# Woods v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 20, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115171

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 20, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115171

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence which contradicted the defendant’s trial testimony
- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CARL EZEKIEL WOODS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-316-TJC-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
through counsel by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 1). He also filed a counseled Memorandum of Law in Support of
his Petition (Doc. 4). Petitioner challenges a state court (Duval County, Florida)
judgment of conviction for first degree murder, armed robbery, and armed
burglary. See id. at 1. Petitioner is serving life imprisonment. Respondents filed
a Response (Doc. 11; Response) with exhibits (Docs. 11-1 to 11-17; Ex.).
Petitioner filed a Notice, through counsel, indicating that he would not file a
reply (Doc. 13). This case is ripe for review.1

1 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need
for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318
II. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure

that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.
(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See
Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th
Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must
consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,
a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that
“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as
alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or
argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears
repeating that even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than
mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at
75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper
deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations modified).
B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254
habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]”
every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on
direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351
(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional
issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate
review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope
v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the

state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,” the
prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[2] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[3] supra, at 84–85, 97 S. Ct.
2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural rule to
deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the
claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural
rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the
judgment and the rule is firmly established and
consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562
U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62
(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612,
617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring
procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not
without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal
review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the
default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.
See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Even though a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state
habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the
default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). For a petitioner to establish cause and prejudice,
the procedural default “must result from some objective
factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from
raising the claim and which cannot be fairly
attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome,

2 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
3 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[4] Under the prejudice
prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial
actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense
so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at
1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
Without a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may receive
consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner
can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the continued
incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would result. The
Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there
remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of
a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier,
477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This exception is
exceedingly narrow in scope,” however, and requires
proof of actual innocence, not just legal innocence.
Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of
the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.

4 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not

presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,
allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a
person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of

reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the
Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.
2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to
show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance
prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in
Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should
be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state
court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether
that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.”
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If

there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court
decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s
representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is

combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling
on counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.
2004).

III. Analysis
A. Ground One
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the standard jury instructions on stand your ground and for failing to request

a special jury instruction concerning common law self-defense and the duty to
retreat for an individual engaged in unlawful activity. Doc. 1 at 5. Petitioner
explains that because he was participating in an unlawful activity (a drug
transaction) at the time deadly force was used, the standard jury instruction on

stand your ground did not apply and counsel should have requested a special
jury instruction concerning common law self-defense. Doc. 4 at 18.
Petitioner, through counsel, raised this claim in his postconviction motion
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state court held

an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the claim, reasoning as follows:
In Ground One of his motion, Defendant argues
his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to
move for a common law self-defense jury instruction.
The common law self-defense jury instruction that
Defendant contends his attorney should have
requested reads:

If you find the defendant was
engaging in an unlawful activity or was
attacked in a place where he did not have
the right to be, then you must consider if
the defendant had a duty to retreat. If the
defendant was in a position of imminent
death or great bodily harm and it would
have increased his own danger to retreat,
then his use of force likely to cause death
or great bodily harm was justifiable.

The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree
murder, as charged in the indictment. In addition, the
jury made special findings concerning the nature of
the murder. The jury found both that Defendant’s
killing of the victim was premeditated and that the
killing was done during the commission of a burglary
or robbery. The jury’s finding that Defendant
committed premediated murder belies any claim that
Defendant’s proposed common law self-defense jury
instruction would have changed the outcome of
Defendant’s case. Simply stated, there is no way to
reconcile a finding of premeditation with a finding of
justifiable self-defense. “Premeditation” requires a
finding that a defendant had “intent before the act,”
i.e., “a fully formed purpose to kill, with enough time
for thought . . . .” Powell v. State, 112 So. 608, 610
(Fla. 1927). Even if the jury was equipped with
Defendant’s proposed instruction, it follows a fortiori
that the jury would not have found Defendant acted
in self-defense because the jury found that Defendant
acted with a fully formed, pre-existing intent to kill
the victim. As such, Defendant cannot prove prejudice
as required by Strickland. Accordingly, this Court
denies Ground One of Defendant’s motion.

Ex. H at 106-07 (internal record citations omitted and citations modified).
Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.
Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and
Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed the denial and issued the following written opinion:
Carl Woods appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary
hearing. He presents three arguments, all relating to
jury instructions he claims his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request. We affirm and write
only to address the first argument: whether trial
defense counsel should have requested a jury
instruction on common law self-defense.

. . .

After a 2016 jury trial, Woods was found guilty
and convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery,
and armed burglary. The convictions stemmed from an
incident that Woods testified was a drug deal gone
bad.

Woods claimed he was the middleman between
Rolando Valencia, a drug dealer, and his roommate
Xavier Davis. He testified the drug transaction was to
take place in Valencia’s apartment. When they
arrived, Woods introduced Valencia and Davis. Then,
inexplicably, after a “split second” Valencia and Davis
became engaged in a violent physical encounter.
Furniture was knocked over and Woods saw Valencia
and Davis with guns out trying to shoot one another.
Woods testified this turn of events was unexpected and
he was only trying to watch Valencia’s television. But
because the other two were attempting to shoot one
another, Woods thought it best to approach them in an
effort to break up the fight. Shots rang out and Woods
believed he had been struck by a bullet.[FN1] Though
he had not anticipated a firefight, he had indeed
brought along his own firearm. He did not know who
shot him. Nevertheless, Woods testified he drew his
firearm, approached Valencia who was up against a
wall in a corner of the room fending off an attacking
Davis, reached around Davis who was standing
between them, pressed the barrel of his gun against
Valencia and pulled the trigger—in self-defense. Davis
and Woods then fled the scene together. Neither called
to report the incident. To avoid disclosing his
involvement by going to a hospital, Woods stated he
had a friend remove the bullet from his leg.[FN2]

FN1. Woods later testified he was not sure
if he had been struck by a bullet.

FN2. Woods showed the jury a mark on his
leg and testified it was the location of his
injury.

Woods acknowledged he was engaged in
criminal activity—facilitating the purchase and sale of
illicit drugs—when he shot Valencia. The State sought
to disprove the self-defense claim and put on strong
circumstantial evidence that Woods intended to rob
and murder Valencia.

The jury found Woods guilty on all three
charges. On the murder charge, it found him guilty on
theories of premeditation and felony murder. It found
Woods committed the murder during the commission
of a burglary or robbery. It found Woods guilty of
burglary, necessarily finding Woods entered
Valencia’s apartment or remained therein with
criminal intent to commit another offense. It also
found Woods guilty of robbery, that he carried a
firearm while committing the offense, and that he
discharged the firearm during the commission of the
robbery causing death or great bodily harm. Woods
appealed his convictions and they were affirmed by
this Court. He subsequently filed a postconviction
motion.

. . .

In his postconviction motion, Woods claimed his
trial defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to request a jury instruction on common law
self-defense as it pertains to a person engaged in an
unlawful activity. This instruction can be given when
a defendant admits being engaged in unlawful activity
but is forced to act in self-defense. Dorsey v. State, 74
So. 3d 521, 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[W]here, as here,
a defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or
was in a place where he did not have a right to be at
the time he was attacked, the common law duty to
retreat still applies.”). Florida abrogated the common
law duty to retreat in all circumstances except when
engaged in unlawful activity. Id. at 526 (“Section
776.013 thus altered the law so that now there is ‘no
duty to retreat’ under a broad array of
circumstances.”). In such a case a defendant is entitled
to, upon request, the common law instruction which
includes a duty to retreat unless one cannot safely do
so. Id.

Because Woods admitted to being engaged in
unlawful activity, he argued this instruction should
have been given. And he argues because it was not
given, even if the jury believed his account, an
acquittal was extremely unlikely because the
instruction given conveys the impression deadly force
can only be used when in a lawful position.

The postconviction court denied the claim. It
found that because the jury determined the murder
was premeditated, Woods’ self-defense claim was
necessarily rejected and he could not show prejudice
from the error. This appeal followed. We affirm, but on
different grounds.

. . .

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), governs ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. “The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Even if Woods was entitled to the common law
self-defense instruction, a conclusion we need not
reach, his claim fails because he cannot demonstrate
prejudice. See Boone v. State, - - - So.3d - - - , 2020 WL
4524638, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1869 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug.
6, 2020) (denying relief after finding the jury
instruction the defendant argued his counsel should
have requested would not have changed the outcome
of the proceeding); Martinez v. State, 655 So. 2d 166,
169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“The question for our review
is whether his counsel’s failure to request that
instruction was so prejudicial that had the request
been made the outcome of the trial would have been
different.”). The jury found Woods guilty of robbery
and, therefore, found Woods had criminal intent to use
force in furtherance of an unlawful taking. There was
an express finding that Woods carried a firearm and
shot Valencia during the commission of the robbery.
That is, the jury found Woods shot Valencia as part of
his commission of a robbery and not in self-defense.
There is no reasonable probability the jury accepted
his account of self-defense but, due to the jury
instructions, felt compelled to find him guilty of
murder.

Ex. L; Woods v. State, 306 So. 3d 1236, 1236-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this
claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. As such, Ground One is denied.
B. Ground Two
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

request the use of the standard jury instruction on the taking of property
occurring as an afterthought to the use of force or violence against the victim.
Doc. 1 at 7. He contends that this standard instruction was central to his
defense and without it, “the remaining robbery instructions that were given to

the jury did not adequately explain that a jury could not convict Woods if it
determined the taking of the property occurred as an afterthought to the use of
force or violence against [the victim].” Doc. 4 at 23.
Petitioner, through counsel, raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion.

The state court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the claim,
reasoning as follows:
In Ground Two of his motion, Defendant argues
his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for an
afterthought jury instruction. Defendant contends this
jury instruction would have resulted in the jury
finding Defendant not guilty of robbery (Count Two).
The record demonstrates that Defendant’s attorney
was not deficient in failing to move for an afterthought
instruction. Additionally, the record shows that even
if Defendant’s attorney had moved for and received
such an instruction, the jury’s verdicts would not have
changed.

The afterthought jury instruction provides: “If
you find that the taking of property occurred as an
afterthought to the use of force or violence against the
victim, the taking does not constitute robbery but may
still constitute theft.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)
15.1; see also DeJesus v. State, 98 So. 3d 105 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2012).

Defendant testified at trial. Defendant testified
that he did not take anything from the victim’s
apartment. Defendant further testified that he did not
learn that his associate, Xavier “Shaun” Davis, took
anything from the victim’s apartment until later that
night. Defendant denied that he and Davis had any
common design to rob the victim. Defendant also
denied that he had anything to do with the taking of
the victim’s money.

Here, it is plain that the standard jury
instruction on robbery adequately covered the theory
of defense. Defendant did not contend that he took the
victim’s property as an afterthought to the use of force.
Instead, Defendant claimed he did not take anything
from the victim’s apartment. Believing Defendant’s
version of events would not have necessitated finding
Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of theft,
but would have instead necessitated finding
Defendant not guilty of either robbery or the lesser-
included offense of theft. Defendant’s trial testimony,
in which Defendant maintained actual innocence of
robbery, rendered an afterthought instruction
inapplicable. It is obvious that Defendant’s attorney
did not perform deficiently in failing to move for an
afterthought instruction when such an instruction
would have been fundamentally incompatible with
Defendant’s trial testimony. See Rigternick v. State,
193 So. 3d 846, 868 (Fla. 2016) (holding that defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to present
evidence which contradicted the defendant’s trial
testimony).

Moreover, the jury’s premeditation finding in
Count One undermines any contention that the jury
would have found Defendant not guilty of robbery if
they received an afterthought instruction. The State
presented ample evidence at trial that Defendant’s
motive in murdering the victim was to steal a large
shipment of high quality marijuana from the victim.
The jury’s finding that Defendant committed
premeditated murder proves the jury simply did not
believe Defendant’s “drug deal gone bad” version of
events. Accordingly, it is clear the jury would not have
acquitted Defendant of robbery even if the trial court
gave the jury an afterthought instruction.

Because Defendant can demonstrate neither
deficiency nor prejudice as required under Strickland,
this Court denies Ground Two of Defendant’s motion.

Ex. H at 107-09 (internal record citations omitted).
Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.
Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and
Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First DCA affirmed the denial of
this claim without comment. See Ex. L (affirming and writing only to address
the first argument set forth in Ground One above).
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this
claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. As such, Ground Two is denied.
C. Ground Three
According to Petitioner, his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

request the use of the standard jury instruction on an independent act. Doc. 1
at 8. He contends that without this standard instruction, “the remaining
instruction[s] given to the jury did not adequately explain that Woods could not
be convicted if the unlawful taking of property was outside of and not a

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the common design or unlawful act
contemplated.” Doc. 4 at 27.
Petitioner, through counsel, raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion.
The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing and then denied this

claim:
In Ground Three of his motion, Defendant
argues his attorney was ineffective for failing to
request the jury instruction regarding the
independent acts of another party. The independent
acts jury instruction in Defendant’s case would have
read:

If you find that the crimes alleged
were committed, an issue in this case is
whether the crimes of robbery and
burglary were independent[] acts of a
person other than the defendant. An
independent act occurs when a person
other than the defendant commits or
attempts to commit a crime

1. which the defendant did not
intend to occur, and
2. in which the defendant did not
participate, and
3. which was outside of and not a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
common design or unlawful act
contemplated by the defendant.

If you find the defendant was not
present when the crimes of robbery and
burglary occurred, that, in and of itself,
does not establish that the crimes of
robbery and burglary were independent
acts of another.

If you find that the crimes of robbery
and burglary were independent acts of
Xavier Davis, then you should find Carl
Woods not guilty of the crimes of robbery
and burglary.

See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(l).

At trial, the State presented overwhelming
evidence tending to show Defendant stole marijuana
and cash from the victim. On these facts, it is clear
that an independent act instruction was inapplicable.
See Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla. 2000)
(“Where, however, the defendant was a willing
participant in the underlying felony and the murder
resulted from forces which [defendant and his
accomplice] set in motion, no independent act
instruction is appropriate.”). Indeed, the jury found
Defendant guilty of both premeditated murder and
felony murder, which demonstrates the jury’s ultimate
conclusion that Defendant traveled to the victim’s
home with the conscious intent to murder and steal
from the victim. As such, an independent act
instruction would not have made any difference in the
trial’s outcome.
Thus, the record shows that Defendant’s
attorney did not perform deficiently by failing to move
for an independent act instruction. Moreover, the
record further shows that even if the trial court had
given such an instruction, the jury’s verdicts would not
have changed. Accordingly, this Court denies Ground
Three of Defendant’s motion.

Ex. H. at 109-110 (internal record citations omitted).
Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.
Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and
Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First DCA affirmed the denial of
this claim without comment. See Ex. L (affirming and writing only to address
the first argument set forth in Ground One above).
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this
claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. As such, Ground Three is denied.
D. Ground Four

Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors
rendered his trial unfair. Doc. 1 at 10. Petitioner raised this claim, through
counsel, in his Rule 3.850 motion. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on
the three ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the postconviction court
denied the cumulative error claim:

In Ground Four of his motion, Defendant asserts
cumulative error. However, “[c]laims of cumulative
error do not warrant relief where each claim of error is
either meritless, procedurally barred, or does not meet
the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 562
(Fla. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). As such,
Defendant’s cumulative error claim necessarily fails
and this Court denies Ground Four of Defendant’s
motion.

Ex. H at 110.
Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.
Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and
Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First DCA affirmed without
comment. See Ex. L (affirming and writing only to address the first argument
set forth in Ground One above).
The First DCA’s opinion did not acknowledge that Petitioner raised this
claim on appeal, even though it was included in his initial brief. See id. (“He
presents three arguments, all relating to jury instructions he claims his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request.” (emphasis added)). Regardless,
assuming that cumulative error claims are cognizable on federal habeas review,
none of Petitioner’s individual ineffectiveness claims warrant relief; thus, there
is nothing to accumulate. See Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117,
1132 (11th Cir. 2012). Petitioner’s trial counsel’s alleged errors, neither
individually nor cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial or due process. Thus,

considering the record, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to federal
habeas relief on Ground Four.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
2. If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.
Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not

warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any
motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such
termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.5

5 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration
of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20% day of
February, 2024.

. Cimelbeg □□ Corrig on
Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge

JAX-3 2/8
C:
Carl Ezekiel Woods, #J50110
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115171. Public record. Not legal advice.