# Williams v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 6, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114173

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 6, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114173

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”
- holding that when a defendant does not successfully prove any of his individual claims and, consequently, counsel’s performance is deemed sufficient, a claim of cumulative error must fail

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

KESHON B. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-1428-BJD-MCR

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Keshon B. Williams, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action on November 9, 2020,1 by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition; Doc.
1) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.2 He
also filed a Memorandum of Law (Memorandum; Doc. 2). The Northern District
of Florida transferred the case to this Court. Order (Doc. 4). In the Petition,
Williams challenges a 2016 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of
conviction for attempted murder in the second degree (count one), two counts

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).
2 For purposes of reference to pleadings, the Court will cite the document page
numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.
of aggravated assault (counts two and three), and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (count four). He raises four grounds for relief. See Petition at 2-

6. Respondents submitted an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Response; Doc. 15). They also submitted an Appendix with Exhibits A-R.3 See
Doc. 15. Williams filed a brief in reply (Reply; Doc. 22).
II. Relevant Procedural History

On April 6, 2015, the State of Florida charged Petitioner by information
in Case No. 2015-CF-1933 with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Ex. A at 12. The State of Florida later filed a third amended information
charging attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of aggravated

assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 36-37. The State
filed notices of intent to classify Petitioner as a prison release reoffender (PRR)
and a habitual felony offender (HFO). Id. at 26, 27, 39, 83, 96, 97. The court
conducted a jury trial on February 16, 2016, and February 18-19, 2016. Ex. B;

Ex. C. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged as to all counts. Ex. A
at 40-44; Ex. C at 446-67, 473-74. Through counsel, Petitioner filed a Motion
for New Trial. Ex. A at 81-82. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 118, 131.

3 The Court refers to the exhibits contained in the Appendix with Exhibits (Doc.
15) as “Ex.” and references the page number in the bottom center of the page, if
available, otherwise the Court refers to the page number on the document itself.
2
On March 16, 2016, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to thirty years in
prison for counts one and four and ten years in prison on counts two and three,

all counts to run concurrently. Ex. A at 87-92, 150. For counts one through
three, the court sentenced Petitioner as a PRR and an HFO. Id.
Petitioner appealed, id. at 122, raising one issue: “the court erred in
denying the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charges of aggravated

assault because there was no evidence of a threat directed at the two
bystanders alleged to be victims.” Ex. G at i. Additional briefing followed. Ex.
H; Ex. I. The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed Petitioner’s
conviction and sentence finding the trial court correctly denied the motion for

judgment of acquittal. Ex. J; Williams v. State, 238 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 2018). The
mandate issued on March 21, 2018. Ex. K.
During the pendency of the direct appeal, Petitioner, through counsel,
filed a Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error. Ex. E at 1-4. The

trial court entered an amended order granting the motion and striking
Petitioner’s designation as an HFO in count one. Id. at 17-28. On October 3,
2016, the trial court entered a corrected judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc
to March 16, 2016. Ex. F.

3
Petitioner filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 on May 11, 2018. Ex. L at 1-18.4 On

March 4, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying Petitioner’s motion for
postconviction relief. Id. at 19-22. In its order, the court set forth the applicable
law regarding postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Ex. L at 19-20. The court

attached portions of the record to its order. Id. at 23-41.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Id. at 42-43. He filed a pro se brief. Ex.
M. The State filed a notice of filing no answer brief. Ex. N. On October 15, 2019,
the First DCA affirmed per curiam the trial court’s decision without a written

opinion. Ex. O. Williams v. State, 282 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). The
mandate issued on November 12, 2019. Ex. P.
Petitioner also filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging the
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ex. Q. On September 24, 2018, the

First DCA denied the petition. Ex. P.

4 In reciting the procedural history, the Court identifies the date of Petitioner’s
filings giving him the benefit of the mailbox rule.
4
III. One-Year Limitations Period
Respondents calculate the Petition was timely filed. Response at 4-5.

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a
hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the
applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.
The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the
Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Petitioner’s] claim[s] without
further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir.

2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
5
V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions
as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,
and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S.
34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of
final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.’”

Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need
not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

6
unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It
should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be
rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely
relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such
as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher
court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98.
The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to
§ 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
7
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000),
§ 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a
“contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application”
clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only
“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of
law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523
(plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application”
clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield v.
Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571 U.S. at --
-, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,
301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).
8
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a
state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in
existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter,
562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were
adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §
2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court

remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
9
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,

either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,”
the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
10
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[5] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[6] supra, at 84–85, 97 S.
Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural
rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal
review of the claims if, among other requisites, the
state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate
to support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–
1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558
U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417
(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted
claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A
prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted
claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice
from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S.,
at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

5 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
6 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
11
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may
be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has

been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a
state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from
the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause,

the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that prevented
[him] from raising the claim and which cannot be
fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v.
Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[7]
Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show
that “the errors at trial actually and substantially
disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied
fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

7 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
12
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’
of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,
allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s
13
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per

curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687).
To establish deficient performance, a person
challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.
Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective
assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104
S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”
Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of
any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test
14
before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part
Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a

court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the
prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243,
1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697.
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is
a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 131 S.
Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state court’s
application of Strickland was unreasonable under §
2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created
by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review
is doubly so.” Id. (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “The question is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination under the
Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable — a substantially
higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 123, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)
(quotation marks omitted). If there is “any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not
15
disturb a state-court decision denying the claim.
Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the
deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds
another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision — when we are
considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As such,
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One
As Ground One, Petitioner alleges he received the ineffective assistance

of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to move for a new trial under the
theory that the weight of the evidence did not support the convictions for
aggravated assault. Petition at 2. In ground one of his postconviction motion,
Petitioner alleged a comparable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ex.

L at 11-14.
Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit. The postconviction
court found defense counsel did file a motion for new trial setting forth specific
16
grounds and the claim of ineffectiveness was without merit. Ex. L at 20. The
First DCA affirmed. Ex. O. As such, AEDPA deference is due.

To the extent that the First DCA decided the claim on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication

of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on the basis of this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is
not entitled to deference, Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit.
The record shows the following. After the State rested, defense counsel, Ms.

Tricia Rado, moved for a judgment of acquittal. Ex. C at 343-55. She
specifically addressed counts two and three in her argument. Id. at 347-54.
The court denied the motion noting, “[i]t’s close. It’s very close.” Id. at 354. Ms.
Rado renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. Id. at

371-72. Of import, the motion for new trial included claims that the trial court
17
erred in not granting the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of
the State’s case and at the close of all of the evidence. Ex. A at 81. In addition,

counsel argued the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and
contrary to the law. Id.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. The

Court is not convinced that Ms. Rado performed deficiently under these
circumstances. Even assuming arguendo deficient performance by counsel,
Petitioner has not shown any resulting prejudice. Petitioner has not shown a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the case would have been

different if counsel had performed differently. Indeed, the First DCA found the
trial court correctly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal as “a
reasonable jury could find Williams had an apparent ability to do harm and
that his firing the rifle and trying to kill someone would create a well-founded

fear that violence was imminent.” Ex. J at 3. For all of the foregoing reasons,
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the claim in Ground One.
B. Ground Two
As Ground Two, Petitioner alleges “[c]ounsel’s failure to alert the court

to Petitioner[’]s highly questionable Mental Health.” Petition at 4. In ground
18
two of his postconviction motion, Petitioner alleged a similar claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Ex. L at 14-16. He alleged defense counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to have Petitioner’s competency at
the time of the crime evaluated. Id. He described going through a rough period
of life, being unemployed, unable to provide for his children, turning to
prescription drugs, alcohol, and cocaine, and dealing with depression and

suicidal thoughts. Id. at 14-15. He described ingesting prescription medication,
alcohol, and cocaine prior to the time of his arrest. Id. at 15. He believed that
he may not have been insane, but asserted he was without the ability to form
specific intent to commit the crimes. Id.

In his Memorandum, Petitioner bifurcated Ground Two into two parts:
Part One – counsel was ineffective for failure to have the issue of his
competency raised and evaluated, and Part Two – counsel failed to properly
convey a plea offer. Memorandum at 4-6. Respondents contend that Petitioner

did not properly exhaust the ineffectiveness claim in the state courts as to
Ground Two, Part Two, and therefore this particular claim is procedurally
defaulted. Response at 25-26.
The Court finds Petitioner did not exhaust the claim raised in Ground

Two, Part Two. Because any future attempt to exhaust it would be futile, the
19
claim is procedurally defaulted. As Petitioner is procedurally barred from
raising Ground Two, Part Two, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice.

Petitioner has failed to establish cause and prejudice or that a fundamental
miscarriage of justice will result if the Court fails to address the claim on its
merits. The Court further finds this is not an extraordinary case as Petitioner
has not made a showing of actual innocence rather than mere legal innocence.

As such, the Court finds that the claim in Ground Two, Part Two, is
procedurally defaulted and the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is
inapplicable. Petitioner’s procedural default bars this Court’s review of Ground
Two, Part Two.

That leaves Ground Two, Part One, for the Court’s consideration.
Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies by
raising this ineffective assistance of counsel claim by asserting it in ground two
of his motion for postconviction relief, and by raising it on appeal from the

denial of postconviction relief. Response at 25.
The postconviction court addressed this ground finding:
In the Defendant’s second ground for relief, he
alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for
failing to have the Defendant evaluated for competency.
The Defendant avers, at the time of the crime: he was
unemployed; unable to provide for his children; was
using prescription drugs, alcohol and cocaine to self-
20
medicate; he was dealing with thoughts of suicide; he
was depressed; and “although may not have been
legally insane at the time, he was definitely without the
ability to form the specific intent to commit the crimes.”
A claim of “voluntary intoxication” defense was
abrogated in 1999 when Florida Statutes, section
775.051 came into effect. This statute states that:
voluntary intoxication resulting from the
consumption, injection, or other use of alcohol or other
controlled substance as described in chapter 893 is not
a defense to any offense proscribed by law. Evidence of
a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not admissible
to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent
to commit an offense and is not admissible to show
that the defendant was insane at the time of the
offense, except when the consumption, injection, or use
of a controlled substance under chapter 893 was
pursuant to a lawful prescription issued to the
defendant by a practitioner as defined in s. 893.02.
Section 775.051, Florida Statutes (2006). The statute
excludes introduction of evidence of voluntary
intoxication at trial. Troy v. State, 948 So. 2d 635, 644-
45 (Fla. 2006); Barrett v. State, 862 So. 2d 44, 46-48
(Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The purpose of this statute is to
make those who choose to become intoxicated
responsible for their actions, and has been held
constitutional. Troy, 948 So. 2d at 664-645; Barrett,
862 So. 2d at 46-48. In review of the instant motion
and the record, the Defendant fails: to indicate or
reflect, he has ever been diagnosed with a mental
illness or any condition that would impact his ability
to understand the proceedings or assist counsel; and
fails to allege specific legal facts showing that a
reasonably competent attorney would have questioned
competence to proceed and set forth clear and
convincing circumstances that create a real,
substantial and legitimate doubt as to the Defendant’s
competency. History of drug abuse, depression, and
21
aggressive, rebellious behavior do not raise a valid
question as to his competency to stand trial. Also, if
attempting to allege trial court error for failure to
make a competency determination, this argument is
procedurally barred from being raised in a
postconviction motion. Therefore, this claim is without
merit.

Ex. L at 20-21. The postconviction court denied relief and the First DCA per
curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion. Ex. O.
To the extent that the First DCA decided the claim on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication
of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to
relief on the basis of this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is
not entitled to deference, Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit.
His ineffectiveness claim is without merit because he has shown neither

22
deficient performance nor resulting prejudice. Accordingly, he is not entitled
to federal habeas relief on the claim in Ground Two, Part One.

As noted by the state court, Petitioner does not allege or intimate that
he suffers from or has been diagnosed with a mental illness or that his counsel
failed to discover some mental health history. Upon review of the trial record,
there is nothing in the record supporting a contention that Petitioner was

unable to assist counsel, understand the proceedings, or fully participate in
trial preparation or trial. Indeed, the record shows that Petitioner made the
decision not to wear street clothes, decided not to take the stand, and confirmed
that his counsel had called the only witness Petitioner wanted called. Ex. C at

367-371. On the record, Petitioner stated he was “very satisfied” with his
counsel’s representation and there were no further witnesses or evidence that
he wanted produced or introduced. Id. at 370. The record shows that Petitioner
was present for the state court proceedings, conferred with his counsel, and

behaved appropriately, without exhibiting unsavory conduct or making any
undue outbursts in the courtroom.
To the extent Petitioner contends he was not competent at the time of
the crime, the state court rejected this contention noting that Petitioner

admitted that “he may not have been legally insane” but was voluntarily
23
intoxicated with multiple substances and was depressed. As such, his condition
was “not admissible to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent to

commit an offense[.]” Ex. L at 20. Notably, Petitioner’s contention that he was
without the ability to form the intent to commit the crimes due to his
intoxication with various substances would have been excluded by the state
court. Therefore, even if counsel had raised the matter, there would have not

been a different result. Counsel’s performance was not deficient nor does
Petitioner meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. As such, Petitioner is not
entitled to relief on Ground Two-Part One.
C. Ground Three

In Ground Three of the Petition, Petitioner claim his counsel’s failure to
alert the trial court that the sentence it was imposing was illegal amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Petition at 5. Respondents contend that
Petitioner did not properly exhaust this ineffectiveness claim in the state

courts. Response at 31.
The Court finds Petitioner did not exhaust the claim raised in Ground
Three. Because any future attempt to exhaust it would be futile, the claim is
procedurally defaulted. As Petitioner is procedurally barred from raising

Ground Three, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice. Petitioner has failed
24
to establish cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice
will result if the Court fails to address the claim on its merits. The Court

further finds this is not an extraordinary case as Petitioner has not made a
showing of actual innocence rather than mere legal innocence. As such, the
Court finds that the claim in Ground Three is procedurally defaulted and the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is inapplicable. Petitioner’s

procedural default bars this Court’s review of Ground Three.
Alternatively, apparently Petitioner concedes that his contention of an
illegal sentence was remedied in the state courts, and “will thus not be raised
to save judicial time and economy.” Reply at 4. Indeed, the record demonstrates

that Petitioner obtained relief from the state court through his Rule 3.800(b)(2)
motion. Ex. E. The trial court corrected its error, and the clerk recorded a
corrected judgment and sentence. Ex. F. No further relief is warranted.
D. Ground Four

Next, the Court addresses Ground Four of the Petition. There, Petitioner
raises a claim of cumulative errors on counsel’s part, allegedly depriving
Petitioner of a fair trial. Petition at 6. The postconviction court denied relief:
In the Defendant’s third ground for relief, he
avers he should be granted a new trial based upon
cumulative effect of ineffective Counsel. It is well-
settled that a claim of cumulative error cannot stand
25
in cases where, following individual evaluation,
alleged errors are found to be without merit or
procedurally barred. Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503,
524 (Fla. 2011); see Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 442
(Fla. 2005) (holding that when a defendant does not
successfully prove any of his individual claims and,
consequently, counsel’s performance is deemed
sufficient, a claim of cumulative error must fail);
Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)
(“Because the alleged individual errors are without
merit, the contention of cumulative error is similarly
without merit.”). Here, Defendant has not
demonstrated that counsel was ineffective under
either prong of Strickland. Accordingly, Defendant is
not entitled to relief[.]

Ex. L at 21. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of postconviction
relief without a written opinion. Ex. O.
To the extent that the First DCA decided the claim on the merits,8 the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication
of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

8 See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

26
presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to
relief on the basis of this claim.

Alternatively, none of Petitioner’s individual ineffectiveness claims
warrant relief; therefore, there is nothing to accumulate. See Morris v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012). Petitioner’s trial counsel’s
alleged errors, neither individually nor cumulatively, deprived him of a fair

trial or due process. Considering the record, the Court finds that Petitioner is
not entitled to federal habeas relief on Ground Four.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Petition
and dismissing this case with prejudice.

3. If Petitioner appeals the denial of the Petition, 9 the Court denies
a certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined that a

9 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner makes "a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make
this substantial showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or
27
certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the
pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may
be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
4, The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 5th day of
October, 2023.

4 ry
fo /liton— | LE O14
BRIAN/J . DAVIS
United States District Judge

sa 9/27
Cc:
Keshon B. Williams
Counsel of Record

that "the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,"
Miller-E] v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114173. Public record. Not legal advice.