# Scafidi v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 1, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115068

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 1, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115068

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that it was “clear that the cause of Haynes’s aneurysm was a medical causation issue beyond the scope of a layperson’s knowledge that required competent medical testimony”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

COURTNEY SCAFIDI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-2772-VMC-TGW

B. BRAUN MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant.
______________________________/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
B. Braun Medical, Inc.’s Omnibus Motion in Limine (Doc. #
76), filed on December 19, 2023. Plaintiff Courtney Scafidi
responded on January 9, 2024. (Doc. # 79). For the reasons
that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Legal Standard
“A motion in limine presents a pretrial issue of
admissibility of evidence that is likely to arise at trial,
and as such, the order, like any other interlocutory order,
remains subject to reconsideration by the court throughout
the trial.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06–
md–1769–ACC-DAB, 6:07–cv–15733–ACC-DAB, 2009 WL 260989, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). “The real purpose of a motion in
limine is to give the trial judge notice of the movant’s
position so as to avoid the introduction of damaging evidence
which may irretrievably [a]ffect the fairness of the trial.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A court has the power to
exclude evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly
inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
“A motion in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve

substantive issues, to test issues of law, or to address or
narrow the issues to be tried.” LSQ Funding Grp. v. EDS Field
Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citing
Royal Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07–80172–
CIV, 2008 WL 2323900, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008)). “Denial
of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all
evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at
trial.” In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Instead, denial of the motion
means the court cannot determine whether the evidence in
question should be excluded outside the trial context.” Id.

“The court will entertain objections on individual proffers
as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within
the scope of a denied motion in limine.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 401 defines “relevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. All
relevant evidence is admissible unless “its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.
402, 403; United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1524 (11th
Cir. 1994). Use of Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence is
an “extraordinary remedy” whose “major function . . . is
limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative
force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial
effect.” United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2001).
The district court has broad discretion to determine the
admissibility of evidence, and the appellate court will not

disturb this Court’s judgment absent a clear abuse of
discretion. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th
Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273,
1285 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Inherent in this standard is the firm
recognition that there are difficult evidentiary rulings that
turn on matters uniquely within the purview of the district
court, which has first-hand access to documentary evidence
and is physically proximate to testifying witnesses and the
jury.”).
II. Discussion
In its Motion, Braun seeks to exclude nine categories of
evidence. The Court will address the various categories

separately.
A. Categories Seven through Nine
As a preliminary matter, Scafidi does not oppose the
Motion as to categories seven through nine because she “will
not seek to introduce evidence on those topics at trial.”
(Doc. # 79 at 1).
Thus, the Motion is granted as unopposed for the
following categories of evidence:
7. Testimony of Plaintiff’s pastor and parents
regarding any documents or notes prepared
concerning any counsel they provided Plaintiff;
8. Evidence and argument related to Plaintiff’s
causes of action for retaliation; and
9. Evidence about the existence of liability
insurance.
(Doc. # 76 at 2).
B. Vestal Recorded Video Conversation
Braun seeks to exclude a video “showing a conversation
between [Braun employee] Ms. Juliet Vestal and a non-customer
facing employee.” (Id. at 3). According to Braun, this video
should be excluded because it “(a) was unlawfully recorded
under Pennsylvania law, (b) is not relevant under Federal
Rule of Evidence 401, and (c) its probative value, if any, is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury under Rule
403.” (Id. at 4).
While there is a factual dispute as to whether the video
was lawfully recorded, the Court agrees with Braun that
exclusion of the video is proper. The video — which was
recorded after Scafidi’s termination — is irrelevant to the
issues in this case, given that Ms. Vestal was discussing
religious accommodations with a non-customer-facing employee.
(Id. at 4-6). Scafidi, however, was a customer-facing
employee who traveled to hospitals and other medical

facilities as part of her work. As such, she was subject to
Braun’s vaccine policy for customer-facing employees — not
its policy for non-customer-facing employees. Thus, the video
sheds no light on whether Braun offered Scafidi a reasonable
accommodation or whether giving Scafidi a blanket exemption
from the vaccine requirement for customer-facing employees
would have been an undue hardship. Furthermore, even if the
video had arguable relevance, there is a high risk that it
would confuse or mislead the jury about the issues in this
case such that the video is due to be excluded under Rule
403.
The Motion is granted as to the video.

C. Scafidi’s Job Performance
Next, Braun seeks to exclude any evidence or testimony
about Scafidi’s “favorable job performance” from trial as
irrelevant and a waste of time. (Id. at 7).
The evidence of Scafidi’s job performance appears
largely irrelevant to the claims of religious discrimination
given that Braun has already admitted that Scafidi’s
termination was unrelated to her job performance. (Id.).
Indeed, during her deposition, Scafidi also acknowledged that
her termination was unrelated to her performance. (Scafidi
Depo. at 74:1-3). Thus, evidence about Scafidi’s job

performance does nothing to establish any of the issues in
this case, such as whether Scafidi had a sincerely held
religious belief that conflicted with the vaccine
requirement, whether Braun offered Scafidi a reasonable
accommodation, or whether Braun would have suffered an undue
hardship if it had exempted Scafidi from the vaccine
requirement. Furthermore, Scafidi’s introduction of
significant evidence and testimony on this subject could
confuse or mislead the jury as to the actual legal and factual
issues to be decided in this case.
Nevertheless, the Court will not exclude this evidence
in its entirety at this time. So that she may tell her story

during trial, it is reasonable to allow Scafidi to briefly
touch upon her job performance while at Braun. However, the
Court warns that it will limit such testimony and evidence so
that the Court and the jury’s time is not wasted. The Motion
is denied without prejudice as to this category of evidence.
D. Braun’s Relative Wealth
Braun also seeks to preclude Scafidi “from submitting
evidence or making argument regarding [] Braun’s wealth,
size, finances, number of employees, or ability to pay.” (Doc.
# 76 at 9). It argues that its “size, finances, and/or ability
to pay is not relevant to the cause of action or defenses and

would only be used to prejudice the jury.” (Id.).
This request is denied without prejudice. As even Braun
acknowledges, Braun’s size and wealth are at least minimally
relevant to its undue burden defense. (Id.). Furthermore,
Scafidi is correct that “the financial size and condition of
[Braun] is relevant in proving punitive damages.” Lawson v.
KFH Indus., Inc., No. 1:09CV609-WHA, 2010 WL 11692214, at *1
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2010).
Still, the Court is mindful of the potential unfair
prejudice that focus on this evidence could create for Braun.
“[T]he relative wealth of the parties should not be the focus
of the trial, and to the extent [Scafidi] attempt[s] to

compare the parties’ wealth or size to make a ‘David and
Goliath’ argument, [Braun] may re-raise this objection at
trial.” Delta T, LLC v. Dan’s Fan City, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-
1731-VMC-SPF, 2021 WL 2159889, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2021)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
McHale v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 8:19-cv-707-VMC-SPF, 2021
WL 4527509, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2021) (“Plaintiffs may
not make quintessential ‘David versus Goliath’ arguments, or
compare Crown to other corporations such as Enron.”), aff’d,
No. 21-14005, 2022 WL 4350702 (11th Cir. Sept. 20, 2022).
E. Other Employees’ Allegations of Discrimination

Next, Braun argues that “evidence of other individuals
who were denied accommodation requests, some of whom have
brought their own lawsuits against [] Braun,” should be
excluded from trial. (Doc. # 76 at 11). Among other things,
Braun insists such “me too” evidence of alleged religious
discrimination is irrelevant to Scafidi’s claims, presents
inadmissible hearsay, will waste limited trial time, and “its
admission will confuse the issues, mislead the jury and cause
unfair prejudice that outweighs any probative value under
Rule 403.” (Id. at 12-14). It emphasizes that Scafidi is
asserting only claims of religious discrimination; she is not
asserting a hostile work environment claim or a pattern and

practice-based claim.
“In cases alleging employment discrimination and
retaliation, ‘me too’ evidence involving claims made by other
employees may be properly admitted pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b) ‘to prove the defendant’s motive, . . .
intent, . . . [or] plan’ to discriminate against the
plaintiff.’” Hausburg v. McDonough, No. 8:20-cv-2300-JSS,
2024 WL 111994, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2024) (quoting
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2008)). However, “courts are reluctant to consider
‘prior bad acts’ in this context where those acts do not

relate directly to the plaintiffs.” Denney v. City of Albany,
247 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2001). “Even when ‘me too’
evidence is relevant under Rule 401, the district court
retains the discretion to exclude that evidence, under Rule
403, if it is unduly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or
cumulative.” Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240,
1258 (11th Cir. 2014).
“Determining whether Rule 404(b) or corroborative
evidence is admissible is a ‘fact-intensive, context-specific
inquiry’ that ‘rests within the sound discretion of the
district court[.]’” Hausburg, 2024 WL 111994, at *2 (quoting
Adams, 754 F.3d at 1258). “Courts generally admit only that

corroborative evidence that ‘closely compares’ with the
circumstances alleged by the plaintiff.” Id.
The Court is hesitant to allow admission of “me too”
evidence here given its limited relevance and the high risk
of undue prejudice and confusing the jury. Nevertheless, the
Court denies the Motion without prejudice at this time because
it is unclear what witnesses would present this “me too”
evidence or whether their experiences closely compare to
Scafidi’s. At trial, when it becomes clear what evidence
Scafidi intends to introduce, Braun may raise its objections
again.

F. Scafidi’s Physical Ailments
Braun “anticipates that Scafidi will testify that she
suffered two ‘stroke like type episodes’ because of her
separation from [] Braun in an attempt to bolster her non-
economic damages.” (Doc. # 76 at 14). Braun contends that
this testimony “should be excluded as inadmissible lay
opinion evidence that is unsupported by any medical
evidence.” (Id.). Indeed, Scafidi testified during her
deposition that these episodes had not been diagnosed as a
stroke by a doctor. (Scafidi Depo. at 232:24-238:19).
In this case, Scafidi seeks, among other things,
compensatory damages for emotional distress. “[A]lthough a

plaintiff’s testimony, standing alone, can support an award
of compensatory damages for emotional distress . . . , the
testimony must establish that the plaintiff suffered
demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently
articulated.” Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408
F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Scafidi “need not provide expert
testimony or abundant corroborating evidence of emotional
distress.” Ramones v. Experian Info. Sols., LLC, No. 19-
62949-CIV, 2021 WL 4050874, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2021).
Her “testimony alone can be sufficient” to establish

emotional distress. Id.
That said, a stroke is not emotional distress. Rather,
it is a medical event that requires a medical diagnosis — not
merely a plaintiff’s speculation that she suffered a stroke.
See Wingster v. Head, 318 F. App’x 809, 814 (11th Cir. 2009)
(stating that it was “clear that the cause of Haynes’s
aneurysm was a medical causation issue beyond the scope of a
layperson’s knowledge that required competent medical
testimony”). While Scafidi certainly may testify about any
emotional anguish, anxiety, and depression she experienced
after her termination, she may not testify that she suffered
a stroke or “stroke-like episode.” Again, as she admitted in

her deposition, the “stroke-like episodes” she suffered have
not been medically diagnosed as strokes. Nor does Scafidi
have other medical expert testimony to present at trial to
that effect.
Thus, the Motion is granted to the extent that Scafidi
may not testify that she suffered a stroke or “stroke-like
episode.” This ruling does not prevent her from testifying as
to the emotional distress she experienced.
G. Opinion Testimony about Braun’s Motives
Finally, Braun seeks to exclude “argument and testimony
related to non-decision makers’ opinions regarding [] Braun’s

motives for implementing its COVID-19 vaccine policy and its
actions towards Scafidi.” (Doc. # 76 at 15). Because “such
evidence and argument is based on speculation and hearsay and
is not based on personal knowledge,” Braun argues that such
“testimony would likely confuse and mislead the jury and
unfairly prejudice” Braun. (Id.).
Although it is unclear at this time whose testimony
Scafidi intends to offer, the Court agrees with Braun that
testimony on this subject should be entirely excluded if a
witness does not possess personal knowledge. “Co-workers’
opinions . . . are generally irrelevant to establish

discrimination or any [discriminatory] intent on the part of
the employer.” Brown v. Progress Energy, No. 8:07-cv-1599-
RAL-TGW, 2009 WL 212426, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2009),
aff’d, 364 F. App’x 556 (11th Cir. 2010). Scafidi may not
introduce any lay opinion testimony about Braun’s motive or
the reason for Scafidi’s termination from Braun employees who
have no personal knowledge of Braun’s decision to terminate
Scafidi. See Johnson v. Scotty’s, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1276,
1283 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (striking a co-worker’s affidavit
because the co-worker was “a lay witness giving an opinion,
from which she forms on the basis of comments, about

management’s decision to terminate the Plaintiff” and the co-
worker “had no personal knowledge as to the reasons for
[Plaintiff’s] termination”).
The Motion is granted as to this category of evidence,
which would essentially be lay speculation about Braun’s
motives. Such lay speculation is both irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. However, testimony from other Braun employees
who do possess personal knowledge of Braun’s motives and
decision to terminate Scafidi is not excluded.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendant B. Braun Medical, Inc.’s Omnibus Motion in
Limine (Doc. # 76) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as
set forth herein.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this lst
day of February, 2024.

Eigen Maca ee
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10115068. Public record. Not legal advice.