# McChriston v. Secretary Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115625

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115625

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding errors of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas review
- stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made’

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MILES TIMOTHY MCCHRISTON,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:21-ev-67-HES-PDB
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Miles Timothy McChriston, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action on January 15, 2021,! by filing a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doce. 1).2 In the
Petition, McChriston challenges a 2014 state court (Duval County, Florida)
judgment of conviction for first-degree murder. He raises twelve grounds for
relief. See Petition at 5-41. Respondents submitted a memorandum in
opposition to the Petition. See Response (Doc. 5). They also submitted
exhibits. See Docs. 5-2 through 5-9; 10-1 through 10-4. McChriston filed a

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).
2 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite the
document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.

brief in reply (Reply; Doc. 8) with exhibits (Docs. 8-2 through 8-8). This action
is ripe for review.
II. Relevant Procedural History
On April 4, 2013, the State of Florida charged McChriston by
indictment with first-degree murder. Doc. 5-2 at 59-61. On October 22, 2014,
a jury found McChriston guilty as charged in the indictment. Doc. 5-5 at
95-96. The trial court sentenced McChriston to a term of life imprisonment.
Id. at 100-06. On direct appeal, with the benefit of counsel, McChriston filed
an initial brief, arguing the trial court erred when it: (1) denied the defense’s
motion for judgment of acquittal and (2) failed to reweigh the evidence before
denying the defense’s motion for new trial. Doc. 10-1. The State filed an
answer brief. Doc. 10-2. The First DCA per curiam affirmed McChriston’s
conviction and sentence on December 1, 2015, Doc. 10-8, and issued the
mandate on December 29, 2015, Doc. 10-4.
Beginning on August 1, 2016, McChriston filed multiple motions for
postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850,
culminating with a motion (Rule 3.850 motion) that raised ten grounds for
relief. Doc. 5-9 at 6-17, 20-32, 37~49, 57-78. In his Rule 3.850 motion,
McChriston alleged counsel was ineffective when she failed to: (1) file a

motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) object to photographs of the victim’s
shirt; (3) properly cross-examine Detective Anthony Dziergowski; (4) present
a defense at trial; (5) object to the prosecutor's closing argument that
misrepresented McChriston’s statements to law enforcement; (6) object to the
prosecutor's closing argument about McChriston’s state of mind at the time of
the murder; (7) object to the prosecutor’s explanation of justifiable and
excusable homicide; (8) object to the prosecutor instructing the jury to show
prejudice; (9) object to the prosecutor’s argument about facts not in evidence;
and (10) object to and move for a mistrial based on a sleeping juror. Id. at
57-78. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on ground ten.
See id. at 86-87. On November 13, 2018, the postconviction denied relief on
all grounds. Id. at 156-66. McChriston pursued an appeal. The First DCA per
curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion on March 24,
2020, id. at 902, and issued the mandate on June 30, 2020, id. at 920.
III. One-Year Limitations Period
This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to
establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (llth Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a
hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,
which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the
applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at
474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before
the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [McChriston’s] claim[s]
without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.8d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala.
Dep't of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1848 (11th Cir. 2023). “The purpose of AEDPA
is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of
error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As
such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “sreatly
circumscribed and highly deferential.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state
court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state
court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the
state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See
Harrington v, Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s
adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United
States Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It

should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 188 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be
rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely
relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision,
such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the
higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d)
bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States:” or
(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope
of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d
389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct
clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable
application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows
for relief only “if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court
has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id.
at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The
“unreasonable application” clause allows for relief
only “if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to
the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 1384S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield
v. Cain, 576 USS. ---, ---, 185 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “a_ state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because
the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.” Titlow, 571
USS. at ---, 184 8. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen,
558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d
738 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made’).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for
prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,
134 8. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a
state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in
existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree.” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one
to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s
claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be
evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §
2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest

court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim,
“state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s
established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a
state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438
(1971)). To provide the State with the necessary
“opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present” his
claim in each appropriate state court Gncluding a
state supreme court with powers of discretionary
review), thereby alerting that court to the federal
nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 865-366, 115
S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845,
119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are
guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court
judgments are accorded the finality and respect
necessary to preserve the integrity of legal
proceedings within our system of federalism. These
rules include the doctrine of procedural default,
under which a federal court will not review the
merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that
a state court declined to hear because the prisoner
failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g.,
Coleman,[?] supra, at 747-748, 111 S. Ct. 2546:
Sykes,[4] supra, at 84-85, 97 S. Ct. 2497. A state
court’s invocation of a procedural rule to deny a
prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the
claims if, among other requisites, the state
procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to
support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Martin, 562 USS. -., --, 181 S. Ct. 1120,
1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler,
558 U.S. --, --, 180 S. Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d
417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally
defaulted claims from being heard is not without
exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a
defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and
prejudice from a violation of federal law. See
Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

3 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
4 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
10

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults
may be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim
has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim
if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice
from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall,
592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish
cause,
the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that
prevented [him] from raising the claim and which
cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct.”
McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir.
1992) (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct.
2639).[°] Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner]
must show that “the errors at trial actually and
substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he
was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the

> Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
11

continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’
of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally,
“[t]o be credible, a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable
evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559
(1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in
most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily
rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

12

C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per
curiam) (first citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and then
Strickland vy. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person
challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.
Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective
assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104
S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.” Id., at 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s
errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant
13

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at
687, 1048. Ct. 2052.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of
any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test
before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part
Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a
court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet
the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d
1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466
USS. at 697.
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation
is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,
131 S. Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state
court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable
under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are
both highly deferential, and when the two apply in
tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and
quotation marks omitted). “The question is not
whether a federal court believes the state court's
determination under the Strickland standard was
14

incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 128, 129 S. Ct.
1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quotation marks
omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that
counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”
then a federal court may not disturb a state-court
decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,
13158. Ct. at 788.
Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “fiJn addition to the
deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds
another layer of deference—this one to a state court’s decision—when we are
considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1809 (11th Cir. 2004). As
such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One
As Ground One, McChriston argues that the trial court violated his
right to due process when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. See
Petition at 5-12. He contends that the evidence at trial did not suggest “any
kind of plan or scheme or reflection or premeditation,” and, as such, the State

15

failed to present sufficient evidence of the premeditation element of first-
degree murder. Id. at 6. McChriston raised this issue on direct appeal, Doc.
10-1 at 18-20, and the State filed an answer brief, Doc. 10-2 at 20-28. The
First DCA per curiam affirmed McChriston’s conviction and sentence without
a written opinion. Doc. 10-3.
The Court determines that McChriston did not fairly present the
federal nature of his claim to the state court. On direct appeal, McChriston
relied exclusively on Florida law to argue that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. Doc. 10-1 at 18-20. Nevertheless,
McChriston contends in his Reply that he alerted the state court to the
federal nature of his claim by citing to Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.
1981), which sets forth the federal standard for “deciding whether evidence is
sufficient to sustain a jury guilty verdict.” Reply at 8. The Court is not
persuaded. Tibbs concerns the distinction between an appellate court’s
reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the evidence and one based on
the sufficiency of the evidence. 397 So. 2d at 1121. It does not cite to or
discuss the leading federal case on due process, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979). As such, McChriston did not alert the state court to the federal
nature of his claim, and in failing to do so, deprived the state court of a

16

meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.
27, 29 (2004). Since future attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is
procedurally defaulted. McChriston has alleged neither cause and prejudice
nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome his failure to exhaust. As such,
Ground One is due to be denied as procedurally barred.
Nevertheless, even if McChriston properly exhausted the claim in
Ground One, he is still not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State
addressed this claim on the merits, Doc. 10-2 at 20-28; therefore, the
appellate court may have affirmed McChriston’s conviction based on the
State’s argument. If the appellate court addressed the merits of this claim,
the state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a
review of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the
state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established
federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore,
McChriston is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
Even assuming that the state court’s adjudication of this claim is not
entitled to deference, McChriston’s claim is without merit because the State

17

presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree
murder. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
State to prove each element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thompson v. Nagle, 118 F.3d 1442, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997). In reviewing
the sufficiency of evidence, “this court must presume that conflicting
inferences to be drawn from the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of
the State.” Id. Jackson vy. Virginia “provides the federal due process
benchmark for evidentiary sufficiency in criminal cases.” Williams v. Sec’y for
Dep’t of Corr., 395 F. App’x 524, 525 (11th Cir. 2010)® (per curiam). In
accordance with this authority, the relevant question is whether any rational
jury, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found McChriston committed
the offense of first-degree murder. The State presented evidence that, on the

® The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent:
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on
a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.
2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions
are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
18

evening of July 24, 2012, McChriston, Richard Persons, James “Bossman”
Williams, and Corey Bright went to the victim’s house to confront him about
assaulting his girlfriend, Persons’ cousin. Docs. 5-7 at 217-19, 223-26,
274-78; 5-8 at 141-46. After the confrontation escalated, the four men shot
the victim. Id. McChriston admitted to law enforcement that he shot the
victim twice. Doc. 5-8 at 153. Forensic evidence connected the gun and bullets
that McChriston used during the incident to those that fatally wounded the
victim. Does. 5-7 at 312-13, 321; 5-8 at 47-49, 147-48, 153.
As to premeditation, the evidence established that McChriston shot the
victim twice in the back with a .45 caliber gun. Doc. 5-8 at 147-48, 153. He
stated that he had experience with guns and aimed “center mass.” Id. at 156.
Moreover, McChriston and Persons had visited the victim’s house to confront
him on the afternoon of July 24, 2012; however, he was not at the house.
Does. 5-7 at 214-17; 5-8 at 140. The shooting occurred when they returned for
the victim later that day. Thus, viewing the evidence in the hight most
favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support the
conviction for first-degree murder. Competent evidence of the elements of the
offense was introduced at trial, and no due process violation occurred. Given
the record, the trial court did not err in denying McChriston’s motion for

19

judgment of acquittal. Therefore, McChriston is not entitled to habeas relief
as to Ground One.
B. Ground Two
Next, McChriston alleges that the trial court violated his right to due
process when it failed to reweigh the evidence before denying his motion for
new trial. See Petition at 13-14. According to McChriston, “the trial court
judge stated simply, ‘Okay. The motion for new trial is denied... . [and the
trial judge] failed to say or do anything indicating he had ‘reweighed’ the
evidence as required.” Id. at 14. McChriston raised this issue on direct
appeal, Doc. 10-1 at 21-22, and the State filed an answer brief, Doc. 10-2 at
29-34. The First DCA per curiam affirmed McChriston’s conviction and
sentence without a written opinion. Doc. 10-3.
The Court determines that McChriston did not fairly present the
federal nature of his claim to the state court. In his initial brief on appeal,
McChriston presented his claim only in the context of state law. Doc. 10-1 at
21-22. He neither cited to a federal statute, nor federal case law. Therefore,
he did not alert the state court to the federal nature of his claim, and in
failing to do so, deprived the state court of a meaningful opportunity to
review the claim. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Since future attempts to

20

exhaust the claim would be futile, it is procedurally defaulted. McChriston
has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice to
overcome his failure to exhaust. Accordingly, Ground Two is due to be denied
as procedurally barred.
Nevertheless, to the extent McChriston asserts that the trial court
applied the wrong standard under Florida law when it denied his motion for
new trial, the claim presents an issue purely of state law not cognizable on
federal habeas review. The purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to
review the lawfulness of McChriston’s custody to determine whether that
custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (holding errors of
state law are not cognizable in federal habeas review); Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to
reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). Thus, insofar
as McChriston alleges that the trial court’s ruling failed to comply with
Florida law, this claim provides no basis for federal habeas relief. As such,
McChriston is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim in Ground
Two.

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C. Grounds Three through Five
In his Reply, McChriston concedes Grounds Three through Five. See
Reply at 11 (‘These three claims are waived in this pleading, as they cannot
prevail.”). As such, Grounds Three through Five are due to be denied.
D. Ground Six
In Ground Six, McChriston alleges that counsel was ineffective when
she failed to present a defense at trial. Petition at 24. He contends that
although he “made statements to the law enforcement officers that would
support a Jury instruction on self-defense or excusable homicide,” counsel
failed to request such an instruction. Id.
McChriston raised a substantially similar claim in his Rule 3.850
motion. Doc. 5-9 at 67-68. The postconviction court denied relief, stating in
pertinent part:
Defendant alleges counsel was ineffective for not
raising a defense on his behalf. Specifically,
Defendant complains counsel was deficient for failing
to request an instruction on self-defense based upon
Defendant's statement to police. Defendant claims
prejudice, alleging that the jury would have rendered
a different verdict had the trial court instructed them
on self-defense.
However, Defendant is not entitled to relief
because he agreed that he was not entitled to an
instruction on self-defense based upon the evidence
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presented, and agreed with counsel’s decision not to
request an instruction on self-defense. Further,
Defendant’s statement would not have supported an
instruction on self-defense because: (1) Defendant
admitted that he did not think the victim was armed
at the time of the shooting; (2) Defendant took time to
aim before shooting the victim in the back; and (8)
Defendant did not describe the victim’s movements as
threatening when questioned by detectives.
Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief on
Ground Four.
Id. at 159-60 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam affirmed
the denial of relief without a written opinion. Id. at 902.
To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits,’ the
Court applies the deferential standard for federal court review of state court
adjudications. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court
concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to
clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceedings. Therefore, McChriston is not entitled to relief on the basis of
this claim.

* In looking through the appellate court’s per curiam affirmance to the circuit
court’s “relevant rationale,” the Court presumes that the appellate court “adopted
the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1194.
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Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of this claim is
not entitled to deference, McChriston’s ineffectiveness claim is still without
merit because the record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion.
“Where there is any evidence introduced at trial which supports the theory of
the defense, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law
applicable to his theory of defense when he so requests.” Bryant v. State, 412
So. 2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1982). At the time of the offense, Florida law provided
that a person was justified in using deadly force in self-defense if he
reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death
or great bodily harm or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
felony. See Fla. Stat. § 776.012 (2012).
In this case, the evidence introduced at trial did not support a self-
defense instruction. Rather, witness testimony established that the murder
occurred when McChriston and three other individuals, all armed with guns,
went to the victim’s house to confront him about a domestic violence incident.
During McChriston’s interview with law enforcement, he stated that he did
not think the victim had a gun during the altercation, and McChriston did
not describe the victim’s movements before the shooting as threatening. Doc.
5-8 at 154, 157. Notably, medical examiner Dr. Valerie Rao testified that the

24

victim sustained most of his injuries to his back, and the bullet from the fatal
gunshot wound entered through his back. Doc. 5-7 at 311-13. Based on the
above, counsel was not deficient when she failed to request a jury instruction
for a defense that the evidence did not support. See Brown v. Warden, 562 F.
App’x 779, 781 (11th Cir. 2014) (‘Whether defense counsel erred by not
requesting a specific jury instruction depends on the state law that governed
the defendant’s trial... . Pursuant to Florida law, defense counsel is not
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that is not warranted by
the evidence.”). Accordingly, McChriston is not entitled to federal habeas
relief on the claim in Ground Six.
E. Grounds Seven through Twelve
In Grounds Seven through Eleven, McChriston alleges counsel was
ineffective when she failed to object to improper prosecutorial comments
during closing arguments. See Petition at 26-38. As Ground Twelve, he
asserts that counsel was ineffective when she failed to object and move for a
mistrial based on a sleeping juror. Id. at 39-40. McChriston raised
substantially similar claims in his Rule 3.850 motion. Doc. 5-9 at 69—75.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Id.

25

at 160-65. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a
written opinion. Id. at 902.
Respondents argue that McChriston did not properly exhaust the
claims in Grounds Seven through Twelve because he failed to invoke one
complete round of the state’s appellate review process. See Response at
14-20. According to Respondents, McChriston abandoned the claims on
appeal when he failed to raise them in his initial brief, and, therefore, they
are procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Id. In his Reply,
McChriston does not appear to address Respondents’ exhaustion argument.
See Reply at 15-21.
The record reflects that McChriston filed a pro se brief on appeal of the
postconviction court’s denial of his Rule 3.850 motion, but he did not raise the
instant claims in his brief. Doc. 5-9 at 864—80. Therefore, McChriston failed
to exhaust the claims in Grounds Seven through Twelve. See Atwater v.
Crosby, 451 F.8d 799, 810 (11th Cir. 2006) (a petitioner abandons a claim
when he receives an evidentiary hearing and fails to raise claim in a brief on
appeal); Wade v. State, 201 So. 3d 806, 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“As the
appellant filed an initial brief but failed to address any of the remaining
[postconviction] claims, he has waived the right to have them considered in

26

this appeal.”). Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact warranting the
application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Because any
future attempt to exhaust the claims would be futile, they are procedurally
defaulted. McChriston has demonstrated neither cause and prejudice to
excuse his lack of exhaustion nor demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of
justice has occurred. As such, Grounds Seven through Twelve are due to be
denied as procedurally barred.
VU. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If McChriston seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the
undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The
Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, McChriston “must demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the
issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2008) (quoting Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
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Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims
on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has
rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.
Upon consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate
of appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Petition
and dismissing this case with prejudice.
3. If McChriston appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court denies
a certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined that a
certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from

28

the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that
may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the
motion.
4, The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate
any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this Lf day of
March, 2024.

/ 1 £0 L427.
VEY E. SCHLESEINGER
; Zisited Stace District Judge

Jax-9 3/5
Cc: Miles Timothy McChriston, #354136
Counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115625. Public record. Not legal advice.