expressly state it is
relying on a state procedural rule to resolve the federal claim... . Second, the
state court’s decision on the procedural issue must rest entirely on state law
32

grounds and not be intertwined with an interpretation of federal law. ... Third,
the state procedural rule must be adequate.” Id. (citations omitted and
emphasis added).
As applied here, the postconviction court’s untimeliness finding was
based on the procedural requirements of Rule 3.850, which is an independent
and adequate state procedural ground. See LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
421 F.3d 1237, 1260 n.25 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he procedural requirements of
Florida’s Rule 3.850 constitute independent and adequate grounds under the
applicable law.”); Kimbrough v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 809 F. App’x 684,
692-93 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding the denial of a claim as untimely under Rule
3.850(b) “rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground”).
Second, the postconviction court’s untimeliness determination rested solely on
state procedural grounds without citing to or otherwise referencing federal
law. Thus, the postconviction court’s “ruling was not intertwined with federal
law.” Kimbrough, 809 F. App’x at 692.
Third, the procedural rule was adequate to support the postconviction
court’s untimeliness finding. See id. That is, the postconviction court properly
applied a regularly followed procedural default principle to find the claim
untimely. A Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief must be filed within
two years of the criminal judgment “unless the motion alleges that the facts on
which the claims for relief are predicated could not have been discovered
33

earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” See Kimbrough, 809 F. App’x at 692
(citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1)). Here, the postconviction court determined
that Blazejowski’s allegations regarding the manufacturing of evidence were
not newly discovered as the record showed she was aware of them as early as
March 2014 -- approximately five months before she entered her no-contest
plea. See Doc. 13-4 at 513. The postconviction court explained:
Defendant alleges that “all details were intentionally
and knowingly kept form [sic] the defense team until
2019.” However, in the March 21, 2014 Affidavit
attached to Defendant’s motion as part of Exhibit 6,
she alleged that “the entire St. Johns County judicial
system knew that Srgt. David Tarbert was not only
involved but responsible for the crimes that
[Defendant] was being accused of.” In the affidavit,
Defendant maintained that during the execution of the
search warrant at her home, the officers informed her
they “found evidence of [Sgt.] Tarbert’s involvement.”
Defendant alleges that the St. Johns County Sheriff's
Office and State Attorney’s Office withheld this
evidence in their discovery disclosures. Additionally,
in her 2016 Florida Bar Complaint, which is also part
of Exhibit 6 to her motion, Defendant alleged that
Assistant State Attorney France and Sgt. Tarbert
manufactured the instant case against her.
Accordingly, the “evidence” is not newly discovered,
and Defendant’s present claim is untimely as the
record reflects she was aware of the aforementioned
information in March 2014. Finally, the Court
observes that Defendant’s present allegations indicate
she was aware of Sgt. Tarbert and Assistant State
Attorney France’s scheme to frame her prior to
entering her plea. However, during the plea colloquy,
the Court asked Defendant whether “anybody coached
you or told you to testify falsely because of any promise
or understanding which has not been told to me,” to
34

which Defendant responded in the negative. For these
reasons, the Court finds the instant claim of newly
discovered evidence fails.
See Doc. 13-4 at 512-13 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the claim is
procedurally barred as the postconviction court’s decision rested on an
independent and adequate state law ground.
Blazejowski has not shown either cause excusing the default or actual
prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, she has failed to identify any fact
warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception. Accordingly, relief on the claim in Ground One is due to be denied.
B. Ground Two
As Ground Two, Blazejowski asserts the State violated her constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process when it charged her with aggravated
stalking and extortion. See Amended Petition at 17-18. Blazejowski raised a
substantially similar claim in her amended petition for writ of certiorari, which
the Fifth DCA dismissed on procedural grounds due to her failure to file an
appendix as ordered. See Doc. 13-2 at 348, 357-58, 365. She also raised the
claim in her Successive Rule 3.850 Motion as a claim of “sentence
manipulation.” See Doc. 18-3 at 268-69. The postconviction court found the
claim untimely and successive. See Doc. 13-4 at 520. The Fifth DCA affirmed
without a written opinion. Id. at 523.

35

Respondents contend, and the Court agrees, that the claim in Ground
Two is procedurally defaulted. See Doc. 13 at 15. Blazejowski has not shown
either cause excusing the default or actual prejudice resulting from the bar.
Moreover, she has failed to identify any fact warranting the application of the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Accordingly, the claim in Ground
Two is due to be denied.
C. Ground Three
As Ground Three, Blazejowski asserts Detective Andrews of the St.
Johns County Sheriffs Office violated the Fourth Amendment by intentionally
including false statements in the search warrant affidavit. See Amended
Petition at 20-37. She further asserts Detective Andrews’ conduct resulted in
violations of Brady v. Maryland, 372 U.S 83 (19638), and Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972). See Amended Petition at 20, 36-37.
To the extent Blazejowski asserts a Fourth Amendment claim or Brady
and Giglio violations, the Court finds her claims are unexhausted because she
failed to raise them in her direct appeal or in her postconviction filings.’ Since
future attempts to exhaust these claims would be futile, the claims are

8 The Court notes that Blazejowski’s factual allegations in Ground Three were
taken almost verbatim from her “sentence manipulation” claim in her Successive
Rule 3.850 Motion. See Doc. 13-3 at 269-79. She did not, however, assert any of the
federal claims she now raises in Ground Three of the Amended Petition. Even if she
had done so, the postconviction court denied the sentence manipulation claim as
untimely and successive. Thus, the claim would have been procedurally defaulted for
the reasons set forth in Grounds One and Two.
36

procedurally defaulted. Blazejowski has alleged neither cause and prejudice
nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome her failure to exhaust. Thus, she is not
entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims raised in Ground Three.
D. Ground Four
Next, Blazejowski asserts her due process rights were violated because
she was not provided written notice of the conditions of her probation. See
Amended Petition at 40-45. She raised this claim in her amended petition for
writ of certiorari, which the Fifth DCA dismissed on procedural grounds. See
Doc. 13-2 at 332, 347-48. She also raised this claim in a Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800 motion. At the time she commenced this federal
habeas action, the Rule 3.800 motion was still pending. See Doc. 13-4 at 527-
32. The postconviction court has since denied the motion, stating in relevant
part:
[A]lthough Defendant’s motion contains multiple
citations to cases indicating a court must orally
pronounce special conditions of probation, this Court
observes that all special conditions, including special
condition 11 which prohibited contact with the victims
in the present case, were orally pronounced at
sentencing.
See State v. Blazejowski, No. 2013-CF-645 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. May 12, 2023).

37

The Fifth DCA per curiam subsequently affirmed the denial of relief.® Id.
Assuming the claim was properly exhausted, the Court addresses the
claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court review of

state court adjudications. Upon thorough review of the record, the Court finds
that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the state
court’s adjudication based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Blazejowski is not
entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of the claim is not
entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. The record wholly refutes
Blazejowski’s assertion that she did not have written notice of the conditions
of her probation. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court orally advised
Blazejowski of the special conditions of her community control and probation,

9 The Fifth DCA also included language in its order cautioning Blazejowski:
This Court previously affirmed [Blazejowski’s] direct
appeal and thereafter, dismissed several petitions and
appeals filed in this Court stemming from St. Johns County
Circuit Court Case No. 2013-CF-645. Because it appears
that [Blazejowski’s] filings are abusive, repetitive,
malicious, or frivolous, [Blazejowski] is cautioned that any
further pro se filings in this Court asserting claims
stemming from St. Johns County Circuit Court Case No.
2013-CF-645, may result in sanctions such as a bar on pro
se filing in this Court. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47
(Fla. 1999).
See State v. Blazejowski, No. 2013-CF-645 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Dec. 14, 2028).
38

including in pertinent part, the requirement that she was to have no contact
with the victims “during the entire time of [her] imprisonment and probation.”
Doc. 13-3 at 216. The trial court also entered an Order of Community
Control/Probation the same day that set forth all conditions. See Doc. 18-1 at
58-66. Thus, Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the claim in Ground Four.
EK. Ground Five
As stated earlier, Blazejowski’s community control/probation order
included, in relevant part, a special condition prohibiting Blazejowski from
contacting any of the victims. See Doc. 13-1 at 60. In 2018, the trial court
revoked the community control/probation order after finding Blazejowski
violated the no-contact provision by sending a subpoena and interrogatories to

one of the victims, Jennifer Robor. Id. at 606-08. As Ground Five of the
Amended Petition, Blazejowski asserts her contact with Robor was a legitimate
exercise of her constitutionally protected right of access to the courts because
she sent the documents to Robor for discovery purposes in connection with a
motion to vacate an injunction.!°9 See Amended Petition at 46-47. She contends
the trial court failed to warn her during her plea hearing and sentencing that

10 The injunction at issue was obtained by another victim, Joseph Good, after
the events underlying this case occurred. See Doc. 13-2 at 151-52 (citing Good v.
Blazejowski, No. DR-13-0715 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2014)); see also
https://apps.stjohnsclerk.com/Benchmark/Home.aspx/Search (last visited March 22,
2024). According to Blazejowski, she sought to vacate the injunction so that she could
qualify for work release from prison.
39

it was “stripping her of her constitutional rights” to access the courts, represent
herself, and confront her accusers. Id. at 46.
To the extent Blazejowski asserts she was denied the right to represent
herself or to confront her accusers, the Court finds her claims are unexhausted
because she failed to raise them in the state court. Since future attempts to
exhaust these claims would be futile, the claims are procedurally defaulted.
Blazejowski has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of
justice to overcome her failure to exhaust.
Insofar as Blazejowski asserts she was denied her constitutional right of

access to the courts, the record reflects that she raised a substantially similar
claim in her direct appeal of the 2018 judgment and sentence. See Doc. 13-2 at
194. The State filed an answer brief, id. at 214-36, and Blazejowski filed a reply
brief, id. at 239-50. On February 4, 2020, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed
the 2018 judgment and sentence without a written opinion. Id. at 252. To the
extent the appellate court decided the claim on the merits, the Court will
address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court
review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record and the
applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the
claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in lght of the evidence
40

presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Blazejowski is not entitled to
relief on the basis of this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of the

access to courts claim is not entitled to deference, the claim is without merit.
Nothing in the record suggests that the state court ever imposed any
restrictions on Blazejowski’s right of access to the state courts. In fact, the
record reflects that Blazejowski has pursued legal relief on numerous occasions
subsequent to the entry of the community control/probation order. Insofar as
Blazejowski argues the no-contact provision hindered her efforts to vacate the
injunction, the record fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
documents she sent to Robor were improper because (1) Robor was not a party
in the injunction case and (2) the interrogatories were unrelated to the grounds
Blazejowski articulated in the motion to vacate. See Doc. 13-2 at 91-93; Doc.
13-1 at 570-572. Thus, even if the no-contact provision of the community
control/probation order was not in place, Blazejowski still would not have been
entitled to the discovery she sought from Robor. Accordingly, Blazejowski is
not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims raised in Ground Five.
F. Ground Six
As Ground Six, Blazejowski asserts the State violated her due process
rights and retaliated against her when it charged her with violating the
conditions of her probation. See Amended Petition at 48-49. Blazejowski raised
Al

a substantially similar claim in her amended petition for writ of certiorari. See
Doc. 13-2 at 347-49, 356. The Fifth DCA dismissed the petition on procedural
grounds due to her failure to file an appendix as ordered. Id. at 365.
Respondents contend, and the Court agrees, that the claim in Ground
Six is procedurally defaulted. Because Blazejowski has not demonstrated cause
and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the claim in
Ground Six is due to be denied.
G. Ground Seven
As Ground Seven, Blazejowski argues the State violated her
constitutional rights by “manipulating the circumstances” and “forcing [her] to
violate conditions of probation.” See Amended Petition at 50. As support for
her argument, Blazejowski presents an alternate version of facts regarding the
circumstances that led her to contact Robor. Id. at 50-51.
As in Ground One, the Court initially determines that Blazejowski fails
to present an identifiable federal constitutional claim in Ground Seven for
which federal habeas relief would lie. Her general assertion that her
“constitutional rights” were violated is insufficient. To the extent Blazejowski
challenges the state courts grounds for revoking the community
control/probation order, she is raising issues of state law that are not
cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (stating
that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’); see
42

Billups v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2009 WL 890273, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2009)
(“{S]tate prisoners’ claims of error involving .. . probation, and revocation of
probation or parole are matters governed by state law that are not cognizable
in federal habeas corpus proceedings.”) (quoting Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324,
331 (8th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2010 WL 4258952, at *10
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2010) (“Whether the state judge’s revocation findings meet
state law requirements does not present a cognizable basis for federal habeas

corpus relief.”).
Even assuming the claim is properly before this Court, the claim lacks
merit. Under Florida law, a community control/probation order may be revoked
if a defendant violates a condition while incarcerated prior to the
commencement of probation. See Stafford v. State, 455 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla.
1984) (holding that the state court has the inherent power “to revoke an order
of probation, the term of which has not yet commenced, should the court
determine that the defendant probationer has been guilty of misconduct
occurring subsequent to the entry of the order of probation”) (quoting Martin
v. State, 243 So. 2d 189, 190-91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)); Cason v. State, 604 So.
2d 928, 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“Where, as here, the defendant is given a split
sentence of prison time followed by a probationary period and the defendant
allegedly violates a condition of probation during the prison portion of the
sentence before the probation begins, the trial court may revoke the
43

defendant’s probation based on such violation.”); Kirkland v. State, 315 So. 3d
788 (Fla. lst DCA 2021) (affirming the revocation of an order of probation
where defendant violated the no-contact provision by contacting the victim
while he was still serving his prison sentence prior to the commencement of
the term of probation). Here, the state court had the inherent power to revoke
Blazejowski’s probation based on her violation of the no-contact provision even
though she was still serving the prison portion of her sentence. Accordingly,
Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the claim in Ground Seven.
H. Ground Eight
As Ground Eight, Blazejowski argues she was exercising her
constitutionally protected rights to “filfe] a motion, access[] the court, ask[] the
court for redress, represent[] herself and tak[e] part in discovery” when she
contacted Robor. See Amended Petition at 52. She asserts this legitimate
exercise of her constitutional rights did not constitute harassment. Id. This is
essentially the same argument Blazejowski raised in Ground Five of the
Amended Petition. Thus, for the same reasons discussed in Ground Five,
Blazejowski is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in
Ground Eight.
I. Ground Nine
As Ground Nine, Blazejowski argues the State failed to prove in 2014
that she met all of the elements required to convict her of aggravated stalking,
44

extortion, and making false reports. See Amended Petition at 53. In turn, she
contends she could not have committed a probation violation because she was
serving an illegal sentence. Id. Blazejowski raised a substantially similar claim
in her amended petition for writ of certiorari. See Doc. 13-2 at 332, 358-60. The
Fifth DCA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. Id. at 365.
Respondents contend, and the Court agrees, that the claim in Ground
Nine is procedurally defaulted. See Doc. 13 at 30. Because Blazejowski has not
demonstrated cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the
default, the claim in Ground Nine is due to be denied.
Nevertheless, even if the claim was properly before the Court, the claim
is without merit. Blazejowski entered an open plea of no contest to the charges.
Nothing in the record suggests her plea was involuntary. During the plea
colloquy, Blazejowski specifically acknowledged that she was waiving her
constitutional rights by entering the plea and giving up her right to appeal all
matters except that of an illegal sentence or a challenge to the circumstances
of the plea. Doc. 13-1 at 18. She also stated that no one had forced, threatened,
or pressured her to plead guilty. Id. at 19. The State proffered an exhaustive
factual basis for the plea and defense counsel stipulated there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the plea. Id. at 20-36. The trial court found there was a
sufficient factual basis prior to accepting the plea. Id. at 36. Thus, on this
record, Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the claim in Ground Nine.
45

J. Ground Ten
As Ground Ten, Blazejowski contends the circuit court judge who
presided over the VOP proceeding was prejudiced and biased against her. See
Amended Petition at 54-55. She argues the judge’s remarks during the VOP
hearing violated her constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. Id.
Blazejowski raised a substantially similar claim in her petition for writ of
prohibition, which the Fifth DCA denied. See Doc. 13-2 at 297-305, 315.
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this
claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Thus, Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the basis
of this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of the claim is not
entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. The Due Process Clause
guaranteed Blazejowski “a fair trial in a fair tribunal, before a judge with no
actual bias against [her] or interest in the outcome of [her] particular case.”
Norris v. United States, 709 F. App’x 952, 957 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bracy
v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997)). To obtain postconviction relief,
46

Blazejowski was required to “prove that under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness, the judge posed a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment such that it created an intolerable threat to the guarantee
of due process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Blazejowski has not met this standard of proof. She fails to demonstrate that
the judge’s remarks during the VOP hearing created “an intolerable threat to
the guarantee of due process.” Id. Accordingly, she is not entitled to federal
habeas relief on the claim in Ground Ten.
VII. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If Blazejowski seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the
undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The
Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Blazejowski “must demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the
issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot

v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

47

Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on
the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.
See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has rejected a
claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Upon
consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of
appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Amended Petition (Doc. 5) is DENIED, and this action is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
ys The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Amended
Petition and dismissing this case with prejudice.
a. If Blazejowski appeals the denial of the Amended Petition, the
Court denies a certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined
that a certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate
from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper

48

that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the
motion.
A, The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this Zs A day of
March, 2024.

H E. SINGER
United St istrict Judge

Jax-10 3/26
C Tawny Blazejowski, #156630
Counsel of Record

49

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115676. Public record. Not legal advice.