# Smith v. Boston Red Sox

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114108

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114108

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that merely because “a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979))

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

MICHELLE J. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-68-JES-NPM

BOSTON RED SOX,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of the Opposed
Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. #35)
filed by the Boston Red Sox (the Defendant or Red Sox) on July 21,
2023. Michelle J. Smith (the Plaintiff or Smith), acting pro se,
filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #36) on August 4, 2023. With
permission from the Court, the Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. #40)
on September 1, 2023. For the reasons set forth, the motion is
granted, with leave to file a second amended complaint.
I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation
omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations must be
“plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Id. at 555. See also Edwards v. Prime
Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani v.
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are merely consistent
with a defendant’s liability fall short of being facially

plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-
step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679.
A pleading drafted by an unrepresented party is held to a
less stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney, and the
Court will construe the documents filed as a complaint and amended
complaint liberally. Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 787 F.3d 1105,
1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
II.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (the AC) makes the following
factual allegations: Plaintiff began working for the Defendant on
January 4, 2020. (Doc. #33, ¶ 10.) In early September 2021,
Plaintiff informed her supervisor, Taryn Bratz (Bratz), that she
was not vaccinated against COVID-19. (Id., ¶¶ 12-13.) Defendant
was afterwards assigned a new supervisor, Kelsey Doherty
(Doherty). (Id., ¶ 17.) Doherty held a meeting and informed
everyone present that they were all vaccinated against COVID-19.
(Id., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff was not at this meeting.1 (Id.) Defendant
announced on November 1, 2021 that it was implementing a new policy

requiring all salaried and hourly non-union employees to be
vaccinated against COVID-19 by January 1, 2022, with exceptions as
required by law. (Id., ¶ 21.)

1 The Defendant asserts Plaintiff was present at the meeting.
However, “when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge
must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The
Court will therefore accept the AC’s version of the facts over
Defendant’s objection.
Defendant then sent employees a survey asking if they were
vaccinated or planning to become vaccinated. (Id.) Those not
vaccinated were told to submit any requested exemptions by November
19, 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff answered that she was not vaccinated nor
was she planning on getting vaccinated and submitted her exemption
request. (Id., ¶¶ 22, 25.) Plaintiff’s exemption request sought to

“explain[] how the Catholic Church’s teachings have led individual
Catholics, including [her]self, to decline certain vaccines.”
(Doc. #33, Ex. 2, p. 1.)2 The request was accompanied by a letter
from Plaintiff’s pastor echoing her rationale. (See id., p. 3.) On
November, 19, 2021, Plaintiff alerted Human Resources Manager Ben
Coakley (Coakley) of the recently enacted Florida Statute
381.00317.3 (Doc. #33, ¶ 26.)
Executive Vice President of Human Resources Amy Waryas
(Waryas) emailed the Plaintiff about a month later, seeking a phone

call to “follow up on [the] vaccination exemption request.” (Id.,

2 “A district court can generally consider exhibits attached
to a complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss, and if the
allegations of the complaint about a particular exhibit conflict
with the contents of the exhibit itself, the exhibit controls.”
Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016).
3 Titled “Private Employer COVID-19 Vaccination Mandates
Prohibited”, the new statute, which was enacted on November 18,
2021, “forbids employers from imposing COVID-19 vaccination
mandates on its employees without providing individual exemptions
based on, among other things, sincerely held religious beliefs.”
Leigh v. Artis-Naples, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-606-JLB-NPM, 2022 WL
18027780, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2022).
Ex. 3, p. 1.) In a subsequent conversation Waryas, Coakley, and
Plaintiff discussed the previous survey sent by the Red Sox to
employees in May 2021. (Id., ¶¶ 31-32.) That survey had asked one
question: are you vaccinated? (Id., ¶ 32.) The survey results
indicated that Plaintiff selected the “yes” box. (Id., ¶ 33.)
Plaintiff was surprised by this because she did not remember the

May survey, but “[d]ue to her belief in the integrity of the Red
Sox”, she assumed she accidently pressed the wrong box. (Id.)
Plaintiff requested that the incorrect answer on the May
survey be corrected. (Id.) The Defendant did not do so. (Id.)
Instead, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated two days later.
(Id., ¶ 34.)
After her termination, Plaintiff noticed an email from
Coakley dated May 13, 2021, appear and disappear in her inbox
before she was cut off from the Red Sox server. (Id., ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff initiated a claim against the Defendant with the EEOC
and received a right to sue letter. (Id., ¶¶ 38-42.)

III.
Plaintiff’s AC (Doc. #33) is the operative pleading and
alleges the following four claims: violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Counts I and II); fraud, invasion of
privacy, and violation of privacy laws (Count III); and violation
of Florida’s Private Whistleblower’s Act (Count IV). Defendant now
moves to dismiss Count III with prejudice. Count III alleges that
Defendant manipulated the computer server to insert data and make
the surveys inconsistent — constituting fraud and violating the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and the Stored Communications
Act (SCA). (Doc. #33, ¶ 57.) Count III further alleges that

“Defendant’s refusal to correct [the] data upon request of
Plaintiff . . . [was] a direct violation of HIPPA [sic].” (Id., ¶
60.) Additionally, Count III alleges that Defendant violated 18
U.S.C. § 1001 when it “portrayed [the Plaintiff] in a false light”
by “disseminating [the] false data . . . to the EEOC, the Florida
Attorney General, and this Court . . . .” (Id., ¶ 59.)
Defendant argues that Count III fails to state a common-law
fraud claim or to plead a fraud claim with sufficient specificity.
Additionally, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state a
common-law invasion of privacy of claim. Lastly, Plaintiff argues
Florida no longer recognizes a false light claim, that HIPAA and

FTCA do not provide for a private cause of action, and that while
Plaintiff does not state which provision of the ECPA or SCA the
Red Sox violated, Count III fails to state a claim under any
provision. The Court will address the arguments in turn, beginning
with Plaintiff’s fraud claim.
A. Fraud
Defendant argues that the fraud claim must be dismissed
because not all of its elements are plead in the AC. (See Doc.
#35, p. 9-10.) And even if all the elements were pled, Defendant
argues that the AC “falls short of pleading fraud with
particularity as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).” (Id. at p.

10.). Both arguments are correct.
“The essential elements of common-law fraud are: (1) a false
statement of fact; (2) known by the person making the statement to
be false at the time it was made; (3) made for the purpose of
inducing another to act in reliance thereon; (4) action by the
other person in reliance on the correctness of the statement; and
(5) resulting damage to the other person.” Gandy v. Trans World
Computer Tech. Grp., 787 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
(citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) imposes
a heightened pleading requirement for a fraud claim. A plaintiff
“must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). That “means identifying
the who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud alleged.” Omnipol,
A.S. v. Multinational Def. Servs., LLC, 32 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2022)(citing Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1237
(11th Cir. 2008)). More specifically, the complaint must allege:
“(1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations
made; (2) the time and place of and person responsible for the
statement; (3) the content and manner in which the statements
misled the Plaintiffs; and (4) what the Defendants gained by the
alleged fraud.” Ambrosia Coal & Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482
F.3d 1309, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (11th Cir.
1997)).

The AC alleges that the May 2021 survey had been doctored to
falsely state the Plaintiff was vaccinated. (See Doc. #33, ¶¶ 32,
37, 57.) The AC identifies Coakley as the person who “manipulate[d]
the survey data to make [Plaintiff]’s surveys false and
inconsistent.” (Id., ¶ 37.) Exhibit 5, attached to the AC,
allegedly “shows how” Coakley, as a “brand ambassador,” had “the
ability to erase, input, and access survey data.” (Id.) (Exhibit
5 is a webpage from a software survey company’s website stating
that a “survey response may be edited if the user has the
appropriate account permission . . . which is controlled by Brand
Administrators.”) The AC asserts this was all done “knowingly.”

(Id., ¶ 58.)
Missing from the AC, however, is any mention that Defendant
sought to induce Plaintiff’s reliance on the false information or
what action was undertaken by the Plaintiff in reliance on the
correctness of the allegedly false statement. See Gandy, 787 So.
2d at 118. “Indeed, to prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant made a deliberate and knowing misrepresentation
designed to cause, and actually causing detrimental reliance by
the plaintiff.” First Interstate Dev. Corp. v. Ablanedo, 511 So.
2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1987). Because the AC alleges no reliance, it
fails to allege specific elements of a fraud claim. A “plaintiff's
‘[f]ailure to allege a specific element of fraud in a complaint is
fatal when challenged by a motion to dismiss.’” Infante v. Bank of

America Corp., 468 F. App'x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2012)4(alteration
in original)(quoting Strack v. Fred Rawn Constr., Inc., 908 So.2d
563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). The fraud claim in Count III will
be dismissed without prejudice.
B. Invasion of Privacy
Count III also alleges an invasion of privacy. (See Doc. #33,
p. 9.) There are four types of invasion of privacy, only two of
which could possibly apply to the facts alleged in this case: “(3)
public disclosure of private facts—the dissemination of truthful
private information which a reasonable person would find
objectionable; and (4) false light in the public eye—publication

of facts which place a person in a false light even though the
facts themselves may not be defamatory.” Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Ginsberg, 351 F.3d 473, 482 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Agency for

4 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are
persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla
v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir.
2007).
Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1252 n.20 (Fla. 1996)). Count III fails to satisfy the
federal pleading standard for either type of potential invasion of
privacy claim.
(1) Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The elements of a claim of public disclosure of private facts

are: 1) the publication, 2) of private facts, 3) that are
offensive, and 4) are not of public concern. Spilfogel v. Fox
Broad. Co., 433 F. App'x 724, 725 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). Defendant argues that the AC “does not allege any
publication” (Doc. #35, p. 11) and that Plaintiff “has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in her COVID-19 vaccination
status, the only arguable private fact that is referenced in the
[AC].” Id. at p. 12.
The AC does not allege that there was a publication of an
allegedly private fact, so dismissal is warranted. See Muhammad v.
Muhammad, 654 F. App'x 455, 457 (11th Cir. 2016)(per

curiam)(acknowledging that “[a]lthough we give liberal
construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants,” they must still
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
grounds upon which it rests.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555(2007))).
Plaintiff states in her brief that the allegedly wrongful
publication was the “disclosing [of] Plaintiff’s vaccination
status, and her Religious Vaccine Exemption Request, to a third
party (Kelsey Doherty) . . . .” (Doc. #36, p. 12.) There are two
problems with this argument. First, no such allegation is set forth
in the AC. Second, such an allegation would be insufficient because
disclosure to Plaintiff’s direct supervisor is not a disclosure to
the public, as required to establish the claim. Publication

“requires that a matter be ‘made public, by communicating it to
the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
knowledge.’” Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 48 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022)(quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 652D (Am. L. Inst. 1977)). The ultimate inquiry is
“whether the disclosed information ‘reaches, or is sure to reach,
the public.’” Id. at 1247. As a result, the minimum requirement
for a public disclosure pleading is “not met where the plaintiff
ma[kes] ‘no allegation’ that the defendant ‘could have expected
public disclosure to arise’ from his communication.” Id. at 1246

n. 6 (quoting Fernandez-Wells v. Beauvais, 983 P.2d 1006, 1009
(N.M. Ct. App. 1999)).
Because the AC fails to allege that any private facts were
made public or were likely to be made public, it must be dismissed.
See Hunstein, 48 F.4th 1236; see also Leach v. Dist. Bd. of
Trustees of Palm Beach, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1341 (S.D. Fla.
2017)(dismissing a Florida public disclosure claim because “there
[was] no allegation that Plaintiff’s [private fact] was revealed
to persons from ‘whom the information predictably goes to
many.’”(quoting Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 689
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991))). Even if the AC pled what Plaintiff
asserts in her brief—that the company shared Plaintiff’s
vaccination information with Plaintiff’s direct supervisor—that

would also be insufficient, partly because “under basic agency
principles, the acts of a corporation's agents are considered to
be those of a single legal actor.” McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000)(citing Dussouy v. Gulf
Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir.1981)). And “[a]s the
Restatement says, ‘it is not an invasion of the right of privacy’
to ‘communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to
a single person or even to a small group of persons.’” Hunstein,
48 F.4th at 1249. Therefore, this portion of Count III is dismissed
without prejudice.
(2) Florida does not recognize a false light claim

Count III also claims that “Defendant[‘]s conduct . . . caused
Plaintiff to be portrayed in a false light . . . .” (Doc. #33, ¶
58.) Defendant argues that any false light claim against it must
be dismissed because “[t]he State of Florida no longer recognizes
such a claim.” (Doc. #35, p. 12.) The Court agrees. See Jews for
Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)(“[W]e
decline to recognize a cause of action for false light invasion of
privacy.”); Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 F. App'x 801, 804 (11th
Cir. 2014)(“[Plaintiff]’s false light invasion of privacy claim
fails because Florida law does not recognize such a cause of
action.”); Maletta v. Woodle, No. 2:20-CV-1004-JES-MRM, 2021 WL
1894023, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 2021)(dismissing a false light
claim since it is not recognized under Florida law). Count III is

dismissed with prejudice as to the false light portion of the
claim.
(3) There is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, HIPAA, or FTCA.
Defendant also challenges whether the other statutes
Plaintiff relies upon in Count III provide for a private cause of
action. (See Doc. #35, p. 13.) The mere existence of a statute
does not establish a private cause of action, even if the statute
has been violated. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
568 (1979)(explaining that merely because “a federal statute has
been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give
rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.”
(quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688
(1979))); Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2015)(“A statute may, but does not necessarily, create a cause
of action either expressly or by implication.”). “[T]he ultimate
issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action.” California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981).
Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under
18 U.S.C. § 1001, HIPAA, or FTCA.
The law in this Circuit and District is clear: 18 U.S.C. §
1001 is a criminal statute which created no private right of
action. Blankenship v. Gulf Power Co., 551 F. App'x 468, 471 (11th
Cir. 2013)(per curiam)(finding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and other

statutes did not “provide[] a cause of action for [defendant’s]
alleged wrongful conduct.”); Lichtenberg v. Sec'y of the Navy, 627
F. App'x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2015)(per curiam)(“Section 1001 of
Title 18 of the U.S.Code is a criminal statute. . . . It does not
provide a civil cause of action.”); Thomas v. Franklin, No. 8:19-
CV-179-T-33TGW, 2019 WL 1281174, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20,
2019)(“Again, as previously explained, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which
makes it a crime to make false statements or use false documents
in a matter within federal jurisdiction, is a criminal statute
that does not create a private cause of action.”). Therefore, the
portion of Count III which relies upon § 1001 is dismissed with

prejudice.
“Likewise, we agree that no private right of action exists
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.”
Crawford v. City of Tampa, 397 F. App'x 621, 623 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); see also Laster v. CareConnect Health Inc., 852 F.
App'x 476, 477 (11th Cir. 2021)(per curiam)(“Here, the district
court correctly dismissed [plaintiff]’s claims under Title 18, the
Public Health Service Act, and HIPAA because these statutes do not
create private rights of action.”)
The same is true for the FTCA. Smith v. JP Morgan Chase, 837
F. App'x 769, 769–70 (11th Cir. 2021)(per curiam)(“A private right
of action does not exist under the FTCA, meaning [plaintiff]'s
allegation . . . is futile because she can bring no action under

the FTCA.”); Lingo v. City of Albany Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev.,
195 F. App'x 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2006)(citing Roberts v. Cameron-
Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 361 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977)). The portion of
Count III relying on HIPAA and the FTCA is dismissed with
prejudice.
(4) The ECPA & SCA claims are not sufficiently pled
Unlike the aforementioned statutes, “[t]he ECPA [does]
authorize[] an aggrieved party to file a civil action . . . .”
United States v. Cray, 450 F. App'x 923, 930 (11th Cir.
2012)(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a)). The ECPA consists of three
statutes: the Wiretap Act, the Pen Register statute, and the SCA.

See Vista Mktg., LLC v. Burkett, 812 F.3d 954, 967 (11th Cir.
2016). The Wiretap Act and the Pen Register statute concern
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications, while
the SCA concerns “access to stored communications and records.”
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003).
Count III asserts that the alleged altering of the surveys
violates “15 U.S. Code sec. 45, The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) [and] 18 U.S. Code Chapter 119, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).” (Doc. #33, ¶ 57.) The Defendant contends
those charges must be dismissed because the “[Plaintiff] does not
state which provision of the ECPA or the SCA the [Defendant] has
allegedly violated.” (Doc. #35, p. 15.) Because the Court agrees,
both are dismissed without prejudice.

The AC does cite to 15 U.S.C § 45 and 18 U.S.C Chapter 119.
But the latter houses multiple ECPA provisions (see 18 U.S.C.
§2510-§2523) while the former is the FTCA which, as already
discussed, has no private cause of action. As a result, it is
unclear whether the Defendant is accused of illegally intercepting
communications, storing communications, both, or neither.5 These
references to entire chapters renders Count III improperly vague
as to this aspect of the claim. See Muhammad, 654 F. App'x at
457; Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“[A] valid civil complaint under the SCA must allege a violation
of one of its provisions.”). Count III fails to allege sufficient

plausible facts to support either claim, and the ECPA/SCA claims
are dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, it is now

5 If the AC is attempting to allege any impropriety under the
ECPA as to the surveys between the parties, that theory would
appear to be improper “because the Act simply does not apply to
parties to the transmission.” United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981
F.2d 1216, 1220 n.1 (11th Cir. 1993).
ORDERED :
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
(Doc. #35) is GRANTED to the extent that Count III of the
Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to the
fraud, invasion of privacy, ECPA/SCA portions of the claim,
and is dismissed with prejudice as to the false light, §
1001, HIPAA, and FTCA portions of the claim.
2. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue any of the claims of Count
III which have been dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff
may file an Amended Complaint within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
this Opinion and Order setting forth her original claims
in the other counts as well as the amended version of Count
Til.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 29th day
of September, 2023.

ox
off le hy ) A Kook
JGHN E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:
Parties of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10114108. Public record. Not legal advice.