# Corpus v. Yen

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 15, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114682

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 15, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114682

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that nurses may generally defer to instructions given by physicians unless it is clear that doing so will likely cause significant harm to the inmate
- finding “no error” in the district court's dismissal of a civil detainee’s complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW CORPUS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-502-JES-NPM

LE YEN and GARDENER,

Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Andrew Corpus, a civilly committed resident of the
Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), initiated this action by
filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1).
Corpus generally alleges that the defendants refuse to prescribe
him appropriate pain relief for a broken thumb and for his chronic
back pain. (Id.) Corpus also seeks a preliminary injunction
requiring Dr. Le Yen to prescribe Tramadol for his back pain.
(Doc. 4). Corpus seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”)(Doc. 10), and his complaint is before the Court on initial
1
screening.

1 A prisoner who seeks to proceed IFP in this Court will have
his complaint screened in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the
court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of
process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). And although, as a
civilly committed resident of the FCCC, Corpus is not a “prisoner”
After careful review, the Court dismisses Corpus’s claims
against Defendant Gardener for failure to state a claim against
her and denies his motion for injunctive relief. Corpus must

complete and return service forms if he wishes to proceed against
Defendant Le Yen.
I. Pleadings
A. Complaint
Corpus generally asserts that he has not received proper pain
management for a recently broken thumb or for back pain that began
long before he became a resident at the FCCC. Corpus’s inclusion
of caselaw, legal jargon, and irrelevant commentary, along with
his non-chronological and repetitive recitation of the facts, make
it difficult to extract logical factual allegations from his 20-
page complaint. Nevertheless, the Court liberally construes the
pleading and sets forth the relevant facts and claims as best it
2
is able. For clarity, the Court separates Corpus’s allegations

under § 1915(e), district courts have the power to screen
complaints filed by all IFP litigants—prisoners and non-prisoners
alike. See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir.
2002) (finding “no error” in the district court's dismissal of a
civil detainee’s complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

2
To the extent Corpus intended to offer facts, claims, or
theories of relief not recognized in this Order, they are dismissed
under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
GJR Invs. V. Cnty of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1998) (recognizing the leniency afforded pro se litigants but
finding that “even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency
does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a
party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
regarding his broken thumb from those related to his chronic back
issues.
1. Broken Thumb
On March 15, 2023, Corpus fell and injured his hand. (Doc.

1 at 4, ¶ 1). For two days afterwards, his hand was numb, and he
felt no pain. However, after the first two days, he felt
excruciating pain. (Id.) He visited Defendant Dr. Le Yen for
pain medication, but Dr. Le Yen refused to provide any. (Id.)
On March 20, 2023, Corpus was taken to Desoto Memorial
Hospital, where an x-ray showed that Corpus’s thumb was broken in
two places. (Id. ¶ 4). The hospital nurse gave Corpus one
Tramadol pill for the pain, which was the only pain medication
Corpus had received since the accident. (Id.)
On March 24, 2023, Corpus was taken to an orthopedic surgeon,
Dr. Connolly. (Doc. 1 at 6, ¶ 6). Corpus told Dr. Connolly’s

assistant about the lack of pain medication. (Id.) The assistant
said that Dr. Connolly prescribed Corpus “Norco” three times a
day, and she gave the escorting officer an envelope with
information for Dr. Le Yen. (Id.)
On April 1, 2023, Corpus met with Captain King, Dr. Le Yen,
and Defendant Nurse Gardener because he was in pain. (Doc. 1 at
7, ¶ 8). Although Dr. Le Yen was aware of the information from

sustain an action”) (overruled on other grounds by Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Desoto Memorial Hospital and Dr. Connolly, she still did not want
to prescribe anything except Tylenol and Ibuprofen for Corpus’s
pain. (Id.) Nurse Gardener said, “Mr. Corpus, we cannot give you

Tramadol every time that you come to medical.” (Id.)
On April 25, 2023, Corpus had a follow-up with Dr. Connolly
who told him that his broken thumb looked good. (Doc. 1 at 9, ¶
13). Dr. Connolly told Corpus that he would extend the Norco
prescription for seven days. (Id.) However, Corpus never
received it. (Id.)
2. Back Pain
Corpus was transferred to the Florida Civil Commitment Center
on December 18, 2005. (Doc. 1 at 18, ¶ 41.) He experienced
chronic and excruciating back pain every morning. (Id.) Dr.
Lamour prescribed Tylenol #3 to be taken three times per day.
(Id. ¶ 42). He also prescribed an antibiotic for an ear infection.

(Id.)
On April 8, 2009, Dr. Lamour sent Corpus to an outside doctor
who gave him a spinal injection. (Doc. 1 at 18, ¶ 43.) The
outside doctor also prescribed Tylenol #3. (Id.) Dr. Lamour
changed Corpus’s prescription to Vicodin and then Tramadol. (Id.)
Corpus asserts that Dr. Le’s and Nurse Gardener’s “refusal to
treat [his] pain rising from his serious medical need of medication
for the pain in his broken thumb and his chronic lower back pain”
was deliberately indifferent. (Doc. 1 at 12, ¶ 24.) He also
asserts that their actions “did rise to the level of gross
negligence[.]” (Id. at 15, ¶ 33). He seeks injunctive relief and
monetary damages from both defendants. (Id. at 11).
B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Corpus has filed an “emergency” motion for a preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. (Doc. 4). Corpus
seeks an order from the Court requiring Dr. Le Yen to restart his
Tramadol prescription. (Id. at 5). He asserts that Dr. Le Yen
told Corpus that she was “afraid [Corpus] was getting addicted [to
Tramadol],” but that the lack of Tramadol was causing Corpus to
“relapse into chronic suffering and pain as he was forced to live
without the necessary medications.” (Id. at 3–4). Corpus asserts
that he has difficulty with prolonged standing, walking, and
sitting due to lack of medication. (Id. at 6).
II. Discussion
Corpus asserts that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his pain. The Supreme Court has held that prison
officials violate the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment when they display “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976).3 “A deliberate-indifference claim entails both an

3 Although, as a civilly committed resident of the FCCC,
Corpus’s medical claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is “ ‘evaluated under the same standard [deliberate indifference]
as a prisoner’s claim of inadequate care under the Eighth
objective and a subjective component.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of
Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). “First, the
inmate must establish an objectively serious medical need . . .

that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious
4
harm.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“Second, the inmate must prove that prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference to that need by showing (1) that they
had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and (2) that

Amendment.’ ” Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Dang ex rel. v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871
F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017)); Hall v. Administrator, FCCC,
2022 WL 4100705, at *2 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding that the district
court erred by evaluating the civilly committed plaintiff’s
medical claims under a professional judgment standard instead of
a deliberate indifference standard); compare Hood v. Dep’t of
Children and Families, 700 F. App’x 988, 990 n.1 (11th Cir. 2017)
(noting that the district court erred when it applied a deliberate
indifference standard to a resident’s claim of inadequate medical
treatment because “[t]he district court should have used the
‘professional judgment’ standard from [Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982)] because [the plaintiff] is a civil detainee, not
a prisoner”). The professional judgment standard acknowledges
“that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional” and that the “decision, if made by a
professional, is presumptively valid[.]” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
322–23. Under this standard, “liability may be imposed only when
the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).
Here, the Court finds that evaluating liability under the
professional judgment standard would not result in a different
outcome. See discussion infra.
4 For the purpose of this screening order only, the Court
finds both Corpus’s broken finger and his chronic back pain to
constitute serious medical needs.
they disregarded that risk (3) by conduct that was more than mere
negligence.” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266 (brackets and quotation
omitted). To show that medical treatment, when provided, was

deliberately indifferent, the plaintiff must show that the care
was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock
the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.”
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).
A. Nurse Gardener
Corpus makes very few allegations against Defendant Nurse
Gardener in his complaint. He alleges only that she told him that
the FCCC could not give him Tramadol every time he came to medical
(Doc. 1 at 7, ¶ 8) and that he tries to avoid going to the medical
department when Nurse Gardner is there because “she always start[s]
an argument with me.” (Id. 17, ¶ 38). Neither Defendant
Gardener’s statement that Corpus could not have Tramadol on demand

nor her alleged propensity to quarrel with him rises to the level
of deliberate indifference. And, while Corpus generally avers
throughout the complaint that both defendants refused to provide
him with appropriate pain medication, by Corpus’s own admission,
the decision to treat his pain with Tylenol and Ibuprofen (or not
at all) instead of prescribing Tramadol was made by Dr. Le Yen,
not Nurse Gardener. Corpus does not explain how Nurse Gardener
was to provide him the requested Tramadol (or other prescription
narcotic pain relief) without an authorized prescription from Dr.
Le Yen. Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Gardner are
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. See Bauer v. Kramer, 424 F. App’x 917, 919 (11th Cir.

2011) (holding that nurses and other such prison personnel are not
deliberately indifferent when they reasonably follow a doctor’s
orders); Smith v. R.G. Harris, D.D.S., 401 F. App’x 952 (5th Cir.
2010) (prison nurse’s failure to write prescription for pain
medication for infected teeth did not support deliberate
indifference claim where nurse was unauthorized to write
prescriptions); Holloway v. Del. Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1075
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that nurses may generally defer to
instructions given by physicians unless it is clear that doing so
will likely cause significant harm to the inmate).
B. Dr. Le Yen
In his complaint, Corpus inconsistently asserts that Dr. Le

Yen has offered either no pain relief or ineffective pain relief
for his broken finger and back pain. As a rule, “a dispute over
the adequacy of medication prescribed by a treating physician
generally does not amount to a constitutional claim.” Brennan v.
Thomas, 780 F. App’x 813, 822 (11th Cir. 2019). See also Brennan
v. Headley, 807 F. App’x 927, 935 (11th Cir. 2020) (“When a
prisoner has received medical attention, courts are reluctant to
second-guess medical judgments even if there is a dispute over the
adequacy of the treatment.”); Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567,
1575 (11th Cir. 1985).
Therefore, to the extent Dr. Le Yen’s decision to limit

Corpus’s pain management regimen to non-opioids was a matter of
medical judgment, Corpus has not stated a deliberate indifference
claim. See Phillips v. Robbins, 752 F. App’x 759, 764-65 (11th
Cir. 2018) (continued reevaluation of allegedly ineffective pain
medication, despite refusal to prescribe alternative medication,
“suggests disagreements in medical opinion, rather than deliberate
indifference.” (citation omitted)); Ross v. Corizon Med. Servs.,
700 F. App’x 914, 916 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The failure to administer
stronger medication [for pain] is generally a medical judgment
that is not an appropriate basis for imposing liability.”); Wright
v. Langford, 562 F. App’x 769, 779 (11th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff’s
“claim that he should have received some other form of pain

medication ... does not state an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim because a doctor’s choice of treatment is
generally ... a matter of medical judgment.”); Locket v. Bonson,
937 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The decision to prescribe
non-narcotic pain medication was within the bounds of professional
judgment.”)
Nevertheless, Corpus also states that he received no pain
relief for his broken finger, at least during the time between the
break and his visit to Desoto Memorial Hospital, and that he
receives no, or completely ineffective, pain relief for his back.
And while Corpus admits in his motion for a temporary restraining
order that Dr. Le Yen has expressed concern that Corpus was

becoming addicted to Tramadol (and refuses to prescribe it for
that reason), when testing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts
do not consider matters outside the four corners of the pleading.
See Hayes v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 648 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th
Cir. 2016). Moreover, the Court must evaluate the facts in the
light most favorable to Corpus. Id. And the complete withholding
of pain medication, if proven, can constitute deliberate
indifference. Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543–44 (11th Cir.
1995)(“Our cases have consistently held that knowledge of the need
for medical care and an intentional refusal to provide that care
constitutes deliberate indifference.”)
Therefore, Corpus will be allowed to develop his claim against

Dr. Le Yen. That it will be difficult for Corpus to overcome the
deference courts have historically afforded matters of medical
judgment—particularly if Dr. Le Yen offers evidence that Corpus
was offered other, non-narcotic, pain relief—does not justify
dismissal at this stage of litigation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)(“And, of course, a well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Motion for Injunctive Relief
In a separate “Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order,” Corpus asks the Court to order
Dr. Le Yen to renew his Tramadol prescription to treat his lower

back pain. (Doc. 4). The party moving for injunctive relief must
show the following: “(1) substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the
injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the
opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson,
147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing All Care Nursing
Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537
(11th Cir. 1989)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly

establishes the burden of persuasion as to [all] four requisites.”
All Care Nursing Serv., Inc., 887 F.2d at 1537 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Corpus has not met his burden of persuasion on the
requirements for obtaining injunctive relief. First, service of
process has not been effected on Dr. Le Yen, and no discovery has
been exchanged. Therefore, the record contains only Corpus’s
unsubstantiated allegations, meaning that Corpus has only alleged—
not shown—a likelihood of success on the merits. Next, as
discussed above (and repeatedly alleged in Corpus’s complaint and
motion), the FCCC has a duty to provide adequate medical care to
its residents. Thus, an order requiring Dr. Le Yen to adequately

treat Corpus’s pain would serve little purpose, as it would amount
to nothing more than an instruction to “obey the law,” which is a
duty already in place. See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178
F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999) (refusing to issue order which
would amount to broad instruction to simply “obey the law”).
Finally, a motion for a preliminary injunction is not
appropriately used as a vehicle for final relief on the merits.
Heckler v. Redbud Hosp. Dist., 473 U.S. 1308, 1314 (1985). Corpus
asserts that Dr. Le Yen is not presently providing him with
Tramadol (and has not done so for years), and he seeks an order
from the Court requiring her to do so, which is (in addition to
monetary damages) the ultimate relief sought in his complaint. In

other words, Corpus attempts to leapfrog the litigation process
and have the Court grant relief without hearing from the
opposition. The Court thus denies his motion for injunctive
relief.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Defendant Gardener is DISMISSED from this action for
failure to state a claim against her on which relief can
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2. Corpus’s motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 4) is
DENIED. Corpus’s motion for a ruling on his motion for
injunctive relief (Doc. 15) is DENIED as moot.
3. If Corpus wishes to continue the prosecution of this
action against Defendant Le Yen, he must complete and
electronically return the highlighted portions of the
attached return service forms within TWENTY-ONE (21)
DAYS.°I
4, If Corpus does not timely return the forms, or explain
his inability to comply, this case will be dismissed for
failure to prosecute without further notice.
5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Corpus with the
appropriate highlighted service forms.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 15th day of
December 2023.

NON Zé AKL
JGHE E. STEELE
Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: Andrew Corpus
Encl: Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons, Waiver of the Service of Summons, Summons in a
Civil Action

> If Plaintiff uses the United States Postal Service instead
of e-filing to return the forms, he must also return a copy of his
complaint, including all exhibits, with his service forms. If
Plaintiff uses the FCCC e-filing procedures, he does not need to
provide a service copy of his complaint.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114682. Public record. Not legal advice.