# United States v. Gaynor

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 9, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115092

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 9, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115092

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that under Rule 805, a statement with multiple levels of hearsay is not admissible unless all levels fall under Rule 801 or an exception

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:21-cv-382-JES-KCD

GEORGE N. GAYNOR JR., in
his capacity as personal
representative of the
Estate of Lavern N. Gaynor
and trustee of the Lavern
N. Gaynor Revocable Trust,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on two Motions in Limine,
one filed by the United States of America (the Government or
Plaintiff) on January 11, 2024 (Doc. #68) and the other filed by
defendant George N. Gaynor Jr. on the same day. (Doc. #69.) Each
party also filed their respective Responses in Opposition. (Docs
##76-77.)
The only issue for the jury in this case is whether Lavern
N. Gaynor’s (Mrs. Gaynor) failure to file FBAR forms for each of
the tax years 2009, 2010, and 2011 was “willful.” Mrs. Gaynor
is deceased, so the defendant is her son, George N. Gaynor Jr.
(Gaynor or Defendant), in his representative capacity. The
motions in limine relate to the admissibility of three categories
of evidence: (1) certain financial records; (2) a biographical
“as told to” book titled Lal: A Legacy of Gracious Giving; and
(3) evidence about Gaynor’s own FBAR penalty proceedings. For the
reasons set forth below, each motion is granted in part and denied

in part.
I.
A motion in limine is a "motion, whether made before or
during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before
the evidence is actually offered." Luce v. United States, 469
U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). These motions "are generally disfavored."
Acevedo v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1192 (S.D. Fla.
2017). "Evidence is excluded upon a motion in limine only if the
evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose." Id. "A motion
in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve substantive issues,
to test issues of law, or to address or narrow the issues to be
tried." McHale v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 8:19-CV-707-VMC-SPF,

2021 WL 4527509, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2021)(citing LSQ Funding
Grp. v. EDS Field Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla.
2012)). "Nor may a party use a motion in limine to sterilize the
other party's presentation of the case." Harris v. Wingo, No.
2:18-CV-17-FTM-29MRM, 2021 WL 5028201, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29,
2021)(cleaned up). Additionally, as the Supreme Court has
cautioned:
The ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds,
particularly if the actual testimony differs from what
was contained in the defendant's proffer. Indeed even
if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district
judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.

Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42.
"A denial of a motion in limine is not a ruling which
affirmatively admits any particular evidence," Harris, 2021 WL
5028201, at *1, and does not preserve an issue for appellate
review. United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.2 (11th Cir.
2009). “The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
evidence is inadmissible on any relevant ground.” United States
v. Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010). "Unless
evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be
deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy,
and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context." In
re Seroquel Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 606MD-1769-ORL-22DAB, 2009
WL 260989, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009).
II.
The parties disagree over the admissibility of certain
financial records. The parties do not dispute the authenticity
of the records (Doc. #77, p. 1), or the accuracy of the
translations. (Id.) Rather, the issue is whether the records come
within the business records exception to hearsay contained in
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(6), or alternatively, Rule
807’s residual hearsay exception.
“Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by a declarant
while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.” United States v. Santos, 947 F.3d 711,

723 (11th Cir. 2020)(quoting United States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d
1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2015)). “Hearsay is inadmissible unless the
statement is not hearsay as provided by Rule 801(d) or falls into
one of the hearsay exceptions.” United States v. Caraballo, 595
F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010)(quoting United States v. Baker,
432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005)).
A. Business Records Exception to Hearsay
A statement that is otherwise inadmissible hearsay is
admissible if it satisfies the business record exception to the
hearsay rule. A statement is a business record if it is a record
of an event and: (1) was made at or near the time of the event
by someone with knowledge; (2) was kept in the course of a

regularly conducted business activity; (3) making the record was
a regular practice of that activity; (4) those conditions are
shown by the testimony of the custodian of the records or another
qualified witness or by a certification that complies with Rule
902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and
(5) the opponent does not show that the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). See Carrizosa v. Chiquita
Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022).
The “qualified witness” need not have been the one who
prepared the documents, “so long as other circumstantial evidence
and testimony suggest their trustworthiness.” Itel Cap. Corp. v.

Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 1983). A “testifying
witness does not need firsthand knowledge of the contents of the
records, of their authors, or even of their preparation. Nor
must the witness know the precise circumstances under which the
records were kept as long as enough circumstantial evidence
establish[es] the trustworthiness of the underlying documents.
Rule 803 does not demand that the one who kept the record, or
even had supervision over [its] preparation, testify.” United
States v. Ahmed, 73 F.4th 1363, 1383 (11th Cir. 2023)(citations
and internal punctuation omitted.)
As the proponent of the evidence, the Government bears the
burden of showing that the documents are authentic” and that they

meet the requirements of Rule 803(6). In re Int'l Mgmt. Assocs.,
LLC, 781 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2015). Since the parties
agree the documents are authentic, (Doc. #77, p. 1), the only
question is whether the financial records meet the requirements
of Rule 803(6). “In the end, admissibility under the business
records exception boils down to reliability, ‘and a trial judge
has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of such
evidence.’” Ahmed, 73 F.4th at 1382–83 (quoting United States
v. Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020)).
B. Residual Hearsay Exception
After reasonable notice, “Rule 807 allows a hearsay
statement to be admitted, even if it doesn't fall under any

exception in Rules 803 or 804, if the statement (1) ‘is supported
by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness—after considering the
totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence,
if any, corroborating the statement,’ and (2) ‘is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.’” Chiquita
Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th at 1326 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
807(a)). “‘Congress intended the residual hearsay exception to
be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances,’ and
it ‘appl[ies] only when certain exceptional guarantees of
trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and
necessity are present.’” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306,
1312 (11th Cir. 2015)(quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556

F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir.2009)). “[T]he burden is on the party
seeking to invoke the residual exception to clearly demonstrate
the existence of the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness.”
N.L.R.B. v. United Sanitation Serv., Div. of Sanitas Serv. Corp.,
737 F.2d 936, 941 (11th Cir. 1984)(citing United States v. Colson,
662 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1981)).
C. The Contested Financial Documents
The contested financial records can be divided into four
categories, based on how they are being certified: (1) Records

of Frey & Co. Administration AG, which are supported by a
declaration from Ernst Specht, identified as the managing
director of Frey & Co. Administration AG (Doc. #68-2); (2) Records
of Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation, which are supported
by a declaration from Sascha Zuger, identified as the country
managing director of Vistra Zurich (Doc. #68-4); (3) Records of
Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd., which are supported by a declaration
from Christoph Hiestand, identified as Group General Counsel for
Julius Baer Group Ltd. (Doc. #68-1); and (4) Records of Banque
Louis, which are unsupported by any declaration.
(1) Frey & Co. Administration AG Records
Defendant argues the Frey & Co. Administration AG records

do not meet the requirement in Rule 803(6)(d) because “the
declarant—Ernst Specht—has inserted a caveat to the declaration”
by adding the word ‘presumably’. (Doc. #77, p. 4.) The declaration
was obviously modified to insert the word ‘presumably’, as
follows:
I further declare that the documents attached are
original records or true copies of records that: were
made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
matters set forth therein, by (or from information
transmitted by) a person presumably with knowledge of
those matters . . . .
(Doc. #68-2)(emphasis added.) “The problem,” the Defendant
argues, “is that by inserti[ng] the word ‘presumably’ to qualify
his attestation, Specht states merely that he assumes the fact

is correct, rather than that he can attest to it even based upon
other than first-hand knowledge.” (Doc. #77, p. 4-5.)
Defendant cites no authority and his argument is
unpersuasive. Declarations under Rule 803(6) need not adhere to
a set language to be valid. See Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 47
F.4th at 1300. The declarant here is merely stating what is often
the case: he cannot personally speak for someone else’s
knowledge. Nor does he need to. “It is not essential that the
offering witness be the recorder or even be certain of who
recorded the item. It is sufficient that the witness be able to
identify the record as authentic and specify that it was made and
preserved in the regular course of business.” United States v.
Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1327 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Atchley, 699 F.2d 1055, 1058 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here,

the declarant does just that: “I further declare that that the
documents attached hereto . . . were kept in the course of the
regularly conducted business activity of Frey & Co.” and “were
prepared or maintained in the course of the said business activity
as a regular practice . . . .” (Doc. #68-2.) The insertion of the
word ‘presumably’ does not make the declaration or the evidence
it supports unreliable.
This portion of Defendant’s motion is denied. The Frey &
Co. Administration AG records are not inadmissible under the
business records exception.
(2) Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation Records

Defendant argues that the Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto
Foundation records do not meet the requirement in Rule 803(6)(d)
because the declarant, Sascha Zuger, “does not explain how—as an
employee of Vistra Zurich—he could be in a position to attest to
the records of Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation.” (Doc.
#77, p. 5.)
A declarant does not need to be employed by the same entity
whose business records are offered. See United States v. Flom,
558 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1977)1 (“Although the usual case
involves an employee of the preparing business laying the
necessary foundation under 803(6), the law is clear that under

circumstances which demonstrate trustworthiness it is not
necessary that the one who kept the record, or even had
supervision over [its] preparation, testify.”). But “Fed. R.
Evid. 803(6) [does] require[] the testimony [or declaration] of

1 The Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] adopted as binding precedent
all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, as
well as all decisions issued after that date by a Unit B panel
of the former Fifth Circuit.” In re Forrest, 47 F.4th 1229, 1235
n.3 (11th Cir. 2022)(citing Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667
F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982)). Any other opinions from other
circuits are merely persuasive.
a custodian or other qualified witness who can explain the record-
keeping procedure utilized.” United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d
1016, 1018–19 (11th Cir. 1997). Who qualifies as “[a ‘]qualified

witness’ is given a very broad interpretation. The witness need
only have enough familiarity with the record-keeping system of
the entity in question to explain how the record came into
existence.” Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th at 1299–300
(alterations in the original) (quoting Weinstein's Fed. Evid. §
at 803.08[8][a]). “It is not necessary for the person who actually
prepared the documents to testify so long as there is other
circumstantial evidence and testimony to suggest the
trustworthiness of the documents.” Garnett, 122 F.3d at
1019(citing Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253,
1259 (11th Cir. 1983)).
The Government does not explain the link between Vistra

Zurich and the entities whose records are being offered. Sascha
Zuger states in her declaration that “[b]y reasons of [her]
position [she is] authorized and qualified to make th[e]
declaration.” (Doc. #68-4.) But this does not say what the
position is with regard to Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto
Foundation, or who authorized her, or how she is qualified. Such
conclusory statements are not sufficient to show the
trustworthiness of the records.
This portion of Defendant’s motion is granted to the extent
that the Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation records are
inadmissible under the business records exception if this is the

foundation presented at trial.
(3) Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd Records
Defendant argues that the Bank Julius records do not meet
the requirement in Rule 803(6)(e) because the bank has previously
“admitted to falsifying records concerning foreign bank accounts
held by American taxpayers—the very kinds of records the
Government seeks to admit” here. (Doc. #77, pp. 5-6.) The
defendant points to two deferred prosecution agreements executed
by Bank Julius in 2016 and 2021 as proof. (See Docs. ##77-1,2.)
“Even if the underlying documents satisfied [all the other
803(6)] requirements, they would still be inadmissible if either
their ‘source of information’ or their ‘method or circumstances

of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.’” In re Int'l
Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 781 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
803(6)(e)). For example, in Dreer, the proffered evidence itself
was not shown to be “falsified, [but] there was an extremely
strong inference arising from evidence of numerous other forged
financial documents that the proffered evidence was not genuine.”
Id., 740 F.2d at 20. That was enough for the district court to
find the proponent had not met his burden of establishing the
evidence was reliable enough to qualify under the business
records exception. Id.
Here, Defendant presents no evidence of “numerous” other

forged financial documents. In the first deferred prosecution
agreement, Bank Julius admitted to, among other things, giving
clients codenames, maintaining accounts for clients in names of
others, and not maintaining bank records in the United States,
all to help those clients evade taxes. (Doc. #77-1, pp. 27-28.)
Nowhere does Bank Julius admit to falsifying its documents. In
the second deferred prosecution agreement, Bank Julius admitted
generally to turning a blind eye to money laundering for soccer
bribes from about February 2013 to May 2015. (Doc. #77-2, p. 25-
35.) Again, nowhere does Bank Julius admit to falsifying its
documents. Additionally, the admissions relate to an unrelated
time-period and topic. This portion of Defendant’s motion is

denied. The Bank Julius records are not inadmissible under the
business records exception.
(4) Banque Louis Records
The Government argues the uncertified Banque Louis records
are admissible through Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception.
(Doc. #68, pp. 8-14.) The Defendant disagrees. (Doc. #77, pp. 7-
9.) So does the Court.
The Banque Louis records fail to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 807 for several reasons. First, they cannot be said to
possess exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness. While they
seem to bear typical bank markings, they are not accompanied by
any testimony, declaration, certification or evidence that can

attest to their truthfulness or reliability. The Government
indicates they were pulled by an unnamed “former IT technician”
(Doc. #68, p. 2), so its chain of custody is questionable at
best. The Government has “made no showing that reasonable
efforts could not have produced a witness with personal knowledge
of” the information in the proffered exhibits. United States v.
Scrima, 819 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987). Defendant’s motion
is granted to the extent the Banque Louis records will not be
admissible if this is the only foundation presented at trial.
III.
Defendant argues Lal should be excluded because it is
impermissible hearsay, irrelevant under Rule 401, and

substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403.
(Doc. #69, p. 3.) The Government responds that “the book is not
hearsay because it is an adopted statement of a party opponent”
under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), it is not offered to prove the truth of
the matter, and it is relevant. (Doc. # 76, pp. 4-5.) The offered
passages recount Mrs. Gaynor’s great-grandmother’s “boycott of
the IRS” and how Mrs. Gaynor “inherited [her] great grandmother’s
belief . . . .” (Lal, at 19-21.) They also recount how “well over
seventy percent of [her uncle’s] money went to the government,”
(id. at 60), how she was “vocal about [her] beliefs” that “double-
tax[ation]” while living overseas was wrong, (id. at 223), “that
capital gains taxes are wrong,” (id.), and that she was “adamantly

against taxation.” (Id.)
As pertinent to this case, to be admissible as an adoptive
admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), “there must be sufficient
foundational facts from which the jury could infer that the
defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement.”
Santos, 947 F.3d at 724 (quoting United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d
1303, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1990)). The foundational facts from
which the jury could infer that Mrs. Gaynor heard, understood,
and acquiesced in the contents of the book, according to the
Government, are that she holds the book’s copyright, that she
distributed the book to her family members, and the author of the
book submitted a declaration stating that Mrs. Gaynor “reviewed

and accepted” the book “as an accurate retelling of her life
story . . . .” (Doc. #69-2, ¶¶ 6-7.) None are sufficient, either
alone or cumulatively.
A jury could not infer from Mrs. Gaynor’s copyright and her
distribution of the book that she heard, understood, and
acquiesced in the particular statements sought to be offered. The
author’s declaration is more on point, but it itself is hearsay
and thus not a “foundational fact” on which the jury could rely.
See Woodyard v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 700 F. App'x 927, 929 n.3
(11th Cir. 2017).2 Additionally, it is undisputed that the words
in the book are those of Dr. Judith Kolva, and not those of Mrs.
Gaynor. (See Doc. #69-2, ¶ 6)(Dr. Kolva’s declaration that “the

text reflects [her] reconstruction of what Mrs. Gaynor said . .
. using words and phrases [Dr. Kolva] drafted.”).3 Thus, “[t]he
[book] involves two levels of hearsay: the [book] says that [Dr.
Kolva] said (first level) that [Mrs. Gaynor] made certain
admissions (second level).” S. Stone Co. v. Singer, 665 F.2d 698,
703 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Based on this record, the book remains
inadmissible hearsay.
The Government argues that “to the extent the book contains
hearsay statements, the United States is not offering them to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, it would offer
the statement to demonstrate Mrs. Gaynor’s state of mind and
motive for keeping a secret Swiss account.” (Doc. #76, p.

9)(internal citations omitted). As an example, the Government
illustrates that it is not offering the statements “to show that
Mrs. Gaynor’s uncle’s estate did in fact pay ‘well over seventy

2 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and
are persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”
Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7
(11th Cir. 2007).
3 If the book was Mrs. Gaynor’s statements, then Rule
801(d)(2)(B) would not even be applicable. United States v.
Mentor, 570 F. App'x 894, 898 (11th Cir.
2014)(unpublished)(“[S]ince the letter was [defendant]'s own
statement, it cannot be an adoptive admission.”).
percent of the money . . . to the government.’” (Id.)(quoting Lal
at p. 60.)
But the Government’s argument only attacks the second level

of hearsay—Mrs. Gaynor’s alleged statements—while the other level
remains. See United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942
(11th Cir. 1988)(explaining that under Rule 805, a statement with
multiple levels of hearsay is not admissible unless all levels
fall under Rule 801 or an exception). By necessity, the
Government is offering Dr. Kolva’s hearsay—that Mrs. Gaynor said
these statements—for their truth. Otherwise, the book would be
worthless (i.e., irrelevant)4 to the case. Defendant’s motion
is granted to the extent the book and its cited passages will not
be admissible if this is the only foundation presented at trial.
IV.
Defendant argues that reference to his own prior FBAR

proceedings should be excluded as irrelevant under Rule 401,
substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403, and
privileged under Rule 408. (Doc. #69, p. 11.) The prior
proceedings, as described by the Defendant, are as follows:
In January 27, 2014, George Gaynor, Jr. was advised
that his 2010 Tax Return had been selected for audit.

4 Defendant argues that the book is “not relevant to this
case and run[s] a substantial risk of unfairly prejudicing
Defendant, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.” (Doc.
#69, p. 9.) The Court questions the relevancy of the cited
passages, but need not resolve that issue in light of the
continuing hearsay nature of the evidence.
On May 18, 2017, the IRS assessed willful FBAR
penalties against George Gaynor, Jr., for his failure
to report a bank account in which he had a reportable
interest. The accounts at issue in George Gaynor Jr.’s
FBAR case were not the same accounts as are at issue
in this case. George Gaynor appealed this assessment
within the IRS and eventually filed suit concerning the
liability in the United States Court for Federal
Claims. The case was ultimately settled in September
2021.
(Id. at pp. 10-11.) The Government explains that some of the
facts between the cases are intertwined, as “Mrs. Gaynor managed
her Swiss Accounts through Mr. Gaynor” and “Mr. Gaynor met with
the same individual Swiss bankers and Swiss financial advisors .
. . to manage both his mother’s accounts and his own.” (Doc. #76,
p. 12.) The Government states it only intends to “use the facts
underlying those proceedings that are relevant here,” with the
“source[s]” being “admissions, testimony, and party stipulations
in Mr. Gaynor’s prior FBAR litigation in the Court of Federal
claims.” (Id. at p. 14.)
Courts in this Circuit have consistently been wary that
“raising . . . prior . . . lawsuit[s] would effectively create a
‘mini-trial’ about the merits of the previous case[s] and other
‘collateral issues’ that may not relate to the present case.”
Goussen v. Mendez Fuel Holdings LLC, No. 18-20012-CIV, 2018 WL
5831084, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2018)(quoting Bui v. Minority
Mobile Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 6518804, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28,
2016); see also Gutierrez v. Galiano Enterprises of Miami, Corp.,
No. 17-24081-CIV, 2019 WL 3302325, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 23,
2019); Pineda v. Pescatlantic Grp., LLC, No. 16-25291-CIV, 2018
WL 11346674, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2018). The relevancy is

even more dubious here given that the prior case is not even Mrs.
Gaynor’s. Courts have recognized that “Plaintiff can demonstrate
Defendants' potential willfulness . . . through witness
testimonies or other evidence of Defendant[‘s] past actions and
practices without mention of previous lawsuits.” Goussen, 2018
WL 5831084, at *2 (quoting Bui, 2016 WL 6518804, at *1). While
the government may, for example, elicit testimony that “Mrs.
Gaynor managed her Swiss Accounts through Mr. Gaynor,” this would
not seem to make Gaynor’s personal FBAR experience relevant or
admissible. But, as is often the case with evidentiary issues,
the Court is not in a position prior to trial to definitively
resolve the objection. United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 336, 339

(5th Cir. 1979)(“[Q]uestions of admissibility are more easily
understood in the specific context in which they arise.”) The
motion will be granted to the extent that the government may not
elicit testimony or evidence concerning Gaynor’s own FBAR
proceedings without the prior approval of the Court.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
The Parties’ Motion in Limine (Doc. #68) and Motion in Limine
(Doc. #69) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth
above.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 9th day
of February, 2024.

— (2 _ i
AA) Pe,
JQGH E. STEELE
5 ISR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115092. Public record. Not legal advice.