# Briggs v. Spurlock

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 5, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114601

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 5, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114601

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration omitted)
- noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”
- affirming directed verdict in favor of officers in their official capacities where the municipality was also a named defendant to avoid redundancy and confusing the jury

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SPENCER L. BRIGGS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1057-MMH-MCR

PETE M. SPURLOCK, et al.,

Defendants.
_________________________________

ORDER
Plaintiff Spencer L. Briggs, a pretrial detainee at the Columbia County
Jail, initiated this action on August 28, 2023, by filing a pro se Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with
exhibits (Doc. 1-1). Briggs names as Defendants: (1) the Columbia County
Sheriff’s Office; (2) Sheriff Mark Hunter; (3) Deputy Cody L. Woods; (4) Deputy
Christopher Alford; and (5) Deputy Pete M. Spurlock. Complaint at 1–3. Briggs
alleges that on March 10, 2023, Deputies Alford and Spurlock stopped his
vehicle based on a “false hearsay 911 call” that he was harassing his fiancée.
Id. at 5; see id. at 12–13. According to Briggs, Deputies Alford and Spurlock
failed to identify themselves as law enforcement and tased Briggs in the neck
when he exited his vehicle. Id. at 5, 13. Briggs asserts that they tased him six
more times, punched him, and choked him. Id. at 4–5. He contends Defendants
violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 3. As relief, Briggs requests “justice from the Columbia

County Sheriff’s Office” and “between $1,000,000 to $10,000,000” in damages.
Id. at 5.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,
or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims
‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

1 Briggs requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 2).
2
judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the
PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show
“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
3
401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306
n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”
the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to
include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
4
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Briggs’s pro se
allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air
5
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.
v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709)).
Here, Briggs’s Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim. The
Columbia County Sheriff’s Office is not an entity subject to suit. See Faulkner
v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Florida

law has not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with the
capacity to be sued.”).3 As such, Briggs’s claim against it is due to be dismissed.
Briggs also sues the remaining Defendants—Deputies Woods, Alford,
Spurlock, and Sheriff Hunter—in their official capacities only. The purpose of

suing a government official in his or her individual capacity is to impose
personal liability for actions taken under color of state law. See Cook ex rel.
Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir.
2005) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)). Suing a

government official in an official capacity, on the other hand, is an alternative
way to assert a claim against the entity he or she represents, which in this case

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
6
would be the Sheriff, or more appropriately, the County. Id. Since Briggs sues
the Sheriff in his official capacity, the official-capacity suits against Deputies

Woods, Alford, and Spurlock are duplicative and should be dismissed. See
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming directed
verdict in favor of officers in their official capacities where the municipality
was also a named defendant to avoid redundancy and confusing the jury); see

also C.P. by and through Perez v. Collier Cnty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1091
(M.D. Fla. 2015) (dismissing similar claims).4 The Court will consider Sheriff
Hunter’s official capacity liability in the context of those cases discussing
county and municipal liability under § 1983.

To the extent that Briggs seeks to hold Columbia County through Sheriff
Hunter vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of the employees
responsible for Briggs’s alleged injury, Briggs has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has soundly

rejected the theory of respondeat superior as a basis for liability in § 1983
actions. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead,

4 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).
7
a county or municipality may be liable in a § 1983 action “only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex rel.

Estate of Tessier, 402 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must
establish that an official policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving
force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
693–94. “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or

created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on
behalf of the municipality.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488,
489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to
“‘distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the

municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” Grech v. Clayton
Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
Indeed, municipal liability arises under § 1983 only where “‘a deliberate choice

to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’ by city
policymakers.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483–84 (1986)). A municipality will
rarely have an officially-adopted policy that permits a particular constitutional

violation, therefore, in order to state a cause of action for damages under
8
§ 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the municipality has a custom
or practice of permitting the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330; McDowell

v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit has
defined “custom” as “a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes
on the force of law” or a “persistent and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d
at 489.

In some circumstances, “the failure to provide proper training may fairly
be said to represent a policy for which the city may be held liable if it actually
causes injury.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Failure to train can lead to
municipal liability “only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees

in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its
inhabitants [such that the failure to train] can be properly thought of as a city
‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 388-89 (alteration
added). Thus, in order to assert such a claim, a plaintiff must “present some

evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a
particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any
action.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). The
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “without notice of a need to train or

supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable as a matter of law
9
for any failure to train or supervise.” Id. at 1351. Indeed, “the need for such
training must be plainly obvious to [County] decisionmakers,” such as where

there is “evidence of a history of widespread prior abuse.” Wright v. Sheppard,
919 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990) (alteration added); see also Rocker v. City
of Ocala, 355 F. App’x 312, 314 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Here, Briggs fails
to allege the existence of any particular custom or policy in Columbia County,

much less one that caused the actions about which he complains; therefore,
Sheriff Hunter is due to be dismissed from this action.
In addition, the State of Florida charged Briggs with fleeing a police
officer and resisting an officer without violence in a Columbia County case

arising from the incident, see State v. Briggs, Information, No. 12-2023-CF-
231-AXXX (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct. March 29, 2023), and with violations of probation
in a Marion County case, see State v. Briggs, Second Amended Affidavit
Violation of Probation, No. 42-2017-CF-3126-AXXX (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. March

24, 2023). The State nolle prossed the charges in the Columbia County case,
noting Briggs “is currently on probation in Marion County and the State will
be seeking an extensive incarceration in that jurisdiction.” State v. Briggs,

10
Notice of Nolle Prosequi, No. 12-2023-CF-231-AXXX (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct. November
6, 2023). The Marion County case remains pending.5

To the extent Briggs requests that the Court intervene in his pending
state court case, such a request is barred by the abstention doctrine and the
principles of exhaustion and comity. Absent some exceptional circumstances
meriting equitable relief, a federal court should refrain from interfering with a

pending state criminal proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44
(1971); Butler v. Ala. Jud. Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir.
2001) (“Younger and its progeny reflect the longstanding national public policy,
based on principles of comity and federalism, of allowing state courts to try

cases already pending in state court free from federal court interference.”)
(citation omitted); Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2022)
(“Younger established that, based on principles of comity and federalism, a
federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings

where the state court conviction and/or sentence is not yet final.”). “In Younger,
the Supreme Court set out three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: (1) there
is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury

5 Under Florida law, the State’s nolle prosequi of the Columbia County charges
does not preclude a Marion County judge from determining that a probation violation
occurred based on the same conduct. See, e.g., State v. Mitchum, 227 So. 3d 697, 699
(Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
11
would occur, or (8) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the
constitutional issues can be raised.” Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d
1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45). Here, Briggs
has not provided any facts suggesting that any of these three exceptions to the
abstention doctrine apply in his case.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case
without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 5th day of
December, 2023.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Jax-9 12/4
C: Spencer L. Briggs, #22004606

12

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114601. Public record. Not legal advice.