# Ray v. State of Florida

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114792

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114792

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the Supreme Court in Younger set three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: “(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or (3
- finding that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’ ”
- finding that the public defender “did not act under ‘color of state law’ notwithstanding his appointment as counsel by a judicial officer”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

CLIFTON MICHAEL RAY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-770-JES-NPM

STATE OF FLORIDA, CAPE
CORAL POLICE DEPARTMENT,
FORT MYERS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, and PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Lee
County,

Defendants.
/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Clifton Michael Ray, a pretrial detainee at the Lee
County Jail, initiated this action by filing a 23-page handwritten
pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint along with 30 pages
of attachments. (Doc. 1). Ray generally complains of alleged
constitutional violations that occurred during his arrest and his
pre-trial court proceedings. He also alleges unconstitutional
conditions of confinement and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ray seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4), and his complaint
is before the Court on initial screening.
After careful consideration of the complaint and attachments,
the Court concludes that Ray has not stated a claim on which relief
may be granted. The complaint is, therefore, dismissed without
prejudice.
I. Complaint
On May 20, 2023, Ray was approached by Officer Kelvis
Rodriguez as he (Ray) sat in his legally parked car. (Doc. 1 at
5). Officer Rodriguez said that he was there because Ray had

violated an open container law. (Id. at 6). Officer Rodriguez
told Ray that his vehicle would be searched for narcotics. (Id.)
During the search, the police seized pay stubs, gift cards, tax
returns, bank and business documents, and electronics, but not
narcotics. (Id.) Ray was arrested and the vehicle impounded.
(Id.)1 Ray asserts that he did not receive a property receipt for
the vehicle or its contents. (Id. at 7). The remainder of Ray’s
complaint is directed towards his allegedly inept public
defender(s) and the lack of due process afforded to pretrial
detainees in Lee County courts. (Id. at 718). Ray also complains
about the price of commissary items at the Lee County Jail and
alleges that his mail has been tampered with. (Id. at 15). Ray

names as defendants the State of Florida, the Cape Coral Police

1 The exhibits attached to the complaint show that, when asked
for identification Ray provided Officer Rodriguez with a fake
identification card, and he was arrested for uttering a false
instrument, for providing false identification to a law
enforcement officer, and for failing to register as a sex offender.
(Doc. 1-1 at 3). See also Criminal case numbers 23-CF-015814, 23-
CF-015811 of the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit
in and for Lee County, Florida. See https://matrix.leeclerk.org
(query: Ray, Clifton).
Department, the Fort Myers Police Department, and the Lee County
Public Defender’s Office. (Id. at 3–4).
As relief, Ray asks the Court to order the State of Florida

to find him innocent of all charges and release him immediately,
to waive all fees and fines, and to return his property. (Doc. 1
at 20). He asks for a “serious investigation” into Officer
Rodriguez’s past traffic stops. (Id.) He also seeks eight
million dollars. (Id.)
II. Legal Standards
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
A federal district court is required to review a civil
complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint
that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the
section provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that--
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal-
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted;
or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is
frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the
defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a
right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition,
where an affirmative defense would defeat a claim, it may be
dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915
F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted” has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of
section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards
in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”). That
is, although a complaint need not provide detailed factual
allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough facts
to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
In making the above determinations, all factual allegations
(as opposed to legal conclusions) in the complaint are viewed as
true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations
in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on persons who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Therefore, to state a claim under section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such
deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb
County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). Additionally, where
a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on one who is not an active
participant in the alleged constitutional deprivation, that
plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional

deprivation. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th
Cir. 1982).
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, a plaintiff may set forth only related
claims in a single civil rights complaint. Here, Ray alleges
completely unrelated claims throughout his 53-pages of pleadings.
He argues that his arrest was unconstitutional, complains about
his prison conditions, describes the allegedly unconstitutional
process he has received in state court, and asserts that he has
received subpar representation from his public defenders. Under
Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff

may not join unrelated claims and various defendants unless the
claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” And “a
claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence if there is
a logical relationship between the claims.” Constr. Aggregates,
Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F. 3d 1334, 1337 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted); see also George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against
different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent
the sort of morass that [a multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit
produced but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing

fees.”). Here, there is no logical relationship between Ray’s
improper arrest, due process, ineffective assistance of counsel,
mail tampering, or price gouging claims and, in fact, each of these
unrelated claims would involve a separate set of defendants. The
complaint is subject to dismissal for this reason alone.
In addition, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 10(b)
requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances.” Complaints that violate Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b)—
in letter or spirit—are often called “shotgun pleadings.” Weiland

v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four categories
of shotgun pleadings, including complaints (such as this one) that
“assert[] multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts
or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought
against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Also frowned upon are
complaints that are “replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause
of action.” Id. at 1322. Shotgun pleadings fail “to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. (footnote

omitted). Here, Ray’s listing of unrelated claims, inclusion of
irrelevant facts and legal conclusions, and failure to separate
his claims by defendant all violate Rules 8(a)(2) and 10, rendering
it difficult or impossible for any defendant to file a cogent
response to the claims. Therefore, the complaint is subject to
dismissal as a shotgun pleading.
Nevertheless, the Court reviews Ray’s allegations as best it
is able and finds that, even if it did not violate Federal Rules
8, 10, and 20(a), his complaint would be subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
A. Ray may not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a
pending state criminal case.
Ray challenges his state charges in Lee County Circuit Court
criminal case numbers 23CF015811 and 23CF015814, and alleges that
he is innocent. The state court docket reflects that Ray’s
criminal cases remain pending.2 Ray now asks the Court to direct
the state to find him “innocent of or drop all charges in all cases
and citations and release him immediately[.]” (Doc. 1 at 20).

Where, as here, the relief sought by a prisoner is a judicial
determination that he is entitled to release from prison, the
inmate’s federal remedy is through a writ of habeas corpus, not a
section 1983 complaint. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
500 (1973) (holding that when a prisoner challenges the fact or
duration of his confinement, and the relief sought is release, his
sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus); Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (finding that “a prisoner in state
custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or
duration of his confinement.’ ”) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at
489). The Court will not construe Ray’s complaint as a habeas
petition. He does not style it as such, and he does not allege

that he has exhausted his habeas remedies in state court.

2 See https://matrix.leeclerk.org (query: Ray, Clifton).
Moreover, Ray may not use section 1983 to challenge an ongoing
state criminal case. Federal courts are not intended as a
“pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.” Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973).
Further, principles of equity, comity, and federalism require the
Court to abstain from interfering in state criminal proceedings.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Ray provides no
reason for this Court to overlook the abstention principle. Nor
does he allege any facts that warrant application of any exception
3
to the Younger doctrine. Accordingly, Ray’s complaint is subject
to dismissal because he seeks relief that the Court is unable to
provide in a section 1983 action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Ray may not sue his public defender under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Ray names the Lee County Public Defender’s Office as a
defendant. (Doc. 1 at 4). He appears to generally allege that
no attorney appointed to represent him has given sufficient
attention to his case. Even assuming that Ray is receiving
ineffective assistance from the public defenders appointed to
represent him, he cannot sue them under section 1983. This is

3
See Hughes v. Attorney General of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263
n.6 (11th Cir. 2004)(noting that the Supreme Court in Younger set
three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: “(1) there is evidence
of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury
would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum
where the constitutional issues can be raised.”).
because section 1983 only bars civil rights abuses committed by
those acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And “a
public defender does not act under color of state law when

performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th
Cir. 1985) (finding that the public defender “did not act under
‘color of state law’ notwithstanding his appointment as counsel by
a judicial officer”). Therefore, neither the Public Defender’s
Office nor Ray’s individual public defenders are liable under
section 1983 for any alleged civil rights violations stemming from
their representation. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
C. Ray has not stated a plausible conditions of
confinement claim.
The Court liberally construes Ray’s complaint as attempting
to raise unrelated conditions of confinement claims regarding his
treatment at the Lee County Jail. Ray alleges that “the State of
Florida illegally price gouges inmates for medical products,
postal supplies, food and other products.” (Doc. 1 at 15).
However, claims regarding prison or jail canteen prices do not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Ferguson v.
Thomas, No. 5:14-cv-02396-RDP-JHE, 2016 WL 3774126, at *11 (N.D.

Ala. Jun. 20, 2016) (“Claims concerning canteen prices do not
[state a § 1983 claim] because prisoners have no right to use of
a prison commissary.”); Munson v. Wilcher, No. CV419-058, 2019 WL
2339264, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2019) (recognizing that the
“Constitution does not guarantee fair prices at the commissary”).

Likewise, Ray’s sparse allegations regarding mail tampering—
that some of his mail has been printed on pink paper or
inexplicably opened outside his presence—are too conclusory to
state a plausible section 1983 claim. In fact, it is unclear who
Ray believes tampered with his mail. As noted, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” and even if the Court were to conclude that
Ray’s sparse allegations stated a plausible section 1983 claim, it
is difficult to see how any defendant named in Ray’s complaint
would be liable. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” (alterations and quotations
omitted)).
Although the Court must liberally construe a pro se complaint,
neither the Court nor the defendants are required to read between
the lines or comb through 53 pages of Ray’s unfiltered factual
allegations and legal conclusions to create a claim on his behalf,
which is what Ray appears to ask the Court to do here. See GJR
Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency
does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a
party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order

to sustain an action[.]”) (citations omitted). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s liberally-construed conditions of confinement claims
are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. Conclusion
Ray has filed an impermissible shotgun complaint, and it would
be impossible for any named defendant to file a responsive pleading
to the allegations raised therein. In addition, Ray’s complaint
does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted against
any named defendant. And while the Court generally allows a pro
se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a defective pleading, the
claims forming the gravamen of Ray’s complaint—challenges to his
ongoing state criminal prosecution and to the quality of his legal

representation—are not suitable to amendment. See Silberman v.
Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019)
(recognizing that no leave to amend is required when doing so would
be futile). Therefore, the dismissal is without leave to amend.
To the extent Ray believes he can state a claim against other
(unnamed) defendants related to his conditions of confinement at
the Lee County Jail, he can file a new complaint that complies
with this Order and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.?
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED :
1. Ray’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice under
Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (b) (11).
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment, deny any pending
motions aS moot, terminate any deadlines, and close this
case,
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 2nd day of
January 2024,

} A en Ae f
E. STEELE
Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTIMP-2
Copies: Clifton Michael Ray

4 Ray will not be assessed a filing fee in this action.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114792. Public record. Not legal advice.